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i. 
Synopsis of the Thesis 
The aim of the thesis is to provide an analysis of the British steel 
industry's attempts to deal with the refonn of industrial relations in the 
period 1964-74, and to evaluate the contribution of productivity bargaining 
to that process. 
After a first introductory chapter, Chapters Two to Four are concerned 
with outlining the industry's problems, the employer's response, and with 
the negotiation of industry-wide productivity agreements. The contribution 
of productivity bargaining is evaluated in Chapters Five to Eight in which 
industrial relations at Corby and Ravenscraig Works are examined. 
The methods of investigation include the use of primary sources such 
as private letters, minutes, reports and statistical data, and also 
published material; this was possible through the author being employed at 
Ravenscraig during 1965-70. Other data was gathered through interviews 
with union officials and managers at various levels, the interview 
programme being carried out while the author was employed at the Steel 
Industry Management College, 1971-75. In addition, employee attitude 
surveys conducted at both Corby and Ravenscraig provided relevant mateiBl. 
The thesis tries to improve understanding of the collective bargaining 
process by a detailed examination of bargaining structures, by tracing 
the reaction and interactions of management, unions and work groups to 
changes in the awareness of their interests as they either react to a 
structural change or introduce a new one which thereby alters behaviour. 
The principal arguments are contained in three sequential but integrated 
hypotheses which identify the key explanatory variables and the nature of 
their interaction. The main contribution of the thesis is to refine and 
make more precise the application of both systems theory and job regulation 
theory to the factory level reform process. 
The conclusions follow from the testing of the hypotheses and are as 
follows: (i) The collective bargaining structure is a major variable 
explaining industrial relations behaviour. (ii) A major weakness of both 
systems and job regulation theories is the one directional nature of their 
causal sequence and the thesis illustrates a systematic process of two 
way interaction between the key structural factors and the behavioural 
response. (iii) The more centralised, standardised and formalised the key 
structural variables (that is, the collective bargaining arrangements, 
management and union organisations) the greater the power of leaders to 
assist or resist reform. Conversely, the more structures are fragmented 
with power devolved the weaker the leadership.' influence. (iv) The 
adherence to a definite causal sequence of key variable interaction 
increases the probability of a successful outcome. 
The hypotheses are tested and the conclusions validated in Chapters 
Five to Eight of the thesis. 
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1. 
Chapter One 
Introduction and Argument 
The study traces industrial relations reform in the British steel 
industry and the use made of productivity bargaining as an agreed means of 
coping with change in the period 1964-74. The first three chapters provide 
an industry-wide background to the works or factory level studies dealt with 
in Chapters Five to Eight. Chapter Two entitled 'Problems and Causes', gives 
attention to the factors making for change and their inter-relationships~ 
Chapter Three called 'Development of the Employer's Strategy' investigates 
the formulation of management's main plans to solve these problems. Chapter 
Four entitled 'Action: Negotiations and Productivity Agreements' is concerned 
with the trade union response to management's strategy and with the agreements 
concluded. 
Chapters Five and Six deal with industrial relations at Corby and 
Chapters Seven and Eight at Ravenscraig works. In this study the word 'works' 
or 'factory' is preferred to the word 'plant' which is more commonly used in 
the industrial relations literature. The reason for this departure is that 
all steel works consist of a number of plants or units of production. There-
fore, the use of the word plant to cover a whole works would be artificial and 
confusing in this context. Chapters Five and Seven outline the traditional 
industrial relations arrangements as found in the period 1964-70, and analyse 
the factors, both national and local, causing pressure for reform of the 
traditional system. In addition, Chapter Five on Corby traces the origins of 
productivity bargaining. Chapters Six and Eight deal with the major changes 
2. 
including those established through productivity bargaining in the period 
1970-74. 
The method of approach in these chapters places a strong emphasis upon 
a detailed and accurate description of the facts. However, any investigation 
of the factual world has to make use of some abstract mode of thought or 
concept to order and make sense of the empirical material. Also, it is 
necessary for the sake of objectivity, for the author to make explicit the 
particular standpoint from which the study is approached. The approach 
used is based upon 'systems' and 'job regulation' theories as these have been 
developed in the literature, and to which the writer has been subjected as a 
student of the subject. This approach is seen from the layout of the various 
chapters which identify environmental variables and, then within this systems 
framework, the institutions of job regulation including their collective 
relationships or rule making functions. (1) 
In addition, systems and job regulation theories are useful to pose what 
A. Flanders called the right question for enquiry. Consequently, throughout 
a critical attitude is adopted to probe the usefulness, strengths and weak-
nesses of these established theories in explaining steel industry industrial 
relations. Of course, the literature contains many criticisms of both 
theories. For example, CJ Margerison(2) argues that job regulation theory 
concentrates upon conflict resolution and thereby does not give sufficient 
weight to the diverse sources of conflict generation. Thus, Margerison takes 
the view that industrial relations theory must take account of non-
institutional (that is, behavioural) sources of conflict. Moreover, it was 
A. Flanders who excluded unstructured personal relations between management 
and employees from industrial relations enquiry.(3) In a similar vein, but 
3. 
from a different standpoint, R Hyman regards job regulation as too narrow a 
theoretical focus, and prefers to treat industrial relations as a study of 
the 'processes of control over work relations'.(4) This definition 
emphasises the conflict revolving around the wider structures of power and 
interests which, in Hyman's view, are closely tied to the contradictory 
tendencies in the capitalist economic system. Hence the workers aspirations 
and objectives as distinct from those of the official trade union are just 
as important to the scope of industrial relations enquiry. AN Blain and 
J Gennard (5) have argued that although job regulation has articulated a 
process of change in industrial relations, nevertheless, the theory fails to 
explain systematically the relationships between such environmental factors 
as the economic, legal, technical and sociological which cause change in the 
underlying balance of power between the parties, and thereby a change in the 
rules. These weaknesses will be a major concern of this study as revealed it 
the hypotheses outlined below. Finally, Hyman (6) further criticises job 
regulation and systems theories for their emphasis upon order, or equilibrim 
which gives credibility to the notion of a shared or common ideology under-
lying the apparent diversity in industrial relations. Thus, he argues, that' 
this emphasis is misleading in a field study characterised by conflict and 
disorder. Moreover, a similar criticism is made by PD Anthony (7) who stateE 
that industrial relations are not as tidy and orderly as job regulation 
theorists imply. 
Similarly, systems theory as developed by JT Dunlop (8) has also come 
in for severe criticism. Blain and Gennard (9), although supporting the 
theory, point out that it defines the study of industrial relations as 
consisting of a 'web of rules' (the system outputs), the parties who make 
and administer the rules, and several environmental factors (the system 
inputs) an alteration in which will cause a change in one or more of the 
4. 
rules. However, systems theory is said to be weak in articulating the 
processes by which a change in the web of rules is achieved. Also, it is 
argued that the systems approach stresses the importance of system goals, 
functions and structures as somehow existing independently (reification) of 
the people who make up the system. As a result, the importance of peoples' 
motives, interests and objectives as they interact with the structures are 
given insufficient weight. Again the systems abstraction appears all too tid} 
an explanation, pushing as it were industrial relations reality into a system~ 
mould. In the real world both parties are likely to have multiple goals 
changing over time, which are internally in conflict. (10) 
Notwithstanding the criticisms levelled at both these theories, this 
thesis attempts to construct a number of hypotheses aimed at refining their 
application to factory level industrial relations reform. The hypotheses are 
developed and tested at the end of Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight. The 
argument is that the institutions of job regulation and in particular the 
structure of collective bargaining (including pay structures) are major 
variables determining behaviour in industrial relations. Further, the collect 
ive bargaining structure has several dimensions including the level at which 
negotiations are conducted, the scope of the subjects covered, the bargaining 
~, and the !2E! the agreements take. (11) Consequently, the first 
hypothesis states that a change in any of these collective bargaining dimen-
sions (the independent variable) will result in a change in the behaviour of 
the parties (the dependent variable) in the direction desired by the initiat-
ing party. For instance, if management formulate an objective to increase 
internal works labour mobility and flexibility (assuming fragmented collective 
bargaining), then, they will have to widen the bargaining unit, probably 
negotiate at works level, and extend the scope of joint regulation to achieve 
this behavioural change. 
5. 
Morevoer, in developing the hypotheses, systematic attention is given to 
changes in the wider environmental factors (that is, labour and product 
markets, the technological context, financial and legal constraints), which 
influence the collective bargaining structure, and the behavioural response of 
the parties. These responses are in turn partly detennined by the parties' 
perceptions and understanding of their economic and status interests, and 
changes in the power balance between and within management and union 
organisations. Therefore, social action theory as developed by D Silvennan (1 
who emphasises the subjective meaning people attach to their objective reality 
is incorporated. 
Hence the first hypothesis, like the established theories, accommodates 
the prediction that a change in collective bargaining structure can have 
sufficient power to alter peoples behaviour in the direction required, but 
equally a change in a leader's, work group's or a union's awareness of its 
interests can alter a structural factor considered an obstacle to the party 
achieving its objective. As a result, the main weakness in both systems and 
job regulation theories is seen as the one directional nature of their causal 
sequence. However, unlike some interpretations of social action, namely that 
by JH Goldthorpe et al (13), this hypothesis places great weight upon the 
influence of the internal system structures (within the workplace) in shaping 
behaviour. The upshot is an analysis which pays greater attention to the 
dynamics of change, and therefore, gives more weight to instability in 
industrial relations than do both systems and job regulation theories. there-
fore, the idea of an integrated value system shared by the parties giving 
order and stability to the system is criticised. 
A second hypothesis states that the more centralised, standardised and 
6. 
formalised are management and union organisations and the collective bargain-
ing structure the greater power of management and union leaders to secure 
change in employee behaviour. Conversely, if these variables are informal 
and fragmented allowing power to be devolved to fairly autonomous union 
branches, work groups and managers, the hypothesis predicts that any proposed 
change in structure will meet with greater resistance. However, again this 
one-directional sequence of causation is not adequate in itself. The 
hypothesis must also accommodate the possibility that centralised management, 
union and collective bargaining structures can be used by leaders to resist 
proposed reforms more effectively in the specific case. Whether a particular 
proposed reform is resisted or not depends upon the leaders' perceptions of 
their own and their members interests. In addition, the hypothesis recognisel 
the possibility of a leaderships' objectives diverging in the short run from 
those of their members, and thereby, influencing industrial relations 
outcomes. (14) 
A third hypothesis argues that a probable sequence of priorities or 
processes of causal interaction exists between the various inter-fiDD (system: 
variables. This causal sequence can commence with one of the parties, say 
management, formulating a strategy in response to some internal or external 
change. In turn management would initially modify the works technology, next 
its own internal organisation, then, alter the collective bargaining arrange-
ments, and finally cause a change in trade union organisation and behaviour. 
This sequence is shown at Corby where management in response to a changing 
technological environment modified works technology, united tubes and steel 
management organisations, then established the COrby-Wide Productivity 
Programme which in turn brought into being the Trade Union Policy Group. 
Thus management's strategy obtained a change in trade union behaviour by 
7. 
increasing the degree of centrality, standardisation and formality in union 
organisation which in turn facilitated the reform. This same sequence of 
interaction can be traced for the maintenance workers at Ravenscraig. There-
fore, the third hypothesis predicts that if any party wishes to pursue an 
objective by changing the other party's behaviour the probability of success 
will improve by working through the sequence of variables in the order 
identified. This conclusion is tested in the text in so far as the Corby 
reform was carried out in the manner described abo~, whereas at Ravenscraig, 
with the production workers, management altered their own organisation and 
then attempted to change that of the union without altering the formal 
collective bargaining arrangements. 
The concept of power is built into the hypotheses, and is viewed as a 
force activated by the party commencing the sequence, but also as arising 
from the transmission of influence through the intermediate variables. Here 
power in both its structural and ideological forms can coerce an opposition 
party or be used to legitimise the actions of the initiator. Thus a party in 
pursuit of its interests will probably alter first its own organisation where 
its power and control are greatest, then the collective bargaining structure 
where its power is weaker, but greater than its power with the other party 
whose behaviour the initiating party wishes to change. Of course, power 
might basically be derived from wider social, economic and political 
processes in society that lie behind changes in the product market and 
technological environment of the enterprise. However, these wider social 
forces are for the most part accepted as a given and are not of central 
concern in this thesis. 
The thesis also attempts to provide a synthesis by bringing together 
8. 
formal systems theory and job regulation theory on the one hand and the 
social action perspective on the other. Given the hypotheses stated above 
formal theory secures the advantage of greater precision in explaining and 
predicting change (namely by taking systematic account of the subjective 
meanings accorded to external events by individuals and informal groups, and 
by showing how the formal structural variables can be used to control 
differences in individual and group perceptions). The latter point is most 
clearly revealed by the second hypothesis which shows that the higher the 
degree of centrality, formality and standardisation in the institutions of 
job regulation and their collective bargaining arrangements, the greater 
the power of the leadership to control their constituents in the direction 
favoured by the leadership. The third hypothesis takes this process further 
by discussing the respective parties' response to some internal system or 
environmental change, in the formation of a strategy to tackle the problem 
identified, and in working through the structural variables as stated above. 
Finally, Chapter Nine will briefly summarise the main conclusions and 
pull together the hypotheses of the thesis. 
9. 
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Chapter Two 
Problems and Causes 
The central problem experienced by the British steel industry throughout 
the period 1964-74 was its poor productivity compared with other international 
steel producers. The British Iron and Steel Federation Report on Labour 
Productivity and Manning (1967) for example, using the measur ... nt of aanpower 
required per 100,000 ingot tons shows Great Lake. in the United States with 
a ratio of 240 .. n year., Toranto in Italy 230, Takai in J.pan 321, whilst in 
Britain the ratio varied between 600 and 1,000. Another writer ia the 
field, Richard Pryke, r.cord.: 
'Between 1965 and 1969 crude steel output rose by 
151. in this country. In most OEeD countries the 
increase wa. at least twice as .uch and in J.pan 
.nd Belgiu. it was three times as large. The only 
place where productivity increased .ore slowly than 
in Britain was in the UUited St.t ••• • 
(R Pryke, Stratesy for Steel, page 27 (1972» 
lDteruatioual compari.ons on ste.l .re .cknowledced to be difficult 
due to the probleas of boundary definition (.g, in soae countri.s labour 
inten.ive .Dlin.ering work is included) and to the ext.nsive u •• aade of 
.ub-contracted labour (e.pecial1y in Japan); nevertk.le •• ~.t authorities 
including the British indu.try its.lf con.idered by the ~dd1e 1960'. 
Briti.h .t •• l productivity to be low by world .tandard •• (l) 
Thia perforaance i. partly reflected in Britain'. d~ai.hiU& ~~re 
11. 
of a growing world steel output as Table One shows: 
Table 2.1 
World Steel Tonnage Exported: 
Changing Market Share by Major Producers, Selected Year.,1950-70 
1950 1955 1961 1965 1970 
U.K. 18.31- 12.9'0 12.0'. 9.0'. 6.0'. 
Japan 
- -
9.01- 23.01- 29.01. 
E.C.S.E. 
- -
50.01. 42.01- 28.0'. 
~econ 
- -
7.0'7. 9.0'7. 15.0'7. 
Others 
- -
22.0'7. 17.0'7. 22.01. 
source: BSC, internal document 
Posaible explanations aa to the British industry'. poor productivity 
are aany and varied. Moreover, it is not my intention to deal with the nou-
labour productivity a.pects in great detail. There are however, a few points 
in the economic-technical area which provide a deeper and more comprehen.ive 
understanding of the industry's problems. Firstly, low productivity i. 
probably related to the slower economic growth rate of the Briti.h gro •• 
domestic product (to which steel consumption is closely tied) (2) ca.pared 
with that of foreign steel producers. Secondly, during the 19501 and 1960s 
new foreign iron ore reserve. were dilcovered and exploited. Thi. altered 
relative COltl between foreign and dome. tic iron ore. to the disadvantage of 
the many Briti.h works located inland on higher cost ore and coal fieldl. 
Simultaneous advances in shipbuilding technology allowed for the con.truction 
of larger ships which helped to promote this deyelopaent. A third reason 
related to the size of the British industry with unitl of plant and workl too 
... 11 to gain maxiaum economies of .cale.(3) In 1969 only Port Talbot 
could produce more than two million ton. per annua, whereal the Japanese 
had thirteen works and the German. eight in this category. A fourth reason 
was the type of technology utilised. The Benlon aeport (Briti.h Iron and 
Steel Federation, 1966) had recognised the LD proce.s(4) as the cheapelt 
12. 
method of converting molten iron into steel. In that year this proce •• 
accounted for 20% of crude steel output, and by 1969 it had risen to only 
27.6%. On the other hand, the LD process made 76.9% of Japane.e, 7l.7t of 
Dutch and 46.0% of German crude steel respectively. (5) Change to the LD proces. 
was desirable, but its late acceptance among.~ British producer. coincided 
with a period of world surplus capacity (to be discussed later), and al.o a 
reluctance to engage in new capital expenditure at .uch tiae •• 
A fifth reason for low productivity, was the use aade of the industry'. 
manpower. As far back as 1954 a special committee was appointed to con.ider 
the evidence on labour productivity arising out of the Ang10-ABerican Tea. 
Report, 1952. Although the Committee did express some concern over the lov 
utilisation of service and maintenance manpower, it took the fairly complacent 
view that the manning of production jobs was not abnorm.l.(6) A number of 
reports concerned with the industry's manning and productivity appeared 
subsequently,(7) but it was only in the middle 1960. that the problem va. 
taken seriously. In 1966 the Benson Report declared that by 1975 the industry 
must produce one third more output with one third fewer .en to achieve 
competitiveness by international .tandard.. However, Ben.on wa. largely a 
technical and economic report, and the Federation'. detailed analy.i. of the 
manpower i •• ue was conducted by the Morri. Working Party. (8) In February 1966, 
the Iron and Steel Trade. Employer.' Aa.ociation (ISTEA) .et up a vorkina party 
under the chairaan.hip of H Morley to investigate ways of improving the 
utilisation of .. intenance manpower. The working party produced a docuaent 
entitled 'The More Effective Use of Maintenance Manpower'(MEUMM) which it 
published for sanageaent consumption in October 1966. Yet another working 
party under the Chairmanship of H Jones wa. set up in Noveaber 1966 in re.ponse 
to an Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) clai. for an annual 
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guaranteed wage for all manual workers. This ISTEA working party published 
an internal report(9) in June 1967 which was to have a significant influence 
on the shape of future British Steel Corporation industrial relations policy. 
All these reports concentrated in the period 1964 to 1967 are indicative of 
the employers' increasing concern with the problem of low productivity. 
What then of their analysis regarding the reasons for low productivity? 
The Morris Working Party made the following statement: 
'The working party believes that the priority given 
to the reconstruction and modernisation of the 
industry diverted managerial effort from the coaparable 
priority of maintaining maximum labour efficiency.' 
Clearly repreaentatives of the BISF formed the view that there waa 
much room for improvement in the management of human resources. They 
identified a number of reasons for overaanning: firstly, that exces.ive 
numbers were carried to cover for sickneas, abaenteeisa, and holidays; 
secondly, that aanageaent had accepted exi.ting aanning .tandard. even 
though technological change had reduced the labour effort required on many 
units of plant; and thirdly, that rigid pra.otion lines and local depa~taental 
agreements often prevented a flexible and mobile use of manpower re.ources. 
In all the.e instances .. nagement too readily accepted e.tablished and 
customary practices in preference to challen&ing the unions, and as a result 
their control had diminished. (10) 
On the .. inteDance side, the Morley Workiua Party recognised that 
aanageaent often had little control over perferaance. Senior eaaineers and 
consultant. esti.ated that the performance of .. intenance workers could be 
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doubled in terms of the British Standards Institute scale.(ll) Moreover, 
pressure for change in maintenance worker productivity was augmented by 
technological change increasing their proportion in the manual labour force. (12) 
By the middle 1960., the industry's managers had becoae increasingly 
aware of the low productivity problem which had been forced upon them by 
external changes in steel making efficiency standard. set el.ewhere in the 
world. In order to develop this argument further and to gain a better under-
.tanding of the forces at work a brief analysis of the international product 
market and the industry's price determination process is now called for. 
The steel product market changed markedly in the 1960. with a reduction 
in Britain's .hare. This was attributable to a nuaber of factors. Firstly, 
to the Japane.e whose output rose from 5 million tonnes in 1937 to 88.5 
million tonne. in 1971.(13) Also the Western European., initially concerned 
with domestic reconstruction were in this period penetrating international 
markets. For example, We.t German production had risen froa 19.8 million 
tonne. in 1937 to 40 million tonnes in 1971. Furthermere, traditional 
British customers luch as Commonwealth and other developing countries 
increasingly built their own steel making capacity and these markets bec .. e 
more difficult. Another major .ource of additional steel output vas the 
commanist countries with the Soviet Union produciag by 1974 an output of 
120.6 million tonnes. Thi. output pushed the United State. with 109 aillieR 
tonne. into .econd po.ition in the world league. The upshot of this great 
increa.e in world .teel output was for supply to outstrip the rate of ri.e 
in demand resulting in exce.s capacity as Table Two .h .... 
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Table 2.2 
World Steel Capacity, Production and Utilisation of Capacity 
for particular periods, 1955 to 1965 
World Capac! ty World Production 7. World 7. UK 
Million Tonnes Million Tonnes Capacity Uaed Capacity Used 
1955-57 325.2 310.8 95.7'7. 95.81. 
1958-68 435.5 339.2 78.5% 89.3'. 
1961-63 473.6 402.2 84.9'7. 78.6'. 
1964 552.5 479.0 91.7'7. 89.0'-
1965 566.4 503.1 88.8% 88.0t 
.ource: Rowley, Steel and Public Policy. pages 186-187 
Table Two .hows that fro. 1961 onwards the degree of capacity utilisation 
wa. lower in Britain than for the world as a whole. Thi. in turn helped to 
raise the British industry's unit costa. Furtheraore, given the .. ergence 
of surplus capacity in the late 1950. there waa a change froa a aellers' to 
a buyers' market and steel prices hardened. The increase in w.rld steel 
competition wa. further increased by the general reduction in steel tariffs,(14) 
a trend which continued with entry into the European eoal and Steel to..unity. 
A comparison of the UK retail price and ateel price indices for the year. 1954 
to 1965(15) provide •• ome evidence of theae factora at work. The retail price 
and ateel price indicea ro.e by 41.7 and 36.6 points respectively. Moreover, 
export profits were £20 aillion lower in 1965 than in 1960, althouah sales 
were 11'- higher. (16) 
Another constraint the indu.try faced on price •• as the Iron and Steel 
Board (ISB). Thi. wa •• et up in 1953, after denadDnalisation, with pavers 
to set aaxi.ua price. which applied to 90t of .teel prod.ct.. In effect 
these maxi.va price. bec .. e actual prices at which ateel wa. sold.(17) The 
belief of the Board was as follow.: 
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... that in an expanding industry prices should 
be high enough to warrant investment in the 
construction of new capacity and low enough to 
bring economic pressure on producers to modernise 
or replace old or obsolete capacity.' 
ISB, Annual Report, 1964, page 25. 
During the period of good trade prior to 1960 the effect of this 
policy was to keep prices, costs and profits down. (18) After 1960 the policy 
of the Board became much more controversial with the emergence of a buyers' 
market. The ISB took the view that its policy on price detenoination was 
long term, that is, took cognizance of ups and downs in the steel business 
cycle. Whereas the BISF (which negotiated with ISB on behalf of the steel 
companies) considered the Board's practice unfavourable with rising unit 
costs and prices not being raised adequately to furnish sufficient profits. 
Consequently, the BISF concluded, earnings on price controlled products were 
more than 13% lower in 1964-65 than in 1959-60, although output was 111. 
higher. (19 ) 
When the industry was nationalised in July, 1967, the ISB was wound up. 
However, government intervention continued. In December 1968 the new Steel 
Corporation submitted proposals to government for price increases which were 
referred to the National Board Prices and Incomes (PIB) under the then Prices 
and Incomes Act. (20) The proposed increases were delayed until June 1969, 
and then cut by 251. until November 1969. Subsequent price submissions were 
also reduced by government as in January 1970 from 121. to 101. and again in 
April from 14% to 71. Therefore, the industry, whether under private or pub lie 
ownership, has taken the view that there has been too much restraint on prices. 
Moreover, the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries stated that the 
Corporation has suffered too much from Ministerial intervention in its 
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pricing policies. This intervention resulted in a loss of revenue of between 
£150 and £200 million to March 1973.(21) 
So far then, the argument has shown that certain factors external to 
the British industry, namely the improvement in world steel making efficiency 
standards associated with new technological innovations, the increase in 
product market competitiveness, and government intervention in the industry's 
price dete~ination process, all affected the industry's earnings and created 
pressure on the employers to recognise the need to improve productiYity. 
However, in the British steel industry the successful outcome of management 
decisions to initiate new investment, raise manpower utilisatioD, and take a 
tougher attitude to costs cannot be decided without regard te the trade union 
response. In addition to reacting to the employers initiatiYe, the trade 
union respon,e is also influenced by more general changes in society .uch as 
full employment and social values. Here management have a related yet 
separate problem which must be taken into account. 
The ability of the union. to exert pres.ure upon .-ployers depends 
largely on bargaining power, and the power of the steel unions, .s in other 
industries in the country, appeared to increase in the peried under review. 
Since World War Two various goveraments haye shown a commitsent to IUstained 
full emplor-ent.(22) Between 1956 and 1972 the average uneaployaent rate 
vas 2.1t compared to an average rate of 151. to 16t in the 1930's. This 
change has made its mark upon labour aarket conditions, and h.s .1s. trans· 
fo~ed workers' .spirations and attitudes to work includina what they expect 
to let fros it.(23) 
Another factor influencing the pover of the steel unious, and in 
particular that of shop floor .. rk Iroups, h.s been the iucre.sing capital 
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intensiveness of the industry and technological integration of production. 
This is related to the point made above concerning external pressure upon 
employers to increase productivity due to improving standards elsewhere in 
the world. In response, British steel employers steadily made technological 
innovations which improved blastfurnace preparation, introduced fuel 
injection and increased the size of furnace hearths. As a consequence, 
between 1957 and 1965 the number of blastfurnaces in use fell from 78 to 66, 
whilst average annual output rose from 145,000 tons to 263,000 tons.(24) On 
the steel smelting side, there has been a shift from the basic open hearth 
furnace to the LD oxygen blowing process. For example, in 1955 there were 
328 open hearth furnaces in use, falling to 209 in 1966.(25) More important 
the technological integration of production has increased the pace of work. 
For instance, change in cycle time between charging a converter with scrap 
and molten iron, and tapping its 150 tons of liquid steel has been reduced to 
40/50 minutes per charge compared with seven to nine hours for a 250 tons 
.pen hearth furnace.(26) 
The upshot of the.e technological innovation. ha. been to .peed up the 
transmi.sion of molten metal between the variou. unita of plant, and to 
increase the degree of interdependence between unita aloDi the work flow. 
In terms of power relations, the elimination of certain technelo,ica1 buffera 
ha. increased the proportionate damage which any union branch or work grou, 
can inflict upon the total production flow. Here a atrategically placed work 
group auch a. a blastfurnace crew or LD vessel crew, on stopping work can 
bring the whole work flow to a halt within a few hours. Wherea., under the 
traditional '1st .. , even in an integrated works, (27) if the b1a.tfurnace 
crew .topped, the open hearth furnaces could continue for a lODier period to 
produce steel using pig iron from stock. Thi. wa. no longer po •• ible with 
larger blaatfurnaces and LD ve •• els, as the latter require .olten iron and 
therefore the coata of a atoppage are greater. 
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For these reasons trade union power in the steel industry has increa.ed. 
However, have the unions used this power to exert pressure upon the employers, 
and thereby contributed to the latter's problems? The following table gives 
some indication that this has happened. 
Table 2.3 
Average Annual Rise in Earnings, Productivity, and Price. 
in the UK steel industry and in the economy,l955-65 
Steel Industry UK Econoay 
Average Earnings +8.11. pa +7.81. pa 
Average Productivity +1.81. pa +2.31. pa 
Rate of Inflation +6.3% pa +5.51. pa 
source: 8ISF, Labour Productivity and Manning, Appendix A 
The above table shows that the annual rise in earnings and prices, and 
hence unit costs in steel has been faster than for the economy as a whole. 
This, partly reflects the poor rate of productivity in the steel industry, 
but it allo indicated that the steel union8 have been pushing hard on the 
earnings front. Moreover, this degree of inflationary cost push was facili-
tated by the industry's collective bargaining arrangeaents, which would .e .. 
to have encouraged inter-union competition and leap-frogging of wage clai ... 
In steel, multi-unioni~ has existed for many years with six major 
union bodies organising manual workers for collective bargaining purposed. 
They are shown in Table Four: 
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Table 2.4 
Membership of Trade Unions Organising Manual Workers 
Iron and Steel Trades Confederation 
National Union of Blastfurnacemen 
Tran.port and General Workers Union 
General and Municipal Workers Union 
National Craftsmen. Co-ordinating Committee 
Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers 
source: Pearson, Court of Enquiry, 1968 
93,250 
19,300 
17,500 
12,800 
22,300 
3,000 
The ISTC which organises .ost production workers on steel furnace. and 
rolling mills, plus labourers and craftsmen's helpers, is traditionally the 
most powerful body. The NUBF organises similar grad.s, but it is confiaed 
to iron .. king and associated activities in England and Wales. These grade. 
are organised by ISTC in Scotland. The National Crafts-ens Co-erdiuating 
Caaaittee(28) organises the bulk of the craftsmen in the industry, and 
membership compared with that of the production unions has i~roved in recent 
years due to technological change. The two general unions organise .. ialy 
labouring grades and some semi-skilled workers in certain parts of the country. 
The Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers (later UCATT) organi.es 
bricklayers, and de.pite being small has ShOWD it •• lf a powerful union in the 
industry, although it .... bership in recent year. has been reduced by 
technological change. Another factor affecting inter-union competition and 
relative statu. has been the increa.ing nuaber of white collar werker. 
unioni •• d in recent years. This influence will be consider •• further in 
Chapter Four. 
In steel the tradition has be.n for the.e auton.-o •• trade uaion bodies 
to .eparately initiate and negotiate clataa en w .. e. and conditiens of 
.-plo,.eat with the .-ployer.' as.ociation. Given thi. auton.., the employers 
bave experienced collective bargalnina probl ... la achieving unifo~ty of 
conditten. for .i.!lar grade. of worker. both in te~ of the -.gnitade of 
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any settlement and in eliminating differences in wage structure. These 
problems are clearly identifiable in the following example of negotiations 
which took place over the 40 hour week and night shift premium payaents 
during the period 1964 to 1969. 
In the autumn of 1964 the ISTC su~tted a claim for a 40 hour week. 
Having regard to the country-wide move in this direction ISTEA reached 
agreement with ISTC to introduce the 40 hour week on 4th July 1965. The 
Aasociation then offered the 40 hour week to all other unions, wbo with the 
exception of the National Union of Blastfurnacemen, accepted. The trouble 
within the NUBF was that their shift production workers were aiming at 
extra payments for working night shifts. The situation therefore was one 
in which the two major production unions in the indu.try were pursuing 
divergent goala. 
This created a problem for ISTEA which wished to avoid further difference. 
in the wage structure and conditions of employment for shift production 
workers. The Association continued atte.pting to get the NUBr to accept 
the 40 hour week. As a result of the eventual staleaate, the NUBr took the 
Association to a special Board of Arbitration which in an award dated 18th 
February, 1965 conceded the union's case. The award gave pr..tua pa,.ent. 
of 20t for normal shift working between the hours of 6 pa aDd 6 .. Monday 
to Friday inclusive, which amounted to • 6t increase in earnings. To be 
consistent with their aia, the .-ployer. a.ked the Confederation to drop 
their agreement on the 40 hour week and to substitute the night shift 
preaiuma for shift production workers. The Confederation declined thi. 
offer and in turn lodged a clai. for night pr..tuaa. Tbis wa. turned down. 
The union responded by taking the ~loyers to arbitration which found in 
an award dated 16th June, 1965 the claia not established. At this point 
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the ISTC's attitude changed, for with little hope of getting both they 
accepted the Association's night premiums offer, agreeing to drop for the 
time being the 40 hour week for shift production workers, on the condition 
that it was introduced for such workers by December 1966. Therefore, the 
1965 40 hour week applied to day men only and to maintenance workers. The 
ISTC shift production workers 40 hour week was implemented fro. l.t July, 1967 
but at no extra cost to the industry. Eventually the NUBF al.o got the 40 
hour week on the same self financing principle through an Industrial Court 
Award dated 28th August, 1969.(29) The delay wa. due to the union'. 
intransigence over the employer's propo.als for manpower reductions backed 
up by the Prices and Incomes Policy. 
The above series of negotiations provided the employers with a hard 
le.son in union competition and leap-frogging. In other word., the exiltence 
of autonomous and fragmented collective bargaining arrangeaent. allowed the 
union. to use their power to pursue divergent aim. in job regulation. More-
over, the large.t union had been outmanoeuvred by the much smaller NUBF in 
winning a 67. increase against the Confederation'. 51. Thi. damaged the ISTC's 
self-iaage as perceived by its own officers, who then pur.ued the .eemingly 
irrational objectives of gaining both the 40 hour week and shift preaiuma 
.t.ultaneoully. In teras of the union'. internal political proc ••••• however, 
thi. behaviour ha. a rational explanation. The union officers could not 
admit their relative lack of succe.s to the meab.r.hip, and felt that the 
claim for night pr .. iums must be pur.u.d to a Board of Arbitration. When the 
clai. wa. turned down, a. the national official. expected, the fault lay with 
the Arbitration Board. In other word., the union used arbitration a. a kind 
of .cape-goat to shift bl .. e. As for the Association, with it. objective of 
unifora tr.a~ent for all .hift production worker., given the above circum-
stanc.s it wa. forc.d to achieve this at the additional cost of cODeedina the 
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40 hour week and shift premiums to both unions. In this way the national 
collective bargaining arrangements made it easier for union pressures to 
raise earnings and thus the industry's labour costs. This lesson was not 
lost on the Jones Working Party. 
Another factor reflecting trade union power and determination to raise 
earnings has been the industry's reported strike figures. The inadequacies 
of these figures should however be noted. Firstly, the Department of Employ-
ment records only strikes involving more than ten worker I and thole which 
last more than one day, except any in which the aggregate number of working 
days exceed one hundred. Secondly, the notification of strikes is voluntary 
and the Department may fail to record some which otherwise would qualify by 
the criteria. Thirdly, strikes are only one form of worker protest which 
can range fro. go slows, overtime bans, etc., to ablenteei~, labour turn-
over, and low morale. Therefore, strikes may be low or non-existent within 
an enterprise or industry, yet the degree of conflict and opposition to 
management .. y be high. Finally, although management generally decry 
strikes because of disruptions to production, nevertheless not all such 
action is necessarily negative and destructive. For example, a manageaent 
conscious that their decisions may be challenged (ultimately by the strike) 
are likely to think and reflect more and thereby improve decision making. Also, 
as shown above, the ablence of strike. does not mean there is no conflict 
and where conflict takes a more overt form, reaedial action may be taken 
looner. Furthermore, knowledge that a work force can exercile such power 
may act as a spur to improve efficiency through new labour laving inYe.taent. 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, strikes remain an important mea.ure. 
Given the above arguaent that changing market and technological 
circuaatanc.s were producing increaling pres.ure on .teel eaployer. to rai.e 
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productivity and take a tougher line on wage costs, also, given that 
the unions were using their ?moJer to secure improved rights and living 
standards for their members, then the result of these opposing forces should 
have been to raise the industry's strike figures. The following table shows 
that this was so. 
Table 2.5 
Reported Stoppage. in the Iron and Steel Industry 
and for all Industries in the UK: 5 year averages, 1959-72 
Years I UK No I UK No Iron 6.. I Iron 6.. Iron 6.. Iron &./ 
Beginning of Strikes Working Steel No Steel No Steel '7. Steel Days 
Days Lost of Strikes of Working of UK Lost ,. of 
Days Lost Strikes UK Days to st 
1959-63 2,418 3,775,000 51.0 139,800 2.10 3.70 
1960-64 2,504 3,183,000 63.6 191,800 2.53 6.02 
1961-65 2,416 3,160,000 73.2 220,200 3.02 6.96 
1962-66 2,266 3,031,000 76.6 185,000 3.38 6.10 
1963-67 3,199 2,429,000 84.8 163,800 3.85 6.74 
1964-68 2,261 3,015,000 95.6 207,000 4.22 6.86 
1965-69 2,380 3,929,000 111.0 228,000 4.66 5.80 
1966-70 2,690 5,540,000 140.6 280,600 5.22 5.06 
1967-71 2,749 7,771,000 150.0 317,800 5.45 4.08 
1968-72 2,825 11,995,000 161.4 408,400 5.71 3.40 
s.urce: Deearcment of Employment Gazette, 1960-73(30) 
The table shows that the nuaber of reported strikea in iron and .teel 
for the period shown rose by 3.16 times with working daya loat riaina 2.92 
ti.... In absolute teras there was a significant increase in both indices 
which would .... to .upport the contention that the steel unions were pu.hing 
harder and that management were resi.ting more, throughout the period. 
On the other hand, it might be argued that thia absolute riae in ateel 
.aa si~ly a reflection of the general riae in strike activity throughout 
Britiah industry and not uniquely attributable to eventa in steel.(3l) 
Certainly, SilYer arguea that the preaent prominence of the .etal workina 
aector (iRclu4ina enaineerina, vehiclea, .etal ead shipbuilding) in total 
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British strikes is not the result of an alteration of relative strike 
proneness of these industries, but due to a drop in coal mining disputes. 
However, even on Silver's figures (pages 100 and 103) metal manufacturing 
strikes rose from 5.64 of the UK total, excluding coal mining in 1959, to 
74 in 1971. The table also gives conflicting evidence (depending on the 
method of measurement used) on the actual number of stoppages; the rise in 
the UK figures was only 20~, which is much less than occured in steel. Put 
another way, iron and steel strikes 1959-63 (average) constituted 2.104 of 
the UK total, but by 1968-72 (average) they had risen to 5.714. The series 
on working days lost however shows an opposite relationship, that i., iron 
and steel was 3.77. of the UK total in 1959-63 (average) and 3.44 in 1969-72 
(average), a fall of 97.. This fall is best explained by the changing nature 
of British strikes in the late 1960s and early 19708. In those years DurcaD 
and McCarthy(32) have shown that the typical strike became longer and 
involved aore worker. than in the middle 1960s; therefore in the table UK 
strike. rose by 1.16 times whereas working days lost rose by 3.1 tim.s. Thus 
the large ri.e in the number of days lost - •• pecially .-ongst public .ector 
.-ployee.,(33) overwhelmed the rise in the steel figures. Moreover, although 
the frequency of steel strikes increased throughout the period, the numbers 
involved per .trike remained ... 11. The strike behaviour of steel workers 
will be examined in detail in the subsequent works level ease .tudies. MeaD-
t~e, the strike figur •• , in .kewing both an ab.olute ri.e in the number of 
.teel strike. and an increase in steel strikes as a proportion of the UK 
total indicate. a tougher attitude by the .teel ..,loyers to labour cost. aDd 
to improving labour productivity in the industry. 
This chapter ha. now identified all the qajor factors making for change 
and it ouly remain. to give some further indication of the indu.try·s 
financial positloa duriaa the period. aefereace has been .. de above (pace 17) 
to the deteriorati .. in profits of which the .ext table give. a more detailed 
acc ... t. 
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Table 2.6 
Profits before Tax as Percentage of Capital E.ployed 
for Iron and Steel Industry, and for all UK, 1957-67 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Iron ~ Steel 18.5 18.2 17.0 15.2 16.1 12.8 7.6 5.5 8.0 7.9 
1967 
4.3 
Ml~ 17.0 17.2 16.5 15.0 15.7 14.7 12.6 12.7 14.1 14.2 13.4 
source: Rowley, Steel and Public Policy, page 119 
The table shows that after 1961 steel industry profit. declined aark.ily 
and in c.-pari.OD with the rest of British indu.try. This position did not 
improve with nationali.ation, for Bse .howed a negligible rete of retUrD on 
net asset. for the year ending September 1969, '-.l~ for the following six 
months (the basis of the financial year then altered), then a ne,ative return 
for the period April 1971 to March 1972, and finally, a 3.4~ return to MarCh 
1973.(34) Thi. 3.4~ figure wa. below the financial objectiye of 8~ ayeraae 
rate of return on net assets set by the Mini.ter in 1972. Tha low rate of 
return prior to nationali.ation provided little incentiYe for employers to 
either rai.e new fund. in the capital market (conversaly fvad. were not .asily 
attracted) or to iuve.t frOB undistributed res.rYes. As a re.ult, new capital 
inYest.ent slu.ped a. Table Seyen .h.... After natioaali.ation new capital 
expenditure remained low up to 1970-72, during ¥bich t~ British Steel 
Corporation (BSe) was formulating it. new inye.t.ent strateay. 
Table 2.7 
Capital Expenditure in Steal Indu.try, at 
constant (1963) Price., 1953-69 (t.) 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
65 68 73 88 107 114 108 158 209 174 77 54 47 38 44 48 46 
.ource: R. Pryke, Strategy for Steel, page 30 
ORe t.portant qualification and contributory factor to the decline in 
profitability and inve.baent was the bunching of new projects in the years 
27. 
1960-1962. It was in those years that major new capital expenditure was 
undertaken at L1anwern in South Wales, Ravenscraig and Gartcosh in Scotland, 
Tinsley Park and Park Gate in Yorkshire. These projects were built ahead of 
demand (due partly to economic indivisibilities in steel plant) and to that 
extent a decline in profitability and invesbnent was expected for some two or 
three years. The consequences of this invesbnent are important for an under-
standing of industrial relations at Ravenscraig Works. 
This picture of financial deterioration clarifies the pressures experienced 
by the employers to improve the industry's efficiency and competitiveness. 
Moreover, these factors (or pressures) continued to operate with nationalisation •. -
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to identify the main problems faced by the steel 
industry and the various factors causing these problems. The 1960's was the 
start of a period of substantial change which was largely taking place beyond 
the control of the British industry. The changes identified included advances 
in the technological processes of iron and steel .. king, .ainly in overseas 
countries, which established new economic standards of efficiency beyond 
those achieved in Britain. As a result the British industry's productiTity 
performance fell below that achieved in other countries. 
Another major change took place in the world steel product .. rket with 
countries such as Japan, the communist block and previously non-industrial 
countries making tremendous strides forward in steel output. Consequently, 
the rate of rise in world steel supply outstripped de.and. Alongside this 
development was the general movement to.ards freer world trade as tariff 
barriers were relaxed. Both these developments had the effect of increaaing 
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international competition and hardening steel prices both at home and abroad. 
Government intervention was another factor helping to keep prices down. As a 
result of these various changes the British steel industry's profits declined. 
In the light of poor productivity and low financiat returns a new climate 
of concern emerged as the issues sharpened and reflected the need to tackle 
the central problem of improving the industry's efficiency. 
The increasing power of the unions was another factor creating a problem 
for the employers. Full employment and the changing technological environment 
favoured the unions' determination to improve their member.' right. and 
living .tandards. This development wa. facilitated by the indu.try'. collective 
bargaining arrangements, which helped push up unit labour costa, aDd to rai.e 
the strike incidence. Therefore, the employers had to improve the indu.try'. 
efficiency and also promote its .tability by reconciling trade union objective. 
with their .trategy for change. 
The next chapter will examine the development of the employer.' .trataaY 
with a view to tackling and .olving theae two major problems. 
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Chapter Three 
Development of the Employer's Strategy 
The previous chapter illustrated the changing environmental circumstances 
affecting the British industry over the last decade or so. 
caused two major problems for the industry's aanageaent. 
Theae changes 
Most significant of 
these was the apparent low level of labour productivity compared with the best 
achieved elsewhere by international producers - resulting in poor finaucial 
returns. Secondly,came the increasing militancy of the trade unions in trying 
to secure advances in their members' rights and living standards. Furtheraore, 
the unions' power seemed to be based on the industry's fraa-ented collective 
bargaining arrangements. These provided the opportunity for the unions to 
pursue divergent a~s, thus encouraging inter-union c~etition. The aia of 
this chapter will be to analyse the response of the industry's aanag .. ent. 
This chapter consists of four parts. The first deals with the economic 
and technological background. Part Two traces the Iron aad Steel Trades 
~loyers' Association's first aajor initiative to t.prove labour producti.tty 
before nationalisation. Part Three is coneeraed with the new Stael Corporation'. 
plan to secure centralisation in national collective barcaininc leadiua to the 
establisbaent of the Trade Union Steel Industry eonsultative Committee. Finally, 
Part Four analyses the development of the Corporation's .. in plan to t.prove 
labour efficiency, and to minimi.e trade union resistance. 
Part ODe, The Econa.1c and Tecbnoloaical Backaround 
Chapter Two .howed that for various reas.ns, ."ely: the sub opti.ua sl.e 
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of works, the shift in relative costs away from domestic to foreign iron ores 
associated with advances in shipbuilding technology and the inland locationa 
of many steel works, the heavy reliance upon the basic open hearth process for 
steel making, and possibly also the slow rate of growth of the economy, the 
British industry's productivity was low compared to that of certain other inter-
national producers. The Benson Working Party having established this analyses 
recommended a major restructuring of the industry's steel making capacity. (1) 
The Report proposed to expand certain integrated steel works (ie six or seven 
works based upon large blaatfurnaces and the basic oxygen process with capacities 
ranging between five and eight million tons compared with Port Talbot - then 
Britain's largest - with just over two million tons per annum) to reap max~um 
economies of scale. The works considered most suitable for expansion were 
located in North Lincolnshire,Teesside and South Wales, (Scotland was considered 
separately) near to deep water ports which could be used to exploit the cheaper 
foreign ores. Benson estimated that these proposed developaents would create 
a surplus of steel capacity over requirements by the mid 1970's. Therefore, the 
Report concluded, that many high cost works using small blastfurnaces and the 
open hearth process should be closed. 
The BISF took little action on the Benson stage one recommendations owing 
to nationalisation. Benson .tage two, which was to deal with ca.pany regroupings 
to accommodate these changes was never completed. Nevertheless the Benson 
Report provided a signpost to the future shape of the industry, and the new 
Steel Corporation used this to develop its own plans. 
With nationalisation, the Bse responded to the ba.ic need to i~roye 
productivity. There were two main options open to the Corporation: one, to 
construct two new large works on greenfield sites; or alternatiyely, as 
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advocated by Benson, expand and modernise certain existing but strategically 
placed works. The Corporation decided on the latter option. As a result, 
and after some delay, capital expenditure was concentrated in five major works. 
These were Port Talbot, and Llanwern in South Wales, Scunthorpe in Lincolnshire 
Lackenby on the North East Coast, and Ravenscraig in Scotland. All these works 
were to use large blastfurnaces and the basic oxygen steel making proc.... As 
a consequence, the BSC's capital expenditure was to rise as the next table 
shows. 
Table 3.1 
BSC, Capital Expenditure Annually 1968-73, at 1972 Pric.s (£m) 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
91 88 131 212 218 230 
source: BSe, Ten Year Strategy, HHSO Omnd 5226 
What this plan meant for the future shape of the indu.try is revealed 
in the quotation from Richard Pryke. 
'In all these five works ••• will account for about 
sixty percent of BSC's capacity. In 1965 the five 
largest works possessed only about a third of the 
capacity owned by the companies which were sub.equently 
acquired by the State.' R Pryke, op cit, page 33 
The investment at Redcar on Tees was to be the largest, with new units of 
plant being phased in while production continued to make u.e of the exi.ting 
facilities at Lackenby Works. In addition to the five major bulk steel making 
units, Sheffield was to continue development as a producer of special stainless 
and alloy steels. The new investment amounted to £3,000 million at 1972 prices 
over ten years(2) On the other side of the .trategy, many existing works were 
to lo.e their iron and open hearth .teel making facilities, although at SaDe 
works, finishing plant would remain in use into the foreseeable future. For 
example, in Scotland, Clyde Iron, Clydebridge, Lanarkshire, Dalzell and Glen-
gamock Works were all to suffer closureso Other regions in England and 
Wale. were to undergo a similar experience. 
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However, due to its long term nature, the ten year strategy although 
approved by the Conservative Government, was likely to be subjected to the 
changing needs of the steel consuming industries and the employment situation 
in the various regions. Furthermore, a significant constraint would be 
changes in Government policy itself. Hence the 1974 Labour Administration 
quickly subjected the plan to review and delayed certain works closures. Yet 
another aspect of the plan, which has been the subject of political controversy, 
was the total future capacity envisaged. The plan aimed to take liquid steel 
capacity from 27 to between 36 and 38 million tonnes by 1982-83. This figure 
has been challenged as too low by the Technical, Administrative, and 
Supervisory Section of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, (3) and 
by others as too high. (4) 
The above is an outline of the origin and main economic and technological 
changes taking place in the industry, and provides the background to under-
standing management's responses to problems encountered in the industrial 
relations area. 
Part Two, The More Effective Use of Maintenance Manpower 
ISTEA undertook the first major initiative aimed at improving the labour 
productivity of maintenance workers. On 9th February 1966, the Association 
set up a working party under the chairmanship of H Morley of the United Steel 
Companies Ltd. The working party examined evidence from companies both within 
and outside the industry, from consultants, and studied certain publications 
on productivity bargaining. It concluded that the efficiency of maintenance 
workers could be doubled.(S) It attributed poor performance to extenlive 
overmanning, bad manpower organi.ation and to the ale of reltrictive job 
practices. Moreover, these p~blem. were likely to increa.e with improvement. 
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in technology. A further problem was the rate of labour turnover which at 
20% was considered high for the industry, and a costly drain on maintenance 
labour supply. An improvement in labour productivity therefore would also 
help ease the labour supply problem. The working party finally recommended 
two alternative methods of tackling these problems. Their methods were as follows: 
Firstly, 'The promotion of the more effective use of maintenance manpower 
in order to rationalise and reduce manning by: 
(a) Minimizing demarcations and restrictive practices within and 
between groups of maintenance workers. Efficiency could undoubtedly 
be improved by agreed overlapping at all levels. The crit.rion to be 
used would be the ability of the man to do the job effectively, 
training having been given where necessary. 
(b) Lmproving the system and organisation for carrying out engineering 
maintenance in order to improve the tempo of work. Engineering 
management. would need to be fully capable of taking advantage of 
the new situation and the resultant manpower .avings which would .ccrue. 
(c) Consideration could then be given to incentive payments based upon 
work measurement'. 
Secondly, 'The introduction of incentive p.yment ••• soon •• po.sible. 
Comp.nies who f.vour this .ccept that the .. int.n.nce organis.tion 
must be capable of .ustaining an incentive systea and that demarcation. 
mu.t not be built into .tandards'. 
In short, the emphasis in these two approaches to improving manpower 
productivity were different. The first focussed upon the need for F.wl.y type 
productivity bargaining to increase efficiency,(6) after which fin.nci.l 
incentive. and work measurement could be introduc.d. The latter was much more 
conc.rned with the i ... diate introduction of incentiv.s .nd work •••• ur ... nt. 
• 
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This reflected differences of interest and strategy within the workiug party. 
The United Steel Companies was a powerful advocate of the latter approach. 
This company were ready for such a development and, had in fact, been holding 
preliminary discussions with the local Allied Craftsmen's Committee in 
Sheffield. Moreover, United Steel argued that a two stage approach gave the 
unions two opportuniti~s to negotiate, and that this ought to be avoided. 
Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of companies took the first view, 
arguing that it was necessary to raise first the efficiency threshold from its 
rather low base. This disagreement was not resolved by the working party 
which recommended a dual approach subject to certain constraints as the next 
quotation shows:(7) 
'In practice the divergent roads towsrds the ultimate 
goal make it necessary for the working party to recomaend 
certain rules, observance of which will have the effect of 
keeping the courses of action as consistent with each other 
as possible'. 
The recommended rules were largely concerned with setting up an industry. 
wide control aechani... On this point the working party suggested that the 
~sociation approach the NCCC with a view to securing a national infor.al 
understanding, and an attitude of acceptance towards local works productivity 
negotiations. Also, the A8sociation should create a Review Body to assess and 
approve company schemes before they were submitted to the local unions. Further-
more, such sch .. es should be the subject of a stipulated maximum par-ent per 
worker. In this way, local bargaining would be the subject of central coatrol, 
thereby helping to curb possible wage leap-frogging between the different 
c~anies. It followed that the Review Body required sufficieat authority to 
perfo~ this responsible task. 
The working party reported to the Aasociation on 8th Noveaber, 1966 and 
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its recommendations were approved. The Association decided to establish the 
Review Body and to give it the authority of the Maintenance and Service 
Standing Committee (within ISTEA the Standing Committee was divided into four 
suo-committees, of which maintenance was one). In effect, the Review Body w.s, 
de facto, the Maintenance Standing Committee called by another naae. Its remit 
was to examine each company scheme, and with the authority of the St.nding 
Committee to accept, modify, or reject them. 
Another major decision of the Association wa. to invite the Neee to • 
joint conference. This conference, to be held outside the normal negotiating 
machinery, was to have a consultative character. This wal a .ajor departure 
from traditional policy. Traditionally, ISTEA g.ve the unions little infoDa.tion, 
.nd limply reacted to union cl.i.s in an ad hoc .nd defensive manner. However, 
thil new initiative invited the unions to dilcull jointly the industry's problems. 
In .ddition to nation.l union officiall, district offici.ls were .1so invit •• to 
the conference which lubsequently took place at E.stbourne in J.nu.ry, 1967. 
Why then did the Association change its policy .nd .dopt a productivity 
b.rg.ining strategy? Here sever.l pOlsible expl.nation •• re credible. 
ODe possible explan.tion rel.tes to the .ppoinbaent of • new Associ.tion 
director around 1964 •. This.man, from outside the industry, se ... to h.v. tak.n 
• ~re "democratic" view of ISTEA'I relationships with the tr.de unions. W •• 
the new str.tegy the result of his more p.rticip.tive aanag .. ent style? 
A second factor w.s the Prices .nd Inca.e. Policy. The 1965 White P.per(8) 
.llowed for w.ge rises above the no~ to .-ployees .cc.pting aor. ex.ctiDg 
work, or for. ch.nge in working practice leading to an incr •••• in produetivity. 
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This, associated with the Pay Standstill of July, 1966 could have helped 
alter the climate and thereby reinforce the hand of those within the Aasociatlon 
who wanted a new departure in policy. If this was the case, then the statement 
that 'incomes restraint is a significant factor in inducing refora' would have 
validity. (9) 
A third influence upon the change of policy could have been the proposed 
nationaillation of the industry_ The Labour Government published in April, 1965 
a White Paper on steel nationalisation (10) which it followed up with a national-
i.ation Bill introduced to the House of Cammon. on 30th June, 1966. This Bill 
received its second reading on 25th July. Further, to facilitate preparation 
for nationalisation, the Minister of Power appointed an Organi8ina Committee 
under the Chairmanship of Lord Melchett in September, 1966. Thi. Committee, 
representing the Corporation, was quickly engaged in consultations with the 
various steel unions, due to the likely statutory obligation (contained in the 
Bill) to consult with representatives of the employee •• {ll) As a consequence 
of this changing cliaate, it i8 possible that the Aa.ociation in Nov .. ber, 1966 
took cognizance of the Bill and adopted the more participatory productivity 
bargaining approach. 
Each of the.e three reason ... y have had .o.e influence upon the Aa.ociation'. 
deci.ion to .elect a productivity bargaining strategy, but their influence was 
limited. To .uggest that Price. and Income. Policy wa. the mo.t important 
factor weuld be to place too auch weight upon the voluntary policy which exi.ted 
prior to the wage freeze of July, 1966. The iapact of natlonali.ation i. 
unlikely to have b.en v.ry important prior to the Bill' ••• cond r.adina and the 
•• ttina up of the OraaDi.ing eom.ittee in S.ptemb.r, 1966. Mer.ov.r, the debate 
within the ... ociation which led to Merley was takina place in 1965. Aa for 
the new dir.ctor, hi. influence i. more difficult to as •••• , but it is hard to 
believe that it wa. more than a facilitating factor. 
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The most important explanation was the pressure building up throughout 
the 1960s for management to improve manpower utilisation. On the one kand, the 
pressure to improve efficiency arose from changes in the product market and 
from foreign technological i.uovation in steel production which reduced the 
British industry'. profits. On the other hand, productivity bargaining as an 
instrument for buying out manpower inefficiencies had a powerful influence at 
this time upon .anagement thought.(12) Given the interaction between the external 
factorl and management thought, a productivity bargaining strategy was the moat 
rational response. The technique was applied first in the maintenance area 
since this had been recognised as overmanned as far back aa 1954.(13) However, 
ita selection was still dependent upon ~o further considerationa. Firatly, 
it depended on the inter-play of the various company intereatl within the 
~aociation since any victory by the United Steel Companies would have coufined 
the strategy more narrowly to work measurement and financial iaceative techniquea. 
Secondly, it depended on management's anticipation of what the employees aDd 
their trade uniona would and could accept. The high density of union organisation 
in the industry required change to be implemented by persuasion, argUBent, and 
the offering of substantial benefits which in turn must pay for th ... elves. 
Finally, the Association's policy shift was due to the aelection of productivity 
bargaining as the most appropriate strategy. For compared with traditional 
collective bargaining productivity bargaining requirea a probl .. ·solviUC 
conaultative approach. 
Part Three, The Trade Union Steel Induatry Conaultative Committee 
The Iron aud Steel Act 1967, achedule four, aection thirty nine, places 
apon the Corporation a statutory obligation t. satiafy itaelf tkat appropriate 
.. chinery exista for conaultation and negotiation with orleDi.atloD. repre.eatlaa 
it • .-ployees. The Organising ee.m1ttee took the vi .. , for rea.oa. aivea below, 
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that the existing consultative and negotiating machinery was not appropri.te 
for a .ingle employer to settle conditions of employment or for proaoting 
efficiency. The Corporation decided to establish new machinery to f.cilitate 
the implementation of their economic strategy, and to secure as much industri.l 
relations stability as possible. These objectives were to be .chieyed by letting 
the autonomous trade union bodies to co-ordin.te their relationships. 10 May, 
1967 the Org.nising c...ittee i ••• ed the following statement of prinCiple. on 
relationships with the trade anions: 
'In particular the Corporation believes that much could be 
gained if the trade unions took action so th.t: 
(a) ComprehensiYe collective aareement. could be nel.ti.t.d, 
dealing with wage. and working conditions, consult.tion, 
grievance and dispute procedures and question. concemine 
recoguition of ellPloyee represent.tives. 
(b) There was close.t c .... per.tion betweeu union. iucludina 
co-operation on questions of .ni.u ... bership 1eadina to 
a more unified system of representation.' 
The inteution of the Corporation to promote inter-union co-ordination 
recardiUl collectiye barg.iniUl w.s .. de more explicit in • letter d.t.d 21st 
September, 1967 to the Alsist.nt Gener.l Secret.ry of the Tr •• e Union Coacr ••• , 
which noted that the: 
'Pri.e ai. of the neaoti.tiUl structure will be to provide 
machinery for the settlement of specific is.ues which .r. 
C ... On to .eyer.l or .11 aroup. of employee. by s~ltaue.ua 
multi-uDiou ueaoti.tion •• ' 
This urC.ncy to reform the c.ua.ltatiy •• Dd collective b.r,.iuiBi .rr .... -
.eat. waa rel.ted to • u .... r of probl... which the Corp.r.tiou •• a likely to be 
f.c. d wi th the ap.ed-.p in til. p.ce .f tecmoloaic.l cla.llle. ODe aa&1I proltl •• 
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that the industry had some previous experience of Was the job d ... rcation 
i •• ue. During the 1960s several disputes of this type had taken place between 
the AUBTW and the Confederation.(14) These disputes arose over replacement 
of the traditionally brick built open hearth furnace by the basic oxygen LD 
ves.el which had a dolmite or manganese block lining. The latter .. terial 
required much less builoing skill, but was claimed by both the skilled brick-
layers and the le.s skilled members of ISTC. 
A second major problem was the possibility of increasing nuabers of 
jurisdictional disputes. The.e disputes were more likely vith nationalisation, 
and with the rationalisation programme. Before nationalisation the private 
companies put certain imped~ents in the vay of white collar employ.es joining 
trade unions. Aa a consequence the proportion of white collar .-ploye.s in 
unions was 10w.(15) Hovever, nationalisation was expected to change this. 
With the rationali.ation programae, new invesbaent weuld create new jobs which 
would lead to disputes as each union attempted to gain recognition right •• 
A third problem concerned inter-union competition over vage. and conditions 
of employment, and the associated wasteful duplication of effort in negotiationa. 
(16) The existing collective bargaining arrangeaents were likely to be put 
under severe strain as the rationalisatioD progr .... dev.loped. AD illustration 
of this probl .. was given in the previous chapter with the NUBP and ISTC 
pursuing night shift pramiuas and the 40 hour week respectively. 
Thus, for all these rea.ons, the new Corporation evolved their stratecy 
aiaed at refor.iug the industry'. consultative and collective bargaining 
arraug ... nta. However, evolving .uch a stratelY is on. thins, gaining it. 
acceptaace by the trade unions is another. Of course, the difficulty in 
achieving trade union co-ordination at national level Wa. Dot helped by the 
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recent history of inter-union antagonism. Another example illustrates this 
point. 
In 1956 the National Joint Trades Union Craftsmen's Iron and Steel Committee 
(later the NCCC) lodged a claim with the ISTEA. In reply, the Association 
offered an increase of ten shillings per normal week to the craft unions. This 
sum had previously been agreed with the production unions. The craft unions 
refused the offer. They insisted that the cla~ was for a wage advance which 
reflected the increasing skills and responsibilities of their members, and 
which would raise their position in the industry's wage league relative to that 
of the production worker. This claim was a challenge to the established 
relationships in the industry, since the employers' association traditionally 
gave greatest attentton in national negotiations to ISTC. The Court of Enquiry 
recorded the craftsmen's case by stating: 
'Hitherto, it was alleged the employers had been able to 
impose an inflexible relationship between wage rates in 
the industry so that all major questions were determined 
in the negotiating machinery on which craftsmen hay. no 
representation' Court of Enguiry, ODd 9843, page 13 
The negotiations were protracted, and the craft unions imposed an .. bar go 
on all fo~ of overtime working on 26th April, 1956. This action had serious 
effects upon production. In response, several companies used • .. ergency te ... • 
of men including meabers of the production unions to do the craftsmens' vork~ 
This decision caused a sense of outrage .. ongst craftsmen, particularly in 
Cardiff, where production workers were regarded a. blackleg.. In re.pon.e, the 
craft union. boycotted plant worked on by the 'emergency t .... ·, and in 
York.hire, Scotland and Cardiff went on strike. In the trade union world the 
term blackleg is reserved for those whose behaviour run. counter to their 
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ideology, that is for behaviour considered immoral. Further evidence of the 
bitter attitudes and relationships which ensued (this time frOB the Confederation'. 
viewpoint) can be observed from the union's statement to the Court of Enquiry.(l7) 
Harry Douglas, the General Secretary,said: 
'Never in the history of negotiation have we known any 
trade union negotiator discredit the accepted skill and 
ability of the members of another union in this manner. 
Such an attack on the status of fellow trade unioni.ts 
is a complete abrogation of accepted trade union 
principles and has deeply shocked my members'. 
The strength and anger of the Confederation's defensive reaction can be 
understood in two ways. Firstly, the gradual change in technology was redUCing 
the number of direct production workers, but increasing the proportion of 
maintenance workers in the labour force.(18) Also, the new technology was 
more sophisticated and thereby increased the skills demanded of the craftsmen. 
Aa a result, the established power balance bebween the two groups was disturbed 
causing the craft unions to demand higher earnings and status. Secondly, the 
example points to differences in ideology bebween craft and production union •• 
Ideological differences are related to many factors which constitute a study 
in theaselves. Nevertheless, two important factors are worth .entioning, ua.ely, 
the nature of the industry'. technology, and the occupational status of the 
men mauning it. The industry has many units of plant (eg coke ovens and bla.t-
furnaces) which must run continuously to retain heat. A strike therefore 
endangers the life of these units, and if they go out aonths of rebuildina is 
required during which the ptDduction operatives will have no Jobs. In addition, 
the production worker's skill, status and wage are .pecific to the industry, 
and this heightens concern for the consequences of strike action. On the other 
hand, craft .. en possess universal skills, emphasize craft solidarity, and have 
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less economic and emotional commibnent to the industry's success. Such 
differences in interest generate separate beliefs and result in conflict at 
the ideological level, with production and craft workers thinking each others' 
behaviour irresponsible. Again the essence of the analysis is caught in the 
following statement made by the Confederation to the Court of Enquiry.(19) 
'We have not only a great pride in our skills in the 
iron and steel industry, we also have a high sense of 
responsibility. You see, Gentlemen, if the iron and 
steel industry sinks, my members go down with it. The 
craftsmen can move from one industry to another easily, 
into jobs specially reserved for them. There are many 
illustrations of this at the present time. This is not 
the ease with our members; great though their skills are 
in making iron and steel, it is not a transferable skill. 
For us to receive the reward of our training, the iron and 
steel industry must prosper. We cannot afford a Cavalier 
attitude towards our industry in the same way a8 those 
whose interests are not irrevocably bound up to it' 
This last sentence, as will be shown below, provides a most revealing 
insight into the Confederation's behaviour in perceiving and reacting to the 
Corporation's plan to establish a National Joint Negotiating Council on issues 
common to all unions. Nevertheless, although the inter-union position was 
difficult, several factors were operating to facilitate the achievement of 
greater co-ordination between the unions. 
Nationalisation created a new climate and provided the opportunity to 
rationalise industrial relations. In creating a single enterprise there was 
a consequent increase in power, authority and control at the centre. This 
provided the organisational rationality (which was not available to the 
Association) to achieve a uniform strategy and provided the drive necessary 
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to make the attainment of the strategy a realistic goal. A single unified 
company was probably the most important influence on the selection of a 
strategy aimed at reforming the national collective bargaining arrangements 
as well as improving labour productivity by implementing the rationalisation 
programme. This establishment of industrial relations refo~ as aD integral 
part of the overall strategy of adjuSbnent to changing circumstances was not 
peculiar to the Steel Corporation; it has been a factor in the strategy of 
other nationalised industries. To quote JDM Be11,(20) Industrial Relations 
Advisor to the Electricity Council: 
'Company agreements ••••• are negotiated on the side of the 
Boards, under the influence of people who represent an 
integrated management, are aware of the wider need. and 
business objectives of a single management organisation, 
and are aware, too, of what kind of provisions in an agree-
ment are likely to help rather than hinder local management 
to do its job. In short, there is the possibility, which 
only the company bargaining situation can give, of developing 
constructive and creative agre~ents which seek not only to 
resolve industrial relations problems or conflicts, but to 
assist positively in enabling the nationalised industry 
concerned successfully to adapt to chaaae and to prOBote 
efficiency in its operations' 
Secondly, all the steel unions were comaited to nationalisation, and the 
need to ~rove the industry's efficiency.(2l) The craft .. en outlined their 
views on the future organisation of the industry in a docuaent entitled 
'Proposals for Natioualisation'.(22) They were the only union body to produce 
a document of this kind. The booklet fo~ed the basis of their discussions 
with the Corporation, and shows the craft unions' acceptance of a thorough 
reorlenis.tion of the industry to reduce costs per tODDe of st.el. However, 
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all the unions insisted that any rationalisation programme must be concerned 
with the social consequences. 
Notwithstanding the unions' commibnent to nationalisation, this was not 
strong enough to overcome their rivalry - as seems to have happened in the coal 
mining industry. On nationali.ation the National Union of Mineworkers was able 
to make arrangements with the various craft unions (ie, the ABU, ETU and ADBTW) 
and the general unions (ie, TGWU and GMWU) which in effect gave the fo~er 
negotiating rights for members of their various union. who would henceforth 
hold dual membership. According to GB Baldwin(23), 'In these ca.es the union. 
themselves have saved the Coal Board the possible embarra .. ent of having to 
choose between them'. Interestingly, the coal mining industry provides an 
illustration of a change in trade union organisation facilitating a refo~ in 
the collective bargaining arrangements. However, the craft unions in coal 
mining were much 1es. powerful than in steel. 
A third factor helping the Corporation's strategy was the introduction 
of new personalities at the top from out.ide the industry. The most i.,ortant 
were Lord Melchett, and also Ron s.ith who bec .. e Board ~er for Personnel 
and Social Policy. s.ith was re.ponsib1e for the idea of refo~DI the CODa.lt-
ative and collective bargaining machinery. As General Secretary of the Union 
of Post Office Workers he was a member of the General Council of the TOt since 
1957. He therefore had knowledge of the poor inter-union relationa in ateel. 
Further, as General Secretary of the Post Office Workers, hi. firat band 
experience of the strain. and effect. of inter-union rivalry must have been 
helpful. ror example, bitter rivalry existed between the Post Office Workera 
and the Telecomaunications Staff Association for some 40 years. (24) Alao, the 
Post Office Engineering Union had had experience of a breakaway union with ita 
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disruptive influence upon union co-ordination within the Whitley Council 
system. (25) In addition, Mr Smith as a Board Member of the British OVerseas 
Aircraft Corporation (1964/67) had gained first hand experience of the aircraft 
industry's Joint Industrial Council. The new men were untainted by the policies 
of the Employers' Association, and therefore, were more acceptable to the unions 
as agents of change. 
The preceding factors influenced the selection of the Corporation', 
strategy to Secure reform of the national consultative and collective bargaining 
machinery. The analysis now deals in much greater detail with the attainment of 
the strategy's objectives and falls into three part.. The first deal. with the 
origin and functions of the Trade Union Steel Industry Consultative Committee 
(or Steel Committee). The second give. consideration to the Corporation's 
aspirations to establish a National Joint Industrial Council (NJIC) and why this 
proved not possible. The third explains the change in the Steel CoaIIIi ttee'. 
function from a loose consultative to a joint negotiating body. 
Initially, the Organising Committee invited the steel union. to meet 
together with them, to discuss the Corporation's future industrial relationa 
strategy. The invitation was refused due to the inter-union antagonism de.cribed 
above. This caused the Organising Committee to meet the unions separately. 
About this time the idea emerged of asking the Trade. Union Congres., the only 
unifying body available, to organise and co-ordinate the steel unions' di.cu •• ion. 
with the Corporation. Each individual anion gave the Corporation permi •• ion to 
try this. Consequently, on 10th March, 1967 Lord Malchett wrote to the TOe 
lUking the fonul request that the Corporation be allowed to deal with the 
appropriate ComBittee of the TOC. 
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In response, the Tue set up a sub-committee of its Economic Committee 
consisting of members from the steel industry. Since the 1962 Congress, the 
General Council had been involved in a debate and examination of trade union 
structure. This debate had rejected the notion of industrial unioni .. in favour 
of possible amalgamation amongst particular groups of unions. In fact, the 
General Council had made a specific recommendation that the ISTC and the NUBF 
should amalgamate though nothing had come of discussions between the unions.(26) 
Nevertheless, the climate was right for a further attempt at increasina the 
degree of union co-ordination, and the TUC reacted favourably to the Corporation'. 
request. 
An exploratory meeting between the Organising Committee and the General 
Council committee was held on 25th April. (27) At this meeting Lord Melchett 
referred to the Corporation's statutory obligation to consult the union., and 
stressed that this could be best met through the TUC. Subsequently, the 
General Council decided to set up a more broadly based committee consisting 
of representatives of the General Council and the steel unions. Sir Harry 
Douglas, President of the TUC and, by now, ex-General Secretary of ISTC was 
elected chairman of the committee.(28) The appoinbDent was not helpful for the 
achievement of the Corporation's objectives for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
Sir H Douglas and the Convener of the NCeC had crossed swords in the bitter 
1956 dispute, and seemingly their personal relationships never improved. Secondly, 
he no longer spoke with authority for the largest union. In other words, the 
new General Secretary, Oai Davis, was the most powerful person on the committee 
but not in a position of formal leadership. This situation delayed events, 
although it did not alter them significantly, and was resolved with the retire-
ment of Sir Harry Douglas at the 1967 Congress. 
Throughout 1967, the parties consulted on a number of item. including the 
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Corporation's proposed organisation structure, employee representation on 
Group Boards, trade union membership and recognition, and reform of the consult-
ative and negotiating machinery. On all these issues the steel unions took 
different views from the BSC, but the one issue of immediate importance to them 
was white collar recognition. This revealed itself at a meeting on 30th June, 
1967 when the Steel Committee info~ed the Corporation that white collar 
recognition should be confined to unions in membership of the Steel Committee.(29) 
Initially, the Corporation rejected the Steel Committee's claim. However, on 
10th July, the Corporation seemingly changed its mind, agreeing to recognise 
the Steel Committee unions, and deciding also that the other unions seeking 
recognition should be referred to the TUC. The agreement was subject to the 
qualification that where other unions had local recognition these rights would 
be maintained. This agreement sparked off, as it turned out, a long and bitter 
inter-union struggle which was to have an important effect upon the Steel 
Committee. 
Therefore, in both origin and function the Steel Committee was no more 
than a loose consultative body prodded along by the TUe Secretariat which 
serviced it. Also, at this time the Committee's minutes were sent to the 
General Council signifying its lack of autonomy. 
The second point concerned the Corporation's aspirations to establish a 
National Joint Industrial Council as an alternative means of promoting inter-
union co-ordination. The Organising Committee would have preferred a National 
Joint Council, but the constraint of inter-union rivalry made such a strategy 
• non-starter. However, in o~der to understand why the NJC was not possible, 
some further analysis of inter-union relationships Is required. 
Some unions including the craft body and the GMWU favoured the ideao The 
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NCCC advocated it in the document 'Proposals for Nationalisation'(30) referred 
to above. It said the following: 
'The functions Qf a National Joint Council should include 
the determination of such conditions as can be commonly 
applied, viz hours of work, shift work, holidays, sick pay, 
pensions etc. Within the Council there should be three 
Standing Committees with plenary powers to determine wage 
and salary issues, 
(a) technicians, maintenance and ancillary workers, 
(b) process workers, and 
(c) supervisory grades up to and including manager level! 
The document also proposed Area and Works Joint Councils. 
The problem however was the intransigence of the ISTC. At the 1970 
national conference of the EETPU the national officer for steel made the 
following statement:(31) 
'We tried to get a National Joint Council at which we 
would negotiate.... Unfortunately other union. - and when 
I say "other unions" I do not mean craft unions, I mean 
production unions - were not prepared to come into the 
National Joint Council' 
Why was the Confederation so resistant? Here several possible explanations 
.... credible. One reason was the aim of the Confederation to establish itself 
as an industrial union.(32) This aspiration was incompatible with the idea 
of an NJC which by definition preserved the identity of other unions in the 
industry. However, this objective was more a fact of history - at lea.t in 
the aanual worker area, where the Confederation had long accepted the existence 
of other unions. In fact, the union had conclqd.d •• veral bilateral agree.ents 
on jurisdictional ri,hts with other unions. 
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A second reason for ISTC resistance was its ideology which was greatly 
influenced by its size, status and responsibility for the industry's industrial 
relations. It was the union leadership's proud boast that industrial relations 
in steel were good, that the union's attitude to the employers was one of 
cooperation rather than confrontation, and that they (up until 1973) had not 
called an official strike since 1926.(33) Therefore, the union was concerned 
to protect its reputation, and wanted to move cautiously on any proposals aiced 
at sharing decisions with other unions, especially as the Confederation re&&rded 
those unions with the bulk of their meabership outside the industry as le.s 
committed to its success. The Confederation would carry major responsibility 
for the decisions of the NJ'C which as one of many unions it would not have been 
totally responsible for making. Moreover, this attitude of ISTC, which was 
personified in Sir Harry Douglas's statement to the Court of Enquiry,(34) .. s 
partly shared by the new general Secretary. Although Dai Davis was more prepared 
than others to accept some fora of multi-union working, neverthele.s he wa. 
eon.trained by the ideology of hi. union and the complexity of the i.sue. 
surrounding .ueh a developaent. This fear of sharing sovereicaty <give. the 
history of the union) created for the union a aajor dil .... , aDd it required 
tiae to adjust. 
A third explanation portrays the Contederatin as les. concerae. wttJa 
the industry'. "elfare and aore with it. 0VIl stata., and the a •• ociated 
privileges. This was at the heart of the 1956 struggle when the craft .. en 
attempted to t.prove their status in the industry's wage-league relative to 
that of production writer.. Dariq the struule the craft alon8 chaUenaeIJ 
the indu.try's establi.hed relatioa.hip whereby the .-ployer •• ettled with 
the Confederation and the. attellpted to apply the agre .. ent to the other won •• 
Thus the craft .. en'. HJIC propo.al was a logical r ... dy to their probl .. , aad 
natiouU.ation provided the opportunity to present it. In other _rd • 
• 
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the craft and other unions could only benefit from the proposal, whereas the 
ISTC could only lose. A further illustration of this was the position of the 
TGWU. This union was not recognised nationally by the ISTEA, but had local 
recognition in various parts of the country. In the manual workers area, this 
did not present a problem as the jurisdictional spheres of influence were 
settled between the unions. However, with white collar workers the position 
was different with low density union membership prior to nationalisation. Hence 
the TGWU was anxious to gain national recognition to secure recruibBent rights. 
On the other hand, the Confederation wished to protect its claim to recruit 
nearly all white collar workers for itself. For these reasons the ISTC resisted 
any proposals to establish a National Joint Council. 
Early in 1968 the Corporation was sensitive to this situation. In the 
light of this it decided that any proposal to set up a NJC, or even to establish 
a new recognition and procedure agreement covering all six unions, would be to 
move too fast too soon. Therefore, the only viable alternative for the time 
being was a loose consultative body through the TOC. 
Given these attitudes, how did the Steel Committee change from a loose 
consultative body to the much more cohesive consultative/negotiation body of 
the early 1970s.7 The following quotes from the Steel Committee to the Select 
Coaadttee on Nationalised Industries is evidence that this change occurred: (35) 
'The primary, though not only, function of the trade unions 
is to protect and advance the interests of their meabers by 
negotiating with the employer improvements in their wages 
and condition. of .-ployaent; the details of which are 
embodied in collective agreements. The Steel Committee are 
no exception to this rule and by far the greater amount of 
their time has been spent in negotiations of this kind. On 
every issue of national importance except one, the Committee 
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now negotiate as a whole; only on wages and salaries 
does each constituent organisation continue to 
negotiate separately. Thus recognition, holiday pay, 
employment and income security, sick pay and pensions 
are all negotiated at national level between the Steel 
Committee and the Corporation' 
Also, Dai Davis, in reply to a question from a m~ber of the Select Committee 
aimed at discovering the degree of unity within the Steel Committee, said: (36) 
• 
'We speak as a Committee representing unions operating 
in the steel industry but this does not take away the 
autonomy of each union. We seek to make our decisions 
on a collective basis' 
In addition, under the Heath Government's Counter Inflation Policy, Phase 
Three, the Steel Committee went further and negotiated a threshold agre .. ent on 
behalf of its constituent unions. Thus, for the first t~e, the Committee 
had got itself directly involved in wage negotiations.(37) Such a chanae, given 
the background against which it commenced, must be considered remarkable. 
The tactics adopted by the Corporation were an important factor influencing 
the development of the Committee's negotiating role. ODe Corporation tactic 
was to keep the ateel unions together, by using where possible the TOC 
Secretariat as a unifying influence. This was achieved by making the Secretariat 
the centre of a network of formal and informal communications between the 
Corporation and the Steel Committee. The Corporation through the Secretariat 
fed in ideas and information, and also obtained early warnin& of eom.!ttee 
discussions in order to influence these prior to a decision. Another tactic 
the Corporation used to maintain interest in the Steel Committee was to push 
at it i.aues of c~n concern to all the unions. This tactic was greatly 
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helped by the Corporation's rationalisation programme. As a consequence the 
unions became increasingly concerned with works closures. For example, in a 
letter dated 5th April, 1968 the TUC Assistant General Secretary info~ed the 
Corporation that the Steel Committee unions were seeking much more detailed 
information of the Corporation's immediate proposals. Subsequent meetings 
discussed proposed closures at Irlam, Park Gate and at other works. One out-
come of the discussions was the establishment of an "early warning" procedure 
on closures. Thus, the unions came to see the need for a forum to discuss this 
problem on a joint basis. 
The unity of the Steel Committ~e was also encouraged by the union 
recognition issue. As stated previously, on 10th July, 1969 the six Steel 
Committee unions and the Corporation agreed union recognition rights for manual 
and white collar employees. Later confusion arose over middle manag.-ent 
grades which the unions believed to be included in the agreement, whereas the 
Corporation claimed they were excluded. The Corporation araued that this largely 
non-unionised group should have the opportunity to choose the union they 
preferred to represent their interests. At this time, the newly formed Steel 
Industry Management Association was claiming recognition on their behalf.(38} 
The Steel Committee resolutely opposed SIMA's right to do so. The Corporation 
tried unsuccessfully to win the Steel Committee's acceptance of SIMA. Finally, 
on 27th February, 1969 the Corporation issued a statement granting SIMA recog-
nition for middle management grades. This was a severe blow to the Steel 
Committee, but particularly for the Confederation which stood to lose much under 
the rationalisation programme, and sought a compen.ati .. benefit from recruibBent 
in this area. Moreover, the Committee's resentment of the Corporation was 
heightened further by the alleged activities of the latter. The six unions 
claimed, with some evidence, that the Corporation was actively encouraging 
employees to join SIMA throughout 1967-68. 
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However, the recognition dispute which caused most hltterness was the 
struggle between the Steel Committee unions and the Association of Scientific 
Technical and Managerial Staffs and the Association of Professional Executive 
Clerical and Computer Staff. Before nationalisation both ASTMS and APEX claimed 
some scattered membership and local recognition in the industry, and during 
1966-67 were actively recruiting and expanding their membership. After the 10th 
July agreement, the 'Two' (as they came to be known) made representations to 
the TUC, and subsequent discussions took place between the TUC's Organisation 
Committee, the Steel Committee and the 'Two' unions. The outcome was a General 
Council recommendation confirming the 10th July agreement. In response, ASTMS 
and APEX took strike action both in the industry and also in sections of the 
engineering industry. As a result, the Secretary of State set up a Court of 
Enquiry in July, 1968 under Lord Pearson. The Court concluded that the agreement 
of 10th July was unfair, and recommended that the 'Two' be granted national 
recognition. The Corporation felt obliged to make some accommodation to the 
Court's decision, and met the Steel Committee late in 1968 to find a compromise. 
However, the latter refused to concede anything to ASTMS and APEX. In December 
1968 the Corporation issued a unilateral statement granting some further local 
recognition to the 'Two'. At this, the Steel Committee decided that 
constituent union members would take orders only from supervisors who were 
members of Steel Committee unions, and handle work approved only by members of 
nationally recognised unions. Again the industry was threatened with disruption, 
and the Secretary of State asked the TUC to intervene. The General Council 
then recommended that national recognition be confined to the Steel Committee 
unions, and that ASTMS and APEX recognition be limited to what they had secured 
by 10th July, 1967. On the 27th February, 1969 the Corporation iaaued a revised 
policy statement largely confirming the TUC recom.endation, but including a 
further slight accommodation to the 'Two'. This gave local recognition in those 
establishments where they already had in membership on 1st February, 1969 a 
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majority of the staff concerned, and where none of the Steel Committee unions 
were recognised locally for that grade. 
The hostility generated by the recognition dispute was an important factor 
in the development of Steel Committee cohesion. To use a political analogy, 
the steel unions perceived the 'Two' unions and to some extent SIMA and the 
Corporation as enemies encroaching upon or attempting to annex some of their 
territory. Their reaction closely resembled the often noted situation where 
divisions within a country become unimportant with the emergence of an external 
threat. This conclusion is captured in the following statement made at the 
1969 Trades Union Congress by Mr RA Grantham, General Secretary of APEX.(39) 
'Over the years there has been an unhappy history of inter-
union relationships within the steel industry. With the 
prospect of nationalisation in 1967 the TUe established a 
Steel Committee to help overcome the problems. Unfortunately, 
only the-main manual unions were represented. It is a fact of 
history that any alliance that is formed on an exclusive basis 
cements its cooperation by turning against others. The Steel 
Committee unions ended their old feuds by deciding to divide 
the white collar workers in the industry among themselves' 
Another insight into the growing cohesion of the Steel Committee to arise 
out of the recognition dispute shows the diminishing influence of the TUC 
General Council in Steel Committee affairs. This came to a head when the 'Two' 
unions challenged what seemed to them the privileged position occupied by the 
Steel Committee within the TUC. The six unions responded by claiming the 
authority to make autonomous decisions under the auspices of the Steel Comadttee. 
Hence the Steel Committee said,(40) 'if the General Council decide to overrule 
the Committee on this issue (recognition), the Committee would have to consider 
reconstituting themselves as a separate body'. The Committee's weakening 
relationship with the General Council was reflected in its decision to cease 
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sending its minutes to the General Council. 
The Committee's negotiating function was further assisted by the 
Corporation's productivity progr."U.1l,a. 1'h59 .H'·)~raJ!l!le will be dealt with in 
some detail below as the third main strategic initiative undertaken by manage-
ment. Meantime, the Corporation presented the programme to the Steel Committee 
rather than to the individual trade unions in order to obtain its involvement. 
This decision was the res1tlt of several informal meetings held with union 
leaders early in 1968. To reinforce the decision the productivity programme 
made the following point. 'It is hoped that the conference (where the pro&ramme 
was presented to the Steel Committee) may be able to discuss and settle 
procedures for carrying the proposals through the various stages'. In other 
words, due to the difficulties described above, it was not possible at this 
stage to achieve a new formal recognition and procedure agreement for manual 
grades cove .. ing all the trade unions; therefore, the Corporation's aim was to 
try to make the Steel Committee the de facto head of the national consultative 
and collective bargaining machinery. 
In addition, the programme itself contained features which were likely 
to encourage trade union cooperation. These included certain items such as 
holidays, pensions and sickness benefits which logh/ally were more easily 
negotiated from a trade union point of view on a joint ba.il. Secondly, the 
productivity p'rogramme was a long term plan phasing in improvements over three 
years. This provided the opportunity for sustained contact between the steel 
unions and for cooperative attitudes to develop. Finally, although the Steel 
Committee initially drew a distinction between consultation and negotiation, 
this in practice turned out to be difficult to sustain. 
With regard to the ISTC, the union in many respects led the Steel Committee 
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fight on recognition. It devoted much time and energy to the issue as can be 
seen from the space taken up by this problem at union executive meetings(41) 
and in the union's journal, "Man and Metal tl • All these events (that is, the 
recognition dispute, the rationalisation programme, and the tactics used by the 
Corporation) played a significant part in ISTC's adjustment to the idea of 
sharing sovereignty. In addition, the Confederation stood to gain most by 
enlisting the support of the other trade unions during the recognition dispute. 
Finally, the retirement of Sir Harry Douglas and the appointment of a new 
General Secretary with views more accommodative to the craftsmen helped the 
adjustment in this direction. 
Part Four, The National Productivity Programme 
This programme was the most important industrial relations initiative 
undertaken by management in response to the industry's changing circumstances. 
It aimed at covering all manual workers employed under the heavy steel 
agreements made between the unions and the ISTEA;(42) such agreements covered 
some 134,000 employees. Also, the document was the most comprehensive in terms 
of the range of issues covered. 
The origins of the productivity programme are to be found in the Jones 
Working Party set up on 4th November, 1965. Initially, the working party was 
set up in response to a specific claim by the ISTC for an annual guaranteed 
wage. This claim reflected a general climate of opinion which, at the time, 
aimed at improving income and employment security for all industrial grades. 
While dealing with this specific claim, the working party went further and 
recommended that the Association undertake an extensive study of its future 
industrial relations policy. It said:(43) 
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''['lie working party unanimously came to the conclusion 
that the defensive strategy hitherto adopted should, at 
this point in time, be replaced by a positive policy 
designed to achieve simplification of wages structure, 
[l,':d:)ility of 'o1orking, reduction lYl the TJlultt£llicity of 
wage rates, reduction in manning and other measures 
designed to achieve optimum utilisation of labour in 
return for which workers should receive security of 
employment and predetennined monetory compensation for 
working on a system of work most appropriate to the order 
book as may be detp.rmined by management from time to time' 
The working party received authority to continue, and in their investi-
gation took cognizance of previous reports by the Benson, the Morris and the 
Morley Working Parties. In June, 1967 it published a report entitled 'Manning, 
Wages Structure and Security of Employment' for management consumption only. 
The Report dealt in detail with the aims of such a programme and the means of 
achieving them. The basic principle was that the costs incurred in reforming 
the wage structure and in improving security of employment should be met from 
savings in labour costs. (44) 
With nationalisation the Personnel and Social Policy DeparbDent was 
established under Ron Smith as Board Member in charge. The depart.ent's 
objective was: 'to ensure the efficient and socially responsible utilisation 
of human resources'. (45) bnmediatety the personnel department was actively 
engaged in the formulation of a new long term strategy. This involved internal 
discussions with the personnel directors at group level, and also within the 
Personnel Advisory Committee which contained many of the old company industrial 
relations managers. Also, the discussions served the purp08e of winning the 
commitment of the industry's management, many of whom were ideologically 
opposed to nationalisation and likely to regard any new Corporation policy with 
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little enthusiasm. Moreover, in an organisation the size of the Corporation 
(employing at forflll:l t.' Jr, 2r,,'), 000) the successful implementation of policy 
depended on the commitment of local management. In addition, the department 
of Personnel and Social Policy was attempting to assess the potential resources 
that existed within the organisation in order to implement the new policy. 
This involved getting works level management to provide information (mostly by 
rule of thumb) on the manning reductions that were possible, and the work 
study and industrial relations personnel they employed. 
The outcome was the acceptance of the Jones Working Party Report as the 
primary document upon which the Corporation's strategy would be based, altered 
in places to suit the needs of a single employer. At the same time it is 
worth noting that there was no sudden change compared with earlier developments, 
a fact which was likely to improve the commitment of existing managers. Never-
theless, nationalisation probably had the effect of increasing the pace of 
policy change, and thereby giving urgency to the Jones Report. A draft 
programme was submitted to the Corporation Board seeking permission to commence 
discussions with the trade unions, and approval wa. granted on April 11th, 1968. 
The productivity programme was presented to the Steel Committee on 10th 
May, 1968 (it was a green booklet and came to be known as the 'Green Book') 
and contained the following main objectives:(46) 
'(a) A highly efficient labour force which can be deployed 
flexibly to meet works' operating need. 
(b) A more effective and more equitable wage structure 
(c) Conditions of employment which will provide a greater 
security and stability of earnings' 
The means of achieving these objectives was through the negotiation of 
a fr .. ework productivity agreement with the steel unions at national level, 
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then, within this framework agreement, by the negotiation of local productivity 
agreements. As in the Morley Report, a national Review Committee was to be 
established to monitor the local productivity negotiations. More specifically, 
the programme's proposal for achieving manpower reductions was to get union 
acceptance of management's right to introduce work measurement techniques. 
This was likely to give rise to two problems of which the Corporation were 
aware. The first concerned the use of work measurement techniques. The 
industry had made little use of work study, and local management and trade 
union officials would need to be prepared for its use. Therefore, the 
Corporation proposed to offer appreciation courses at all levels. Furthe~ore, 
work study engineers were in short supply indicating a need to revise training 
and recruibment policies. The Jones Working Party had estimated that the 
work study staff should be about 1% of the work force. The second problem 
concerned the use of work study findings since the BSC saw these as a means of 
reasserting control over manning standards. The Green Book put it as follows:(47 
'The results of work study investigations will be made 
available to both management and trade unions and 
joint consultation will take place before any recommend-
ations are implemented. Although IUnag_ent must have 
the right to implement the manning which work study 
discloses as appropriate' 
Management in attemptJ.1\g to secure sole prerogative on lI8IUling levels 
was departing from established practice by which production -.naing was 
jointly agreed. The idea was strongly held, at least by senior manag_ent, 
and can be traced through the deliberations of the Morris and Jone. Working 
Partie.. Moreover, it is interesting that the Corporation should consider 
that a move in this direction was possible through "objective" work study 
techniques. 
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Reform of the wage structure was another main feature of the productivity 
programme. This, the Corporation argued would help curb wage drift and 
provide an important aid to works level productivity bargaining. The main 
proposals covering premium payments are contained in the next table. 
Table 3.2 
Proposed Premium Payments to Wages, May 1968 
Shif ts, ~1onday to Friday 
Weekend Premiums, Saturday 
Sunday 
Day shift,Monday to Friday,plain time 
Saturday, plus 50% 
Sunday, plus 100% 
6.00 a.m.- 2.00 p.m.,plain time 
2.00 p.m.-lO.OO p.m.,plus 12~% 
10.00 p.m.- 6.00 a.m.,plus 25% 
6.00 a.m.- 2.00 p.m.,plus 501-
2.00 p.m.-10.00 p.m.,plus 501. 
10.00 p.m.- 6.00 a.m.,plus 1007-
6.00 a.m.- 2.00 p.m.,plus 100% 
2.00 p.m.-lO.OO p.m.,plus 100% 
10.00 p.m.- 6.00 a.m.,plus 501. 
Overtime, hours worked plus 501. on time and bonus rates, except 
at weekends when premiums apply only. 
source: BSe, National Productivity Programme 
The proposals aimed at establishing uniform t~e conditions which would 
replace the different conditions existing for various groups in respect of 
shift premiums and overti.e payments. Both production and maintenance workers 
were paid a cost of living payment which the progr ... e proposed to consolidate 
into their respective shift and hourly rates. In addition, the production 
operatives tonnage bonus was to be l~lted to a maximum of 25% of total 
shift earnings. Tonnage bonus for these workers was based on the standard 
output of specific units of plant, and will be dealt with in the works case 
.tudies. This latter proposal was .eant to t.prove the stability of the 
production workers earnings. OD the other hand, the craft ... n in addition to 
their hourly rate had a different wage structure. The extra pa,..nts derived 
from the Nov .. ber 1964 Ifficiency, Service and Qualifications aareeaent were 
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to be consolidated into the hourly rate. Also, craftsnen were paid a 
tonnage bonus, but on a weekly and not a shift basis. The weekly bonus was 
calculated on a standard output for the whole works and not individual units 
of plant as with production workers. The Green Book proposed to consolidate 
into the hourly rate 35/- of this weekly bonus. Finally, the rotating shift 
payment to craftsnen was to be consolidated into the hourly rate. These 
simplifications to the wage structure would help to improve the flexible 
deployment of manpower at works level. 
Improved security of employment was yet another main feature of the 
programme. This included improvement in the guaranteed week from four to five 
shifts; also, provision for maintainiub a workman's earnings if demoted within 
a promotion ladder, or alternatively redeployed to another promotion line.(48) 
This latter provision would keep a man's earnings at 807. of his previous 
earnings for a period of 13 weeks after which it would diminish progressively. 
Associated with these proposals was the need to work out procedures to handle 
redeployment and redundancy. The measures were aimed at easing resistance to 
the rationalisation programme. 
The programme also included provision for improving the holiday with pay 
scheme, and introducing for manual workers pensions and sick pay. These were 
the symbols of the Corporation's intention to improve its employees' conditions 
of employment. On the issues of holidays with pay and pensions, the 
Corporation's proposals differed from the Jones Working Party recomaendations. 
In the former case, the working party had considered improvement too costly, 
and pensions to be outwith their remit.(49) Another main proposal was to 
set up a joint working party to investigate and determine the best method of 
applying job evaluation within the Corporation. On this point the 
Corporation was seeking from the unions acceptance in principle of a scheme 
for the future. This proposal went beyond the Jones Report which had 
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recommended a crude job grading structure and that an Association working 
party should be set up to study the technique. 
It was the Corporation's aim to introduce these proposals over a three 
year period as follows: 
Table 3.3 
Implementation Plan for Productivity Programme, May 1968 
Year One 
Year Two 
Year Three 
Standard Time Conditions, Guaranteed Week, Redeployment 
Benefits, and Discontinuance of Cost of Living Payment. 
Holiday with Pay and Pensions 
Further rationalisation of the Wage Structure and 
Job Evaluation 
source: BSC National Productivity Programme 
The Corporation estimated that over three years the programme would add 
15.6% to the total wage bill. This consisted of 4.6% or £6.6 millions in year 
one, and 5.5% or £7.9 millions per annum for years two and three each. The 
proposed wage structure reform was the largest single cost, estimated at 
3.3% or £4.7 millions. This was followed by the pension scheme at 1.2% or 
£1.7 million per annum. All the other items if taken separately were very 
much less expensive. On the savings side, the Corporation estimated that 
cancellation of the cost of living payment would amount to 2% of the wage 
bill in 1969 (that is, the first full year). However, given the aim that the 
programme should pay for itself, the Corporation estimated that labour inputs 
in man years had to be reduced by 5,850 in 1969, 6,960 in 1970 and again 
6,960 in 1971. 
Another important aspect of the Corporation's strategy not explicit in 
the programme, was the desire to achieve greater inter-union co-ordination 
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at works level. This ,.;'as implicit in the logie of the Green Book and in 
some respects was vital to its success. For example, if the full benefits 
of demanning, work reorganisation, and increased labour mobility and flexibility 
were to be achieved, then works or near works-wide agreements were necessary. 
Why the Corporation did not make this explicit in the programme is not known, 
but it probably arose from the difficulties of getting some degree of multi-
union negotiations at national level. In addition to the national union 
problem, a further problem existed in the multi-branch structure of the 
producti<'H1. untol1s. The steel industry with branches based in the work place 
has a tradition of branch and work group autonomy. In addition, the production 
unions' rule c-JOO~s 3ave formal author! ty to the local braneh to negotiate with 
management on time and bonus rates. These two aspects will be considered in 
detail tn the works case studies on Ravenscraig and Corby. Given the small 
size of branches, and that several existed in most large works, an extra 
constraint was placed upon attaining the objectives of the productivity 
programme. Therefore, the productivity programme also contained implieations 
for production union branch relationships. It is in this respect that the 
twin strategies of the Corporation, of seeking to increase union co-ordination 
through both the programme and the Steel Committee, most clearly coincide and 
can be seen as parts of an integrated whole. 
Finally, a word ought to be said concerning the influence of the Prices 
and Incomes Policy on the formulation of the programme. This seems to have 
had some influence, in that Corporation executives (during March and April, 
1968) held several meetings with the Ministry of Power. Ministry officials 
seemed to. have expressed concern that the programme (whieh, as a proposed 
framework agreement, by itself did not reduee the manning by a single perlOn) 
should not exeeed the Government's 3~t wage ceiling established in April, 1968. 
Also, they wanted the benefits phased-in over a longer period and in addition 
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they cast doubt upon the ':stirn-sted costs and benefits of reforming the wage 
structure - the costliest item. The Corporation met the Ministry's main 
point, namely that the proposals would not exceed 3~% per annum in the first 
year. This appears to have been achieved by building in estimated savings to 
be derived from abolishing the cost of living payment. In other words, the 
Corporation took account of Incomes Policy and had to adjust the programme to 
conform with it. However, Incomes Policy was not a major determining factor 
tn the development of the Corporation's productivity programme. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The main purpose of this chapter has been to describe the strategies 
adopted by management to solve the problems identified in Chapter Two. The 
strategies aimed to improve labour productivity and thereby financial results, 
and to achieve this While maintaining reasonable stability in industrial 
relations. Secondly, the Chapter has attempted to identify the important 
factors influencing the selection of these strategies. The discussion began 
with a brief description of the origin and development of the economic and 
technological problems facing the British steel industry. To these problans 
the industry responded with a programme to concentrate output in large hot 
metal integrated works near to deep water ports and to phase out older, smaller 
and high cost units of plant. 
ISTEA took the first major initiative among maintenance workers in 1966. 
Significantly, this involved a major departure from the earlier ad hoc, 
defensive policy to a more positive, joint participative approach towards 
tackling the industry's problems. Several fa«ors influenced the employers' 
decision to adopt productivity bargaining; these included product market 
changes, nationalisation and Incomes Policy; but the most important factor 
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was the need to promote a change in industrial relations by an appropriate 
method in a heavily unionised industry. Since information on productivity 
bargaining was spreading steadily during the 1960s, the employers decided 
upon this strategy as a response to the situation. Nevertheless, this decision 
was only reached after political developments had occurred within the Associatio~ 
A second strategy aimed to increase the degree of inter-union co-ordination 
by reforming the national collective bargaining arrangements on issues of 
common interest. This proved difficult to achieve owing to the history of 
union rivalry. Consequently, the initial idea of a comprehensive recognition 
and procedure agreement and NJIC was discarded in favour of a new institution 
known as the Steel Committee. Initially no more than a loose consultative 
body, it took on a negotiating function over a period of time. The main 
reason for this change of function was the creation of a single employer with 
a coherent and authoritative strategy at the centre. This included a forceful 
representation of the rationalisation strategy including works closures and 
redundancies, assisted by tactics giving support to the TUC Secretariat as a 
unifying influence. 
The Confederation proved a major obstacle to greater inter-union co-
ordination, although the craft unions and general uniol\s favoured the idea of 
an NJC. The ISTC due to its history, ideology, power and statu. found it 
difficult to come to terms with the changes taking place in the industry. For 
example, the Corporation's rationalisation progr ... e was reducing the number 
of process worker. faster than the number of other grade. of employee. To 
compensate the Confederation attempted to recruit white collar and middle 
manageaent grades, but were opposed by the white collar unions, SIMA, ASTMS 
and APEX. As a result, a vicious inter-union recognition dispute broke out, 
and the Confederation sought au alliance with the Steel eom.!ttee uuious. 
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This experience had the effect of welding the Steel Committee into a cohe.ive 
body, and led to the ending of old inter-union rivalries. 
Central to the Corporation strategy wa. the productivity programme. 
Manpower utilisation was to be improved through the introduction of work 
measurement and local productivity agreeaent.. The.e techniques would allow 
management to regain control over production manning .tandard.. R.fo~ of the 
wage .tructure was planned in order to remove certain ob.tacle. to the flexible 
and mobile u.e of manpower, whil.t the elimina~ion of certain anomalies wa. 
seen a. helping to curb wage drift. Improvement8 in 8ecurity of .-ployaent 
were likely to reduce trade union resistance to change. All three elements 
were to remove differences between grades of workers, establi8hed by 
autonomous trade union bargaining, and thereby improve 8tability in indu8trial 
relatioDs. 
The above then, were the major .trategies dev.lop.d by ........ nt in 
re8pon8e to the pre.sure. generated by the chaaaiug 8ituation facing the 
indu8try in the p.riod under review. The next Chapt.r will deal with 
national •• Iotiation. b.t. ••• the parties, and in particular with trade union 
re.pon.e. to the8e initiative •• 
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Chapter Four 
Action: Negotiations and Productivity Agreements 
The previous Chapter identified various strategies developed by management 
in response to the industry's changing environmental circumstances and the 
major problems these generated. They involved a plan to rationalise the industry': 
technology, location and organisation, with a view to increasing efficiency. 
Also, ISTEA's initiative aimed at improving the utilisation of maintenance 
manpower. Then, most importantly, with the establishment of BSe (covering 
90% of the industry's crude steel making capacity), came a productivity 
programme aimed at facilitating the rationalisation strategy. Also, the 
productivity programme aimed at achieving a reasonable degree of orderly change 
in the industrial relations system. Therefore, BSC took the initiative in 
reforming the traditional autonomous and fragmented collective bargaining 
arrangements at national level and sought the creation of the Trade Union Steel 
Industry Consultative Committee. 
This Chapter aims to analyse the national negotiations and their results. 
Attention is focused upon management's tactics to implement the strategies 
identified in the last Chapter. Also analysed are trade union responses, 
objectives and counter strategies, if any. In addition, attention is given to 
internal differences within management and trade union organisations, and to 
how these influenced negotiations between the parties. The Chapter begins 
with the introduction of the 40 hour week for shift production workers. This 
va. not dealt with in the previous Chapter as no long te~ agreement on it 
existed. Nevertheless, as a type of productivity agreement it contained 
implications for the works level case studies. The Chapter then analyses the 
approach of the parties to "The More Effective Use f Ma o intenance Manpower". 
73. 
This is followed by an examination of the negotiating process surrounding 
the national productivity programme. 
Part One, Shift Production Workers, The 40 Hour Week Agreement 
This agreement was referred to in Chapter Two, where it was used to 
illustrate the competitive nature of national level collective b.rgaining. To 
recall, the Confederation submitted a claim for a 40 hour week in .utumn 1964, 
and agreement was reached to introduce it with no loss of earnings on 4th July, 
1965. The Association then offered the 40 hour week to .11 the unions which, 
with the exception of the NUBF, accepted. The latter union decided to pursue a 
claim for night shift premium payments which were subsequently awarded by • 
Board of Arbitration. Consequently, the Association offered the ISTC night 
premiums if the union dropped the 40 hour week. The Confeder.tion refused the 
offer and instead lodged a claim for night shift premiums in .ddition to the 
40 hour week. The Association, and later a Board of Arbitration, rejected the 
claim. The union at this point accepted the night premium offer .nd agreed to 
forego the 40 hour week for shift production workers, subject to the following: 
•••••• 40 hour week for shift production workers sh.ll 
be subject to a fresh claim not earlier th.n June, 1966 
••••• a 40 hour week for such workers be introduced in 
December, 1966 subject to an agreement having been re.ched 
on the conditions to apply' 
This meant th.t .pproximately two thirds of the membership of the production 
unions remained on the 42 hour week. 
As events turned out it w.s not pos.ible to in~roduce the .ar .... at by 
Dec.-ber 1966, owina to the then prices .nd incoaes st.ndstill of July, 1966. 
This policy placed • It.it.tion upon the p.rtie., who then entered into 
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discussions on how best to implement their agreement. Management argued that 
the 40 hour week could be introduced at no extra cost to the industry by 
reduced manning. The union's national leadership showed little resistance to 
this proposal, although they did express concern over possible difficulties at 
some of the works. 
This difference in attitudes and interests between the union'. leadership 
and some rank and file members has been noted previously by other writers on 
industrial relations. Walton and McKersie(l) show that, with vertical differ-
entation within a union, top officers are more concerned with precadeut, policy, 
and public image than are the rank and file. In other word., the Confederation's 
officers were committed to the 40 hour week for all workers due to the earlier 
agreement, but the membership less so with the proposed redaction in manning. 
As a result of this internal difference the trade union leadership sought fro. 
management the following clause a~ed at strengthening their hand over t.plement-
ation: (2) 
'Conscious of the need to increase efficiency to meet 
intense world competition the Association and the 
Confederation shall join in making every effort to 
secure improved productivity in all the industry's 
operations by the elimination of wasteful practices 
and by the most effective use of manpower and working 
methods. To this end the Confederation will cooperata 
with manageaent in making possible the introduction, at 
no extra cost to the industry, of a 40 hour week 
(average) for shift production worker.' 
Local resistance to the 40 hour week was also encouraged by the technical 
complexities of operating such a rota on many units of plant. In recognition 
of this, the agre ... nt allowed for the contiuuation of the 42 hour week rota, 
with the proyiSO that the individual employee take an unpaid shift off eyery 
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four weeks. In this case the manning was not aUlMented. 
The agreement contained two further interesting features. Firstly,. 
prep.r.tory period was accepted running from February to 1st July, during 
which consultations were to take place locally to agree the necessary manning 
reductions prior to implementation. Secondly, a joint sub-committee v.s to be 
set up to monitor progress and handle disputes .rising over ~leaent.tiou. 
The blastfurnacemen continued to show no interest in the 40 hour week 
throughout 1967. However, in 1968 the position changed, with the union submitting 
a claim on 12th November. The Corporation's response {the Association was 
formally wound up on 7th March, 1968} was to offer the 40 hour we.k, but on the 
same terms as those accepted previously by the Confederation. 
This offer was unacc.ptable to the union, which argued that the 40 bour 
w •• k was g.n.ral throughout industry. Also, the blastfurnacemen's productivity 
had incr •• s.d by 33t betw •• n 1967 and 1968 due partly to the .fforts of th.ir 
memb.rs. In addition, th. standard manning was jointly .gr •• d, .nd 1f •• uag.-
m.nt wish.d a r.vision the matt.r should b. pursued through the 1957 procedure 
.gr .... nt. As. result, the union cl.imed the 40 hour we.k .s • richt without 
the need to p.y for it by • aaupower reduction. 
Th. Corpor.tion question.d the v.lidity of the union's case arauing that 
productivity h.d l.rgely incre.sed through i.,roved org.nisation .nd t.chno-
logic.l inno •• tion. With reg.rd to the 1957 .ar .... nt ..... g ... nt had fail.d 
to achiev. a .. nnina revision by this approach. Also. the c1i .. te of the late 
1960's •• s h.avily influ.nc.d by the Corporation's discussions with other 
unions ov.r the productivity programm.. Thus. to have .et the blastfuruac •• en's 
cl.~ without productivity casc.ssions, would have encour.ged .. expectation on 
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the part of the Confederation for a similar 57. concession. Furthermore, the 
Corporation was caught between the productivity progr~e (with a cost of 4.67. 
in year one) and the prices and incomes policy (with its 3.51. ceiling) which 
ruled out any additional wage concession to the blastfurnacemen. Therefore, 
the Corporation wished to avoid doing anything which would endanger the Green 
Book, and insisted that the issue be dealt with as part of the programme. As a 
result the negotiations became deadlocked, and finally the claim was referred 
to arbitration. 
The arbitration board made its award on 22nd August 1969,(3) giving the 
40 hour week, but also strongly recommending the parties to introduce it on 
te~s similar to those adopted in the agreement between the Corporation and the 
Confederation. 
To conclude, the 40 hour week provided a national framework within which 
works level manning negotiations, and the associated reallocation of duties were 
to be conducted. For most shift production workers it was th~ forerunner to 
the productivity programme and therefore contained implications for local 
productivity bargaining to be carried out under it. Secondly, it is tempting 
to view the blastfurnacemen's hard attitude towards the 40 hour week as an 
expression of inter-union rivalry and an attempt to win an advantage over ISTC. 
The union's motivation in this instance however is better explained by a concern 
for its falling membership,(4) heightened by its small size. Both unions were 
experiencing a simi~ar fall in manual membership, but the position of ISTC was 
very different. The Confederation was larger in size, power and status, but 
most important, it stood to gain more from the recruitment of white collar 
workers. Finally, although this principle of conceding the 40 hour week at no 
extra cost to the industry reflected a developing management concern with 
improving manpower efficiency, on this occasion it was largely the result of 
intervention by the prices and incomes policy. 
... 
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Part Two, The More Effective Use of Maintenance Manpower 
In February, 1966 the Association established the Morley Working Party 
to investigate the best means of improving maintenance manpower productivity; 
their report became Association policy towards the end of 1966. However, within 
the working party, disagreement arose over the means of achieving an improvement 
in productivity. In particular the south Yorkshire company favoured a one-off 
agreement giving weight to the introduction of work measurement and financial 
incentives, whilst the others preferred initially to tackle the overmanning 
problem (that is, restrictive practices, systematic overtime, etc.,) followed 
by a second phase which introduced work measurement and financial incentives. 
Also, the Association decided to change its attitude to the craft unions, which 
had previously been defensive keeping communications to a minimum; it now 
decided upon a more participative approach. These policy decisions led to the 
Eastbourne Conference held on 19th January, 1967. 
Eastbourne was a consultative meeting at which management submitted to 
the unions the document entitled "The More Effective Use of Maintenance Manpower" 
as a basis for discussion.(5) ISTEA's main tactic was to win the commibDent of 
union full-time officials to an informal national understanding based upon 
common principles within which local bargaining would be conducted. Consequently, 
there was no need to develop joint institutions to monitor progress and to 
ensure conformdty. Moreover, no mention was made of the Association's own 
Review Committee, which, as described in Chapter Three, was given authority to 
scrutinise the various companies' proposals, both before meeting the unions 
and during negotiations.(6) It would appear therefore that the Association's 
conversion to an open participative approach was not quite complete. 
This was due partly to ISTEA's traditional ideology generating mistrust and 
suspicion, but also for other reasons discussed below • 
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How did the unions react to these proposals? They were suspicious of 
the Association's switch in policy, but both at Eastbourne and at the meetings 
which followed the craft unions were concerned about two issues. One concerned 
the relaxation of craft job demarcations, and the other the shift of emphasis 
in formal negotiations to works level. 
As regards the former, the steel industry employs only a small proportion 
of the total membership of the craft unions which outside of the industry do 
not confine recruibnent to craftsmen; nevertheless they are heavily influenced 
by their craft ideology. (7) Thus management are often faced with union rules 
(such as restrictive job practices and on the apprenticeship) associated with 
wider craft protection which they find restrictive in the specific situation. 
ISTEA's proposals, by relating improvements in earnings to improv,ed productivity, 
challenged the existence of these accepted principles. This presented a 
problem to the craftsmen and their unions. 
Secondly, the emphasis upon local productivity negotiations to some extent 
reversed the direction along which the unions had been moving for several years. 
Before 1949 there were no national negotiations in steel covering craftsmen. 
In fact, the National Joint Trade Union Craftsmen's Iron and Steel Committee 
was only created in the late 1940's, and a national procedure agreement signed 
with the Association on 19th January, 1949. Unt'U that time, wages and other 
conditions of employment were negotiated either at works' or district level.(8) 
Dissatisfied with the differences in wage levels throughout the United Kinedom, 
the craft unions pressed for, and won, a uniform wage structure with a 
consolidated national hourly rate. This was partly conceded in an Industrial 
Court Award of 13th August, 1949.(9) Given this trend to centralised bargaining 
would the NCCCallow a larger proportion of the craftsmens earnings to be 
settled at local level? (lO) 
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After Eastbourne the craft unions rapidly faced up to both these problems. 
On the issue of restrictive job practices the NCCC's attitude (as represented 
by the full-time officials) was positive. They accepted management's argument 
that maintenance efficiency had to be improved by accepting inter-craft flexi-
bility and similar issues. The craft unions' attitude was probably influenced 
by their experience of productivity bargaining at Port Talbot Works,(ll) and 
in other industries. Also, the NeCC, in their document entitled "Proposals for 
Nationalisation", clearly showed their positive attitude to improving the 
industry's efficiency.(l2) However, nationalisation although a positive factor 
was not the most important one determining the craft response. This was mainly 
influenced by the long run objective to improve their members' relative 
position in the industry's wage league compared with production and other workers 
in outside industries. The previous chapter showed the existence of bitter 
competition between the craft and production unions over this issue. Moreover 
the national November 1964 Ten Shillings Efficiency, Service and Qualification 
agreement, was a concession by the employers' association to this pressure. 
This agreement recognised the enhanced status of the craftsmen, it allowed 
increased flexibility between them, and recognised ,their increasing skills due 
to technological advance. Therefore, the Association's proposals coincided 
with an increasing realisation by the craft unions that their long run objective 
could only be achieved if craft work came to be perceived by management as more 
skilled and responsible. Finally, on the question of prices and incomes policy, 
although ISTEA's proposals conformed with this, it did not appear to be an 
important consideration with the trade unions. 
Secondly, the shift of emphasis from national to local bargaining was also 
accepted by the NCCC. The craft unions' initial response was to negotiate a 
formal national agreement. The Association rejected the idea. Seemingly, the 
Association was attempting to avoid giving the non-craft unions an argument 
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for submitting a national wage claim which may not have paid attention to the 
craftsmens' productivity criteria. With the employers firmly opposed to a 
formal national agreement, even of the framework type, the NCCC accepted the 
Association's proposals in order to achieve its own wage objectives.(13) 
However, in agreeing to the proposal the craft unions pressed for and 
achieved a uniform understanding that phase one agreements would pay between 
£2 and £3 per week across the country. As a consequence the national unde~stand­
ing did not weaken the negotiating function of the national union officers. 
Also, it coincided with the desire of the employers' associations, reflected by 
the Review Committee, to avoid wage leapfrogging between steel works. 
With the national understanding, the Sheffield area went ahead quickly 
and conducted their own type of agreement based upon work measurement, planned 
maintenance systems, and financial incentives. This agreement which paid about 
£6 per week for average performance was operating by the middle of 1968. the 
speed at which United Steel Companies Ltd., implemented their scheme was the 
result of previous local discussions held ~rior to the national understanding 
with the District Craft Committee. 
Meanwhile, the other companies began to draw up plans for submission to 
the Review Committee for approval. As local negotiations got underway throughout 
1967 and 68 they were caught up in an increasingly complex situation with the 
submission of the Corporation's national productivity programme to the unions 
in May, 1968. To understand the complexity it is necessary to clarify the 
overlap between "The MOre Effective Use of Maintenance Manpower" proposals and 
the productivity programme, without pre-empting the analysis of the latter to 
be dealt with in the next part of this chapter. 
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The national productivity programme referred to such items as work measure-
ment, local productivity deals, and planned maintenance systems, which were all 
part of "The More Effective Use of Maintenance Manpower" agreement. In a sense 
the Association/Corporation having obtained NCCC agreement to introduce local 
productivity bargaining for no extra national payment, were subsequently doing 
so through the productivity programme. However, such a criticism ignores the 
fact that the productivity programme was much more comprehensive in several 
respects. Firstly, it aimed at reforming the wage structure for all manual 
workers, and also contained employment and income security proposals. Secondly, 
the Corporation wished to move quickly on the maintenance proposals and as a 
result, although incorporated into the framework of the national productivity 
programme, decided to keep the local maintenance negotiations separate, and 
if possible, achieve local agreements prior to the National Productivity 
Agreement. 
This plan to separate local MEUMM negotiations from the national product-
ivity discussions proved to be impossible. For the local negotiations got 
caught up in an Neee wage claim leading to a rising tide of labour unrest towards 
the end of 1967. This unrest involved sporadic strike action and will be examin-
ed in detail in the next part of the Chapter. Furthermore, the Neee withdrew 
from all productivity discussions which in effect delayed implementation of 
most of the phase one agreements until 1970. Eventually the productivity 
programme for craftsmen was agreed in March 1969, and the local maintenance 
negotiations again went ahead. These agreements however paid £4 per week (14) 
instead of the £2 to £3 contained in the national understanding, a fact that 
reflected the general rise in earnings that occured after 1969. Thus in the 
years 1967-69 average earnings rose 12.7t compared with 21.51. for 1969-71.(15) 
In order to complete the MEUMM analysis, the narrative now jumps beyond 
82. 
the productivity programme discussions of 1968-69. Phase two discussions of 
the maintenance manpower proposals began in 1970 in various areas across the 
Corporation. The main exception was the Sheffield area which had concluded 
its own "one stage" agreement earlier. The NCCC phase two claim was for time 
and one third (that is, the basic hourly rate plus one third for incentive bonus) 
at standard performance. This was equal to a bonus of £8.20 per week at 1968 
wage rates. Therefore, the National Productivity Agreement of 1969 did not 
change the structure of the Association's earlier MEUMM proposals, but merely 
accepted and added to them. 
The craft unions argued that they had pitched their phase one claim too 
low, and quoted as evidence the resistance of craftsmen in certain works, 
including Shotton in North Wales. Therefore, the phase two figure of £8.20 
aimed partly at obtaining compensation for their moderation during phase one. 
Also, the NCCC wanted the figure stated in a formal agreement on this occasion. 
Both the wage demand and the emphasis upon a formal agreement showed the NCCC 
leaderships' concern to regain control over their membership. The position of 
the leadership had suffered as a result of unofficial action during the period 
1968 to 1970, and their strategy highlights the importance of internal union 
conflict as an influence upon the collective bargaining process. Walton and 
McKersie conceptualise the position of chief negotiators as in a boundary role, 
caught between the need for predictability in the relationship with their 
opposite numbers at the bargaining table, and the expectations of their 
constituents which are invariably greater.(l6) 
Management's response to the cla~ was to arrive at an info~al national 
understanding on the cash value to be paid for local agreements. Also, manage-
ment rejected the claim for time and one third, which would automatically raise 
the bonus element with every increase in the time rate. Eventually, the NCCC 
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accepted these points, but remained adarnent on their claim for £8.20 per week 
at standard performance. On this the Corporation offered £5.50 per week, and 
negotiations came to a halt. The stalemate was later eased when the parties 
agreed that local settlements could yield more than £5.50 but less than £8.20. 
The case studies, discussed later, will show which of these amounts the local 
agreements moved towards. 
Finally, before leaving the negotiations over the "More Effective Use of 
Maintenance Manpower" a word should be said about one of its side effects. The 
Sheffield area agreement, concluded in 1968, was undermined. The delays and 
higher values obtained in the 1970 phase one agreements, with phase two still 
to come, reduced the wage differential of the Sheffield craftsmen. They revolted 
pressing for an additional settlement. Hence the United Steel Companies, who 
favoured a one stage approach to avoid giving the unions an opportunity to 
bargain twice, ended up doing just that. In this sense the company was correct. 
However, even if United Steel's advice had been followed, it would be dangerous 
to conclude that this would have reduced the total wage settlement for the 
period. The steel industry was caught up in a more general country-wide wage 
inflation, and Neee pressure for higher wages would have existed in any case, 
irrespective of the MEUMM phase two. 
To conclude, there are three main points of interest in this part of the 
Chapter. First, the employers' strategy challenged the craftsmens protective 
job practices, and proposed a shift in the focus of bargaining from national to 
works level. The craft unions adjusted to these demands, accepting them as the 
best means of improving their long term aim to improve their position in the 
industry's wage league. However, the NCeC's response was less positive amongst 
the rank and file. In some localities craftsmen resisted the proposal to relax 
job practices, indicating that they either considered the issue as a point of 
, 
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principle, or that the phase one £2 to £3 per week was inadequate. Certainly, 
the national officials thought the latter. 
Second, the leadership of the NCCC was challenged and they attempted to 
win back control over their membership. The leaderships' authority had been 
weakened by the moderate wage settlement of phase one, causing them to adopt 
a hard uncompromising line during phase two negotiations. The phase one settle-
ment frustrated rank and file expectations to improve their relative position 
in the industry'.s wage league, and resulted in unofficial action called by shop 
stewards. The phase two deadlock was only resolved when both parties agreed 
that local settlements should fall between the Corporation's last offer of £5.50 
and the NCCC's demand for £8.20. In this way the union leadership was able to 
compromise without losing face in the eyes of their members. 
Therefore, the Corporation, in pursuit of the employers' association's 
manpower strategy, achieved success in that most of the principles were agreed 
with the NCCC. Whether or not these aims were successfully implemented at works 
level is another question which can only be tested by works level investigation. 
Part Three, The National Productivity Programme 
Chapter Three explained the factors influencing the origin and formation 
of the productivity programme. To recap briefly, the origins go back to the 
Jones Working Party established in November, 1966 whose ideas were subsequently 
taken up by the Corporation and adapted to meet existing needs. The aims of the 
programme were to improve manpower efficiency, to promote the development of 
the rationalisation strategy, and to assist in achieving greater order and 
stability within the industrial relations system by encouraging multi-union 
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negotiations on issues common to all unions. However, owing to the difficult 
state of management-union and inter-union relationships at the time (arising 
from previous inter-union rivalry, insecurity caused by the rationalisation 
strategy, shared decision making and the union recognition dispute), the outcome 
of negotiations to achieve these aims was very uncertain. Part Three deals with 
the process of consultation and negotiation which achieved the implementation 
of the productivity programme, with identifying the tactics used by the Corporatiol 
with reactions of the trade unions, and the factors producing these reactions. 
The approach is to describe the Corporation's presentation of the programme to 
the Steel Committee and to consider the latter's response. These take the 
form of individual union negotiations with the Corporation on certain aspects 
of the programme. However, rather than deal with each union's individual 
negotiations, only those of the NCCC and the Confederation will be considered. 
Finally, the Steel Committee's negotiations with the Corporation will be 
analysed leading to the first multi-union collective agreement in the industry. 
On 10th May 1968, the productivity programme was presented to the Steel 
Committee at a consultative conference. The proceedings opened with the 
Corporation emphasizing the need to encourage new attitudes on the part of all 
employees including management. (17) Progress was to be achieved through the 
productivity programme which as a long term plan aimed at improving the guaranteed 
week, introducing sick pay, pensions and other features. These benefits had to 
be paid for, and this required both unions and management to tackle the serious 
overmanning problem, that is, a reduction of some 20,000 out of 134,000 workers. 
To achieve these aims management required the right to introduce local product-
ivity bargaining, work measurement, etc., and in the case of the latter the 
right to introduce the manning standards revealed by work study to be appropriate. 
The Corporation put the issue of manning control squarely on the table as 
essential to the successful outcome of the package. 
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On the question of the wage structure reform, the Corporation argued this 
was in urgent need of change. In modern conditions it had become unwieldy, 
complex, and irrational, often placing a constraint upon a mobile and flexible 
use of manpower. Moreover, the proposed changes in the wage structure would 
prepare the way for job evaluation. 
Finally, the Corporation emphasized the need for a new procedure to 
discuss and negotiate various aspects of the programme. It proposed that multi-
union discussions should be held under the auspices of the Steel Committee. In 
addition, joint SSC/Steel Committee working parties should be established to 
discuss issues common to all manual workers like sick pay and pensions o 
In terms of procedure for negotiating the programme union reaction was 
more influential in shaping the outcome. The Steel Committee was unable to 
organise the various trade union views or to establish multi-union negotiations 
since, as mentioned in Chapter Three, the Steel Committee at this time was 
merely a loose consultative body and the production unions had no intention of 
establishing multi-union negotiations. It was therefore the NCCC who made the 
first move:(18) 
'The NCCC informed the Steel Committee that it was 
embarking on direct negotiations with regard to a 
wage claim on behalf of its constituent unions and 
requested that the Corporation should be informed 
that questions of wage structure and wage payments 
should continue to be discussed directly between 
the unions independently, and the Corporation, 
through established procedures, not through the 
Steel Committee'. 
Why the NCCC, which advocated the establishment of an NJIC should be the 
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first to push for separate union negotiations is an interesting question. After 
all, the craft unions believed that their skills and experience were under-
valued relative to those of the production workers, and after years of struggle 
saw the NJIC as a logical means of achieving this long term aim. In early 1968, 
however, this rational solution to their problem was pushed aside in the 
pursuit of the more immediate aim of a substantial wage award. Tables 4.1 
and 4.2 indicate why this was done. 
Table 4.1 
Average Earnings per Worker, Iron and Steel Industry, 1963 ~ 1968 
December, 1963 December, 1968 7~ncrease 
Maintenance Workers £17.80 £22.80 29% 
Production Workers £18.35 £24.10 31% 
source: BISF, statistical statement 
These figures show that in the period 1963-68 the percentage difference 
between the average earnings of production and maintenance workers widened 
marginally in the steel industry, despite the November, 1964 Efficiency, Service 
and Qualifications Agreement, intended to achieve the opposite. MOreover, 
Depar~ent of Employment statistics show that the average weekly earnings of 
production and maintenance workers in iron and steel manufacture rose by 20% 
and 19% respectively between June 1964, and June 1968. More significantly, 
Table 4.2 furnishes evidence of craftsmen (and therefore also production workers) 
in steel falling behind craftsmen in the engineering and shipbuilding industries: 
Table 4.2 
Indices of Average Weekly Earnings in Three Industries.(Jan 1964 - 100) 
June 1964 June 1968 % increase 
Iron and Steel 104.1 124.2 19% 
Engineering 103.9 127.9 23% 
Shipbuilding 102.4 140.8 37% 
source: Ministry of Labour Gazette, 1965-68 
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These findings are particularly important when it is considered that the 
craft unions in steel organise the same craftsmen (eg boilermakers, fitters, 
electricians etc.,) as in engineering and shipbuilding. Also, the craft unions' 
full-time officials may, in certain areas, cover all three industries. Thus 
the craft unions' organisation, which cuts across industry boundaries, acted 
as a mechanism for transmitting wage movements for similar grades in other 
industries into the steel industry negotiations. Some evidence of this mechanism 
at work can be obtained from the statement made by the EETPU's national officer. 
(19) He said, "4/11 per hour plus cost of living is a miserable pittance •••• 
as far as I am concerned, electricians in this industry are a low paid grade." 
The relative deprivation of steel craftsmen, therefore, was rising in this 
period as they compared their increasingly unfavourable position to that of 
their traditional reference groups.(20) Consequently, feelings of injustice, 
frustration and aggression began to build up and to be exerted by the rank 
and file membership upon the NCCC. Therefore, the NCCC leadership became more 
militant pushing for a separate quick settlement under the productivity 
programme and a much larger wage claim under phase two of the MEUMM. 
The deterioration in the industrial relations climate was not confined 
to the NCCC unions, for officials of the bricklayers' union were subject to 
pressure from unofficial strikers on the north east coast of England. In 
addition, the GMWU submitted a substantial wage claim at this time. 
However, although the need to win a major wage increase was an important 
factor for the NCCC, it was not the only problem which the productivity 
programme created. This second problem related to the comprehensive nature 
of the programme which would take some time to discuss and negotiate. Clause 12 
states the following: 
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'The proposals cover a very wide range of subjects 
and will require detailed and possibly lengthy 
discussions, but the Corporation is convinced that 
with good will the difficulties can be overcome and 
that a more efficient and prosperous industry and 
work force will result' 
Given the mood of the craftsmen the priorities of the NCCC and the 
Corporation were likely to clash in terms of time scale. An indication of the 
craftsmen's concern was expressed in the closing speech at the EETPU, National 
Conference by the union's president. (2l) He said, 
'I have fears about the meaning of clause 12 at the 
bottom of page five, because the amount of time that 
could be taken which is implicit in this clause could 
be counter productive to what it was intended to achieve. 
It seems t.o me that quite apart from improvement in 
manning, the issue of consolidation (wage) is a 
separate question •••••• unless there is some relief maybe 
through consolidation, and particularly for those plants 
whose wage levels and conditions are lower than average, 
then we shall be in trouble and an amount of trouble 
that might torpedo the negotiations Q 
Clearly, the NCCC and the other unions saw the comprehensiveness of the 
programme as an obstacle to achieving their immediate objectives. Therefore, 
any attempt, by the Corporation to secure a multi-union agreement on the basis 
of a new institution was seen as likely to prolong delay. 
Trade union reactions therefore created a major problem for the COrporation 
in deciding the tactics to adopt in implementing the productivity programme. 
The Corporation's first action in early 1968 was to inform the unions that it 
favoured a revision in wages and conditions, but within the context of a 
productivity package then being prepared. In this way the Corporation was 
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able to demonstrate goodwill to the unions, and at the same time use the wage 
pressure from the rank and file to secure a quid pro quo. In other words, 
in the context of a strong union desire to win a wage concession, the unions 
were more likely to concede something in return. Of course, this move required 
a balanced approach, as any undue delay was likely to harden attitudes and 
to increase the possibility of more widespread industrial action. 
The second tactical move by the Corporation after 10th May, was to avoid 
negotiating too soon with the individual unions, thereby giving the Steel 
Committee time to strengthen its hand with the constituent unions. Early 
meetings with individual unions were kept on a consultative basis. Not that 
the Corporation expected the Steel Committee to negotiate on all these issues, 
but it sought from the Committee an understanding on what issues would be the 
subject of multi-union negotiation. The early months passed with no response 
from the Steel Committee, and as a result, the Corporation requested a meeting 
to discuss the Committee's views on the programme in general and on the 
procedures it might adopt in future discussions. (22) In response the Steel 
Committee informed the Corporation that the unions would negotiate on wages 
and wage structure questions independently of each other. However, under the 
auspices of the Steel Committee the unions would enter directly into joint 
working parties with the Corporation on more immediate issues, such as 
redundancy, the guaranteed week, and on redeployment; proposals on hOlidays, 
sick pay and pensions, would be discussed on the same basis, but were considered 
less urgent for the time being. These statements gave the Corporation an 
understanding on the proposals to be adopted on different aspects of the 
programme. Negotiations could now begin in earnest. 
The Steel Committee's delayed response was also influenced greatly by 
the att! tude of the Confederation. The union made no attempt to s,tart 
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negotiations until May, 1969 (one year after the programme was submitted to 
the Steel Committee), whereas the NCCC, AUBTW and GMHU began immediately. 
This apparent reluctance by the Confederation to negotiate was related to the 
white collar recognition problem and the bitter feelings engendered between 
the Corporation and the union. Some evidence in support of this reasoning can 
be found in the union's quarterly report. This states,(23) 
'That while appreciating the Executive Councils views 
on the inter-union dispute re recognition to the 
white collar workers, this matter should be secondary 
to the importance of continuing the negotiations 
contained in the Green Book on productivity bargaining, 
which obviously has been put aside.' 
The charge made by No 1 Area Committee was denied by the Executive, and 
the matter dropped. ~fuen questioned on this point national officials explained 
the delay as due to the fundamental nature of the issues raised by the Green 
Book. As the industry's largest union, the Confederation had to move forward 
with caution. This attitude was shown by the union's willingness in May, 1969 
to set up a joint Corporation/Conf~deration working party to discuss the 
programme. The ISTC was the only union to make such a request. This explanation 
complements the discussion given earlier concerning the union's reluctance to 
enter a Joint Industrial Council, but both views probably contained some truth 
since the recognition dispute occupied a disproportionate amount of the union's 
time and energy, resulting in less attention to the Green Book proposals. 
Notwithstanding the Confederation dragging its feet on the programme, 
especially on the wage restructuring aspects, its reaction on the issue of 
income and employment security was very different. The rationalisation 
programme's effect was very immediate and a cause of concern to all the unions. 
Hence the Steel Committee responded by submitting its own counter proposals 
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contained in a document entitled "Employment and Income Security".(24) This 
was drawn up by the Steel Committee Secretariat, and was submitted to the 
Corporation in September 1968, as a basis for negotiations. The document was 
wider ranging than the productivity programme, although many items overlapped. 
This aspect of the Green Book coincided with the aims of the Steel Committee 
and in particular with those of the Confederation, who had more to lose than 
most other unions. Consequently, the Confederation's attitude was modified and 
the historic decision made to depart from tradition and enter multi-union 
negotiations on some issues. 
In the analysis which follows the negotiations of the NCCC and ISTC are 
dealt with. These negotiations constitute the most interesting insight into 
the major division within the union side of the industry. However, it should 
not be forgotten that other important negotiations, particularly those involving 
the blastfurnacemen were taking place in tpis period. Finally, the first set 
of formal negotiations between the Corporation and the Steel Committee will 
be analysed. 
Negotiations: The National Craftsmen's Co-ordinating Committee 
The NCCC broadly welcomed the Corporation's proposals to improve manpower 
productivity. On wage structure reform the NCCC's attitude was also positive, 
it being perceived as a means of increasing the basic hourly rate. The following 
concentrates on the controversial aspects including the wage structure and 
manpower productivity, with particular emphasis placed on factors influencing 
trade union behaviour and the final results achieved. 
The proposals for wage structure reform contained two aspects. Firstly, 
a consolidation of several elements into the hourly rate and, secondly, 
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the establishment of uniform time conditions for shift, weekend, and overtime 
premiums. Also, the Green Book proposed uniformity in the starting and 
finishing times of weekend premiums. All these wage elements differed between 
craftsmen and production workers. The next table shows the craftsmen's 
traditional pay structure compared with the Corporation's proposals: 
Table 4.3 
Existing and Proposed Pay Structure for Craftsmen, 
National Productivity Programme 
Traditional Wage Structure 
Hourly rate 4/11.21 
Cost of living (variable) 
Tonnage bonus (variable) 
Efficiency 10/- per week 
Service and Qualifications(variable) 
Gift hours (days 8 hrs 
(back 9.3 hrs 
(nights 10.6 hrs 
OVertime, time and a half 
Weekend premiums, time and a half 
and double time 
Rota extra, 21 shift 4.72d 
Proposed Wage Structure 
Hourly rate 8/3 
-Residual continued 
Residual for individuals 
Shift premiums (days 8 hrs 
(back 9 hrs 
(nights 10 hrs 
OVertime, time and a half 
Weekend premiums, time and a half 
and double time 
Table 4.3 shows that the Corporation aimed at consolidating many elements 
in the craftsmen's wage structure. They proposed the abolition of the cost 
of living payment fixed in relation to the monthly index of retail prices. 
Also, they proposed to abolish the 10/- Efficiency, Service and Qualification 
payments. The service and educational elements varied with the individual, 
and an estimated average payment of 24/- per week was to be consolidated for 
everyone. Thus those paid below 24/- stood to gain, whilst those above were 
to be 'red circled' until the wage structure caught up. Also, the hourly 
'rota extra'(4.72d) paid to 21 shift working craftsmen was to be consolidated,(25) 
as well as 35/- of the tonnage bonus payment. The tonnage bonus negotiated 
at district or works level paid no premium as it did with production workers 
This was a grievance with the craftsmen, and consolidation would help solve 
the disputeo Further, the amount of bonus payment varied between locations, 
therefore, the consolidation would leave a considerable residual bonus at 
many works. It was proposed that this should be a fixed amount~ The upshot 
was the establishment of a new hourly rate of 8/3 per hour which was an offer 
giving a marginal improvement. At this stage, however, the Corporation was 
holding something back as a negotiating margin. 
Another proposal intended to rationalise the premium payments which 
varied between production and maintenance workers. The craft grades were paid 
'gift hours', that is, 9.3 hours for a 2pm to 10pm shift, and 10 0 6 hours for a 
lOpm to 6am shift. On the other hand, production workers were paid 808 hours 
and 90 6 hours respectively for these shifts. The history of gift hours was 
longer. These were introduced because craftsmen in the engineering industry 
were paid a night premium. The Green Book now proposed the elimination of these 
differences and the establishment for all manual workers of 9 and 10 hours 
respectively. 
The NCCC had clear policy objectives on wage structure reform, namely a 
high hourly rate of 10/- per hour, a local productivity bonus, and in the 
longer run job evaluation. The latter was to meet the craftsmen's long term 
aspirations to achieve their rightful place in the industry's wage league viz-
a-viz the production worker. To this extent the Corporation's objectives 
seemingly coincided with those of the NCCC. However, when it came to the 
actual negotiations, the re.ction within the craft unions was mixed. 
Initially the NCCC was prepared to accept consolidation of the November, 
1964 agreement and some other extras, but had reservations on the consolidation 
of the cost of living bonus and on the tonnage bonus. The NCCC's reluctance to 
accept an agreement which did not give automatic protection to wages during 
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inflation is not too difficult to understand. For example, the retail price 
index indicated n marked increase in the second half of the 1960's, that is, 
between 1966 and 1969 the average increase was 4.9% per annum compared with 
2.3% per annum in the period 1962-64. Moreover, inflation was particularly 
meaningful to the craftsmen whose hourly rate had not altered since 1965. This 
fact, coupled to the feeling that craftsmen in steel had fallen behind product-
ion workers and craftsmen in ancillary industries, did not predispose them to 
this proposal. Finally, the pressure within the NCCC not to concede on this 
issue was strongest from the lower paid areas of the country. 
On the tonnage bonus consolidation, reaction amongst craftsmen was again 
mixed resulting in internal conflict within the NCCC. Some establishments, in 
particular Shotton in North Wales, but also to some extent Corby in Northampton-
shire, resisted certain aspects of the associated MEUMM agreement. (26) Other 
craftsmen, in works about to introduce technological change, had a vested 
interest in retaining the looser tonnage bonus system under which it was easier 
to negotiate higher bonus earnings compared with the new productivity proposals 
based upon work measurement and planned maintenance systems. These differences 
amongst craftsmen throughout the country, were based partly on differences 
between low and high paid areas, and partly on resistance to proposals seen by 
some as enchancing management's control. 
Apparently, these differences were not thought by the NCCC, to be all 
that.significantand were seen as less important than the need to win an overall 
wage increase. The upshot was an NCCC recommendation to the membership in 
late 1968 to accept the Corporation's manpower and wage structure proposals in 
total. At this point the internal conflicts within the NCCC broke out and 
began to have a marked influence upon the negotiations. As the intensity of 
rank and file resentment escalated, and became more widespread than in 1967, 
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the craftsmen at Shotton, in the North East of England, and in Scotland engaged 
in strike action. The leadership of the rank and file agitation, as happened 
a year earlier, fell to the Shotton craftsmen, who appeared to lead an 
unofficial shop steward movement which met at Manchester in March 1969.(27) 
Subject to this kind of pressure, the NCCC leadership was forced to harden its 
attitude and demand further concessions, resulting in a deterioration of the 
bargaini~relationship between the parties. As a tactical measure the NCCC 
withdrew from productivity negotiations (which also meant withdrawing from 
the local MEUMM negotiations) and reverted to a straight national wage claim. 
This action was a surprise to the Corporation which thought that the problems 
with the craft unions had been settled towards the end of 1968. 
What then was the reason for this rank and file revolt which was wide 
spread and not confined simply to high paying versus low paying areas, nor to 
any specific works? As mentioned previously, the craftsmen's grievance was a 
long standing one and by the late 1960's, having had no increase in their 
hourly rate since 1964, their frustration had become acute. Moreover, the 
phase one productivity agreements, based upon £2 and £3, were considered by 
some areas as a pittance in rela~on to the work that was asked in return. 
Furthermore, the leadership of the NCCC apparently seemed to accept delay. 
For, in March 1968, the NCCC held a delegate conference and decided to give 
the Corporation a further three months to answer their claim in the context 
of wage restructuring. Afterwards the chainman of the NCCC made the following 
public statement, '~e are with them (the Corporation), not in opposition to 
them". (28) All this is very important in understanding the wide-spread 
feelings of dissatisfaction amongst the rank and file craftsmen; however, 
the major conflict arose over the proposal to reduce the shift differential. 
This conflict was nei~her inter-craft, nor inter-occupational, but arose 
primarily from differential systems of work. The shift craftsmen who made up 
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some ~ of the craft force sa,q the proposals as containing very little benef! t 
to them. In fact, in terms of their relative earnings and status, there would 
be a deterioration. To recall the proposals, the Corporation suggested a 
reduction in the shift premium from 9.3 and 10.6 to 9 and 10 hours respectively, 
and the abolition of the 21 shift rota extra payment. That this dissatisfaction 
was strongly felt, can be seen frool the next statement made by a Shotton 
craftsman at the EETPU's national conference.(29) 
'l\1tat happens when it comes to national negotiations 
on rates of pay? Then it seems that the shift 
differential is one of the first items which is used 
as part of the bargaining for a higher rate of pay 
for everyone. \-lhen thi s happens and an all round 
increase has been finalised, the day men's share is 
inevitably greater than the shift man and the differ-
ential has once again been reduced' 
The focus of dissatisfaction was upon wage relativities, but this time 
within the craft group. Shift premiums were paid to compensate for social 
inconvenience, and therefore the proposal to reduce them infringed the shift 
man's idea of justice. Moreover, two other external factors probably had an 
influence. Firstly, the increasing pace of inflation itself was reducing the 
value of the 4.72d rota extra (the rota extra was also paid for the social 
inconvenience of continuous shift work). Secondly, the engineering industry 
paid time plus one third for night shift, and the proposals were to reduce the 
steel craftsmen's payment on nights from time plus one third (10 0 6 hours) to 
time plus a quarter. 
The Corporation and the NCCC failed to give sufficient attention to these 
developments causing the rank and file craftsmen to resort to unofficial action. 
For this the Corporation must take some of the blame, because in their desire 
to secure uniformity in their plans they put pressure upon the leadership of 
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the craft unions. On the other hand, since the craft unions are democratic 
bodies accountable to their membership, the leadership should have been aware 
of this pressure and reflected it on their demands. Why did this not happen 
sooner? 
In the real world, issues are seldom as distinct as the conflict described 
above; in fact, there were other problems also being resolved at the same 
time between the higher and the lower paid areas, and over tonnage bonus 
consolidation. Consequently, the day/shift conflict was diffused as a result 
of these other tensions and submerged in a wave of general resenbnent, to be 
remedied by a wage concession. It required perceptive leadership to pick 
this issue out and called for sound political judgement to give it priority. 
A second possible explanation (although purely speculative) was that many of 
the lay officials participating in the NCCC's decision making processes were 
day men. (30) Hence the shift man's special interest was given less importance. 
If this was the case (and it would need to be tested) then the shift men 
would have little option but to seek a remedy through unofficial action. 
Again this illustrates the importance of internal organisational pressures 
in understanding the total collective bargaining process. Thus AA Blum has 
noted:(31} 'Moderating internal pressures actually dominates a large part of 
what we regard as the total process of collective bargaining'. In addition, 
Walton and McKersie refer to internal fractional conflict, and argue that a 
leadership faced with this must regain control by committing themselves to 
one group or another. (32) How then did the NCCC and the Corporation react? 
First, the union demanded that the rota extra should be retained, and 
extended to include two and three shift workers.(33) Second, that the 
membership should be protected against a rise in the cost of living within 
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the life span of the agreenient. ~egarding the first demand, the NCCC committed 
itself to gaining something extra for the shift men, but interestingly the 
focus of the argument tended to shift towards the view that craftsmen stood 
to gain less from the progrru~e than the other unions. Of course, this may 
have been a move designed to help unite the craftsmen, and thereby consolidate 
the 1eaderships' position. In other words, although welcoming the productivity 
programme and the benefits offered, the NCCC considered that the craftsmen 
stood to gai.n less than other ~yorkers. For example, the Green Book proposed 
the extension of the guaranteed week from four to five shifts; but in this 
continuous working industry the craftsmen benefited less from this than the 
production workers, the reason being that when production has stopped management 
take the opportunity to carry out major repairs to the plant. 
The Corporation responded sympathetically agreeing to retain the 21 shift 
rota extra and for the first time to introduce a rota extra for other shift 
workers. This concession helped the union leadership out of a difficult 
situation. On the cost of living it was agreed that the NCCC could come back 
to negotiate further wage compensation if the general price level rose markedly. 
This understanding was not stated in the agreement but in a national circular, 
clause 7(a), which followed the agreement. 
The upshot of the wage structure negotiations was to bring the hourly 
rate to 9/4 0 5, that is, very near to the NCCC's original claim for a 10/- rate. 
Moreover, the new rate exlcuded the 21 shift rota extra of 5d, and the 2d 
for other shift workers. After twelve months a further consolidation of 4.5d 
(that is, remainder of the service and qualification payments) and the residual 
rise in the cost of living between March 1969 and 1970 was to take place, 
giving a rate of 9/11 per hour. 
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The other major issue of controversy concerned manpower productivity. 
Management saw work measurement as a means of strengthening their prerogative 
over the industry's lax manning standards. The Green Book said, 'Management 
have the right to impleclent the manning which work study discloses as 
appropriate'(34) However, the trade unions would be consulted and would have 
resort to special procedures in the event of disagreement. This clause caused 
concern amongst the craft unions for two reasons. First, work measurement 
can signify a shift in control from workers to management and thereby generate 
feelings of job insecurity. The fact that the rank and file held such fears 
can be seen from the national officer's statement made at the EETPU's conference, 
'One of the things that has been concerning me over 
these past eighteen months is that I have a feeling 
at times that some of our shop stewards are chasing 
shadows and missing the whole substance of this word 
productivity which has been bandied about so much that 
it has lost its meaning in some quarters •••••• Fear and 
ignorance permeated that debate, because it was fear that 
they were ignorant of the implications of work study and 
job evaluation techniques that made them oppose productlvity.'(35) 
The second cause of concern arose over the programme's aim to reduce the 
manpower by some 20,000. The craft unions had no formal rights to regulate 
jointly with management the maintenance manning. However, productivity 
bargaining heightened the craft unions' concern to protect their members 
interests. Aware of shop steward feeling on the issue the NCCC's response 
was to demand safeguards. Thus the NCCC accepted the BSC's proposal to 
establish a separate procedure to deal with work study disputes, but insisted 
on the inclusion of independent experts. Hence craftsmen who objected to 
BSC work study findings could call in an independent party with author! ty to 
conduct their own investigation. These experts were to submit their findings 
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to the parties for further consideration. Clause 13 of the agreement states;(36) 
'~,'here there is a disagreement between the findings 
of an independent expert and management's plans 
these will be reconsidered by both parties. When 
there is agreement the plans will be put into effect' 
This innovation not only extended procedural differentiation, but also 
introduced a limited form of status quo. Clause 12 explicitly states, 
'Manning or methods of ~lorking not being fully agreed 
may nevertheless be proceeded with provided that there 
is provisional agreement over these plans' 
Both these clauses aimed at reducing the suspicions of local craftsmen 
and at helping to solve a difficult situation which otherwise might be dead-
locked. For instance, if the independent investigator's findings agreed with 
those of management the union had no argument. However, if they disagreed 
with management's findings, then the plans would not go into effect until a 
local agreement was achieved. Presum~dly, the independent expert's results 
would modify management's own findings and make a settlement easier. 
This concludes the craft unions' negotiations with the Corporation which 
highlighted the two major aspects of controversy, namely, on wage structure 
reform and manpower productivity. On both counts the NCCC altered the 
Corporation's initial plans. To complete the picture the undernoted all 
refer to the main points of the agreement. 
The general aims of the strategy were accepted by the NCCC, that is, a 
highly efficient labour force to meet works' operating needs, a more effective 
and more equitable wage structure, and conditions of employment which would 
provide greater security and stability of earnings. In addition, the NCCC 
agreed to enter into multi-union negotiations on issues common to all manual 
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workers. This was a formal affirmation of the understanding the Corporation 
had sought fronl the Steel Commi ttee. Guidelines were also agreed covering 
the formulation of works' productivity plans to be concluded according to 
certain principles. These included, 
(A) Priorities for work study prograrrmes. 
(B) Targets for manning reductions 
eC) Estimation of "lage cost savings. 
CD) Payments to be related to circumstances where jobs have changed 
resulting jn improved standards of performance. 
(E) No payments to be mad!'! in advance of implementing changes in 
manning and working methods, and phasing-in of payments to 
coincide with planned stages of change. 
The fixed residual tonnage bonus was to be incorporated into local 
productivity agreements. In addition, the NCCC undertook to investigate 
with the Corporation the possibilities of applying job evaluation. A Joint 
Noni toring Commi ttee was to be established to revie~ .. and to implement the 
programme. Moreover, the agreement took the form of a fixed three year term, 
the first of its kind in the industry. 
Negotiations: The Iron and Steel Trades Confederation 
Again the analysis deals with points of controversy between the parties, 
such as wage structure problems and aspects of manpower productivity. Also, 
the BSC's tactics are identified and the union's attitudes and reactions to 
these explained. Also, mention will be made of other, non-controversial, 
but nevertheless important features of the agreement. 
The Confederation (like the craft unions) welcomed the productivity 
programme as a radical departure from anything done previously by the 
industry's management. There was no serious problem within the union over 
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accepting work measurement, productivity bargaining etc. The union had already 
accepted and helped implement such techniques at Port Talbot in South Wales. (37) 
Also, many proposals contained in the progranune had been the subject of claims 
by the union, although these had been resisted by the old employers' 
association. For example, the union had submitted claims to improve the 
guaranteed week and in 1965 claimed an annual guaranteed wage. (38) Moreover, 
the Corporation designed the programme to meet the needs of the Confederation, 
and thereby to induce the industry's most powerful union to accept. This 
conformed to the traditional pattern of management-union relationships which 
had so upset the NCCC in 1956. Therefore, management was rather surprised 
when the Confederation did not respond quickly and positively to their 
initiative. 
The general reasons behind the union's slow response have been investigated 
above and need not be repeated here in detail. Briefly it was due to a 
combination of the union's perceptions of its status viz-a-viz the other unions, 
and the recognition dispute which soaked up energy, and to some extent embitter-
ed relationships with the Corporation. 
At a more detailed level, the Confederation expressed concern about some 
of the proposals in the programme and flatly disagreed with one or two of 
them. In May 1969, the parties agreed to set up a joint working party to 
discuss the proposals in detail. This took the programme out of the normal 
machinery of negotiation, where one party tends to seek a gain at the expense 
of the other, into a setting with greater problem solving potential. In 
additio~ the union's Central Negotiating Committee was large and not suitable 
for discussing the detail of a complex document lf~e the Green Book. The 
working party, which consisted of four representatives of both management and 
the union, allowed the parties to explore areas of agreement and to define 
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more clearly areas of disagreement to be resolved through the negotiating 
channel. Furthermore, problem solving \laS made easier in a setting where no 
hard and fast commitment was required prior to the actual negotiations. This 
was important to the union which had to report back to the Central Negotiating 
Committee. Hence, once started this innovation undoubtedly speeded up the 
productivity bargaining process. In other Hords, the Corporation and Con-
federation approach to the problem vms more akin to what has been called by 
Walton and McKersie, 'integrative bargaining'. (39) and (40) 
However, there were still differences between the parties of which the 
following analysis identifies four. First, the controversy over wage structure 
reform; second, the issue of management prerogative; third, the proposal to 
create new works level institutions to reform collective bargaining; and fourth, 
the disagreement over the cash settlement. An examination of these shows the 
union's attitudes and attempts at modifying management's strategy. 
On wage structure reform the programme proposed to consolidate the cost 
of living payment, improve premium payments, eliminate certain inconsistencies 
in over-time payments, and also that the tonnage bonus should not be more than 
25% of total shift earnings at normal outputs. The main dispute arose over 
the cost of living consolidation, with the strongest feelings expressed by the 
Scottish area. (41) 
'\ve therefore call on our national negotiators to 
reject the above proposals and demand a continuation 
of the cost of living agreement and the retention of 
full negotiating rights on all questions' 
Scotland, as a lower paid area benefited from the flat cost of living 
payment, which gave a proportionately larger increase to the lower paid in a 
period of inflation. Yet another factor was the country-wide concern in the 
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media and elsEwhere over possible entry Into the European Economic Community. 
This held implications of highEr food prices under the common agricultural 
policy. Again, the Scottish attitude can be understood in the light of the 
fact that lower income groups spend a higher proportion of their incomes on 
food. The Confederation had to take account of this pressure to protect its 
lower paid members. 
The Corporation anticipated this issue, partly for the reasons mentioned 
earlier and partly from their experience of the craftsmen's negotiations. 
Consequently, BSC gave the union an assurance. that if the cost of living were 
to rise significantly during the period of the agreement, the union would 
have the right to reopen negotiations. (42) Further, because the labouring 
grades would be hardest hit, the Corporation was prepared to negotiate a 
'lower paid workers agreement' to give extra protection to this grade. This 
latter agreement was to be outside the costing of the programme itself. 
Secondly, the Confederation baulked at the proposal to increase manage-
mentes prerogative to implement manning arrangements when work measurement 
found them to be appropriate. On this question the rank and file were out-
spoken. Thus Area Committee Nol stated: 
'This Area Committee notes with approval some of 
the proposals contained in the BSC productivity 
programme but it is particularly opposed to the 
following: Clause 8(c) on page 10, which suggests 
that management must have the right to alter manning 
as the results of work study indicates' 
On this issue the Confederation's position differed from that of the 
craftsmen. In this instance the BSC were attempting to take away from ISTC 
an established right to regulate manning standards jointly. As a result, the 
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union refused to accept the Green Book proposal, although they did accept 
that a wide spread use of work measurement created a new situation. Hence 
within the working party, the Confederation proposed that manning disputes 
should be dealt with by a joint management/union committee, that is, by joint 
regulation. Management thought this would create an obstacle to change and 
favoured the solution adopted previously by the NCCC, namely the establishment 
of a separate procedure with the incorporation of independent experts at the 
request of the union. In this way the Corporation obtained a greater cormnit-
ment to work measurement by placating the fears of the union, whereas the 
union secured a limited status quo. 
Management also attempted to extend its influence over the seniority rule 
and the transfer of labour. On promotion by seniority the Corporation wished 
to ease certain restrictions imposed unilaterally by the union. These problems 
included the length of the promotion lines, and also people disinclined to 
accept further promotion. (43) Seniority creates a number of problems for 
management who prefer promotion on the basis of competence. For instance, a 
management harbouring doubts about a person's suitability for a top job (such 
as mill rollerman), will be forced to challenge the seniority rule as the 
promotion may adversely affect production. In this way a conflict can arise 
between management and union, especially as the latter perceive the seniority 
rule as protection against management's interpretation of what constitutes 
competence. The "sticker" problem arises where a man for one reason or 
another refuses to accept further promotion, or is prevented from doing so 
by management. As a result some promotion lines, with the passage of time, 
can contain three or four stickers which largely eliminates promotion for 
those lower down. 
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A similar problem existed in the transfer of workers between sections of 
a works or between different works. A seniority system, geared to specific 
production units, can mean that men doing senior jobs in one unit can be faced 
with redundancy (due to a trade recession) whilst less experienced workers 
remain employed in another unit. Alternatively, the senior worker if redeployed 
to another unit of plant \"'i11 lose seniority. This loss of skill to the 
industry was likely to grO\\T , ... i th the rationalisation programme. 
Within the working party management proposed greater flexibility and trans-
ferability between promotion lines; also, that alternative channels should be 
found for those men disinclined to take further promotion. The Confederation's 
representatives responded by suggesting that tnanagement's proposals could be 
partly met if new entrants to the industry were classed as temporary employees 
for a period of two years. This would be to the advantage of longer serving 
employees who on transfer to a new unit would automatically carry two years 
seniority. However, along with this offer, the union wanted management to 
establish a post-entry closed shop, for the seniority rule gave t~union a 
measure of control over the membership which it did not wish to have weakened. 
The outcome of the joint working party discussions, and the negotiations 
which followed, was an agreement improving the transfer of labour, including 
the provision for promotion crossover points and for displaced workers to carry 
seniority between works. On the closed shop, at national level, the union 
achieved no advance, merely an agreement to retain the status quo. 
Yet another area where the Corporation sought more flexibility was in 
the extended working week agreement. In the mills the normal working week was 
17 shifts, as opposed to 20 or 21 shifts in the iron and steel making process 
proper. Under this agreement management, when the circumstances required, 
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sought permission of the union's head office to extend the working week for 
anything up to 21 shifts. The Corporation believed that, in certain market 
situations, efficiency could be increased, if local management were able to 
change quickly the working week by simply consulting with the local union 
branch. (44) This proposal caused the union some concern as it was likely to 
increase the insecurity of their members earnings. Under the existing pro-
cedure management only sought to extend the working week if the arrangement 
would last for some time. This pressure was removed by the new proposal and 
might encourage local management to change working hours by the week. 
A solution was agreed which allowed the parties to achieve their aims; 
that is, it was decided that management must seek the union's agreement to 
extend the working week, but that the authority to grant permission, would be 
devolved from head office to the divisional office level. This change would 
speed up the procedure. 
The third problem concerned the creation of new institutions at works 
level to implement the local productivity agreements. This was not mentioned 
in the Green Book, but it was necessary to achieve the benefits of demanning, 
work reorganisation, increased labour mobility and other changes. However, 
it was a central feature within the joint working party. 
The Corporation proposed to draw up overall "works plans" to establish 
appropriate manning levels, to decide work measurement priorities, to cost 
and work out savings and to monitor their implementation. In initiating these 
plans local management were to consult with the various union branches, and 
the following guideline was to be pursued. 
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'The Corporation hold the view that, where not 
already established, joint branch meetings with 
management be introduced on matters of common 
interest to the various branches'(45) 
To tackle this problem the Corporation submitted a nuaber of 
alternatives to union representatives on the working party. These were,(46) 
'A joint committee of all branches within a works. 
A joint committee of branches in departaents within a 
works, for example melting shops, mills etc. 
Joint committee of branches in similar proce.ses covering 
more than one works in an area, for instance, all melting shops' 
Management preferred the first alternative a. the most appropriate to 
provide a .ystem of consultation, and pos.ibly negotiation, and also to 
monitor the progress of a work's productivity agreement. It i. important to 
note however that the whole approach wa. open ended and es.entially problem 
orientated. In other words, the union was not being pre. sed to change it. 
constitution to provide for multi-branch work.-wide negotiation •• 
How did the Confederation respond to the.e proposals? Of the three 
approaches the union thought the second the .ost practical and thus likely 
to have the be.t chance of achieveaent. Given the multi-branch .tructure 
(referred to in Chapter Three, page 65) any work.-wide plan to .hare 
.ayina. stood a better chance of being accepted by the branches on a 
deparbaental ba.is.(47) Thus the Confederation were reluctant to agree to 
any radical change in the collective bargaini .. structure, and favoured a 
voluntary develop.ent where local branches were prepared to accept it. Such 
a developaent had taken place at Clyde.dale Work. in Scotland. Therefore, 
the ISTC wa. not prepared to curtail branch autonomy, but adopted an enablina 
attitude. The final agre .. ent put the matter as follow.,(48) 
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'In order to ensure effective joint consultation 
at local level it is agreed that formal bodies 
consisting of representatives of local management 
and the joint branches should be set up. The object 
of such bodies should be to provide a comprehensive and 
effective means for the examination of overall and 
separate works plans and their subsequent progress. The 
exact composition of such bodies should be a matter for 
local determination •••••• ' 
This national agreement on works institutional reform was vague and 
lacking in precision, but probably reflected the reality of power within the 
union. What resulted from the agreement would depend upon the effort and 
commibnent of the local parties. 
The final controversy between the parties concerned the cash settlement. 
The joint working party completed its report on 12th August, 1969, and on 26th 
August the Central Negotiating Committee met the Corporation. At the meeting 
management presented a document based up.on the working party report. The 
meeting did not go smoothly, and the Corporation offered to modify some points 
in the document; but it was on the money that the sticking point came. The 
Corporation's final offer was 4/- per shift paid retroactively to 1st June, 
and a further 2/6 per shift as from 1st March, 1970. The offer (said to be 
the best ever made at national level) granted over the period of the agreement 
£2.10.4 to the 21 shift rota worker on £20 per week, and £2.14.7 to the same 
worker on £30 per weeko(49) Nevertheless, a majority of the Central Negot-
iating Committee rejected the offer. 
What caused the negotiating committee to be so difficult? Was it just 
that not enough money was being offered, or was there some other factor at 
work? The status of the committee had diminished, as most of the important 
111. 
decisions were made within the joint working party. The probability of some 
resentment on the part of the cOJ~littee's members was therefore high. More-
over, they were excluded not only from the wage structure and manpm'1er product" 
ivity decisions, but also from the employment and income security aspects, 
which were negotiated through the Steel Committee. This body at the time was 
confined to full-time officials. The national negotiating committee's 
reactions, therefore, in demanding further cash concessions, was the only 
avenue le.ft to the committee to fulfill a useful purpose. This reflects a 
weakness in the decision to set up a joint working party, which may enchance 
problem solving, but fail to secure full commitment to decisions. 
The rejection of the wage offer caused a backlash within the union. 
First, from the branches, the general secretary reported receiving,(50) 'a 
large number of letters, most of which were critical of the decision to reject 
BSC's offer'. Second, the Executive Council instructed the general secretary 
to reconvene the Central Negotiating Committee and to resume negotiations.(51) 
In addition, the Executive advised that if the committee failed to secure an 
improved offer then the previous one be accepted. On reconvening, the 
negotiating committee failed to secure further concessions, and as a result 
the employer's last offer was accepted on 27th November, 1969. 
Having dealt with the controversial aspects of the Confederation's 
negotiations all that remains is to record features of the agreement which 
although important were not controversial. These included, 
(A) Agreement on the three main objectives, namely to improve 
efficiency, reform the wage structure, and increase the status and 
security of employees. 
(B) Also, the Confederation agreed to enter into multi-union negotiations 
on aspects of the programme common to all manual workers. 
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(c) Agreed guidelines for the conduct of local productivity 
bargaining such as l.:agc increases to he related to job 
changes rE:sultin& in higher performance, no payments to 
be made in advance of implementing manning changes and 
the introduction of new methods. The needs of those made 
redundant or redeployed to be taken into account. 
(D) Agreement to jointly participate 'vith management and the 
other unions in a joint working party on job evaluation to 
produce a scheme as quickly as possible. 
(E) Set up a National Joint Committee to stimulate and monitor 
the progress of the programme. 
(F) The agreement was for a three year fixed term. Also, the 
terminal dates of both the NCCC and the ISTC agreements were 
to fall at the same time. The Corporation's aim being to 
minimise the opportunities available for unions to leapfrog 
on wages. 
Negotiations: The Trade Union Steel Industry Consultative Conmittee 
Negotiations between the Corporation and the Steel Committee led to 
the collective agreement on employment and income security dated 15th December, 
1969. Given the past intensity of inter-union rivalry this was an important 
advance for the industry. Of course, multi-union negotiations had been a 
major element in the Corporation's strategy, and one tactic for achieving 
this was to set up joint working parties. The benefits to be derived from 
this approach have been discussed above in connection with the Confederation's 
negotiations. However, the problem solving approach associated with the 
working parties was more likely to be successful on items like improving the 
guaranteed week, redeployment compensation, pensions, and so on. This was 
due to the fact that such issues gave both parties greater satisfaction; they 
gave union members greater job security and management a more flexible and 
mobile labour force. Walton and McKersie have written: (52) 'To quote a 
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participant in the human relations committee in steeL ••••• the joint approach 
is least effective when applied to wages, very useful on fringes, and has 
its greatest future promise on job security issues'. 
Another interesting feature was that the negotiations were handled on 
the union side by the full-time officials of the Steel Committee without 
the participation of lay representatives. None of the unions had given the 
Steel Cornmi ttee formal authori ty to negotiate on their behalf, and so bypass 
normal negotiating procedures. It would appear that in the changing circum-
stances of the period there was a pragmatic response by union leaders result-
ing in an informal, initially ad hoc, negotiating function. Almost certainly 
if the Steel Committee had tried to obtain authority by formally seeking 
the permission of the respective union executives it is doubtful if the union 
response would have been quick enough,(53) and indeed whether multi-union 
negotiations would ever have commenced. Also, the development was unlikely 
to meet serious resistance as this would have meant union members foregoing 
(at least for a time) significant benefits. Only the very brave, or the 
procedurally pedantic, therefore, were likely to object. However, as shown 
previously there were obvious tensions within the Confederation's negotiating 
committee which probably arose from this development. In addition, due to 
limited representation, several craft unions including the EETPU had no 
representative on the committee at this time. This limited representation 
and in particular the absence of lay representatives was likely to cause 
problems in the longer run. (54) 
The background to the negotiations concerned the Steel Committee's 
reception of the productivity programme in May, 1968, and the Committee's 
own document of September, 1968 drawn up by the TUC Secretariat.(55) The 
unions' effort reflected the seriousness and urgency attached to the 
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rationalisation programme. Thpir uocument devoted most of its attention to 
limi ting redundancies and to ensuring adequate compensati on. Also, it 
represented the Steel Committee's formal negotiating position. On redundancy 
it urged the BSC to limit the use of contractors to work which could not be 
undertaken by the Corporation's own employees. Information on sub-contractors 
was to be disclosed to the unions. Recruitment was to be restricted and the 
rate of natural wastage accelerated with voluntary severance pay. Provision 
was to be made for the redeployment of workers within the Corporation and 
for increased co-operation between BSC and other private and public companies, 
including government agencies. The TUC document also emphasized the need to 
work out agreed redundancy criteria. The unions favoured the "last in, first 
out" principle, but were prepared to consider other factors such as skill. 
Income maintenance pa~nents should be made to the redundant and to workers 
transferred within the Corporation. The Steel Committee claimed terms that 
were as advanced as the most favourable established in coal mining and the 
railways. 
The union document was more comprehensive and explicit on a number of 
items than the productivity programme. On redundancy the Green Book merely 
referred to the need for jointly agreed redundancy procedures and made no 
mention of severance pay. Presumedly the Corporation considered it either 
a bad tactic to mention the principle of payment (although they did in other 
respects), or that the Redundancy Payment Act provided sufficient compen-
sation. On the income maintenance side the Green Book was more forthcoming, 
and the parties were at one in principle. The Corporation's proposals were: 
'Demotion within a promotion line: first 13 weeks at 
80% followed by 60% for a further 13 weeks of the 
difference between the new job and the loss in shift earnings. 
Redeployment to another job outwith the workers own promotion 
line: first 13 weeks at 80%, second at 60%,third at 40% 
followed by a fourth 13 we(,ks at 20'7. of the difference 
between the new job and loss in shift earnings'. 
However, the Grecn Book was silent on cost incurred by the worker in 
transferring to another works o These costs included travelling time, lodging 
allowances, and removal and resettlement expenses. 
Again, on the proposal to extend the guaranteed week there 't-las no issue 
of principle between the parties. 
Before dealing with the negotiations two preliminary points may be of help 
in understanding the analysis. First, although the steel unions drew up 
proposals which in some respects were more comprehensive, it would be a 
mistake to see the unions as initiating a new strategy. The Steel Committee's 
proposals were a reaction to the Corporation's overall strategy as contained 
in the programme. Second, the steel unions were helped by the TUC Secretariat 
who fed in information from other industries who had tackled similar problems. 
This is not to say that without the TUC Secretariat the steel unions would 
not have pressed for these benefits. Changes in environmental factors such 
as rising unemployment, rising membership expectations, and entry into the 
european community were all working in the direction of heightening trade 
union awareness. Nevertheless, the direct institutional involvement of 
Congress House staff for the first time ever in the negotiations of the steel 
unions acted as a mechanism for the transmission of ideas and facts from one 
industrial sector to another. This illustration moreover adds credibility 
to the argument (see Chapter Three page 53) that the TUC Secretariat was a 
force helping to promote unity within the Steel Committee. 
The working party on employment and income security held four meetings 
and quickly reached agreement on major points of principle. It decided to 
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go bEyond the Green Book proposals and recommend severance payments in 
addition to the employees entitlement under the Redundancy Payments Act. 
They recommended a 20~~ lump sum payment, but left the actual amount to be 
decided in negotiations between the Steel Committee and the Corporation. In 
negotiations the Corporation proposed differential payments bet~veen regions 
of the country geared to unemplo)~ent 1evels.(56) This offer was also cal-
cu1ated to concentrate larger payments in areas where works closures were 
heaviest. However, the unions rejected the offer in favour of uniform pay-
ments to all redundant workers in the industry. Such proposals would have 
put the Steel Committee leadership in an impossible position viz-a-viz 
redundant workers outside the designated areas. Consequently, the principle 
of a uniform payment was agreed. 
In the negotiations proper the Steel Committee argued that the 20'7. 
was not in line with that paid in coal mining. The Corporation ~re not 
impressed and pointed out that coal mining was a special case supported 
directly by government funds. (57) In the end the Corporation agreed to pay 
25% in addition to the Redundancy Payment Act entitlement. Nevertheless, 
the Steel Committee felt that they had climbed down as the following 
statement shows:(58) 
'It is true we got 25% in excess of the Redundancy 
Payments Act and the reason why we accepted 251. was 
that already some closures had taken place and we 
had no time to start arguing about percentages when 
members had lost their jobs' 
On redeployment the unions wanted one uniform tapered scale of payments, 
and this was agreed. Disagreement developed over the cash compensation, 
with the unions claiming the first eight weeks at 1001. make up to be reduced 
in accordance with the productivity programme proposals. Again the 
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Corporation were pushed up, finally agreeing to extend the income maintenance 
period from 52 weeks to 60 weeks. 
The final an'a of dispute arose over the proposal to extend the guaran-
teed week from four to fiv~ shirts at 75% of shift earnings, excluding 
premiums. The 75~~ was derivpd from the Green Book guideline dividing shift 
earnings into 75% time rate and 25~l tonnage bonus. The Steel Committee 
wanted the guarantee raised to 80% The Corporation initially resisted 
arguing that the 80% guarantee ,",ould discourage workers on high bonuses from 
moving towards the guideline, but under pressure conceded the 80~~, rational-
ising that it was in line with the programme's total philosophy to increase 
the stability of earnings. Thus the unions achieved the best of both worlds 
wi th an 80i~ fall back rate in the event of low outputs and a 25% bonus 
element during periods of high output. 
Another problem to arise over the guaranteed week resulted in a delay 
in the signing of the agreement. The clause reads as follows: 
'Clause 5, The guarantee shall not apply in the following cases:-
(i) On cessation or dislocation of production or employment 
arising in respect of any strike affecting the operation 
of the plant' 
Before the agreement could be signed this clause was disputed in Scotland 
where a strike developed at one of the Corporation's works which supplied a 
second steel works. The latter works had to stop production and local 
management refused to apply the guaranteed week agreement. The Steel Comndttee 
argued that management's action was only justified if the strike had occurred 
within the works concerned. Deadlock ensued, and was only resolved by an 
informal understanding contained in a 'Points for Guidance' document issued 
to local management. (59) This merely said that in applying clause 5(i), 
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local manaBemellt shall not makp n JTccipitant decision, and that adequate 
prior consultation 3nd noti~e should be given on the need to suspend pro-
duction. The Steel Couunittec apparently found this form of words acceptable, 
although it would seem that the Corporation in no way diluted the formal 
agreemen t. 
This completes the controversial aspects of the employment and income 
security negotiations, although other agreements were made on lodging, 
travclHng allowances and so on. On the question of notifying the unions 
on works closures, a procedure ~~as agreed between the Steel Committee and 
the Corporation. Furthermore, the Steel Committee continued to negotiate 
on other issues proposed in the Green Book lvhich included, a new holiday wi th 
pay agreement; also ~vorking parties ,..rere set up and agreements subsequently 
concluded on sick pay and pensions. The latter two items were delayed for 
a time due to proposed government legislation on pensions. 
By 1975 the one significant item outstanding, and therefore, well outside 
the productivity programme's time schedule, was job evaluation. The 
Corporation eventually decided on the Urwick Orr profile method as appropriate 
to the steel industry. Subsequently, a job evaluation pilot scheme was 
commenced at Normandy Park Works, Scunthorpe, with the agreement of the Steel 
Committee unions. However, the results proved unacceptable to the NUBF, who 
argued that the factor weightings were wrong as they did not give sufficient 
weight to hazards, and physical effort. Clearly, this type of problem will 
remain so long as the unions cannot agree a criteria. In addition, job 
evaluation for manual workers might prove a costly exercise. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter identified three major productivity agreements through which 
management attempted to achieve an improvement in labour productivity. 
The first of these was the 40 hour week for shift production workers to 
be implemented at no extra cost to the industry. It was concluded that this 
agreement was due to the intervention of Prices and Incomes Policy. 
The maintenance productivity agreements were launched by the old 
employers' association in 1967. However, the local negotiations,lollth the 
exception of south Yorkshire, were caught up in the rising tide of labour 
unrest amongst the craftsmen towards the end of 1967. The unrest, which 
also spilled over into the national productivity programme discussions, led 
to the imposition of sanctions and to delays in local productivity discussions. 
This unrest reflected the decline in the steel craftsmen's and production 
workers' wage relative to that paid in engineering and shipbuilding. 
The third productivity agreement concerned the Corporation's national 
productivity programme. The programme's strategy was to improve manpower 
efficiency, and also to secure a greater degree of orderliness in industrial 
relations. Regarding efficiency, the proposals aimed at a reduction in man-
power with higher levels of output through the use of work measurement, planned 
maintenance systems, works productivity plans and similar changes. The 
Corporation attempted to achieve the unilateral right to implement the manning 
found by work study to be appropriate. This was perceived by the unions as 
a threat, and was resisted. In the end the unions accepted a limited status 
quo agreement. 
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Hage structure r.eform was another source of conflict between the parties, 
with both the NCCC and the Confederation reluctant to consolidate the cost of 
living payment. This agreement gave a measure of protection to the lower 
paid in an era of increasing inflation. Agreement was reached when the BSC 
offered to negotiate a lower paid workers' agreement outside the programme, 
and gave the unions an undertaking that should inflation rise significantly, 
further negotiations would take place. The Corporation hoped that a more 
uniform wage structure would reduce inter-union wage leapfrogging and improve 
internal works labour mobility. 
The prograrmne also made proposals for employment and income secur! ty 
aimed at reducing trade union resistance to the Corporation's rationalisation 
prograrmne. The Steel Cormnittee reacted favourably to these proposals and 
achieved a more comprehensive package than that offered by the Green Book. 
A further point of interest is the first multi-union negotiations leading 
to a national collective agreement in steel. In September, 1968, the 
Corporation achieved an understanding with the Steel Committee that the unions 
would negotiate jointly on employment and income security issues, but separat-
ely on wages and productivity elements. 
The Corporation also tried to change the collective bargaining instit-
utions at works level, by joint branch negotiations on works productivity 
plans. However, the Confederation's national agreement on this issue was 
considered vague and left much scope for local agreement. In addition, the 
Corporation made use of the joint working party approach which assisted 
factual discussion and a more problem solving orientation, but the union 
response varied. The NCCC's negotiations focused on the level of cash settle-
ment reflecting membership pressure to obtain an immediate wage advance. On 
, 
u.; 
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the other hand, the Confederation co-operated in a joint working party to 
pursue the problems and issues involved. 
The importance of conflict within the unions came out most clearly when 
in 1968 the NCCC leadership informed the Corporation that the agreement 
which they had reconwended to their members was not acceptable, and that 
they were substituting a straight wage claim and other demands. Thus the 
NCCC leadership claimed £8.20 per week, plus extra shift payments. This 
claim was designed partly to regain their control over the unofficial shop 
steward movement. 
Internal union conflict and its influence on bargaining was also evident 
in the opposition of the low paid members of the Confederation to the 
abolition of the cost of living bonus which led to the lower paid workers' 
award. Yet another source of conflict arose between the Central Negotiating 
Committee and the joint working parties when the latter unde~ined the 
negotiating function of the former. This caused the negotiating committee 
to develop a hard bargaining attitude in the final negotiations o 
Finally these productivity agreements can only be fully judged by 
works level investigation. The study now turns to such investigations at 
the Corby and Ravenscraig Works. 
---~~---- - --~-----
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Chapter Five 
Industrial Relations at Corby Steel and Tube Works! 1964-70 
This Chapter analyses industrial relations in the Corby Works during the 
period immediately prior to the introduction of the Corby-Wide Productivity 
Programme. The Corby-Wide Productivity Programme (CWPP) i. the .ubject of the 
next Chapter. This Chapter commences with a brief outline of the product 
aarket, technology, labour market and community at Corby. A .econd part deal. 
with the traditional sy.tea of industrial relations at the work., naaely 
management and trade union organisations, and their collective baraainina 
arrangeaent.. The third part identifies the developaent of productivity 
bargaining, which is then analysed in some depth owina to it •• icaificance for I 
the sub.equent Corby productivity progr ... e. The fourth part of the chapter 
evaluate. the productivity agre .. ent. of this period, indicatina the 1 ••• 0., to 
be l.ara.d. Pinally, hypoth •••• ar. d.veloped which help to explain the 
chang •• in indu.trial relation. in more ab.tract t.ras includina th. differ.nt 
fo~ of productivity agr.em.nt adopted by the parti •• to t.pl ... nt thi. ckanae, 
Part On., The Corby IDviroaaent 
In the ~dile 1930. Stewart and Lloyd. L~ited put dowa the Corby Work. 
on the iron .tone fi.ld. of Nor~ton.hire. Today. there ar ..... 11,000 
..,loyee. on the Corby .ite, and until very recently Corby wa. virtually a 
one ca.pany t .... (l) Con.equ.ntly, the towa'. pro.perity was and continue. to 
be clo.ely tied to the .ucce •• of the ca.pany. 
Corby produce •• teel tube and the work. ba. a capacity to .ake nearly 
one ~llio. tOaDe' of tki. per aaa... Output i. divided into ca.aercial and 
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quality tubes with the former accounting for 850,000 tonn.s. The product 
market is very competitive. no.eltic competition co. •• lar,.ly fro. Tube 
Inv •• baeat. aad fro. iaport. fra. Iadia, Korea .ad J.pan. Ia additioa, Corby 
tube i. in ca.petition with other product •• uch a. concrete and plastic •• 
On the coaaercial tube side, ,a.le •• and .caffoldina tube. (400,Qoo tonne. 
per .nnu.) and .peci.l bollow .ection. (300,000 tonne. p.r .DRU.) coa.titute 
... t of the productioa. Th. mark.t d .... d for ,a.l •••• nd .caffoldi .. tub. 
fluctuate. aarkedly, .nd follows clo.ely the ,eneral bu.ia ••• cycle. Capit.l 
good. iadu.trie •• uch ••• hipbuilding, be.tiag .ad T.atil.tiDl, and buildi .. 
coa.uae 34t of , •• le •• tube production .loae. The mark. tina .tr.t.ay deT.lop-
.d .t Corby to ea •• th •• e up •• ad down. ia d .... d ha. b •• a to switcb o.tp.t 
iato .xport aarket. durina trade r.c ••• io... Ia r.c.at y •• r., hovaT.r, this 
.tr.t •• y ha. b.ea 1... .ucce •• ful b.cau.e .ay ,ea.ral trade r.c ••• ion hal 
tended iacrea.inaly to bit .11 tube produci .. countri •• at the .... ti... AI 
c.-p.titioa ia export aarket. hal iacr •••• d, Corby ........ nt haT. b.caa • 
.or. co.t con.ciou •• ad awar. of the need to .Toid di.raptiT. i •••• tri.l 
di.put ••• 
On th •• u.lity .id. of the tube market, 30t of output i ••• ld dir.ctly 
to .xport aark.t., ••• in with incre •• ina difficulti... Th. daae.tic d ..... 
for q •• lity t.be i. h •• vily iaflu.ac •• by the l.vel of p.~lic exp ••• itur., 
which ... in fluctu.t •• aark.dly. 
Tbe t.chnololY .t Corby con.i.t. of three .. i. pr04uction proc •••••• 
The.e .re ~ner.l, iroa .ad .t •• l, .ad tube productio.. In the ~a.r.l work. 
iron .toa. i. qu.rri.d and .... three ~llio. te.... per ..... .."lied to 
tk. ~la.t furaac. dep.rt.8nt for ... ltina iato iro.. Cor~1 iron .t ... 
coatai .. b.twe •• 28t ... 32~ iroa whicb i. le •• ricb than th. for.ian or •• 
t.,ort.d. Ike irOD .... t •• l work. i ... ch .are ca.plex and con.l.t. of 
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several .ub-production units, naaely the coke ovens, four bla.t furnaces, two 
electric arc furnaces, and three basic oxygen vessels for steel -.kina; in 
the .ills there is a heavy cogging aill, and two narrow guage .trip ~ll •• 
The.e strip mills provide the input material fro. which the tubes are shaped. 
The .trip aill. have a co.bined capacity of over one million tonne. per 
annUR. The above processes are highly integrated fro. the preparation of 
iron ore through to the strip for tube .. king. 
The tube works technology, however, consists of a discrete variety of 
production units. The following diagr .. helps to .xplain the.e, 
Strip 
Mills 
El.ctric 
W.ld 
Plaut 
Despatch 
Dialr .. 5.1 
Corby Tub. Works, Production Proces. 
Strip Stock 
Continuous 
W.ld 
Plaut 
Calvaniaiq 
liaisbiq 
War.heusi 
Despatch 
El.ctric 
a.sistance 
Weld 
Despatcla 
Despatch Cold Dra. 
Plant 
ne spa tch 
Of th.s. production units the continuous veld plaut is the .. st illlport-
aut with four alll. producina 600,000 tOlUles per aau_. Of this '00,000 
toaae., rou,hly ou. third of tub •• ,0 to the ,alvaaiai .. plaat fer fiai.hi ... 
Th •• l.ctric weld plant produce. 250,000 t ..... per alUlua. The .l.ctric 
r •• iKanee weld plaat aael plu, 11111 produc. IlUch ... ll.r, but hip.r quality 
tu~ •• both .ati .. 50,000 tODD.S .ach. The cold draw plant receiv •• 15,000 
t_es frOll the plu, ~1l for fini.hi ... 
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Given this relatively new integrated technology, at lea.t by British 
steel works standards,(2) and its new location on the iron field., Corby 
obtained conaiderable economic advaDCa&es during the 1950.. Tk •••• dvant.g.s, 
hov.ver, were threat.ned in the 1960. by ch.nges in the wider t.chnological 
cont.xt. The.e changea(3) took place in shipbuildinc where the con.truction 
of l.rger c.p.city ships allowed the tran.port co.ts of for.iaa(richer) iron 
ore to f.ll. So aignificant was this change tbat the indu.try' •• tr.teay(4) 
.dopted in the aiddle to late 1960s was to develop larger co •• t.l works 
using foreign iron omes. Thi. d.v.lop •• nt r.pr ••• nted a thr •• t to tb. 
inl.nd loc.t.d Corby, and in particular to the aiDeral and iron .nd st •• l 
work. s.ction.. Wher •• s the tube works obt.ined ••••• ur. of prot.ction fro. 
iti uniqu.ne ••• s a tube aaker in Brit.in, thi. prot.ction was not .v.il.ble 
to the .te.l work.. Th. f.ar w.. that .trip .t •• l could b. produc.d .t 
r.duced co.t., in coa.t.l loc.tion., .nd iaported into Corby. 
At this point it i. desir.ble to turn to Corby ••• co.auDity aud to 
.naly.e certain fe.ture. of tbe Corby l.bour aarket. The popul.tio. of the 
town i •• round 55,000, having grown fro. • vill.ge of 1,500 iD the early 
1930.. Therefore, the work •• Dd tbe town h.ve grown togethar with people 
ca.ing in fro. Dortbern BritaiD to take up ..,lo,..at. Thi ••• v.lo,..at ba. 
led to the labour aarket .nd town ca..unity h.ving a p.rticul.r influ.nc. 
upon iad •• tri.l r.l.tioD •• t the work •• 
Labour .. rket •• r. conc.rn.d with the •• pply .nd d .... d for o~cupatioaal 
.kill. aud the pric. paid for th... Corby'. labour .. rk.t coaai.t. i. tk. 
narrov ••••• of the tOWll i u.lf uuI the t part of the ••• t lIi.l .... vi Wa 
••• y trav.lling di.tanc.. Throughout it. exi.teDce Corby has .xperi.Dc •• 
• .... ower .hortaa. •• tk ••• xt table iDdicat ••• 
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Table 5.1 
Unemployment Rate in Corby, East Midlands and Great Britain, 
1966-70 
-
-" -- ------ ---" - --
Corby East Midlands Great Britain 
Deceaber,1966 1.8~ 1.7'%. 2.4'%. 
Do ,1967 2.6~ 1.9'%. 2.5'%. 
Do ,1968 2.n. 1.9'%. 2.4'%. 
Do ,1969 2~2~ 2.l~ 2.5'%. 
Do ,1970 2.8~ 2.3'%. 2.7'%. 
Averal· 2.3'%. 1.9'%. 2.5'%. 
source: Deparbaent of Employaent Gazette 
The table .bows that durina the 1960. the Corby labour market una.ploy-
lIlent rat. wa. lower than the national av.reae. Furth.r .vid.nc. of thia 
relative manpower .borta,e was the exten.iv. recruiba.nt driv •• .ouat.d by 
the per.onn.l deparbBent in Scotland .nd northern Enaland. Thi. .hortace w •• 
acute, p.rticularly amonast .killed craft ... n, and the recruitaaat driv •• 
continu.' up to 1969. ODe articulate ob.erv.r of the Corby .c •• e put the 
point this w.y.(5) 
'Corby has for many year. b •• n a pro.perou. towa with 
an ab ..... e. of job. and payina kiah wa,e.' 
Labour •• pply ther.for. va. a con.traint at Corby in th. 1960., ...... 
way to •••• this va. to ~rov. the pr"uetivity of the .xi.time labour fore •• 
Corby town it.elf i. in a .en ••• foreiaa town •• t in the ai •• l. of 
nral lfortlulllpt.uklr •• (6) 'ria. lec.la .f IIorthampton.hlre have tat.n j.b. 
in the work., tra.ltieaally ia the aiDeral. and bla.t furnae •• eetioa.. Oth.r 
unit. of th. plant, h ..... r, ar ... nn •• by out.i'er. who.e root. are in 
aortb Britaia, aDd ia particular in Scotland. Corby ~.t b. the only work. 
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in England where the visitor is confronted by .loa ••• r.f.rrina to Scotti.h 
footb.ll te.... Al.o, the old Stewart .nd Lloyd Company (continu.d by ~e 
Corporation) organise a large annual Highland Gath.riua •• the coapany 
playing field •• 
Saae local people take the view that this differ.nc. in culture helps 
to reinforce the citizens' identity with the succe •• or failure of the works. 
The argument is that any crisis adversely aff.cting the works will cau.e the 
citizen. and workers to react positively to solve the probl... Cert.inly 
some local councillors, who were also lay union officials, keld this view, 
and al.o .. nag ... nt who in introducing the Corby-Wid. ProductiYity Procr ... e 
in 1971, played upon this identity. The e.sence of the araURent beiua that 
the .an should support the productivity progr .... and prot.ct their jobs, 
.nd the town.(7) However, this a.sumption that an adver.e experience will 
bring about areater cohesion be~een culture, town and work. in order to 
fiaht econoaic adver.ity, mu.t be regarded with .OBe caution. For exa.p1e, 
if in.truaent.l work .ttitude. predoainate at Corby(8), and the opportun{~ie. 
for aood job. and pay which induced people to .oye there in the fir.t pl.ce 
now di.appear, the worker. and their families .. y d.cide to pack up aDd 
return to Scotl.nd. In this c •• e the trinity of culture, town aDd works 
would weaken .nd not .trenathen a. previou.ly .ulle.ted. riDa11y, e.e. if 
the ••• ..,tion that cohe.ion will re.ult froa crisis ... correct, tki. doe. 
not rule out the po •• ibility that .trona conflicts of intara.t ari.ina 
froa within the work ... y not outweiah any c~nity identity that exi.t •• 
To ..... ri •• ' due to chanae. in the product aarket, but ,articular1y in 
tha wider teclmoloaieal c01ltext, Corby aanaa_nt were faced witll c-'itioua 
eueareai .. tke de.elopMut of .cae fora of proclucti.ity aare_ ut• TIle.e 
featura. were r.inforced by labour aarket difficultie., aud by certain 
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characteristics in the local community. However, before .. barking upon 
the productivity bargaining developaents the thesis turns to an a.alysis of 
the parties in the industrial relationa system and to their traditional 
relationships. 
Part Two, The Partiea and their Collective Relationahips 
The philosophy of the Stewart and Lloyda Company towards its employees 
was one of paternali... This ideology had been fostered by the fact that 
the town was developed by the company. This paternali .. continued until 
after nationalisation and revealed itself on the issue of white collar 
trade union recoanition. In the new Steel Corporation, Corby Works was one 
of the last to be unionised, partly because of aana, ... nt resistance aDd 
partly through lack of enthusiasm by certain groups of white collar workers. 
Thus Stewart and Lloyds waa lenerally a good .-ployer, but on it. own terms. 
~ shova above, the Corby .ite consi.ted of four .ep.r.te work. e.ch 
having it. own aanageri.l hier.rchy; namely adner.ls, iron and .teel, tabes 
and Lanc •• hire .nd Corby. In teras of nuaber • .-ployed the t.portaat works 
were the iron and .teel .nd the tube works. The ........ nt structure of 
both these units only came together at comp.ny board level. In aclditlOR, 
relationships between the two works were so distant th.t loc.l people talkecl 
of the 'Steel Curtain'. This clivision of structure •• s due to the orlaia • 
• tion of the old Stew.rt company in tube production fro. Which it l.ter 
exten.ed its operations into st.el -.kina. Th .... i.eeriag fuaction ... 
• lso divicled on the Corby alte, with both st.el ancl tube wrks bavl .. chief 
e .. i.eer.. The.e clivi.ions were officially .ndecl with the appoint...t of 
the fir.t Corby Croup ..... i .. Director coveriag the whole .ite i. March 196, 
Tbe i •••• tri.l rel.tiona function .t Corby va •• lso clivided, with steel 
•• d tube. h •• i .. their respecti.e dep.rtaentl. Thi. w •• reinforced by 
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separ.te .ffiliation to the ISTEA. In e.ch works the industri.l relationa 
manalera h.d respon.ibility for production and _intenance ,r.de., but 
not for white collar employe... Thi. division held policy i.,lic.tiona 
for indu.tri.l relations in the works .s will be .een l.ter when d •• cribina 
the developaent of productivity bars.inina. 
At thia point, it is worth notina the ltatus of the induatri.l 
relation. function at Corby. By 1966 there were tw.nty four people ..,loyed 
acrols Corby in this function incl.dina those workina on •• cr.tari.l .nd 
.tati.tic.l work. Of the twenty four, five were university arad •• t.s 
reflectins sa.ethina of the qu.lity of the p.ople involved. Both ste.l 
.nd tube industri.l rel.tions functions were he.d.d by .. n of ..... eri.l 
rank, .nd in 1965 the ca.pany appointed. Director of Per.oDA.l. App.r.ntly, 
however. this per.on w •• not. ae.ber of the _in co.p.ny bo.rd. 
In teras of .uthority, indu.tri.l rel.tion. w.a oraani •• d oa a fuact-
ional b •• i. with each .ubordin.te officer reporti .. dir.ctly to hi. fuact-
ional chief. In total the function consi.t.d of an .dvi.ory •• rvic. to 
line and enaia.erina _naa ... nt. N.v.rthel.... ca.pany policy r.quir •• all 
liae .. Raa.r. to diacu •• with the industrial r.l.tiona lIAIlAI.ra all clal .. 
on w., •• and _nnina. rurtheraore. at the infor..1 lev.l, the inf1 •• ac. of 
iadu.tria1 r.1ationa vaa .. ch ,r.at.r. 'or inatanc., it .. a .aid that tb. 
tab. work. iuaatrial relatio •• -naa.r rul.d witla a 'rN of ir .. •• • ... r-
th.1e.a, the r.lation.hip b.twe.n lin. and indu.tria1 r.1atioa • ..aaa.r • 
... one of int.r-d.p.nd.ncy. Th. ind •• trial r.1ationa ..... r. r .. uir" 
the co-op.ration of the lin. for quick and accurat. iafor.atioa, ... ~ 
1ia. a •• d.d the know1.d,. ... akil1. of til. ind •• tria1 r.1ation. .p.cia1i.t. 
In addition, c.rtai. cbaR& •• took plac. duri .. the 1'60., iac1adi .. ,r"act-
ivity baraainina, vldcb incr.aa •• the .tat •• and inf1u.ac. of til. 
i .... tria1 r.1atiODl d.parta8nt. 
134. 
Trade Union Structure and Government 
There were seven independent trade unions with recocnitioD to 
ne,otiate on behalf of manual employees at Corby. The size of these unions 
in 1974 Is civen in the Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 
Trade Union Membership at Corby, 1974 
Iron and Steel Trades Confederation 
~lc ... ted Union Engineering Workers 
Hational Union of Blastfurnaceaen· 
Electrical and Plu.bing Trade Union 
Amalcamated Union of Building Trade Workers 
British Roll Turners Society 
General and Municiple Workers Union 
7,000 
2,437 
1,750 
924 
90 
20 
7 
source: various trade unions and Corby manac ... nt 
The table shows the overwhelming importance of ISTC, and on the 
maintenance side of the AUEW. In the following analysi. attention will be 
drawn to the two main production unions and to the larcest two .. iat .... c. 
unions. Reference to the other unions will only be made wh.re they have a 
decisive influence upon events. 
The Iron and Steel Trades Confed.ration da.iaat.s ind •• trial relations 
at Corby. The union's membership was sustained without the a •• i.taace of a 
formal closed shop alreeaent. There were 'check off' arrana ... nt. op.rat1ac. 
but not all workers made use of the facility. Th. probl ... of nOR-
compliance ... bers worried the union, and was raiaed fro. tt.e to tt.. ia 
n.,otiations when the union souaht aanal ... nt's a.sistaRC. with tba 
probl... At Corby there are twenty three manual work.r brancbes of tb • 
• nion, and nineteen staff branch.s. The followiaa table ,i... infor.ation 
OR branch si •• for the .. nual workers. 
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Table 5.3 
ISTC Branch Membership (manual) at Steel and Tube Works, 1974 
Corby Nol 490 Continuous Weld 335 
(basic oxygen shop) 
Corby N02 398 Continuous Weld Finishing 184 
(heavy aUl) 
Corby N08 213 Continuous Weld Warebou •• 339 
(traffic) 
Corby Nol2 57 Corby Nol7 72 
(.crap recovery) (marshalling bay) 
Corby No13 114 Galvanizing 131 
(bricklayer. labour.r.) 
Corby No14 417 Electric Weld s.a. 556 
(.trip IRill.) 
Corby Nol5 82 Electric Re.i.tance Weld 474 
(civil .aaineering) 
Corby No16 143 C.W. Packer. 267 
(.lectric arc plant) 
Plug Mill 403 
E.S.T. 82 
Rectangl. Hollow Section. 40 
Cold Draw 160 
source: Iron and Steel Trade. Confederation 
The large.t brancbes are Corby Nol and 4 In the .te.l work., and the 
EWsa and Eaw in the tube works. The govermaent of ISTC branches will b. 
di.cu ••• d in Chapter Sev.n. In this chapter, the e •• ential f.atur. to .. 
stre •• ed 1. the auton~ of the various branch... Thi. autoaa." .a.briaed 
ia the rule book, allow. the braach to aeaotiat. with .. nal_llt OIl wac •• 
and oth.r i ••••• aff.cting their ... b.r.' iater •• t.. Moreov.r, DO branch 
of the union, Ilor any jOint branch c~ttee, has autbority to illterve. la 
the aov.ra.ent of anoth.r braach if the latt.r doe. not wi.h it. 
Staff branches ..araed tower •• the end of 1969, Vbea Corby .... ' ... nt 
wa. force. to reco .. i.e the Confederation for the.e Irade.. lecoanitiOll 
.a. the collap.e of the Corby Poreaan'. ".ociation, a .0.-.. iOl1 body, 
which repre.ented their collective intere.t.. So paternali.tic va. the 
'or ... Il'. ".ociation that the fir.t Corby Group Mauaaina Dir.ctor wa. 
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at one time its chainDan. 
The Corby Joint Branches Committee was a for .. for discussiQg common 
probl .. s. It was not a nelotiating body and, in fact, wa. more conc.rned 
with internal trade union matters. It aet to dee ide the Corby vie. on 
is.ue. to be di.cus.ed at the union'. Divi.ional Officer. Conference, and 
at the He.vy Steel Conference. The latter put forw.rd to the union'. 
executive c~ttee re.olution. on w.ge. and condition. of -.ployaent. The 
tube work. had it. own Joint Br.nche. eo.mittee which wa. u.ed to .... 11 
extent by _nel.ent. For example, _naa_ent would «Iiscu •• with thi. 
body •• eriou. .ectional .trike which wa. cau.ina oth.r. to 10 •• work. 
Th.r. w ••• 1.0 a Staff Joint Brauche. eo..itt •• which in ~ ... r.pre.-
.nted on the Corby Joint Brauch •• eo..itt ••• 
Pinally, Corby Work. i. p.rt of No 4 Divi.ioD of the UniOD .n«l i • 
•• rv •• by • divi.ional officer aud thr •• divi.ional arlaai •• r.. Ibe •• 
full-ti •• offici.l. oper.t. fro. Biraiaahea .nd .peDd • f.ir ... uat of 
tt.. at Corby. Accordinc to the work. iudu.tri.l r.l.tiou ••• p.r~t 
th.r. i •• Coat.d.r.ti .. official .t Corby ao.t d.y •• uriaa the y •• r. 
Th. Rational Union of Il •• tfurnac_a (IUD) or,ani ••• work.r. in the 
.! •• r.l., cok. ov.na, or. pr.p.r.tion, .int.r pleat. and .. tbe bl •• t-
fumac... T.b. aniou' • ..-bar.hip .t Corby i. partly .u.tain.d by .rr .... -
.. nt •• t.il.r to tho •• of ISTC. Th. lod,.. (aot branche.) .re ,i..- ia 
the following table .lOUl with the r •• pectiv • ..-ber.hip •• 
137. 
Table 5.4 
NUBl Lod,e Meabership ( .. uual) at Corby, 1974 
Corby Mol Lodge 465 Corby Loco.otive 125 (blastfuruaces and ancillariel) 
Corby M02 Lodge 381 Corby Tar.ac 66 
(ore preparation and linter plants) 
Corby Coke Oveu Lodge 286 Shauks aud McEwanl 129 
Corby Mines 298 
lource: NUBl, District Office, Granthaa 
The avera,e lod,e .ize (a. with ISTC) is ... 11. The lodee. also 
bave a de,ree of autoua.y, althou,h the rule book .ays that the lod,e 
d.le,ate CaDDot ue,otiate a chauae iu wace. or iu .taudard .aDDiaa without 
coaaultiq with the uuiou'. district secretary. (9) Lo"e ,oyer-.ut i. 
otherwise .~lar to that of ISTe, conai.tina of chair.aa, a dele,at. and 
a ... 11 ca.aittee. The.e officer. conduct the bu.iue •• of the 10d,e aDd 
lUke repr.seutationa to uu,_ut. The rule. of the NUBr do aot prnide 
for a joiut lod,e ca.aittee at workl level, althoup they are mown to 
exist. Also, the rule book did uot preveut certain MUir lay officials 
fro. playi. a prOlli.eat part oa bodies such as the Corby Tr"e hi_ 
.. sociatioa (to b. dealt with later). 
At district level there is co-ordiaatioa of lK&l utters with eacla 
lod,e electi .. dele,ates to the District Deleeate Board "eti... Tke 
MUir bas curreatly five District eo..ittees, each service. by a full-tbae 
district secretary. At Corby the district secretary is iu fre~ueDt 
coutact with the lo4,es t. baule their _,e clai .. aDd -'ers arie.-
.. ees. The District Dele,ate .. ard .. ets twice per year a" alao fe~l­
ates resolutiOll8 for su~ssioa to the Batioaal Ixecuti.e. !he Diatrict 
Dele,ate Board elects four officials to atteDd the UBioa'a a ... al Goaeral 
eoUDeil; tlte sovereip authority (rule 3 HUBl Handbook) of the uuiou. 
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The National Executive Committee meets more frequeat1y thaa thia, aad all 
districts are represented. The ,eneral aecretary ia the a.nior ful1-t~e 
official of the union, and there ia a ful1-tiae officer force of aix. 
Thus the union has a full-~e officer ratio' to aeaberahip 4f 112,677 
which co.parea favourably with the ISTC's 114,000 in 1973.(10) 
The craft Unionl at Corby are .uch lesa .. lti-uaion ia structure 
than at Ravenscrai" or in most other atee1 works. ODe explanation for 
thia ia that Stewart aad Lloyds, with so. •• xp.ri.ac. of .. lti-unioa 
probl ... , took the opportunity of the new lite at Corby to l~it r.coa-
nition. Another difference between Corby and .any other .t •• l w.rks is 
th.t • .-i-akilled .nd un.kill.d workers .r. in ... ber.hip of the cr.ft 
• .t.a •• Dd aot the Confeder.tion. Cr.ft union ..-b.rship .t Corby is 
p.rtly a •• tained by • pr.-entry clo •• d shop .'r .... nt. Th. follovina 
... ly.is vill tr •• t the ADIW .nd IITPU •• p.r.tely. 
The ADIW .t Corby or,.nis.d • wid. v.ri.ty of skill.d .a. l.aa 
.kill .... iate .. nc. work.r.. In .ddition to the aorael fitt.ra, tura.r., 
.nd .. chiaiata, the vaioa h.d in .eab.rahip weld.ra .ad p1.t.ra who el •• -
wh.r. would be in aeab.rship of the Boileraaker.' Soci.ty. Th.y .1a. 
or,aDia •• pip.fitt.r. (no plaab.r. were ..,l.y •• ) aDd .yea p.iat.ra .ad 
joia.r.. Al.o the union or,.ni •• d the aeal-akill.d aDd .. akill.d worker. 
ia the aechaDica1 tr •••• of which th. .t.el worka had the 1.r,.at 
proportion. 
At the work pl.c., .. ion or,aai •• tlon i. built .pOD the ahe, .teward. 
lach •• p.rt.eat of the works .nd •• ch tr.d. haa • ahop ateward. !bar. 
exiat •• hier.rchy .f .tew.rd. with the Joiat Shop Steward eo..1ttee of 
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the AUEW electinc a convener of shop stewards. Both steel aDd tuba works 
have their respective steward hierarchies, althouch the one in steel 
was larcer due both to the greater meabership and also to the variety of 
trades. This division in union structure reflected the equally 
divided aanaceaent orlanisation prior to 1969. 
The AI1IW hal six branches based on the tOWD (includiq ane staff 
branch) which elect representatives to the Corby District eo..ittee. 
However, unlike District eo.aittees elsewhere the Corby eo..ittee 
consisted a~ost wholly of steward • .-played at Corby Works. Moreover, 
this closene.s of the District eo..ittee to the works was further 
reinforced by the district secretary, who was al.o .. ..,loy... Th.r.fore, 
the traditional role of the AUEW's District eo..ittee of sup.rvision and 
protection of trade interests was v.ry .eaniaaful at Corby wh.r. it was 
intt.Ately involv.d in industrial relatioua. Also at District eo..itt.e 
the steel and tube works stewards caae together to discuss ca..on probl •••• 
It is now aecessary to consider the relationship betwe.n the union 
at Corby and the full-ti.e officials. The first full-tiae offic.r to be 
involv.d in a Corby dispute is the divisional officer locat.d at Watford. 
Accordi .. to the industrial relation. deparbaent the officer visited 
Corby about six tiaes p.r year. Most of the union's busia.ss, tb.r.fore, 
was conducted by the stewards aad the part-t~ district secr~ry. 
The other .. jor craft dion the IITPU it .. d. up of tiae served 
.lectrici ... , char,ehaDd .... a few le.s .killed Irad... !ke aal .. 
• tructur. was siailar to that of tk. AUIW with .ach d.part.eat el.ctina 
its Oft .te.ard. TIl •• e forae. the Shop Iteward. ec-t.tte. frca which a 
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convener is elected. Again both steel and tube works had aeparate union 
atructures to deal with manaceaent. 
The union'a branches are based upon the town. The IITPU had no diatrict 
secretary st.d1ar to the AnEW, and prior to 1965, the stewards caae under 
the Area Committee and the full-time area official. Of course, the Area 
Committee ha. a much wider jurisdiction than Corby itself. This diff.rence 
in structure between the two craft orcaniaationa created a probl .. at OIrby 
in the chancing circumstance. of the ~ddle 1960a. The probl .. related to 
the difference in status between the EETPU convener and the AUIW district 
aecretary. This caused the EETPU convener to obtain fra. the Area eo..ittee 
p.r.ission to act as an unofficial district s.cr.tary, with a jurisdiction 
cOTerina both steel and tube works and a1ao extending outaide. MOreover, 
manag .. ent contribut.d to the development by addr.s.iag it. for.al correspond-
ence to the union's di.trict secretary. A8 a r.sult, the EITPU convener 
increased hi. influence at Corby. In fact, so .uch .0 that he an. the AUEW 
di.trict .ecretary were the only lay officials to attend the .. stboume 
eoaference in January, 1967. 
'ftle other chaDDel of shop .teward involv .. nt with the uniOll out.id. 
tbe work place~s through .-.bership participation in ar.a aad aational 
conf.r.nc.a. Tbe union abeliahed the Area eo..itte •• tructur. ia 1965, 
r.placilll it with area and industry conferenc.a. The.e confer.nces debate 
isau •• of aignificanc. to the union in sp.cific iad.atri.a.(ll) 
TIl. WCC::C:: has no juria.icti .. OTer the AUEW aad DTPU at Corlay. TIle 
local proceclur. aar._au .... with each uion in the llicldle 1950., ... 
the .... 1 conatitutiOll of Juae 1949 for Allie. Diatrict erafta.en. eo..ittees 
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make no mention of it.(12) In the absence of NCCC jurhdiction no jOint 
works cr.ft committee h.s been established .s at Ravenscr.ic. Moreov.r, 
the simpler trade union structure at Corby probably created no d .... d for 
one. Nevertheless, .1thouCh this wa. the tradition.l position, circumatances 
becan to ch.nge in the 1960., and • joint AUEW/EETPU body was set up in 
the steel works in 1965. This interesting developaent shows the initi.tive 
and perseverance of the IETPU convener cum di.trict secretary. MOreover, it 
was • developaent closely tied up with the ~ergence of productivity 
b.rc.inina, and for that re.son is worth describina in detail. 
In 1964, the EETPU convener decided to entice the AU!W iato • joint 
work inc .rr.na_ent. This w.s rejected .t first o¥ina 'to th. dGllinaat 
po.ition of the AUEW. App.r.atly, oa craft i.sues the co.p •• y de.lt with 
the ADEW and applied the outcoae of their discu.sioa. to the IITPU. 
Coac.rn.d to t.prov. the status of the cr.ft ... a (.ad his OWD uaio.), the 
conve.er envisaced th.t th.ir w.Ces could be t.prov.d thr.ush incr ••••• 
.. apower effici.ncy. Con.equ.ntly, ia April 1964 the IETPU .ubaitt.d a 
prop.s.l for .n .v.il.bility bonus. The •••• nce of thi. vas for cr.ft .... 
to uad.rtake .ore work ia fewer hour.. This iade.d v ••• n e.rly initi.tive 
b •• rina in llind th.t ISTEA. did not •• t up the Morl.y Workinc P.rty until 
F.bru.ry, 1966. However, "naa_ent showed ao ,r •• t intere.t and it bec ... 
iIIp.r.tiv. th.t tile IITPU obtai. the .upport of th. aore pow.rful AIfIW. 
Th. courtship b.twe.n the uaious was h.lped by the .l.ction of • aev ADlW 
district secret.ry, .nd by th. ead of 1964, th. union .ssoci.ted itself 
with the .v.il.bility bonus cl.i.. Mana,.eat vere iaforaed of the jOiat 
worki •• rr.na_nt .t .... ti. b.ld ia F.bru.ry, 1965. Th. a.v joint 
body's .ucc ••••• s t..edi.t.ly ••• ur •• wb.a it obtaia.d • con.ider.bl. 
incr .... in boau.. Mor.ov.r, the d.v.lopaeat .dd.d further to the tra.e 
UBioa bi.rarcby withia the st •• l work. cr.ft uaio ••• 
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Anoth.r institutional change established in October 1966, .. s the 
Corby Association of Trade Unions. This consUltativ. body covered all 
the unions in the .te.l work.. The As.ociation propo.ed to raise the 
statu. of work.rs by fonaulating policies on sick pay, p.nsiOBa, and in 
seeking an extension of participation in .. n ..... nt decision -.king. 1be 
secretary of the As.ociation was the IETPU convener. 
To su..arise, at Corby both manaaeaent and trade union structures were 
very fraplented. OIl the union side, althouah Corby had fewer aions than 
.. ny other works the absence of an allied craft ... n ca..ittee partly offset 
this benefit. Further the divi.ion in the aanaa ... nt oraani.ation caused 
the creft8aen to divide into steel and tube worka unions. The production 
unions with their larae nuaber of ... 11 branches added to the dearee of 
fraplentation. However, there were sip.. that thines were chaneine with 
the craft unions, followed by the craft and production uni ... , aetti .. 
to,ether to fora joint bodies. Thus the Joint eraft .. u eo-ittee aud the 
Aasociatioa of Trade Unions were .abryonic develo,..nts which ia t~ would 
alter relationship. between the various partie.. Before purauin, this theae 
further in Part Three the traditional coll.ctive baraainina arrana ... nta 
have to ~. a .. lyae4. 
!be Tr .. itional Collectiv. Baraaini .. ArraDl ... nt. 
In what followa the conc.pts of job reaulation and collective barlAin-
ine .tructure are u.ed as a freaework to analy.e the fact. of Corby 
industrial relations. Here, the rule. refer not only to tho.e for.ally 
earee., but also to iaforaal custa. and practice as well a. tho.e lald 40wn 
unilaterally ~y the partiea. Th. analyaia uae. the further diviaion into 
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substantive and procedural rules, dealing firstly with productioa aud then 
with maiateaaace workera. Collective bargaiaiag atructure ia uaed in the 
way described by WEJ McCarthy in the Departaent of EEployaeat'a Manpower 
Paper No 5, thea. features are: the level at which iaaues are aegotiated, 
the scope of the issues sub}ect to collective bargaining, the !!E! which tb. 
resultaat collective agreeaenta take, and the bar&aiaina unit or nuabers 
of people covered by the agreement. 
Production workers' wage ratea, both datal (tiae) aad toanage bonus, 
were negotiated at deparbaental level. If the partiea failed to agreetthen 
a aettl .. eat could be sought at a higher level in the procedure. Another 
subatantive issue negotiated at deparbBental level waa atandard .... ioa. 
Negotiationa on maaning could ariae over a new it .. of plant, or if aaa. 
technological or organisational change disturbed the existing re~uir ... nt. 
The maaning standards were not eatablished by work .. asurement. These agree-
aeata were foraally written with both parties signina the docu.ent. Also, 
the agreeaents were nearly all open ended with either party haviaa the riaht 
to re-negotiate at very short notice. 
On the above isaues the trade uniona' right to negotiate was regarded by 
maDageRent a. legitimate. However, there were other issues where this 
legit~cy was lesa clear cut. The content of the worka rule book was decided 
unilaterally by .an&geaent and the unions made little att.-pt to d ... n4 the 
right of joint regulation. Nevertheless, they did on occasion challenge 
their t.pl .. entation. For instance, when management i.,osed a punisbaent 
upon an employee who allegedly broke a rule, the branch officials would 
challenge the decision and attempt to negotiate a reductioa in the punishaeat. 
According to the induatrial relations deparbaeat this probl .. increa.ed 
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throughout the 1960s. Overtime was another issue over which the legitimacy 
of bargaining was doubtful, and this caused a number of problema. At Corby 
overtime was high due to the general manpower shortage experienced in the 
1960s, and same workers felt it to be unevenly distributed. As a result 
these workers demanded more overtime. Another problem arose when a shift 
workers' replacement failed to turn up for work and management bad to force 
the employee who had completed his shift to work a 'doubler', that i. two 
shifts in succession. Here the legitimacy of management's action wa. 
questioned by the workers, although the problem and the di.ciplinary impli-
cations stemmed from absenteeisa. Absenteei .. was high and so.e .. aager. 
thought that overtime working had much to do with it. 
The union also imposed unilateral rule. upon aanag ... nt, e.pecially on 
promotion and job demarcation. In general management accepted the union 
view that promotion was based upon seniority within the departaent. OD 
occasions manageaent disputed the rule when in their view a particular person 
wa. not fitted for a top job. Such disputes were rare and normally settled 
by negotiation. Job d ... rcation problems arose when work groups and 
individuals refused to undertake work not considered their., or claiaed the 
work of another group. Maaag .. ent generally accepted the.e job pr.ctices, 
although the occa.ional dispute went the lenath of •• eutral eo..ittee. 
The siz. of the bar,.inina units in both steel .Dd tub. work. were ... 11. 
lach of the twenty three br.nches and eight MUll lodge. con.titut.d a 
b.rg.inina unit, but within. branch, work group. laad a .... ur. of autoDOll)' 
to negotiate th.ir own tt.e and to ... g. boaus r.te. throuah the bra.ck. In 
other word., the branch it.elf con.i.ted of ..aller units as in the .trip 
alU., wh.re the aill crew, fin1.hina b •• p.r.ollll.l, and checker •• U 
145. 
negotiated separately. Therefore, the collective barg.ining .tructur. was 
highly autonomous and fragmented with each group pur.uina it. own interest. 
At national level .greem.nts which influenced b.haviour .t Corby iaclud.: 
the annu.l w.ge round which .dds • flat s .. or percentage to e.rnina. for the 
.tandard working week; a minimum earnings l.vel for labourer.; the .liding 
scale .ddition which origin.lly fluctu.t.d with the pric. of .te.l but was 
.tabilis.d in 1941; the monthly cost of living bonu.; the .tand.rd working 
hours p.r week; .hift premiuaa for 2 pa to 10 p. and 10 pa to 6 .. ; ov.rti.e 
.nd weekend premium.; guar.nteed we.k .greement; holiday and holiday with 
pay .gre ... nt; .nd the .xttnded working week for adll •• 
The production workers' procedure agr .... nt .a. the ••• n. by which a •• 
sub.tantive .gr ..... t. were .. d., and disput •• haadl.d. Th. proc.dure al.o 
.abodi •• the r.coguitiou right. of the p.rtie., the f.ciliti •• to be u.ed, 
plus the juri.diction of the agr .... nt. 
Th. proc.dur •• tt..,t.d to r •• olve conflict as follow •• A cl.~ or 
gri.vanc. could ca.aeuc. .t d.part.ant.l l.v.l and if no •• ttl .... t .. . 
r •• ched, .tag. two could be invok.d with •• e.tina b.t .... the work.f ...... r/ 
i.du.tri.l r.l.tion. offic.r and the branch offici.l.. A ekird i.t.rDe1 
.ta,. b.tw •• a the .... r.pr ••• nt.tiv •• plus the .al •• full-t~ offici.l wa • 
• v.ilabl.. Aft.r this ~. X.utr.l eo..itt •• co •• i.tina of two r.pr •••• tativ •• 
of uu,_.t and two of the union frOil oth.r work. witlai. ,the Corpor.tio1l 
could b. invok.d. ft. fUllCtionina of tili. eo..itt •• will If •• i.c ••••• in 
d.tail i. Chapt.r S,v •• on "v.n.crai,. Th. aext .xt.rnal .tea •• a. ek. 
National Sub-eo..1tt •• , followed, if ear •• d Ify arbitration. 
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Although the ISTC procedure agreement wa. ba.ed upon cu.tom and practice, 
it was under.tood by tho.e concerned. On the other hand, the NUIF had a 
formal national procedure agreement, although at work. level it made little 
difference to behaviour compared with the ISTC procedure. Procedural differ-
entiation did not exist in the period, a.d problema, even thoae of doubtful 
legitimacy, found their way into the all eabracing procedure. Statu. quo 
wa. another factor of little significance, with production worker. accepting 
change, or agreeing to work a new plant, and agreeing the rate •• ub.equently. 
Retroactive payaent was common and reduced much of the re.i.t&nce to chanle. 
The facilities offered to branch and lodge official. were confined to 
what manageaent termed rea.onable acce •• to the meaber.hip. URion .eeting. 
were not allowed in working hour., although there was an occa.ional exception 
if aanageaent felt that their intere.t would benefit. There were no lay full-
tiae br.nch official., nor wa. there. demand for thea. However, branch 
officials required to attend aeeting. ia working hour. were p.id. 
As shown above the bargaining unit. on w&le i •• ue. were ... 11 ... the 
br.ach offici.l. h.d the right to pur.ue their cl.iaI up to leutr.l eo..dttee 
level. As. re.u1t Neutr.l Comaittee reait. referred to arouad 100 production 
oper.tive. or le •• in a labour force of .... 7,000, and aive. the hiahly 
.utonoaou. &ad fr.saeated b.rg.ining .tructure, eo..ittee 'eci.t ... ofteR 
.olve. one pro~l .... 41 .t.ulta.eou.ly .parke. off •• other. 
'l'be aalnteU1lce worker.' 88tll .ub.tantive .cre .. nt .t work. leye1 v •• 
the toaaage bonua. However, the steel and tube work.' collective b.r,.illilll 
.rrang .. e.t. differed on boaa.. The .teel cr.ft .... •• b .... '-.e • .,0 • 
• eltiBg .hop output .pplied equ.lly to .U cr.ft ... i. the .t.el work. with 
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pro rata reductions for the less skilled. In the tube works, a nwaber of 
bonus scheRes were in existence based upon separate units of plant. 
Consequently, disparities over eaminal arole between tube craft .. en, aDd 
al.o between tube and steel craftsmen. Negotiationl also took.~lace over 
abnormal condition money (ACK), although this fo~ of payment was le.s 
significant in the tube works where conditions were nearer to those of a 
general eDiineering factory. The steel works ACK paym.nts illcr .. s.d durina 
the 1960s riling to averaae about 30/- per w •• k. Moreover, thes. pa,.ants 
were hiaher in the iron works where several jobs carried pa,..ats of 2/-
p.r hour, at a ti .. when the hourly rate va. 4/11.21. 
In addition to pay, a nuaber of issues were the subject of n.aotiation, 
a1 thouah aauaa ... nt did not conc.de the formal riaht. OVertime va. one .uch 
issue and will be dealt with in detail later. ADotker was .. nniDl, here 
aanaa ... nt siaply authorised the .stablisba.nt en the ba.is of experi.nc •• 
Howev.r, during an .. era.ncy r.pair or plann.d .hut down, th.y wo.ld a .... nt 
the .. nniq by transferring workers fra. one d.partaent to another. This 
formal ..uaa ... nt riaht vas oft.n resist.d by the shop stewards and .. ,ot-
iations ensu.d. Such restrictions on labour mobility also applied in the 
area of restrictive job practices. Typical of the.e were .elders ref Us ina 
to use burnina equipa.at, and fitt.rs vaitiua for pipefitters to r ... ve 
pipework fraa a job. Iuforul neaotiations o'Ccurre ••• n .. ua .. nt 
di.ciplined workers for breaking a company rule and also ever the u.. of 
contractors. On the latter is.ue Corby craft ... n often refu •• d to work 
be.ide contractors labour. 
The fora that acre .. nts took t.nded to vary with the deare. of 
leaitiaacy or recoau1tion accorded to thea by .. nag ... nt. Wace aar .... nt• 
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were normally written up, whereas issues like job deaarcation or .ability 
were lurrounded by informal understandings and aisunderltandiUCI. Most of 
the collective agreements were open ended in fo~. 
The bargaining unit structure was frae-.nt.d but not al ca.plicated 
al that of the production worker.. The various work., that iI, Ite.l, tub.l, 
mineral., and Lancashire and Corby had their own unit.. Within .ach work. 
the •• chanical and electrical trad.s negotiat.d s.parat.ly, although not in 
the ate.l works where a Joint Shop Stewards Ca.mitt.e .xi.t.d frOB 1965. Th. 
1 ••• skill.d maintenance workers, who took their lead from the craftsmen, 
had the right to leparate negotiation. with manaleaent. 
National lubstantive agreem.nts betw.en the ISTIA and the Ieee r.gulat. 
work at Corby; althoulh the Corby union. were outside the NeCC. Th. ~.t 
important national rule in the period 1964-70 was the hourly rate. Thi. 
rat. did not apply at Corby until .ore r.cent ti ... when Stewart and Lloyd. 
brought the union. into line. Traditionally the Corby rate was hilb.r, ~ut 
the gift hour. for back and night .hift. lower than tho.e coatain.d ia the 
national alr.em.nt. Other important national agr .... nt. applyina at Corby 
wer.: the Novemb.r 1964 Agree.ent on Effici.ncy, S.rvice and Qualification.; 
pr.-iu.s for we.k-.nd and ov.rti •• working; holiday and holiday with pay 
entitl ... nts; .tandard w •• kly hour.; and the guarant •• d w •• k alr .... nt. 
Both the ADIW and the IITPU bav. s.parat. proc.dur. acr .... nt •• t Corby 
which .r. fo~lly writt.n and .ign.d by the parti... The .ituatiou 1 •• or. 
c~lex ~ this however, and in the ca •• of the ADIW th.re are in f.ct 
.l.v.n proc.dure alr .... nt •• (l3) Th •• Ir .... at. for.ally allow for the 
n.lotiation of bonus and ACK payments, and for the handling of di.put •• over 
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their application. The most interesting procedural question is the claUD 
by the Corby unions that they do not come within the jurisdiction of the 
NCCC. Some of the agreements, namely tho.e of the mineral. and Lancashire 
and Corby, terminate at divisional office level. Other agreements including 
.teel and tube work. contained clauses referring a dispute to London. 
However, the London aeeting is between the unions' divisional and district 
offic.r. and repre •• ntatives of the ISTEA. Only aft.r this stage has be.n 
exhaust.d and if both parti.s agree, can the dispute be r.ferred to a full 
ae.ting of employers and national union officials. Clearly, the autbprity 
and influence in handling a dispute lay with the AUEW Di.trict to..ittee,to 
a smaller extent with the Divisional Office and only with the national 
offic.r if asked to participat. by the District eom.itt ••• 
This .ituation was an embarrassm.nt to the AUIV's national officer for 
the steel industry, who was al.o conv.n.r of the MCCC. Mor.ov.r, thi • 
..harra .... nt b.c ... more acut. with nationali.ation and the increasiug 
standardi.ation of industrial relation. policy. Thi. anoaalous situatioa 
c ... to a head in Jun., 1970 wh.n a .eriou. strike took place at Corby. Th. 
dispute which c .... nc.d with a work to rule and overtime ban .oon dev.loped 
into a strike. Th. District eo..itt ••• x.rcised it. authority and .ndor.ed 
the us. of sanctions, appar.ntly to increase union .olidarity, and to put 
maxi ... pressure upon aana,eaent. The Corporation att.-pted to brina in 
the national officer, but the District eo..ittee was able to exclude him 
until they thought the ti.e right. Th. local u8ion th.8 allowed th. dispute 
to go on in procedure so a. to result in a solution with national officer 
involv ... nt. Thus, the District eo..ittee used its authority to endorse 
the strike and the procedure agr .... nt to it. own ends. (14) 
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The outcome of this dispute was the inclusion of a clause in the 
return to work formula committing the parties to di.cu ••• nd .gr.e • new 
procedure. Thi. new procedure w.s established for .11 AUEW a .. bers on the 
Corby site in July, 1971. The .greeaent aakes explicit the iavolv .. ent of 
Bse Headqu.rters and the AUEW National Executive in a di.pute referred to 
n.tional level. FUrther to meet the multi-union probl .. , the procedure 
.llow. formally for joint AUEW/EETPU meeting. with aanageDent. Neyerth.l ••• , 
the new procedure remains outwith the juri.diction of the Neee, but in 
proyiding for national officer involvement in .. lti-union dispute. c.n be 
con.idered the next be.t arr.ncaa.nt. 
Ai.in procedur.l differentiation i. not .cknowledged by the new .gree-
aent. It i. typically .11 embracing, with cl.u •• one .t.ting that • workaan 
can r.i.e "any aatter" with hi. immediate supervi.or. Al.o, on .hop .tew.rd 
f.cilitie. the .gre .. ent i •• ilent, .lthough .t the informal leyel both the 
AUEW di.trict •• cret.ry, the EETPU convener (c .. di.trict .ecretary), aDd 
the ADIW tube work. convener h.d .cope for .ovemeat due to tbeir f.irly 
l.rge juri.diction •• Notwith.tanding thi., aanag ... nt d.nied that tb.y ked 
full-ti.e l.y offici.l. at Corby. 
Manaa ... nt'. right. under the procedure agr .... nt r ... in •• l.rgely 
un.pecified, •• do tho •• of the union. Th. new procedure g.y. top Corpor-
.tion offici.l •• pl.c., .nd al.o cont.in.d the .... 1 pe.c. cl.u •• giviaa 
manag .... t the right to expect work.r. in di.pute to r ... ia .t work uatil 
th. proc.dure w •• exhau.ted. On the qu •• tion of tbe .cope of ...., ... nt 
riaht. (for ex..ple, to decide ov.rtia., aauaiaa,etc.), tbe agr .... nt 
r ... iaed .ileat. 
To ..... ri •• , th •• boye aDaly.i. highlight. the .. in fe.ture. of the 
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traditional collective bargaining arrangements at Corby.. It has shown that 
the collective barsaining structures of both production and ..tateaance 
work.rs were extremely fragmented, autonomous, and partly iufo~l. Informal 
bargaining over issues like overtime, labour mobility and di.cipline wa. 
on the increase. Thus the scope of collective bar,aining vas much wider 
than manaseaent wished to formally acknowl.dse. Anoth.r .. jor change was 
the riSing a.pirations of the union. for greater influence in the "na,eaent 
decision making process. The policies of ~e Joint Craft .. en's eo.aittee 
and the Corby Aasociation of Trade Unions in the .tee1 work. reflected 
thi. point of viev. The dev.lopment of these change. will be traced in 
the next .ection which d.al. with the origin and growth of productivity 
bargaining. 
Part Three, Early Productivity Bargaining at Corby 
Productivity bargaining originated in 1965 with the .. int.Danc. 
employe •• in the iron and steel works. These .arly di.cu •• ions were ahead 
of tho.e for the .teel industry in general a. ISTEA e.tabli.hed the Morley 
Working Party in February 1966 and its recaaaendations bec .. e national 
policy lat.r that year. Also, Corby se ... to have .. brac.d productivity 
bargaining every bit a. early a. Port Talbot Work •• (15) 
Productivity bargaining ca.aence. with the EITPU'. cla~ for a. 
availability bonus related to t.proved .. npover utili.ation. At tb. ti .. 
.. naa .. ent ianor.d the productivity eleaent and nothing wa. done. However, 
in June 1965, a .trike occurred amona.t craft .. en ov.r the .. nning of the 
basic oxyaen plant, then beina .ub.titut.d for the old be ..... r .teel making 
proc.... Thi. stoppa,e led to a hearing in LondOR, where the local unions 
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took the opportunity to make productivity suggestioDs. In response local 
.. na, .. ent proposed the "twenty point plan". This plan bec .. e mown sub-
sequently as the Magenta Book. The essential features of the plan were: 
(a) An important objective was to secure improved labour aobility 
between deparaaents within the works. Manageaent emphasized the 
need to exercise this ri,ht in order that the orgaai.ation could 
cope better with emer,ency breakdowns. Greater mobility of the 
.. intenance labour force would help to avoid extra overti.e working 
aDd thereby improve efficiency. 
(b) Maaag .. ent also proposed the elimination of aany restrictive 
practice.. To facilitate this the craftsaen were to be trained in 
a wider range of skills, for example, welders would learn to burn, 
and fitters learn to 'tack weld'. A training ,ch ..... s to be 
introduced con.isting of one weeks theory, taught 'off the job', 
followed by three weeks practice 'on the job'. 
(c) A graded wage structure was to be introduced for .. intenance workers 
providing a hierarchy of .. intenanae skills. The structure 
consisted of Grade 1 craft .. en, Grade 3 s .. i-skilled, and Grade 5 
labourers. Grades 2 and 4 were to be aade up of trained .. D praaoted 
fro. the ,rades immediately below. Thi. graded structure would 
provide greater flexibility and .obility within each re.pectiv. 
grade, and .ost important Grade 2 could perfo~, unattenjed, certain 
craft job.. Both these benefit. would reduce the wa.te a •• ociated 
with the craft .. en' ... te. Selection for training was decided by 
aanageaeDt u.ing the criteria of ability and aeniority. Thi. did 
not apply to craft ... D or chargehands. Further the final a ....... nt 
of wh.ther the trainee passed or failed was to be decid.d by manage-
•• nt. The shop stewards' right. were confined to consultation. 
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(d) Other items contained in the "twenty point plan" emphasized 
managerial rights as the following quote shows:(l6) 
'Management will stipulate the manning of particular jobs. ' 
'The decision on whether extra overtime is required 
must be made by management.' 
These features of the "twenty point plan" show management's desir.e to 
alter some aspects of the collective bargaining and wage structure., but on 
management's terms. In other words, management saw productivity bargaining 
as a means of reasserting their prerogative which, as shown above, wa. the 
subject of challenge. Such a strategy can be explained in terms of manage-
mentes interests reinforced by a strong ideology. Further, Corby steel 
works management may have wished to be seen as conceding little to the unions 
due to the defensive attitude of the tube works management at the t~e. 
Whatever the reason, management's approach to productivity bargaining at 
corby wa. a long way from what A Flanders called "regaining control by 
sharing it". 
The union response to the plan was mild and apparently favourable. So 
co-operative, in fact, that in 1965 they suggested to management that when 
craftsmen undertake overtime working that they take time off in lieu. 
Alternatively, given staff status craftsmen would work up to four hours extra 
per week for no extra payment. These suggestion. reflected the union leaders 
desire to seek new arrangements for Corby. Nevertheless, managanent insisted 
on an exten.ion of consultation rather than in the scope of joint regulation. 
This is clearly illustrated by the training aspect of the "twenty point plan", 
where union involvement increased, but took the form of consultative rights. 
Employee participation therefore was increased by giving the union access to 
more information, and to more senior management. 
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This desire to co-operate, however, should not disguise the tr.de 
unions interest in securing increased earnings for their meabership. The 
"twenty point p1antt introduced a new dep.rt.ent.1 productivity bonus in 
July 1965, and consolidated the ACM payments into. flat payaent. In 
February 1966, the Ir.ded wage structure with associ.ted incre.ses in weae 
r.tes was introduced. Of course, the gr.ded wage structure paid nothial to 
the Grade 1 craftsmen, but this was acceptable, a. the union. expected the 
productivity bonus to incre.se over the following ye.r. Unfortvnat.ly, by 
mid 1966, this expected improvement in earnings h.d not .. terialis.d and 
a strike resulted in July, 1966. 
rollowing the strike .. nag_ent proposed a aanpover savinls sch_e 
based upon the •• asur ... nt of actual manhours worked ca.p.red with • datu. 
y •• r which w •• b.s.d upon the manhours work.d ov.r the previous four years. 
Alter.tion. could b ... de in the datum for chance. in technoloay .nd product 
d_nd. The .ch ... •• t.rl.t was to reduce total aanhour. by 15t below 
manpower d.tura, within a period of two ye.r.. S.ving. were to be .. nitored 
on a four .onthly b •• i •• nd the .h.r. out n.loti.ted by the p.rtie.. The 
.are_ent .. de an initial interia paya.nt of 4.8d per hour for .hift working 
craft .. en. Thi. p.raent ro.e to 7.8d by April, 1967. 
The Malenta aare ... nt •• 1.0 cr •• ted a Dew p.rticipative .tructure 
known •• the Centr.1 Joint Worki .. Party. Thi. body con.i.t.d of .ight 
..-b.r., four frOll UDaI_nt aa.d two each fro. the AUIW .Dd the IITPU. 
It. uin fuaction vas to di.cu •• prolre •• aad probl .... ri.ina fro. iaple.eat., 
.tion of the productivity .cr .... nt•• Later under the manpower •• ving. 
part of the aare.ent six departaental jOint ca.ntte •• were e.tab lilhed 
wbich ext.ad.d further the decree of p.rticipation to .hop floor level. Thi. 
confol'lled with tile .. ioa.' .trategy for further involvaent. The.e new 
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committees were consultative and did not infringe the rights of the parties 
to have access to the traditional procedure. For example, a job deaarcation 
dispute which could not be settled by the Central Joint Working Party would 
involve the District Committee within a period of seven days. 
The study now investicates the developaent of productivity baraainina 
in the tube works. The experience here was very different, and it provides 
a better insight into the factors limiting change under productivity 
baraaining. 
In tubes, neither management nor the unions made any attempt to d.velop 
a productivity progr ... e until well into 1967. Nanaa ... nt's .ttitud. 
changed as a result of factors noted belOVe They subadtted proposals to 
the cr.ft unions implying • two stage .pproach: First, to r.duce job 
restrictions,iaprove internal labour aobility, and reduce .. naima; aecG6d, 
.nd .ubsequently, to bring in planned .. int.nance ayat ... b ••••• pon work 
ae •• ur ... nt. The cr.ft .. en reacted with a.apicion and adatrust, and the 
bar,.inina that follow.d w.s touch with little enthu.i ... and .uch re.ist-
.nc.. Alr .... nt was finally re.ched in June, 1968. 
eo.pared to the steel works the tube works n.gotiation. contained 
•• ver.l .iff.rencea both in t.ras of cliaat •• nd re.ult.. CD the i •••• 
of job flexibility the atevard. in tube. ,ave auch Ie •• away than their 
coll.aau.a ia the ateel work.. The uniona aar.ed that fitt.r. co.ld do 
th.ir own .linaiaa ead that the .eal-akill •• burn.r'a job could h •• 11.tD.t •• , 
but ~ s-.i-akilled .an would be allow.d to perfora routine cr.ft joba. On 
the i •• ue of l.bour aobility the tub. at.ward. took • .or. r •• trictiv. lin •• 
In the at.el works, the non-craft ,r.d.d aen could ua. a r.ne. of akilla 
aDd b • .oved around the work.. In the tub.. the ar.ded men could only 
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perform one job which placed severe limits upon mobility. Pra.otion within 
the graded structure was another area where the tubes stew.rds pl.ced 
greater con.traints upon management. Steel works management had the right 
to select and evaluate the trainee; in tubes these were the .ubject of 
joint regulation. The one major concession made by the tube works .tewards 
was on manning. They agreed to • reduction in the nu.ber of cr.ft ... n'. 
mate., which in the c.se of the AnEW me.nt • reduction of .ixty aen(that is, 
from 439 to 379). Also, the new electric weld .tretch pl.nt w.s to be 
manned without extra recruitment. The tot.l manpower reduction w •• 
estimated .t 13~. 
Finally, the major institution.l innov.tion for iaproyina the cl~t. 
of industri.l rel.tions w.s the .ettina up of • Consult.tiv. eo..ittee 
simil.r to th.t in the steel works. There were some small differ.nce. in 
con.titution .nd purpo.e, the eo..ittee member.hip being ..all.r with four 
in.te.d of eight members, .nd there were no manpower •• vina. to monitor on 
a regul.r b.si.. The .. in work of the eo..ittee w •• to r.yi.w p.rfor.Aace 
.nd •• si.t iapleaent.tion of the .greeaent. 
For production worker. productivity b.r,.iniBg c~enc.d in l.t. 1968, 
.nd eight .gr.eaent. were concluded in the tube work., and one each in the 
.inter plaat, aad the basic oxygen .hop in tbe p.riod 1969-70. Th. fellowing 
..... ry highlight. the e •• ential fe.ture. of th •• gr .... nt., ~ut has b.en 
confined to the tube work. where the docuaeatary eTid.nce was .or. ca.pl.te. 
However, the .t •• l agr.eaent. cont.in no diff.r.nc •• of principl •• 
Th. productivity agr .... at. in tube. coy.r.d 1,444 operative. or 42~ 
of the production labour force. The b.rg.iRina unit .ize wa .... 11 with 
the .verag. agr .... nt coy.rina 180 per.on., and ranging froa 46 on the 
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coil pickle line to 400 1n the plug mill. A b.rgaining unit ~&ht c •• sist 
of the whole br.nch, or an occupational group which negotiated with 
management through the branch official •• 
The Icope of the issue. dealt with under productivity barc.ining were 
narrow, and mainly concerued with aanning reductions .nd the .ssoci.t.d 
reallocation of dutie.. However, the occasional .cr .... nt de.lt with 
workin& hours as the one at the c.lv.nizin& pl.nt. This pl.nt worked a 
prep.ratory ahift giving sixteen in tot.l for the week. It ca.aenced on 
Sunday at 10.00 pm when workers prepared tubes, for pickling, for the start-
up on Monday .t 6.00 am. Man.geaent took the view that if the .en's work 
rate could be r.i.ed tow.rds the end of the normal week then the prep.r.tory 
shift could be .boli.hed. 
Regarding the redistribution of s.vin&s, the br.nch necoti.ted • 
sh.re and then applied this to the wace rates of the group directly involved. 
On occ •• ion. the application of this principle could seriously upset w.ce 
differenti.l. within the branch. When this was likely to occur the br.ach 
offici.ls would encourace the .pread of saviBls to the whole branch or to 
rel.ted work croup. a. happened with the pluC aill acre ... nt in March,l970. 
Thi. conclude. the discu.sion of the oriaia and develop.ent of product-
ivity bara.iniBl at Corby. An evaluation of the results of the productivity 
aareeaents concluded in this period is now .tt..,te •• 
Part Four, An Ev.lu.tion of the Early Productivity Aire ... nts 
This p.rt is pr~rily concerned with aeasurine the results of 
productivity b.ra.iaiaa in ter.. of the objective. to t.prove aaapower 
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productivity and the state of industrial relationa. Again aa in the 
previous part the maintenance agreementa are considered first. 
The first agreement to be as.essed is the Magenta agre ... nt applyiaa 
to the iron and steel works. To attempt an objective evaluation it ia 
neces.ary to use soae crude indices of performance and although the.e have 
.any inadequacies, they allow a rough evaluation to be made. Table 5.5 
contains the manning figures for the steel works aaintenance force. 
Table 5.5 
Corby Steel Work., Maintenance Personnel 
Year Mechanical Mechanical and Electrical 
1965 1,200 1,432 
1966 1,149 1,376 
1967 1,117 1,328 
1968 1,111 1,328 
source: Industrial Relations Depsrtment 
These figures show a progressive reduction in the manning by 105 aen 
or 7.3~ in the period 1965-68. This vas a period when the unions were .ost 
cooperative in imp1eaenting the clauses on job relaxation, mobility aad in 
seeking aanpower savings. However, this reduction In actual aanpower ... y 
present a false picture as either the physical output per man may fall, or 
alternatively more overtime could be worked. These aspects .ust be checked 
and the following table gives soae information on the physical product per 
.. n duriDg the period. 
Table 5.6 
Corby Steel Works, Mainteuance Labour Productivity, 1966-68 
Year Maintenance Output of Physical Productivity 
HanIliq Strip Mills per un 
1966 1,376 729,983 530 tonnes 
1967 1,328 723,497 544 tonne. 
1968 1,328 754,982 568 tonne. 
source: Industrial Relations DeparbDent 
159. 
The table shows that average productivity per man rose by 7.11.., and 
therefore the reduction in manning was not a limiting factor. However, in 
the short term the manning reduction achieved might have been at the expense 
of poorer aaintenance which would not affect production for sa.e t~.. This 
is unlikely as the figures cover a three year period which is long enough for 
poor maintenance to show up in retarded production. There r ... ina the possibl 
charge that the physical productivity per man increased, not fram improved 
productivity, but due to additional hours worked. Alain, the evidence of 
the next table show this not to be so. 
Table 5.7 
Corby Steel Works, Average Maint.bace Overtime per Man, 1965-68 
Year Avera,e Hours Average Overtime Overtime a. Average Overtime 
Worked Hours Worked 1.. of Hours per aan 
(mechanical maintenance only) 
1965 47,416 6,446 13.61.. 5.3' 
1966 47,366 5,701 12.01.. 4.9 
1967 47,800 4,994 10.41.. 4.4' 
1968 44,350 5,209 11.71.. 4.6 
source: Industrial Relations Department 
It could be concluded from the above table that on the basis of the 
productivity criteria the Magenta agreement was a great succes.. Unfortun-
ately, when the analysis is extended up to 1970 the picture ,ets a little 
clouded as the next table shows. 
Table 5.8 
Corby Steel Works, Average Maintenance Overtt.e per man, 1970 
Year Average Kours Averag_ Overtime Overtime a. Avera,e Overtu. 
Worked Hours Worked "X. of Hour. per IUD 
1970 46,885 5,696 12.11~ 5.1 
source. Industrial Belation. DeparbBeut 
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By 1970, overti.e l.vels had mov.d back to the l.v.1 •• xi.ti .. prior to 
the productivity aareements. Moreover, a .tmil.r tread i •• 1.0 r.veal.d in 
physical productivity per man which fell fro. 568 tonn •• in 1968 to 555 
tonne. by 1970. It would seem, th.refore, that after a bright .tart .... thing 
beg.n to go wrong with the st.el work •• gr .... nt frOta about 1968 onw.rda. To 
inve.tigate this point further it i. nece ••• ry to exaaine certain fiRaRci.l 
matt.r •• 
Fro. 1966 to 1970 the .teel work. cr.ft .. en·. e.ming. ro.e by 12~~, 
fro. £21.42 to £24.42 for 40 hour. work.d. Thi. incre •• e w •• bett.r than at 
Raven.cr.ig, where the i.prov ... nt w ••• rouad 10;~. As the national wage r.te 
did not change uatil Karch, 1969 (.lthoulh there were ... 11 incre •••• vader 
the aatioaal co.t of living p.yaent) mo.t of the incre •• e c ... frOll the 
productivity .gr .... nt. 00 the face of it, this .hould have g.n.r.ted 
s.ti.f.ction with the .areement, but .pp.reatly this w •• not the c •••• 
Initi.lly the cr.ft union. expected their e.mina. to incr •••• ov.r tho •• of 
1965 by £4.40 per week, but •• ving. und.r the .ar ... ent coatin •• lly fell 
.hort. Fru.tr.tion, therefore, built up, and with it, the coop.r.tion between 
the p.rti •• declined. To !.prove the po.ition .. nag ... nt propo •• d .. npower 
r.duction., but the union. refu •• d to .cc.pt the job 10 •• iaYolv.d. 
lncre •• iaaly the aaion. bl .. ed maaag .. eat for the agr .... at·. l.ck of .ucc •••• 
A typical opiaion expr •••• d by the .hop .t.w.rd. w.', 'we ,.v ......... nt • 
bl.nk ch.qu. on productivity .nd th.y could aot .ak ••• e of it'. Tb.r.fore, 
in fiDaDci.l ter.. the productivity .'r .... at. were 1 ••• thaa .ucce •• ful, 
both fro. the vi.w point of .. naa ... nt .ad work.r •• 
The tube wort. aar • ..-nt va •• co.pl.t. f.ilure .nd, in f.ct, n.v.r 
r •• lly lot .tart.d. It l •• t.d for .11 of .ix .onth.. Th. eareament·. al ... t 
i •• taat f.ilure va. due to • ~.under.tandina over the v.,e .ettleaent. 
161. 
The shop stewards believed that they had made an a,ree.ent for £3 per week 
which was in line with the national understanding of betwe.n £2 and £3. 
The payment was to be made in two in.tallments, a 30/- primer (allowed under 
the national guidelines) followed by a further 30/- when the agr.e.ent was 
fully implemented. However, manageaent maintained that the 30/- and not 
£3 wa. the total de.l. Needle.s to s.y a bitt.r argusent arose with the 
unions finally withdr.wing from the agreement. 
The 30/- p.yment continued as a reduction in the cr.ftsmen's mat •• had 
t.ken place prior to the withdraw.l, although the di.cus.ion croups 
collapsed. This situation reinforced the suspicion and hostility of the 
tube works craft .. en tow.rds this type of agreement. 
Finally, regarding the degree of conflict within .nd betwe.n the p.rti •• , 
the .ost obvious •• a.ur. is the recorded strike figur... Unfortunat.ly,.t 
Corby no accurat. stati.tical r.cord existed in this p.riod,(l7) and in the 
.bsence of this obj.ctive y.rd.tick .ore .ubjective i.pre •• ion. have to 
.uffice. 
ODe .re. of oppo.ition w •• the resistance of some .ngine.riaa for ... n 
to the productivity .Ireem.nt.. Th. For ... n b.li.ved that aanag ... nt had 
not con.ulted thea re,.rding the .gr .... nt., .nd th.refor., th.y felt little 
c~ta.nt to thea. In .ddition, the .'r .... nt. incr •••• d th.ir work load 
und.r job r.laxation and mobility cl.u •• s, but no cogniz.nce w •• tak.n of 
thi.. Thu., giv •• little r.cognition, and so.ewhat confused, the for..-n 
.... little .ttempt to .ak. the agr .... nt ••• uec.... Thi. point .dds 
cr.d.nc. to the .hop steward opinion liv.n .bove, that aanag ... nt were 
liv.a • "blaak chequ." on productivity but could not make u.e of it. Thi. 
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is another example of what Walton and McKersie tenD intra-organisational 
bargaining,(18) which shows how internal conflict within management can 
influence the outcome of the productivity bargaining process. 
A second area of conflict existed within the steel works unions due 
to the fact that the EETPU gave little away on job relaxation under the 
agreement compared with the AUEW. This is surprising in the light of the 
EETPU convener's positive attitude towards productivity bargaining. Of 
course, the electricians legitimized their position by arguing that safety 
requirements made it necessary for time-served electricians to perfonD most 
of the jobs. However, the union's restrictive attitude was further revealed 
by the graded wage structure, where after four years, only two men were 
promoted to Grade 2. Given that the electricians made little contribution, 
conflict between the two unions was inevitable. 
Within the AnEW itself problems existed with certain trades like pipe-
fitters and welders who resisted parts of the agreement. Both these groups 
were concerned with job security, as some of their work was overtaken by 
fitters. Hence as late as 1969 some fitters could not, or would not, perfonD 
pipework operations without the assistance of a pipefitter. The importance 
of work group behaviour in this context has been identified by Alan Flanders 
in his Fawley study and requires no further expansion here. (19) 
As to strike activity, although no accurate record of this was kept 
it is knoVD that there were several major stoppages during the period and 
particularly in 1969/70. The steel works maintenance worker. engaged in 
.trike activity in February and Sept.-ber 1969, due largely to the product-
ivity bonus being out of line with their expectations. As a result, 
attitudes became .are restrictive as shown by the February di.pute, which 
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arose out of the refusal of one man to move from one machine to another 
under the terms of the agreement. However, the most serious dispute was 
that of June 1970, which appeared on the surface as a claim for an increase 
in tonnage bonus across the Corby site. This dispute reflected the steel 
craftsmen's disappoinbaent with their earnings under the Magenta agreements 
(and underlying this their frustration with the national situation), and 
for the tube craftsmen the fact that their earnings had fallen behind those 
in steel. The next table shows this. 
Table 5.9 
Craftsmens Earnings in Corby Steel Works and Tube Works, 1969-70 
Year Earnings (first week in March) 
Steel Works Tube Works 
1969 £23.20 £21.37 
1970 £24.42 £22.38 
Tonnage Bonus Earnings 
1970 £ 4.48 £ 2.39 
source: Industrial Relations DeparbDent 
The tubel craftsmen were earning about £2.00 per week less than those 
in the steel works. Management were faced with the problem of how to concede 
more money to the tube craft .. en without sparking off a further clai. from 
the steel works. The final settleaent provided for a bonul payment of 
£5.40acrols the site with steel craftsaen receiving an extra £1.00, and 
tubes craftsaen £3.00 per week. In return the tube craft .. en accepted the 
.. in feature. of the Nagenta acreaments thereby bringing thea into line 
with the steel works. On this occasion the suspicions of the tube works 
Ihop Itewards concemina productivity barcainina vere overcome by a 
coabination of financial induc .. ent, the District Coaaittee's favourable 
response, and by national officer involveaent.(20) 
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The production w,rkers productivity agreements covered 1,444 
operatives in the tube works. There was a major reduction of 169 men, or 
1l.7~ of those covered by the agreements. There was no redundancy and all 
displaced personnel were offered redeployment in other parts of the works. 
Hence output per .. n rose for those units of plant concerned, but it cannot 
be shown that productivity increased for the tube works as a whole. For 
this to be so total output per .. n would have to increase, and it was not 
possible OD the information available to separate this contribution from 
other influences. 
Financially the agreements appear to have been very successful for 
both management and workers with savings split on an equal basis. An 
illustration of the .oney involved is given by the continuous weld finishing 
a,reeaent, where the total savings constituted £26,041 per annum, providing 
an increase per aan of £3.17 per week, or 16~. This was a considerable 
incre.se to the .en involved and ca.pares with the 131. gained by the tubes 
craft .. en in 1970. Moreover it raise. the question, if such increases were 
available to ... 11 bar,aining units of this type, what effect did this 
have upon industrial relations? 
Unfortunately, the answer i. not clear. The coaplexity of the product-
ion .... structure was great and often one ,roup bad little idea of what 
oth.rs war. earnina. AD insi,bt into the junale of wag. rat.s that existed 
at this tt.e eaD be had froa a wa,. aUrYey eonduet.d by Urviek Orr and 
Partn.rs. Por iu.tance, in th. steel works there were 926 designated 
oceupations with 364 s.parate .a,e rates, cover ina a aannina of 2,631. In 
~e tube works, the po.ition va. a little better with 251 pay rate. for 
2,365 operative.. Al.o the tODDaae bonus el ... nt in the Wa,e strueture 
varied areatly between work ,roup. and depar~ent.. For example, the 
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slitters and cutters in one mill had a bonus element of 70% in shift earnings. 
Therefore, it was possible for two similar jobs in tenDS of skill and 
responsibility to be paid very different rates. For instance, the 15 tonne 
crane drivers in the basic oxygen plant and Nol strip mill, received 48/6 
and 35/3 respectively per shift. Yet another injustice was the coke oven 
heater (a senior man) paid at £24.00 per week, and the less skilled slitters 
and cutters at Lancashire and Corby who received £54.00 per week. Neverthe-
less, although no one branch or lodge had an accurate knowledge of wage 
relativities, information all be it inaccurate, did get around, and in this 
sense productivity bargaining probably put extra pre •• ure upon the system. 
One of the most serious disputes in the period was a strike by No6 
branch in the tube works in March and April, 1969. The strike lasted for 
four weeks and is worth commenting upon in some detail. The work stoppage 
took place over a wage claim and involved 470 cranemen and slingers. The 
basic grievance wa. that the work ,roup concerned felt their wale levels to 
be fallinc behind tho.e of certain other group.. Mana,ement responded by 
offering a productivity alrea.ent, but wished to break the crane group up 
and associate thea with other groups to increase efficiency, that is, they 
wished to chance the traditional collective bargaining structure. The crane-
aen with the support of the branch officials resisted these proposals and 
a .. jor conflict developed. Neither the cran ... n nor the branch officials 
were oppo •• d to productivity bargaining in principle. As d.adlock ensued, 
aana, ... nt atte.pted to by-pass the branch official. and negotiate directly 
with the work ,roup., but with no .ucc.... The union's Executiv. Council 
announeed the strike unofficial and gave its support to .. na,eaent. 
Mana, .. ent, to break the deadloek, eTentually issued letters to the strikers 
threatenina di.-1 •• al, if they refu.ed to reea.aenee work. Tbi. aetion 
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precipitated further .trike action with 1,500 men stopping work in support. 
Relationships between the branch officials, the official union, and 
manageaent deteriorated markedly. 
Having reached serious proportions, pressure to find a solution 
increased and the return to work formula included the witbdrawal of the 
di •• issal notices and the negotiation of a new productivity agre.-ent. Also, 
the branch officials were deprived of office by the Union Executive, who 
advised that the branch members be distributed 8mOnc the other branches. 
This experience in which productivity bargaining played a large part, was 
traumatic to .ay the least, and wa. to have an important influence upon 
the climate of indu.trial relation. at Corby. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Thi. Chapter has dealt with important background factors and events 
at Corby work., and thereby hopefully will a •• ist under.tandin& of the 
Corby-Wide Productivity Progr ... e to be discussed in the next Chapter. 
In conclusion, it can be said that productivity bargaining made a 
u.eful contribution to reduciD& "DDing aad wale costs ia this period. For 
production workers this can only be claimed for the units of plant involved. 
The .. intenance agree.ents allowed progress in relaxing job restrictions, 
iaprovina internal labour mobility, uparadina the less skilled, and in 
reducina the amount of overt~e worked. Also, the .. intenance agreeaents 
e.tablished new institutions to extend employee participation within the 
works. However, in 1969-70 the aar ... ents worked less well, and coDflict 
increa.... In tbe case of the .. intenance aareements, this corresponded 
closely with their failure to produce increa.e. in earnings in line with 
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the workers expectations. 
Therefore, an important lesson for management with regard to any new 
initiative in productivity bargaining was that the agreement should earn 
sufficient savings to meet the workers' expectations. Failure to meet 
these expectations will lead to a decline in commibDent to the agreement. 
Moreover, employee expectations were not confined to Corby, but were 
undoubtedly influenced by what was happening in the wider indu.try. Both 
maintenance and production workers had suffered a decline in their wage 
pOSition relative to workers in shipbuilding and engineering, and their 
unions, particularly the NCCC were claiming .ubstantial wage increases for 
productivity at national level. 
A second conclusion i. the importance of certain external and internal 
structural variables in influenCing the form of productivity bargaining 
adopted by the parties. For maintenance workers, difference. in works 
technology, collective bargaining and wage structures, and union organ-
i.ation. in the respective works influenced the outcome of the productivity 
agreements. Al.o the ... e factors influenced the production worker.' 
approach to productivity bargaining. Furtheraore the unions .trike 
behaviour was influenced by the.e same structural variable.. For in.tance, 
the craftSBens strike in June 1970 was the direct result of .eparate 
approaches to productivity bargaining in .teel and tube work.; and the 
bitter production worker.' strike of March, 1969 the outcoae of an attempt 
by .. naaeaent to .lter the bargaining unit of the cr.nemen and slingers. 
Therefore, productivity baraainiUi did not eliminate conflict .t Corby. 
Moreover, at Corby productivity bargaining did little to reduce the highly 
autono.ou. and fr .... nted nature of the bara.ining .tructure .s • whole. 
168. 
This was a central problem which any new management initiative would be 
required to tackle. 
A third conclusion is the importance of the management organisation 
as an influence upon union behaviour. The division between the tube and 
steel works in particular, allowed the respective managements to pursue 
divergent policies in productivity bargaining. As a result any new manage-
ment initiative h.d to de.l with this problem. In effect, the first 
managing director for the entire Corby site w •• appointed in Karch, 1969 
and the job of building. more unified management got underw.y. However, 
the "steel curtain" still existed in 1970 and this had to be taken down. 
Fin.lly, the cl~te of indultrial relations deteriorated towards the 
end of the 19601, and aanagement relponded to this with the Corby-Wide 
Productivity Programme. It il to an examination of tbis programme that 
the next Chapter turn •• 
P.rt Five The Hypotheles 
The the.is now turns away from empiric.l description, .ad .ttempts to 
foraul.te hypotheles to explain in a more abltract and economical manner 
events at Corby. The hypothe.el developed in this section will be tested, 
built upon and refined in sub •• quent Chapter •• 
Wh.t then .re the .. in f.ctors -.kina for the development of product-
ivity baraainina on the Corby lite at this time? For purpose. of 
distinauisbiag and a.sianiug priori tie. b.tween these factorl the following 
lumaary il nec •••• ry. 
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The influence of the product market can be dismissed in this period 
as the really difficult years did not commence until the recession of 1971. 
External policies such as those of employers' association and incomes 
policy made their impact after 1965. The labour market on the other hand 
probably had a minor influence owing to the shortage of skilled craftsmen 
during the 1960s. However, this could not be a major cause as the tube 
works experienced the same shortage and did not embrace productivity 
bargaining as early as the steel works. Furthermore, this same argument 
applies to the general dissatisfaction of the craftsmen with their low wage 
level in the industry. The other main external factor was the chanai .. 
technology of the industry. By the middle 1960s the argument for large 
scale coastal works using rich imported ore was well established. This 
technological threat had a differential effect upon steel and tube works. 
Of the external influences this would Seem to be the most powerful variable 
explaining the early adoption of productivity bargaining in the steel works. 
Clearly, JT Dunlop's systems theory would appear useful in throwing light 
upon the parties' response to an environmental chanae which threatened 
the system's survival. Further, the Corby town "cOlllDunity effect" probably 
worked in the same direction. On the other hand, within the works itself 
the attitude of the parties to the adoption of productivity bargaining was 
also t.portant. GG Sa.ers has said, (21) 'rules and decisions are the 
products of the ainds and emotions of men, and they result froa environ-
mental chances only as these are registered in the mind and emotions'. 
Consequently, at Corby there was no deter.inistic response by the parties 
to the enviroaaental change, but a conscious attempt to define their 
situation and to improve upon it. The steel works EETPU convener in 
conjunction with the AUEW took the initiative to improve manpower efficiency 
as a way of increasing earnings and the union's statul.(22) Manageaent 
after a hesitant start responded with the "twenty pOint plan" and later 
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the manpower savings scheme. This coincidence of the parties interests 
was the complete recipe for successful productivity bargaining. Here 
Flanders statement, 'efficiency is inherent in managements social function' 
was shared by the steel unions.(23) 
That trade union officials were concerned to improve efficiency at 
Corby should not surprise anyone. Evidence that the craft and production 
trade unions showed this concern at national level was given above in 
Chapter Four.(24) Also, JA Banks has shown(25) that the ISTC adopted a 
policy of public ownership for the industry, in the inter-war period, due 
to the inefficiency they considered existed; the inefficiency being 
bl .. ed for unemployment among union members. Much the same thought existed 
amongst the steel union. at Corby, although the EETPU was the first to 
articulate it. 
However, why va. aanageaent .0 insi.tent upon their traditional 
prerogative and aore i.portant why did the steel shop stewards allow them 
to be? 
The .teel works .hop stewards behaviour is belt explained in ter.. 
of their priaary objectives. They realised that the productivity agree-
ments were on manageaent's te~, but that Corby's survival depended upon 
their acceptance. In other words, the st .. ards' leadership recognised 
that the traditional collective bargaining and wage structure. were an 
obstacle to efficiency and that the.e could only be altered on aanageaent's 
ter.. if disruption and delay ware to be avoided. 
, 
Again Walton and MeRer.ies 
work(26) on the influence that internal union bargaining can bave on the 
collective bargaining proce.s i. of relevance. The shop stewards were 
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more conscious of what was at stake in the long term than the rank and file 
members. However, the stewards had to defend their members' interests 
when their members' expectations of extending the scope of collective 
bargaining clashed with management's. But in the formal productivity 
bargaining negotiations the union leadership managed to avoid allowing this 
issue to become a focus of division between the parties. 
How then did the shop stewards manage to achieve their objectives? It 
would appear that they knew only too well that their ability to carry their 
members depended upon the size of the increase in earnings obtained under 
the agre_ent.. For when the productivity agreement failed to meet the 
mens' earning. expectations a strike developed in July, 1966. Then the 
stewards adopted an opposition role to management in order to achieve a better 
cash deal. On the other hand, the basic strategy was kept in existence as 
shown by the subsequent acceptance of the manpower savings and sharing scheme. 
If cooperation marked the steel works negotiations, what explains the 
differences in attitude between the steel and tube works? The conversion 
of the tube works aanag .. ent in 1967 to productivity bargaining was due 
primarily to external factors, namely the change in ISTEA policy, and to 
incomes policy. The tube works ItMEUMM" agre_ent was favoured by ISTEA and 
contained the two stage approach agreed with the NCCC. However, the national 
agre.ent as an explanation is not totally convincing when applied to the 
tube craft .. en. First, the Corby unions were outside the jurisdiction of 
the NCCC (although representatives attended the Eastbourne Conference), 
therefore, incaaes policy vas a .ore t.portant influence with the unions. 
Also, the craft..ens concern with their low level of wages in the industry 
was an tmportant backaround factor. However, none of the above external 
factors affected tubes and steel works differently, and therefore, throw 
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any light upon differences of attitude on the union side. Only the wider 
technological threat had a differential influence upon behaviour; but, 
although a factor stimulating action, by itself it is not adequate in 
explaining the particular strategy adopted by the steel shop stewards. A 
more comprehensive explanation appears to require, in addition, an analysis 
of the interactions between certain internal structural variables, and the 
attitudes and motivations of the parties. These structural factors included 
Corby management and trade union organisations, the respective works 
technologies, collective bargaining and wage structures. These interactions 
must now be examined in order to explain more fully differences in the 
behaviour of steel and tube works shop stewards. 
One explanation held by several managers at Corby, was the differences 
in leadership qualities on the union side. Leadership meaning the attitude 
and influence exercised by the conveners due to their personalities and 
formal office. The steel works convener (cum district secretary) of the 
EETPU was articulate, far seeing, knowledgeable, intelligent and capable. 
He waS abreast of modern ideas on productivity bargaining, and developments 
in the industry including both the technological threat and the more general 
craft discontent. This man, it was said, pulled the various strings together 
by relating the craft .. en's wage advance at Corby with the need to improve 
manpower productivity. Also, he had established the first Joint Craft 
Committee in the steel work., and was favourably disposed to productivity 
bargaining. These personal leadership qualities were absent in the tube 
works where the convener, a. a c~nist, was regarded by management as a 
militant and opposed to productivity bargaining. 
The problem with this hypothesi. lies in divising adequate tests for 
it and in separating out its influence from other factors. Moreover, as a 
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management definition of their situation the explanation reveals a managerial 
value, that is, the steel works convener was perceived as cooperative and 
concerned to improve efficiency. On the other hand, management perceived 
the tube works convener as uncooperative and as an obstacle to improving 
productivity. Hence the leadership qualities of the tubes convener were 
disregarded, although it can take good leadership qualities to resist as 
well as to innovate (Churchill's resistance to Nazi aggression 1940), 
especially if productivity bargaining is perceived as an attack upon trad-
itional trade union defences. (27) 
One way of escaping from the 'quality of leadership' explanation 
without denying its validity completely, is to show that the ability to 
exercise leadership is closely tied to the wider structures within which 
the shop .tewards worked. 
In the steel works the AnEW and EETPU memberships were larger than in 
tubes; for example, in steel the AUEW had 1,100 members and in tubes 480. 
Also, the hierarchy of shop stewards was more developed in steel than in 
tubel. The Iteel works EETPU convener as unofficial district lecretary had, 
like the AUEW diltrict secretary, a jurisdiction covering the Corby site. 
Without becoming involved in the complexities of trade union structure and 
government, it nevertheless has been well established that the size of union 
organisation puts influence into the hands of officials. (28 and 29) Further-
more, the tubes works convener, it was reported in several interviews, met 
the shop stewards more regularly to discuss on going issues, and was nearer 
to grassroots opinion. Therefore, it would appear that the fo~ of union 
organisation was a significant influence upon the leadership qualities 
displayed by the respective sbop stewards. 
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A second difference between steel and tube works was in the collective 
bargaining arrangements and wage structures. Collective bargaining in 
tubes was more fragmented with each unit of plant (eg. plug mill, continuous 
weld, etc.) having its own tonnage bonus. Hence, departmental shop stewards 
were more directly engaged in negotiations with engineering management, 
whereas in the steel works the tonnage bonus for all maintenance workers 
was based upon melting shop output. Thus, the collective bargaining 
structure in the steel works was more standarised and centralised. Overtime 
was another issue allowing greater scope for informal departmental bargaining 
in tubes, where the normal week was fifteen shifts compared to twenty one 
in the steel works. The upshot of these differences WaS to place a larger 
degree of influence in the hands of the senior lay union officials in the 
steel works, and thereby greater scope for thea to exercise leadership 
qualities. 
Another structural difference between steel and tube works was in their 
respective technologies. La Sayles has argued (30) that technology and 
the resulting patterns of work organisation are major variables influencing 
work group behaviour. Therefore, it is reasonable to ask, how useful is 
the Sayles theory in explaining differences in behaviour between steel 
and tube works maintenance workers? 
Steel and tube works craft .. en constitute the s .. e occupational groups 
(eg. electricians and fitters), usina the ... e skills to perfor. essentially 
the function of .. iataininc .. chinery. Consequently, there was no 
significant occupational difference to explain their varied behavioural 
re.ponse to productivity bargaining. However, within the respective works 
so.e occupational difference. did exist. For example, the percentage of 
boilermakers, sead-skilled and unskilled worker. was higher in steel. 
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Hence, the leaders of the steel unions had more to gain for their semi 
and unskilled membership from a productivity agreement. Such grades would 
benefit from upgrading in earnings and status. This benefit was not 
available to tube leaders to the same extent. However, the steel unions 
had more to lose in terms of job relaxation. Furthermore, although the 
craftsmen constituted the same occupational group, the technology of the 
respective works was different.(3l) Earlier this Chapter showed that the 
steel works was technologically more integrated than the tube works. This 
technological difference appears in addition to influencing people's 
behaviour, also to be an important factor influencing the works collective 
bargaining and wage structures. The integrated work flow in steel aeemed 
to encourage workers to identify with works output for tonnage bonus 
purposes, whereas the output of the discrete plants in tubes, caused the 
craftsmen to identify with their units for tonnage bonus purposes. Therefore, 
it would appear, that the respective works collective bargaining and wage 
structures were partly shaped by the different technologies. In this way 
the collective bargaining and wage structures are intermediate variables 
coming between works technology and the behavioural response. 
Sayles alao argues,(32) 
'Where the plant lacks any strong occupationally oriented 
work croups, the union leader tends to be aore independent 
of the meabers judgements and feelings. This independence 
can result in the development of highly cooperative 
relationships with aanageDent which mdght be doomed to 
failure in other situations where the prejudices and fears 
of specific rank and file groups would cause the overthrow 
of any officer who was too auch in the graces of .anagement.' 
At Corby, the stael works provided Ireater occupational differentiation 
than did the tube works. Yet it was tha .teel union leaders who developed 
176. 
the cooperative relationships with management. This, as argued above, 
was due to the homogeneous collective bargaining arrangements and to the 
greater hierarchical union organisation in the steel works. Nevertheless, 
the Sayles argument coincides with that of this theSis, for both arguments 
show that the greater the degree of autonomy exercised by work groups, then, 
the more difficult it is for the shop stewards to give leadership which is 
not in conformity with the work groups immediate short term interests as 
perceived by the groups. Both arguments also accept the importance of the 
technology as a factor shaping structures and relationships within these. 
However, a difference does exist between the two argumenta. Sayles 
attributes work group behaviour (ie, his conservative, strategiC, erratic 
and apathetic) to differences in technologically shaped occupational groups, 
whereas this explanation places less weight upon occupational groups and 
more on differences in collective bargaining and wage structures arising 
partly from differences in technology. As a result, the tube works stewards 
were forced to coordinate union activity nearer to the grassroots. 
Consequently, they could not ignore to the aaae degree the challenge to 
management prerogatives fra. the work group.. Therefore, the stewards' 
response to the new issues when they arose, such as training, was to seek 
an extension of joint regulation. This extension of collective bargaining 
helped to legitimiae their behaviour. On the other hand, the steel works 
with its more centralised trade union and bargaining structures, enabled 
the convener with his favourable attitude to productivity bargaining to 
pursue a more independent line. Hence they ignored their members' challenge 
to management's prerogative, and accepted productivity bargaining on 
_nag_ent teras. 
In answer to the above question, it can be said that the Sayles' 
analysis has been found helpful in explaining the interaction between 
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certain structural variables and behaviour. However, whereas Sayles gave 
weight to the influence of technology and the associated occupational 
groups, this argument emphasizes the significance of the interactions 
between peoples' motivations and the structural factors of technology, 
internal management organisation, collective bargaining arrangements and 
trade union structure. 
Thus, the hypothesis emerging here is not deterministic as can be 
shown by the tube works shop stewards challenging at the informal level 
management's traditional right to decide certain isaues. Moreover, the 
steel works' union leadership exercised a conscious choice in deciding to 
ignore the informal challenge to management prerogatives, and in accepting 
a form of productivity bargaining which secured for manag .. ent their 
traditional rights. The opposition of the tube works convener to product-
ivity bargaining is partly explained by the existence of more autonoaous 
work groups which kept him closer to rank and file opinion, and partly due 
to his own assessaent of his members interests. This question of the 
relative importance of the leaderships' consciousness interacting with 
structures as an influence upon behaviour will be examined again in the 
next Chapter. (33) Meantime all the hypothesis explains is that these aspects 
of structure are important in influencing behaviour, and that the scope 
for leadership to exercise choice is .ore difficult in some structures than 
in others. How the stewards (and for that matter manaa ... nt) interact with 
these structures would appear to depend upon their values and how they 
perceive their interests at a given point in time. These perceptions in 
turn are influenced by a variety of wider social variables including, 
neighbourhood, education, social class etc., but fund .. ental to thea is 
a concern with the in-plant groups' economic interests and status. 
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In these tenDS management's primary commibnent is to profit and 
economic efficiency and to achieve this they sought control. Management 
at both ateel and tube works attempted to secure these objectives through 
p~oductivity agreement.. Of course, this is not to argue that management 
have no concern with employee security. Many company personnel policies 
would refute that argument, but they are secondary to the primary interest. 
On the other hand, the trade unions gave primary commibBent to security 
of income and employemnt, and to this end the union sought control. The 
tube works stewards perceived their interests to lie in resisting job 
relaxation and mobility clauses of the productivity proposals, and in securing 
control by an extension of joint job regulation in the wage structure and 
training areas. However, the unions primary commibaent to job security is 
not to argue that they will not in certain circumstances advocate efficiency. 
This clearly happened in the steel works where the shop stewarda cooperated 
with manageaent to improve manpower efficiency. But, even here it would 
be a aistake to perceive the .teel works shop steward. as giving priority 
to manage.ent's .. in goal at the expense of their ... bers. For given the 
stewards perception. of their aeabera long tera interesta, and al.o the 
wider technological threat to ateel production (and all that implied for 
the Corby comaunity), their primary commibDent waa atill to the job 
security of their .eabera. However, their ability to exerciae leadership 
and to take this longer run view was influenced by the internal structural 
variables discuased above. 
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Chapter Six 
The Corby-Wide Productivity Programme, 1970-74 
The Corby-Wide Productivity Programme (CWPP) initially aimed at covering 
all manual workers, although subsequently several white collar groups 
(excluding maBageaent) entered the programme. This Chapter deals mainly with 
the agreements for manual workers, and consists of five parts. Part one 
analyses the objectives and development of the cwPp's strategy, and in 
particular the audit phase. The Corby audit refers to the investigation 
for potential savinas. Part two considers the design of the prograaae and 
highlights its structural features. A third Part deals with probleas arising 
out of negotiations with the trade unions, and in impleaenting the programme. 
The fourth Part is concerned with the eveluation of the programme's results, 
including an analysis of its collapse towards the end of 1974. Then Part 
five returns to the hypotheses developed in the previous Chapter with a 
view to further refineBent and to testing their validity. 
In addition, the Corby-Wide Productivity Progr ... e was the only one of 
its type ever atte.pted in the British steel industry, and a close exam-
ination of the progr ... e .. y provide lessons for future policy within the 
British Steel Corporation. 
Part ODe, Objectives ana the Audit Phase 
The objectiTes of the progr .... arise out of the probl ... highlighted 
in Chapter live. The earlier pha •• of productivity bargainine had attempted 
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to lolve these probleml but had been unsuccessful for various reasons; 
either the progra.me had lost its momentum, al occurred in the case of 
the Iteel workl maintenance personnel, or the programme had created more 
problema than it had solved. It seems desirable therefore to recap the 
argument and outline the objectives of the programme. 
Certain technological innovations in steel production and in the inter-
national transit of iron ore shifted the costs of steel production in favour 
of the coastal workl. This change threatened to make Corby a high cost 
steel producer, and thereby eliminate Iteel production at this inland 
location. In addition, the product market had become increalingly compet-
itive. Faced with these chauges Corby management law the need for a new 
initiative in productivity bargaining. ThUI, the major objective of the 
Corby-Wide Productivity Progr ... e wa. to "reduce the labour COlts of the 
product". The COlt aaving target wal put at £2.00 per tonne by the Corby 
group director in 1971. 
If improved efficiency wa. the primary objective of the progr ... e the 
.econd wa. to improve the climate of industrial relation.. During the 
y.ar. 1968-70, the works had luffered fro. several major strikes by both 
production and .. intenance workers, and by 1970 a period of stsbility was 
clearly needed. The .trike activity along with the fra,.ented and autonomous 
bargainiug structure a.si.ted in making the wage .tructure chaotic, and the 
refora of this pay .tructure wa. an essential pre-requi.ite to .tability 
in indu.trial relations. A ref ora of this kind necellitated a more central-
ised collective bargainiaa syst... The ap,oinbaent in March, 1968 of a 
Corby group director was the first step to unify the managea.nt organisation 
and to for.ulate a strategy to this end. However, change. in the.e .ocial 
.tructure. were not enough in th ... elve.; employee attitude. had al.o to 
183. 
be altered and this was to be achieved by an extension of employee partici-
pation. But although such participation was acceptable to management as 
a method of achieving their objectives, it was not considered an end in itself. 
The first public announcement of the future strategy was made on 12th 
June, 1969 in the form of a statement of intent. This was a policy state-
ment containing the main principles of the programme and it indicated that 
after an initial audit period, a plan would be drawn up for negotiation with 
the trade unions. The plan was to be ready by the end of January, 1970. 
This t~e schedule turned out to be wildly optiaistic and something must be 
.aid about this before identifying the programme'. principle •• 
The first sign of trouble aro.e when the ISTC divi.ional officer lodged 
an objection. The Financial Ti.es reported that (1) 'the divi.ional officer 
wa. writin& to all branch official. of the Confederation in Corby instructina 
them not to •• lca.. aanaa .. ent'. plan'. This uncooperative attitude wa. 
apparently due to the fact that the local proposals cut across national 
di.cus.ion, between BSC headquarters and the union on productivity. It is 
surpri.ing that the Corporation's head office appears not to have known what 
wa. goina on at Corby. Apparently Corby management had developed the policy 
autonomously, and had not sought head office permission to approach the 
unions. Thi. wa. regarded seriously, a. the programme contained proposals 
to alter a.pect, of the national wa,e structure. The upshot was a ban on 
Corby maus,ement proceeding further until the matter had been thoroughly 
discussed with head office. Eventually, permission was given to 10 ahead 
in Noyember 1969, but only for crafts-en who bad concluded their national 
productivity agreeaent in March 1969, whereas ISTC did not conclude an 
aare .. ent until Noyeaber of that year. 
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The main features of the proposed Corby-Wide Productivity Programme 
were as follows: 
(a) A comprehensive wages plan covering all manual workers which would 
rationalise the existing complex wage structure and payment system by the 
introduction of a graded wage structure. This would reduce the number of 
pay rates (including bonus rates), establish rough wage relativities, and 
pave the way for job evaluation. The plan was proposed by the consultants 
Urwick Orr and Partners, and was accepted by the Corby management. At this 
early stage there was some thought of a progressive planned earnings increase 
over the period of the plan, but this idea was subsequently dropped. 
(b) The second feature was the proposal to set up a Wages Policy Committee 
made up of the works most .enior management, including the director in 
charge. This feature wa. partly inspired by the Donovan Commi •• ion's 
proposal that .enior management should be involved in the for.ulation of 
comp.ny per.onnel policie •• (2) 
(c) The third feature concerned con.ultation and employee participation in 
the programme. It wa. propo.ed th.t • nu.ber of joint management/union 
discussion group. would be created, giving the union. the opportunity to 
praaote idea. on ways to improve productivity. The arrangements were 
e.sentially con.ultative, and did not extend to joint deci.ion makina. 
Thi. was reve.led by two .spects: First, the idea. of the joint groups were 
to be .ub.itted to the Wage. Policy eo..ittee for consideration in the wage 
pl.nning proce... Second, it wa. propo.ed to e.tabli.h purely management 
study group. to undertake detailed inv •• tigation. into productivity 
t.provement. 
(d) Another principle was that t.prov .. eut. in earning. h.d to be paid for 
by incre •••• in productivity. To generate the info~tion on productivity 
potential .n audit or inve.tig.tion wa. to be conducted throughout the 
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works. This information would then be used to draw up the wages plan. 
The craftsmen's audit got underway in late 1969. It had been manage-
ment's intention to cover .11 manual workera, irrespective of trade union, 
in the one agreement. However, it was felt that conducting separate union 
audits would not by itself prevent a comprehensive agreement from being 
established. Aa a result, three separ.te Central Discus.ion Groups were 
eventually set up: one for the craft unions, one for the Confeder.tion, 
and. third for the NUBP. The Cr.ft Discussion Group consisted of four 
management representatives plus the consultant and five union offici.ls.(3) 
The r~it for the Craft Discu.sion Group was as follows: 
'The discussion group will explore ways .nd means of 
increasing productivity and exchange ideas and views 
.bout requireaents for an improved wage structure, 
stability of earnings and security of eaployaent for 
workers across Corby'. 
With tr.de union involvement in the audit, .. nagement experienced the 
first pressure to alter their original progr ... e design. They had 
.-phasized joint consultation and .. nagement prerogative., but the unions 
wished stronger .-ployee participation. Con.equently, sev.ral t.port.nt 
change. were .. de to the conduct of the audit. Pir.tly, elev.n Area Craft 
Discu •• ion Group. w.re e.tabli.h.d to work with the audit .tudy croups and 
to report to the Central Di.cu •• ion Group. Thi. ide. was not n.w and had 
first eaerced und.r the Hacneta Book .gr .... ut.. S.coudly, the .tudy croups 
which aanac .. ent .nvi.aged as purely .. naS ... nt bodi •• bec .. e joint groups. 
H.nce union r.pr ••• ntatives b.c .. e deeply involved in the detail.d inve.ti-
cation. on how to t.prov. effici.ncy in the various unit. throughout the 
work.. In this vay the d.gre. of .-ployee participation va. ext.nded under 
the Corby-Wide Productivity Progr ..... 
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Another important innovation arising out of trade union pressure ~s 
the extension of the audit from manpower to all other resources including 
fuel, materials and equipment. Again, this suggestion was excepted by 
management, and was a change from the original statement of intention which 
referred only to reduced labour costs in the product. 
The craft audit took eleven months to complete, this was considerably 
longer than the six months envisaged in the statement of intent. However, 
audit progress was reasonable and by December, 1970 some 707. of maintenance 
workers had been covered. Moreover, the craftsmens' investigation finished 
well ahead of that of the production workers. The audit findings, based 
largely upon work measurement, showed the main source of productivity 
improvement arising from increased manpower utilisation. Actual performance 
was in the area of 367. utilisation. Converted to a Performance Index this 
equalled 60 compared with the potential of 100. Also, the investigations 
showed that not all of the 2,200 maintenance personnel could be made to 
improve performance to this extent, and that a more realistic figure was 
1,390 who might achieve this target. Given an increase from 60 to 100 
Performance Index, for 1390 men, the calculations suggested a manpower 
surplus of 550 men. 
Savings on the basis of these calculations amounted to £725,000 with 
an extra £110,000 from secondary improvements related to production/ 
maintenance flexibility. Further savings from consumable items, improved 
plant efficiency, etc., was put at £1.55 million. Thus, after three years 
of operation, it wal e.tiaated that the CWPP could save from maintenance 
operations soae £2.25 ~llion'.(4) From this calculation it was estimated 
that after three year. the payment per craftsman would be around £4.60 per 
week. This estimate was later revised down to £4.20. 
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However, the craft audit met with difficulties which delayed progress. 
One delay was the craftsmens' strike of June 1970, causing the union to 
withdraw from the audit between 27th May and 18th August. Management's 
objective of having one comprehensive agreement for all manual workers was 
another reason for delay. They wished to finish both the craft and product-
ion audits at the same time, and these got badly out of phase. Therefore, 
management attempted to delay the completion of the maintenance audit, a 
tactic which was to bring its own difficulties. Another problem was the 
hostility of certain shop stewards to the Corby-Wide Productivity Progranme 
concept. This resistance was, particularly noticeable in the tube works, 
where the earlier phase of productivity bargaining had met with only limited 
success. Evidence of this difficulty is contained in Table 6.1 which 
records the audit's progress up to April, 1970. 
Table 6.1 
CWPP, Maintenance Audit Reports to April, 1970 
Area Discussion Groups Percentage of 
Studies Completed 
Blastfurnaces 907-
Iron and Steel Workshops 90'7. 
Coke Ovens 60'7. 
Rolling Mills 50'7. 
Steel Works 50'7. 
Tube Works Shops No Progress 
Continuous Mills 101. 
Lancashire and Corby 907. 
Minerals 80'7. 
ERW and CD Mi 11s No Progress 
Civil Ingineering 70'7. 
source: Urwick Orr Consultant 
So uncooperative were the tube workers at the study group level that 
.. nageaent developed the tactic of using Area and Central Group meetings 
to make advances. 
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The production audits which were going on simultaneously during 1970, 
also experienced difficulties. One problem concerned representation on 
the Confederation's Central Discussion Group. Management had insisted 
that the number of union representatives be kept down to six persons to 
facilitate discussion and problem solving. This rule effectively excluded 
from direct representation many of ISTC's twenty three branches some of 
which felt slighted. The union's representatives were elected by the Corby 
Joint Branches Committee. This problem did not arise with the NUBF, for 
each of the five lodges had direct representation on their Central Group. 
At Area Discussion Group level there were eight Confederation and 
three blastfurnace groups. Area Group objectives were the saae as those of 
the craft workers, namely to promote study groups, bring local knowledge to 
bear, and to report progress to the Central Groups. Also, trade union 
involvement in these groups was extensive, as with the craft unions. 
However, trade union involvement to this extent did not go unchallenged 
by middle manageaent, some of whom felt their authority as managers was 
threatened. This was particularly so with the production worker's audit 
where eaphasis was on the iaprovement of plant efficiency and material usage, 
and less on aanpower aspects: areas which lie within management's prerogative. 
Consequently, the operation of Area and Study Groups allowed a aanager's 
subordinates to scrutinise his running of the plant by identifying 
inefficiencies. Therefore, aanacers holding a traditional view of their 
rights felt insecure in this .ore participative set up. Certainly, resent-
ment and opposition existed, but given the hierarchical nature of authority 
within aanageaent and its associated pover distribution, this opposition 
was rarely shown openly. 
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The Urwick Orr consultant also played an active part in the audit. 
Ideas for improving productivity came from both management and trade union 
participants, but also from the consultant who tried to achieve i.,ro •• -
ments. The consultant helped to decide priorities regarding resource 
allocation to specific projects and ideas. In the early days those projects 
generating the fastest payback were favoured most. The consultant would 
summarise the conclusions and write up audit reports for discussion at 
Area and Central Group aeeting.. Another important a.pect of the consultant's 
work was to promote at every opportunity the CWPP idea and to play down 
the contributions of the various sections. In other words, the consultant, 
and indeed the audit, had the subsidiary goal of helping the participants 
to widen their horizons beyond their immediate work groups, and thereby to 
help to persuade thea to accept the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme. 
To a.ai.t with this and to facilitate di.cussions on the wage plan, a 
moratorium was placed on departaental level productivity bargaining. 
The production audit progres.ed slowly, and by February 1971, 74~of 
production operative. had either been covered by audit reports, or an audit 
wa. in progre... Of the 2,591 operative. covered by audit reports, 1,459 
had their work studied in detail, and this revealed a potential aanpower 
saving of 14~. Also the u.e of production operative. to take over minor 
routine ta.ks from the craft .. en would improve aanpower efficiency. The 
audit identified 180 such job ta.k.. A third area of potential .avings 
lay in ~roved plant performance through higher yield., that ia, a larger 
output from a given input and lower .. terial wastage. Nevertheles., by 
February 1971, .ome 814 (l2.6~) operatives r ... ined to be covered by the 
audit, and a further 871 (l3.5~) refused to cooperate with the progr...e. 
What difficultie ... de the latter group oppo.e the production audit? 
Aa mentioned previou.ly certain branches were excluded from the Confed -
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eration's Central Discussion Group, and some of these felt aggrieved. One 
such branch with a status problem was Corby No 1, which covered the melters, 
the traditional aristocrats of the industry. This branch had entered the 
programme e.rly, but on f.ilure to secure direct representation on the 
central group, decided to come out of the audit in April, 1970. Another 
difficulty arose with No 2 lodge of the NUBF who left in February, 1970. 
This lodge refused to accept ~k mea.urement. The other major difficulty 
arose out of the mor.torium placed on deparbBent.l productivity bargaining. 
This resulted in oppo.ition fro. • number of br.nches who felt they could 
do better for theaaelves by barg.ining in the traditional way. These 
br.nches included the electric furn.ce, rolling mills, gener.l services 
and the continuous weld branch. 
The fir.t ph •• e of the .udit w.s dr.wn to a close in March, 1970 and 
to mark the end of ph.se one the role of the Urwick Orr consult.nt was 
.ltered. A new consult.nt was .ppointed who w ••• n employee of the 
Corpor.tion .nd Urwick Orr continued to be repre.ented on site by • senior 
con.ultant who .dvi.ed manageaent on the progr ... e's developaent. Moreover, 
.bout this tiae it w •• decided to develop the .udit on • continuous b.sis 
which h.d not be.n the origiaal intention. The initi.l pl.n w.s to identify 
•• ving., dr.w up • w.g. pl.n, .nd negotiate this with the trade unions. 
The decision to aake the .udit continuous w ..... jor change of .tr.tegy 
which influenced the .ub.equent d.sign of the Corby-Wide Productivity 
Progr ..... 
P.rt Two, The Corby-Wid. Productivity Prolr .... , De.il! and Structur. 
Thi. p.rt describe. the •••• nti.l structur.l element. in the de.ign of 
the progr..... The .tructure wa. de.igned to .chieve the progr .... •• 
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objectives a. de.cribed in Part One above. The .. in eleaent. are the 
impleaentation .tructure; the monitoring syatea and financial a.pecta; 
the coaprehensive wage structure; cOBaunications systea; and disputes 
procedures. However, these eleaents never constituted a blue print 
designed by aanag .. ent to be applied rigidly. The Corby-Wide Productivity 
Progr .... wa. always controversial and developed in a flexible and con-
tinuing fashion. It was the subject of BSC head office interventions, and 
also trade union attitudes continued to develop and chaD&e with 
consequences for it. In addition, fro. tiae to tiae management itself was 
not always clear on how to tackle certain probl.... Hence, the structural 
.l .. ents dealt with in Part Two are subject to aarginal chanaes as the 
progr .... dev.loped. 
The ~l .. entation Structure 
It was aanaaeRent's intention to e.tabli.h a Central Corby-Wide 
Productivity Council as the governing body cov.rina all trade unions on 
sit.. The inauaural aeeting was held on 13th January, 1911. In addition, 
subordinate eo..itte.s at works (that is, ~n.rals, st •• 1 and tub. worka) 
and plant levels were set up. The Committee structur. confor.ad to the 
aanaa ... nt hi.rarchy with the central body chaired by the dir.ctor in charae, 
the Works eo..itte.s by the respective works aana,.rs and the Plaat 
eo..itte.s by the d.part.ental aanag.rs. The first Cantral Council a.etina 
wa. arranaed for 3rd February, 1911. 
The craft unions and four branches of the ISTC fail.d to turn up to 
this first aeeting. Their r.fu.al to participat. in the proar .... at this 
st ... will b. traced in Part Thr... However, due to th.ir noa-participation, 
the Cantral Corby Council did not .. terialise and the a •• tina d.cid.d to 
r.constitut. its.lf a. the Production - Sub Comaittee. Thus, the door ... 
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left open for the craft unions to enter the programme at a later date. 
This meeting decided to commence the tasks of drawing up a draft productivity 
agreement, and a graded wage structure. To this end two working parties 
were constituted to discuss the issues in detail and to report back. Hence, 
owing to the non-participation of the craft unions, the analysis in this 
part relies heavily upon the work of the Production - Sub Committee. 
The production union agreement dated 22nd February, 1971 refers to the 
eventual establishment of a Central Corby Productivity Council, and to the 
continuation of the discussion group structure. Meantime the Production-
Sub Co.mittee was to develop and implement the agreement. On the management 
side, the most senior personnel were represented, including the Corby 
managing director, senior works managers, and the group industrial relations 
manager. On the union side representation consisted of eight Confederation 
branch officials, five NUBF lodge officials, with one from the GMWU. In 
addition, both ISTC and NUBF were represented by their full-time officials. 
A&ain, this conforaed to the Donovan Commission's ideas for full-time 
officer involveaent in the .. kina of company level agreements.(5) 
The Production - Sub eo.mittee, as the governing body of the agreement, 
met once every three aonths. Its authority included the right to en.ure 
that the progr ... e functioned properly and .atisfied the te~ of the 
agre .. ent. It held ultimate responsibility for the promotion of audit 
work. Also, the Committee dealt with the financial a.pects including the 
monitoring of saving., aDd the negotiation of their distribution. Further, 
tbe Sub eo..ittee defined the t.plementation structure and the term. of 
referenceof the subordinate committees. The implementation structure i. 
illustrated in the next diagr ... 
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Diagram 6.1 
Implementation Structure of the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme 
I Production-Sub Coamittee .1 
• I Trade Union Central Review Working Audit Activities Wages 
Policy Group Group Parties Group Policy 
Coami t te e 
II 
Works Implementation Planning Groups 
Minerals I Iron and Steel 1 Tubes 
M 
Area Discussion Groups 
Iron &. Steel Mills General Services Quality COIIIIlercial Minerals 
Coke Tube Tube 
Group A Group B 
I 
Plant Groups '" Traditional Procedures r 
Study Groups Local Negotiations 
Plant Efficiency 
~roups 
The functioning of this complex structure requires some discussion, 
and the purpose of the various bodies needs to be expl.ined. 
The Centr.l Review Group w.s ~.ller th.n the Production-Sub Committee 
.nd met more regularly. AA. sub committee it de.lt with routine work 
which included the screening of probl ... to relieve the top Committee of 
work. The emph.sis w.s on integr.tive solutions, although negotiations did 
occur .t Centr.l Review. This emph.sis on integr.tive solutions w.s 
inherent in the philosophy of the proar ... e, .nd refl.ct.d .n .ctiv •• ttempt 
to find. correct .nsw.r b ••• d upon the f.cts of the situation, .n .pproach 
th.t h.s b.en .n.ly •• d by Mary P.rker Poll.t .nd .nshrined in her conc.pt 
of "the l.wof the situ.tion".(6) Other probl ... concerned disputes over 
the int.rpr.t.tion of the .ar .... nt. In addition, Centr.l leview monitored 
the monthly perfonaanc. r.sults (described l.ter), .nd .timul.ted the Are. 
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Groups to improve productivity. It also had a role in deciding priorities 
regarding the implementation of plans and ideas. The Audit Activity Group 
was more concerned with the technical problems of the audit and with 
providing opportunities for ideas to develop. It also had a coordin.ting 
role on .udit implementation .cross site, .nd reviewed directly the results 
of the study groups .nd the audit consultant. The Tr.de Union Policy Group 
w.s the unions' centr.l policy body which liaised with the tr.de union 
br.nches, and coordinated their activities regarding the CWPP. The Wages 
Policy eo..ittee .lre.dy discussed w.s the senior manaaeBent body concerned 
with the programme. 
Moving down the impleaent.tion structure to the Works Lmpl .. ent.tion 
Pl.nning Groups .nd the Are. eo..ittees. The former corresponds to the 
gener.l works .. naaer le~l in the ora.nis.tion~ hier.rchy. Work. Lmplement-
ation were pri .. rily re.ponsibl. for working out the det.il of t.plementation 
plans. This included coordination of audit .ctivity within the re.pective 
work •• nd d.ciding priorities between .udit pl.n.. Moreover, they h.d the 
.uthority to .lter d.tua. (described later) which h.d been found to be too 
hard to .chieve in the liaht of .xperience. Work. ~le.entation .1.0 
aonitored the work of the Are. eo..ittee., .nd worked in close li.ison with 
the Central a.view Group. These bodies .lso h.d • neaoti.tina function. 
Th. Ar •• Group.' pri .. ry objective w.s to st~ul.te efficiency within 
th.ir re.p.ctive .r.... In thi. context ide.s for t.provina efficiency 
would b. di.cu ••• d .nd .p.cific project •• ith.r aiven to Pl.nt Group. or 
Study Groups. Further, Ar.a Group. h.d • r •• pondibility for en.urina that 
audit. ear •• d .t Worka ~l ... nt.tion 1..-1 were in f.ct i.pl .. ent.d. Th.y 
.1.0 aonitor.d p.rforaaac. filur.s und.r the .ar • ...ut. 
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At the bottom of the structure were the Plant Groups sometimes called 
the Plant Study Groups (not to be confused with the Plant Efficiency Groups). 
The Plant Groups conducted studies given to them by the Area Groups and 
reported progress to them. These bodies were important, for changes can 
be discussed at Area level and above, but have to be implemented at shop 
floor level and the Plant Groups had the task of securing rank and file 
involvement in the agreed change •• 
The Plant Efficiency Group. were the only aulti-trade union bodies 
covering all unions under the programme. As a result, they did not come 
directly under any specific agreement within the CWPP. The Groups' exist.nce 
aro.e out of overlaps or grey areas re.ulting from the various agreements. 
To illustrate: problema arose if a craft union had little incentive to 
implement a certain change since it gave little benefit to themselves, 
although significant savings were po •• ible to the production workers. Since 
no Central Corby Productivity Council existed to coordinate and tackle .uch 
problems, the job had to be done at plant level, by Plant Efficiency Group •• 
The above covers the .. in implementation eleaents designed to achieve 
the pro&r ... e's objective.. How.ver, this .tructure applied only to the 
production unions, and not to the craft unions who refused to participate 
in the Central Productivity Council. Eventually the craft union. concluded 
their own agreement., although not a. one joint body. In fact, there were 
three craft union a&reeaents; one for the mini-crafts, that i., UCATT 
(AUBTW), BaTS, and the bricklayers labourer.; and one for the AUEW, and 
EETPU re.pectively. In teraa of structure all four agreements contained 
el .. ent •• ~ilar to each other. Although the ADEW insi.ted on their 
central ca..ittee beina known a. a Negotiating eo.mittee and not the 
ADEW-Sub eo.aittee to avoid cogparison with other unions. 
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Clearly management did not achieve a unified structure under the 
Corby-Wide Productivity Programme, although they did obtain some strong 
similarities between the various agreements. All the agreements had their 
hierarchy of committees which management deemed necessary to promote employee 
involvement and commitment to the programme. Also, they felt that this 
committee structure would improve productivity and also assist in the 
reduction of absenteeism, labour turnover, and possibly strikes. On the 
other hand, the implementation structure took up a lot of management's time, 
and also that of the lay union officials, several of whom were virtually 
full-time. Part four of this chapter will consider whether or not employee 
participation through the implementation structure positively improved 
performance. 
The Monitoring Mechanism 
Another main structural feature of the programme was the mechanism 
designed to monitor performance. The consultants had earlier favoured a 
value added scheme, but this was rejected by the Wages Policy Committee as 
too complex. Senior management felt that a method of measurement nearer to 
the standard costing system favoured by the Corporation would be easier for 
middle management to work with. The system adopted was based upon plant 
yield, speeds and stops, and level of expenditure. 
A datum year, 1970/71, was decided upon to measure costs incurred on 
the criteria of yields, speeds and .tops, and level of expenses.(7) Then, 
the datum year was used to coapare with actual costs in subsequent years, 
and the deviations (called productivity variances) recorded. The datum year 
was adjustable to allow for changes in raw material prices, national wage 
awards and other cost chang •• outwith Corby's control. Further, adjustments 
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could be made to datum if cost reducing capital expenditure took place. (8) 
The measures of yields, speeds and stoppages were regarded as efficiency 
factors, whereas levels of expenses as cost factors. Yield was the 
relationship between material entering into the manufacturing process and 
the output of acceptable tonnage. Thus, if operators took greater care the 
ratio between the two would improve the yield, that is, a given output would 
require a smaller input. However, in measuring yield two qualifications 
were taken into account. First, an allowance was made for the effect of 
stock adjuscnent. This proved necessary as some output initially considered 
defective was rectified and made acceptable. Second, output declared scrap 
was not totally lost from the process, and could be recycled replacing scrap 
which otherwise would have to be bought from elsewhere to produce steel. Yet 
a third factor complicating the simple ratio was the concept of material usage 
efficiency. Appendix 1 shows how the calculation of this measurement was 
used. Its introduction was necessary due to changes in product mix between 
current and datum years. For without the material usage efficiency equation 
a predominance of easy products in the datum year measured against difficult 
products in the current year would produce a loss, although the plant could 
be working with equal efficiency on both occasions. 
The speed of working was defined as the measure of the production rate 
during the hours that the plant was manned, less delays. Again speed 
variances were affected by different products, and a formula similar to the 
material usage efficiency wa. constructed. This speed efficiency was 
designed to integrate the different speeds on the various products. Thus a 
positive varia.ce wal recorded when there was a laving of time in the 
current period for producing the lame output to datum. 
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Stoppages were defined as the time lost to production due to mischance, 
change in product size, meal breaks, and mill roll changes. It excluded 
time lost due to a fall in demand for the product as the plant ceased 
operation for certain shifts. Stoppages were not influenced by changes in 
product mix. They were measured as a percentage of time lost against planned 
manned hours, and by comparing current time period with datum. This calcul-
ation is shown in Appendix 2. However, the measure was not appropriate for 
continuous production plants such as the coke ovens, where a speed calcul-
ation was used. For example, so many ovens pushed per man shift. (9) Finally, 
speed and stoppages measurements were closely interrelated, for if speeds 
were under recorded then delays showed larger than actual. 
The level of expenditures covered items like wage costs, tools, materials 
fuel consumption, consumable ite.s such as gloves, and the hire of plant 
from contractors. A fo~ula had to be found to obtain a measure of compar-
ative efficiency between expenditure levels at datum and in the current 
tiae period. This was achieved by deciding upon a determining factor for 
each expense item which produced a calculation on a per unit basis. For 
example, with wages, the determining factor was hours worked; whereas for 
electricity consumption it vas per tonne of steel charged. In this way a 
calculation showing monthly expense allowances could be arrived at for 
comparison with expenditures. 
These physical results were converted into financial returns by the 
accountants. However, although the physical results were available on a 
monthly basis (results were available at the start of the next but one 
month) the financial results were monitored on a six monthly basis. 
The distribution of savings was agreed at a 50~ split between the 
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Corporation and the unions. The initial plan was to work the agreement, 
monitor on a six monthly basis, and then negotiate a distribution with 
the unions. However, the principle that there would be no payment until 
savings were earned was lost in the negotiations. As a result, an interim 
productivity payment was paid to each participant based upon a savings 
forecast and not actual results. Therefore, when the six monthly financial 
results became available the first call made against the savings was the 
cost of the interim productivity bonus. If savings were in excess of these 
interia costs then a balancing item remained. This was available for two 
possible uses. Firstly, an additional lump sum could be paid to each 
employee covered by the agreement. Alternatively, the sum could be put into 
reserve to sustain future productivity payments during adverse times. 
The monitoring system described above was shared by all the trade 
unions at Corby, although as .entioned previously there were four separate 
manual agree.ents. There were exceptions however to the common monitoring 
system. Each agreement monitored expense savings separately, and the 
production agreement allowed savings arising fro. demanning to be dealt 
with outside the expense variance structure. Nevertheless, all the unions 
accepted the CoaaOD par-ent under yield, speeds and stoppages, because it 
was not possible to identify their specific contributions. On the manning 
.ide, the production agreeaent provided for the following distribution of 
savings: 
(a) Up to 3O~ of aanpower savings were available to the branch/lodge 
concerned to assist with job crading within the graded structure. 
(b) A further 20~ of savings were allocated to the central fund to finance 
the CWPP productivity payaents. 
(c) AD extra lO~ vas .. de available to the Corby i.co.e security fund - a 
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fund which worked on the same principle as the national income 
security agre~ent (described in Chapter Four), but improved upon it. 
Hence at Corby, if a person was redeployed owing to job loss, his 
previous earnings were sustained for sixty weeks (assuming the new job 
wa. lower paid) at 1007., compared with eight weeks at 100% under the 
national agreement. 
The craft unions productivity agreements contained several differences 
compared with the production agreements. On the manning issue no agreement 
proved possible with the craft unions. A further difference concerned the 
level of production activity at which monitoring ceased. Under the product-
ion agreement the monitoring of .avings stopped when the strip mill came 
down to .ixteen shift working. Management argued that below this level 
fixed costs were rising per unit of output and out-weighing any benefit 
from monitored lavings. Moreover, it was illogical to att~t to reduce 
stoppage. and t.prove Ipeeds at such low level. of activity. The unions 
would not accept management'. arguaent on this point, although the EETPU 
and the ~ni-crafts agreed to set up a joint working party to discuss the 
problea. 
To conclude, the .onitoring mechanism can be regarded al an important 
design feature a~ed at shifting the collective baraaining arrangements in 
the direction of increased centralisation in the absence of a Central Corby 
Productivity Council. Therefore, although a unified impleaentation 
structure was not achieved, all the unions were operating within a uniform 
.onitorine syst .. with soa. ainor qualifications. Furtheraore, this change 
in the collective bargainine arrangeaents encouraaed closer working within 
.. nag ... nt and between the different branche. and union •• 
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A second important advantage of the monitoring system described above 
was the scope it provided for the extension of employee participation. In 
effect each unit of plant in the works was a monitoring cost centre. These 
units discussed the detail of productivity improvements and explored the 
reasons for the productivity variances. Consequently, all the benefits 
said to flow from employee participation such as higher productivity, 
reduced absenteeism, lower labour turnover, and fewer strikes, were 
potentially available. (lO) Whether this potential can be fully achieved 
or indeed whether the proposition is valid will be considered further in 
Part Four of this Chapter. 
Before leaving the monitoring structure somethine must be said about 
a possible disadvantage of the system. Clearly from the above analysis of 
yields, speeds and stops and levels of expenditure, and in particular the 
use of the materials u.aee efficiency foraula, the monitoring system wa. 
complex and remote from the average employee. The following q.uote frca 
R McKersie (11) referring to the operation of a si~lar a,re .. ent makes 
the point. 
'Even though the coaaittee understood the workings of the 
ratio, and an outside accountant was used, there was a 
,.n.ral suspicion of the bonus calculations in the firm. 
This wa. increa.ed by makine allowances for the product 
mix which made the .ystea fairer but more difficult to 
,rasp. Thi. so .app.d acral. and l •••• n.d effort that 
production st.adily declined and Brid,e had to abandon the 
scheme in mid 1962'. 
Thu. an i~ortant que.tion to be considered in Part Four must b. 
wheth.r or not the Corby experience wa. any differ.nt. 
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The Wages Structure. 
Reform of wage structures have been an important feature in many 
productivity agreements, and Corby was no exception. One important management 
objection was to reduce the number of pay rates, a factor generating disorder 
at Corby. Moreover, it was thought that the greater rationality of a 
graded wage structure would assist the development of job evaluation in the 
future. Management had hoped to develop a comprehensive wage structure 
covering both production and maintenance workers to help contain wage drift 
in the case of the craftsmen.(12) Also, the new wage structure aimed to 
establish a more unifOnB division between time and tonnage bonus elements. 
For, as shown previously, the percentage of bonus varied greatly from one 
work group to another. Other objectives were to enchance the stability of 
earnings for some groups, and to secure greater flexibility and mobility 
between people in the s .. e grade. 
The method chosen was si~ly to accept the current earnings distribution 
and to slot jobs with these earnings into agread grades. Thus, no attempt 
was .. de to grade jobs according to job content as required by various job 
evaluation techniques. Therefore, most of the existing wage anomalies were 
built into the graded wage structure. MOreover, with such a complex job 
structure, anything short of a full points rating method of job evaluation 
wa. likely to prove difficult to implement.(13) 
The nuaber of grades to be adopted was the subject of some debate, with 
manageDent seeking twenty, and the Confederation and the NUBF thirteen and 
seven respectively. Finally, the parties agreed on nineteen grades with £1 
gap. or .teps. The total range went from £16.50 to £35.50 with .ome highly 
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paid jobs excluded from the structure. Morevoer, because the graded 
structure was Corby-Wide, men on the same promotion line in any particular 
deparbaent were not necessarily in succession in the graded structure. For 
instance, the electric furnace had people in grades 1,3,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 
13, and 17, whereas the EWSR plant had personnel in grades 1,5,7,8,9,11,12 
13, and 14. Generally the bottom grades 1 to 3 were filled by labourers, 
and the coke oven and blastfurnace departments were more than proportionately 
represented in the lower grades; in fact, the senior operatives in these 
departments only reached grades nine and ten respectively. On the other 
hand, the strip ail1s and tube works occupations reached into grade thirteen 
and above. 
Another feature of the graded structure was the 80/20 percent split 
in the basic shift earnings. This vas to apply above grade five as grades 
three, four and five had common datal and bonus rates, and grades one and 
two no bonus at all. Changes in basic shift earnings, to confora to the 
80/20 division, were to be negotiated at departmental level. Finally, the 
production union agre .. ents contained a ceiling on vage increases of 
twelve percent in anyone year. This aeasure was to .afeguard the Corporation 
fro. vage caaparison clai .. outwith Corby. 
The graded wage atructure, like the monitoring syst .. at.ed at central-
ising collective bargaining at Corby. Once accepted, the production unions 
agreed to forgo local wage bargaining, except within the fr .. evork of the 
CWPP. Hovevar, certain probl .. s reaained even within the graded structure. 
Savings arising froa production manpower reductions were outside the expense 
savings variances and up to 30t of such .avings could be retained by the 
local branch to r..ove vage anoaalies under the graded structure. However, 
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in practice branches were likely to keep the whole 30% to themselves. Thus 
work groups with jobs less skilled than others, but with scope to negotiate 
demanning could raise their relative earnings and secure a higher grade. 
The only solutions to this problem were either to change to a more thorough 
job evaluation scheme or a further reduction in branch autonomy. 
Yet .nother problea was the integr.tion of production and maintenance 
workers onto the same w.ge structure. Maintenanc. workers had h.d their 
own five gr.de structure since the time of the Magent. Book in the .teel 
work., .nd .ince 1970 in tubes. But,. major difficulty arose over the 
different element. in the re.pective .tructures. Production workers were 
p.id the same dat.l (ti.e) plus • bonus per shift, and both the.e rate. were 
incre •• ed by • multiplier to obt.in weekly earning.. Al.o, the .hift 
multiplier included .llowances for .hift work and week-end work. On the 
other h.nd, the .. intenence worker. h.d .n hourly rate, but • weekly bonus 
which c.rried no extr •• for overti.e, .hift or week-end workiaa. Thi. 
difference h.d little effect upon rel.tive e.rnings, but wh.n it came to 
int.,r.tion pre.ented a aajor probl... No doubt the craft union. would h.ve 
.ccepted extra bonus for .hift .nd week-end working, but .. ua,eaent'. 
problea w •• to get thea to .ccept • reduction el.ewhere. Manageaent could 
not e •• ily .olve this probl .. ; they del.yed .nd the situation changed, as 
will be .een in the next p.rt of the Ch.pter. Cou.equently, the concept of 
a ca.prehen.ive w.,e .tructure wa. lo.t, and both production .nd .. inteuance 
group. ret.ined .ep.r.t. structure •• 
The ea..unic.tion. Sy.t .. 
The coaplexity of the Corby-Wide Productivity Progr ...... de. good 
c~nic.tion •• y.t ...... nti.l to it •• ucces.. The main channel through 
" :, 
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which information flowed to junior management and employees was the 
implementation structure itself. Given the large number of committees it 
was assumed that a big proportion of employees would participate in this 
direct way. 
The second most important channel of communication wa. through the 
trade unions. Management's strategy was to train selected union officials 
in the details of the progr ... e, and provide an appreciation for other 
employees. To facilitate trade union comaunications concerning the programme, 
"report back facilities" were made available to the unions in the 
Corporation's ti.e. The Trade Union Policy Group met regularly to discuss 
union attitudes to the programme, its progress, and any intended changes 
whether initiated by management or the unions. In addition, policy group 
representatives reported back group discus.ions to their own unions, again 
in Corporation time. These report-back meetings also provided an opportunity 
for rank and file aeabers and less senior lay officials to channel ideas, 
critici ... , and attitudes back to the policy group. Further, policy 
group .embers, in their own time, would attend branch meetings to discuss 
the prolr ... e when the occasion deaanded it. Oth.r faciliti •• provided to 
union officials, concerned payment for lost tim. at work due to attendance 
at meetings. These facilities were classified into long (a whole day) or 
short (a half day), and each committee had its desiauated facility, such 
as the Production-Sub Coaaitte. which had long facilities, and the Study 
Group. short facilitie •• 
Another ca..unication channel was line manal .. ent itself. However, no 
special arranleaents were .. de to involve lower line management. In fact, 
in the early day. of the progr .... middle and lower manag __ ent had no 
repre.entation on the higher comaittees. 
206. 
The final, and in many ways the most novel communications medium of 
the programme was the establishment of a Joint Publications Group. This 
body had the responsibility for the publication of a regular news sheet 
and for posters designed to carry information on the programme. In this 
way management hoped to give rank and file employees an appreciation of 
what the programme was about. The news sheets published for the first time 
in November, 1971 contained concise and accurate information on the 
programme's design and operation, and were easily read and understood by 
the employees. They further brought to the attention of the employees ideas 
for making savings. The posters were fixed on notice boards throughout the 
works. These carried less information but were eye catching and punchy 
in design.(14) 
These were the major channels through which information on the CWPP 
was conveyed to the participants. It would appear that senior management 
had a clear strategy on this matter and had consciously designed a proper 
communications system. Moreover, they believed that good communications 
not only improved people's understanding and therefore involvement in the 
programme, but would integrate the aspirations, needs and interests of 
employees with those of the organisation. (15) This attitude appears to 
have had an ideological basis, partly due to the genuine paternalism of the 
old Stewart and Lloyd's company and, partly to management's interest in 
securing trade union cooperation. Moreover, this managerial ideology has 
received theoretical support and respectability from the writings of the 
human relations academics referred to previously. A cautionary note however, 
has been made by Alan Fox (16) when he points to the dangers of management 
seeing difficulties in failing to achieve objectives as being due essentially 
to poor human relations. Such a conclusion could cause management to devote 
resources to solving a problem for which improved communications was not 
the appropriate answer. 
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Conflict Resolution Procedures 
The Corby-Wide Productivity Programme in no way infringed the parties' 
rights to use the industry's traditional procedures. For example, under 
the graded wage structure the slotting of jobs into grades and the negot-
iation of the 80/20 division in datal/bonus earnings were dealt with at 
deparCDental level, with unresolved disputes rising to higher levels in 
the procedure. Alain disputes over manpower savings could and did go the 
length of the Neutral Committee. Nevertheless, with a complex plan like 
the CWPP, departures from the traditional procedure were inevitable owing 
to the inadequacies of the programme. Aa a result, clause ten of the 
Production Productivity Agreement allowed for disputes arising over the 
interpretation and application of the agreement to be referred to the 
Production-Sub eo.mittee. This clause, subject to acceptance by the local 
branches, was permitted by the national productivity agreement dated 
November, 1969. 
Another problea to ari.e under the CWPP concerned the functioning of 
the Neutral Com.ittee procedure. One of the Neutral Commdttee's essential 
feature. is that the panel consists of two manageaent and two union 
representatives fra. outwith the district where the dispute has occured. 
Consequently, Neutral Committee ... bers had no experience of the CWPP, and 
often they did not understand the implications of their decision. concerning 
a specific dispute for the total progra.me. This was a considerable cause 
of di.sati.faction. 
A further procedural l~lication to arise out of the CWPP was the 
branch officials heightened awareness of the interdependence of the various 
production units. Traditionally, if one work group or branch stopped work 
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resulting in others losing work it fell to either the full-time official 
or the Joint Branches Committee to promote the interests of those affected. 
Under the Corby-Wide Productivity Probrar.vne the Trade Union Policy Group 
as a central institution saw a role for itself in safeguarding production, 
and the interests of those affected by a sectional work stoppage. 
Thus, procedural innovation came to Corby in the form of a Production 
Advisory Panel in February, 1972. This was a management initiative which 
offered the parties an alternative route to the industry procedure to 
resolve disputes over wages, demanning, changes in working practice, etc. 
The panel's decision making powers were limited to recommendations and to 
voluntary acceptance by the parties. ~ such, use of the panel dId not 
formally deny the disputant party access to the traditional procedure. 
Nevertheless, the panel offered benefits over the Neutral Committee of speed, 
and experience of the programme. The panel itself consisted of three 
management and three union representatives not directly involved in the 
dispute. The management panelists were chosen by the group industrial 
relations .. nager, and the union representatives by the appropriate full-
tiae union officer. The procedure was formal with both parti ••• ubaitting 
written evidence within seven days of making application for a hearing. 
After receiving both written and verbal evidence the panel retired to hammer 
out an acre .. ent in closed session. The panel's recommendation was then 
given in writing to both parties. The Advisory Panel was initially set up 
as an experi.ent for six aonths, and its success will be evaluated in 
Part Four. 
The Production Protection Procedure, a further innovation, was 
e.tablished in June 1973. This Trade Union Policy Group initiative was 
intended to bring quick conciliation to disputes between local manageaent 
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and union branches/lodges. Management considered the term 'conciliation' 
too strong and the name 'protection procedure' was adopted. This was an 
informal procedure but it was worked out in great detail. The procedure 
established a team of three trade union policy members who were available 
to be contacted by either management or branch if a dispute was affecting 
production. After the initial contact, the group industrial relations 
manager and the trade union policy team would decide if the protection 
procedure should be initiated. Once underway, the union team sought to 
establish the fact. by interviewing the parties separately, and formulate 
a view on the action required to solve the problem. Again, no one with 
a direct interest in the dispute was in the union team. 
In this way the production protection procedure brought to bear a 
Corby-Wide interest upon a dispute perceived by the participants in sectional 
terms in order to safeguard the productivity bonus. Moreover, the protect-
ion procedure could be viewed a. an attempt by the Trade Union Policy Group 
(with management's consent) to encroach upon branch/lodge autonaay without 
having the constitutional right to do so.(17) Hence, the Corby solution 
to autonaaous union organisation and sectional work stoppage. in an inte-
grated technology was sUDilar to that adopted at Ravenseraig Works. As at 
Ravenseraig, the parties were .eeking informal ways to get around the formal 
constraints placed upon them by outdated collective bargaining arrangements 
and union organisation. 
Thi. ca.plete. the ana1y.i. of the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme's 
design. In ..... ry there are four .. in eleaents to the design: the 
imp1eaentation structure, the monitoring .yst .. , the commun~iation •• yste., 
and the proce4bres for resolving industrial disputes. The next part of the 
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Chapter considers the actual negotiations between the parties and the 
probleas encountered. This analysis will throw light on the difficulties 
experienced in the achievement of this design. 
Part Three, The Negotiations and Problems Arising 
The purpose of this part is to trace the progress of social change 
leading to the establisbaent of the programme analysed previously. Of 
specific interest are changes in the collective bargaining arrangements, 
wage structure, trade union organisation and the attitudes of the unions 
to the Corby-Wide Productivity Progr ... e. In particular, attention is 
given to negotiations between the parties, deal ina first with the production 
unions, and then with the craft unions. 
Production Unions. Nelotiations 
Given the difficulties with the craft unions, to be described sub-
sequently, aanag .. ent decided to continue the programme with the production 
unions. They made this decision on two grounds. First, the st.tement of 
intent with its audit and .oratoriu. on d.partaental l.vel bargaining had 
raised the production workers' expectations regarding the programm.. A 
r.fusal to conclude an agr.ement would have c.used frustration, .nd would 
have been seen by the production unions as the craft tail walling the dog. 
S.cond, .. uag .. ent hoped that with production work.rs' r.ceiving benefits 
under the .gr .... nt the craft unions would come in. Thus, management 
decided to go ahead without the craft ... n, .lthough this reduced the chances 
of achievina one ca.pr.hensi •• productivity agr .... nt. Having d.cided to 
take this risk it was then decided to pr.ss ah.ad with three f.atures of 
the progr ... e. 
211. 
On 22nd February 1971, the productivity agreement was made covering 
the implementation structure, monitoring mechanism, and on the contents of 
appendix A. This appendix to the agreement contained a list of rules and 
restrictive job practices which management either wished to change or to 
reinforce. These included rules relating to changing shifts on the job, 
meal breaks, mobility and flexibility, union facilities and so on. Given 
the extensive audit period there was no major differences between the 
parties on these issues, but there was a difference over the financial 
settlement. The unions pressed for an immediate payment, arguing that they 
had been engaged in the audit for a long time and required something to 
revive their .embers' interest and faith now that negotiations had started. 
However, this was contrary to the principles of the Corby-Wide Productivity 
Progr ... e which had been designed to be self financing. Moreover, it was 
al.o contrary to clause 7 (2) of the national productivity agreea.nt which 
stat.d that 'no payaents will b. made in advance of implementing 
(productivity) changes'. The difference between the parties was resolved 
when aanag_ent agreed to aake a payaent of £25.00 per man frOil the date 
that the agreement wa. signed. Of course, this was a misinterpr.tation of 
the national agre ... nt, but it had the .ffect of putting pressure on the 
branches to acc.pt the draft agreeaent. The £25.00 was financed by the 
Corporation and .et from savings subsequently generated by the agreement. 
Anoth.r dispute concerned the 501. split of savings generated by the 
progr ... e. Nanag ... ut had initially offered the unions a shar. of one 
third, with the union. clailling 601. of the saving.. M .. ntioned in the 
pr.yious section the agr .... nt arriy.d at paid the unions 501. with the 
exc.ption of aanpover sayings. The fo~ula agre.d for manpower savings 
wa. up to 3O~ r.tained by the brauch, 201. plus going to the Corby-Wide 
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pool, and 10% to a separate fund for financing redeployment payments. 
This device of the branch obtaining up to 304 of manpower savings must be 
regarded as a significant carrot offered to the advocates of branch 
autonomy. In effect, it allowed for a degree of decentra1ised productivity 
bargaining within a centralised framework, and thereby strengthened the 
hand of the Production-Sub Committee in its dealings with the branches 
remaining outside the programme. Notwithstanding this, some branches 
continued to prefer the previous phase of productivity bargaining when 
they could secure 50% of manpower savings. 
The second agreement on Employment and InCOBe Security wa. concluded 
on 22nd April, 1971. Under the national productivity programme an agree-
ment on employment and income security had been concluded between the 
Corpor.tion and the Trades Union Steel Indu.try Consultative Committee 
(TUSICC), in December 1969.(18) There were two important items in the 
loc.l agreeaent. Corby management gave an undertaking of no redundancy. 
Second, a per.on redeployed to a lower paid job would have his income 
.ustained at lOOt for a period of sixty weeks. This compared with eight 
week •• t lOOt under the national agreem.nt. Howev.r, the local .greement 
was funded fra. the unions share of the saving •• 
The third feature of the progr ... e was the Graded W.ge Structure 
which proved much .or. difficult to achieve. The graded structure which 
covered .11 production worker •• ~ed to ration.lise the wAle structure, 
provide gre.ter .t.bility of .arning., and increa.e mobility of labour 
within the respective Ir.des. It va ••• timated to co.t the Corby manage-
m.nt .bout £300,000 with .n .v.r •• e incr •••• of 65p per man p.r w •• k. Of 
cour.e, .s the approach w •• to slot people into a ninet.en gr.de structure 
with £1.00 differentials the .ctual increa.e to anyone person could 
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range from one penny to ninety nine pence. With this cash at stake the unions 
were exerting pressure upon management to implement the graded structure. 
On the other hand, management resisted this pressure on the ground 
that the objectives of the graded structure could only be achieved if all the 
branches were participating in the programme. At this time, September, 1971, 
Nos 1,3,12 and 17 branches reaained outside, and also part of No 2 Lodge. 
Management's tactic was to put pressure upon the recalcitrant branches by 
using the unions. Moreover, to reinforce this pressure, an offer of 2p per 
hour wa. made under the productivity programme, if everyone would accept the 
graded wage structure. The unions responded by cooperating at tiaes with 
manageaent to get the deviant branches to confora, and at other times by 
threatening to withdraw from the programme. This tactic, on the productivity 
bonus, was difficult to hold in the loncer term, and management finally agreed 
to pay the 2p per hour in September, back dated to July, 1971. However, this, 
as explained in Part Two, was an interim productivity payaent to be charged 
against the monitored financial results when they became available in November. 
In October, No 12 branch joined the programme, but others remained 
opposed, although every effort was .. de to obtain their compliance. For 
example, official union pressure was brought to bear on No 3 branch 
(continuous weld) which initially silned the productivity agreeaent, accepted 
the £25 and then withdrew. The ISTC National Executive discussed the matter 
and instructed the general secretary to write and infor. the branch that they 
had comproaised their autonoey under the alreeaent. Subsequently, in 
February 1972, aana, ... nt decided to i~l .. ent the graded structure provided 
that these branches sicaed the aare ... nt. At this point No 17 branch entered 
the pro'r ..... 
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Unfortunately, a further difficulty arose in the form of retroactive 
payment. Management wanted to pay from the date when the individual branches 
had signed the agreement. However, the unions wanted a common date of 
implementation and at one stage a £25 payment per man. This argument was 
settled on the basis of £20 per man with extra payment to those branches 
who were entitled to more by management's criterion. For instance, the coke 
ovens lodge received a payment of £31.23 per man. These payments were 
financed from the Corporation's share and not from the unions share of the 
progr ... e. At last, some thirteen months after the first negotiating meeting, 
the agreement was fully operational, although Nos I and 3 branches and part 
of No 2 lodge continued out.ide. 
Serious discu •• ions concerning the entry of Nos I and 3 branches' 
ca..enced in Kay, 1972. No 1 branch had tried to negotiate their own product-
ivity agre .. ent outside of the progr ... e, but .. nagement refused to cooperate. 
Consequently, the branch reversed it. attitude and in April .ought entry 
to the programae claiming a payment of £100 per man. In addition, they 
sought aSlurances over direct representation on the Production-Sub Committee. 
The £100, araued the branch, was the lum received by those who had participated 
since February, 1971. Also at this time No 3 branch were adopting a concil-
iatory attitude and clatmina a £75 entry payment having been paid the initial 
£25. 
However, difficulties lurrounding Nos 1 and 3 branches' entry did not 
confine th .... lv.. to th.s. two branches and their .ntry price. The idea 
that the two branch •• which had b •• n ob.tructuv. to the progr .... '. d.v.lop-
•• nt should r.c.iv. the .... pay..nt. va. unacceptable to the coop.ratina 
branch... The initial po.ition. of the partie •• howed the participatina 
branch •• takina a harder line than both the aanaa .. ent and full-tiae union 
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officials. The participating branches insisted that the No 1 branch 
entitleaent was £25 entry, £20 minimum graded structure, and the current 
productivity bonus. The full-time officers were simply in favour of finding 
a working solution. On the other hand, management proposed that No 1 branch 
be paid £45 for entry, the graded structure, the productivity bonus, plus a 
further £20 fra. the "discard fund". Of course, management's less rigid 
attitude was due to the importance they attached to both branches being 
included in the programae as they were larae and strategically placed in 
the work flow. (l9) 
At this point a word on the 'Discard Fund' is necessary by way of 
explanation. The di.card fund was the term applied to that part of the 
aeneral .avings put aside to finance the entry of the branches remaining 
out.ide the prolr ... e. Given the nature of the monitoring syst .. (that is, 
yields, .peeds and stops) it was not po.sible to specify the source of 
savinls a. belonging to any branch or union. Hence, unle •• the monitored 
.avinl' were to increase in proportion with the entry of these branches, 
which was unlikely, then the savings would be spread out over a creater 
nuaber of participants. To avoid this built in disincentive the discard 
fund was established, and it stood at £55,000 at this time. 
To break the deadlock the Trade Union Policy Group proposed a formula 
whereby everyone including .eabers of Nol and 3 branches would receive a 
£20 payment. However, the discard fund was not larae enough to finance 
this payment, and the unions sugC •• ted making use of £126,000 of savings 
gluerated in Noveaber 1971, but held back by aanag .. ent. In Noveaber the 
16 shift clause had been activated and the monitored savings were not added 
to the fund.(20) This was a cause of tension between the partie" althouah 
aanag ... nt vere technically correct in their interpretation of the agreeaent. 
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Nevertheless, management accepted the principle of a payment for everyone, 
but rejected the suggestion to use the November savings. 
The agreement arrived at was complicated, but paid an extra £30 to the 
non-participating branches and promised a lump sum of £20 to the participants 
at the end of the April accounting period. In total No 1 branch members 
received £75 on entry to the programme. This was funded from 50% of the 
discard fund existing on 2nd April, plus a proportion of the production union 
savings discarded for April to June. The offer of a "pot of gold" at the 
end of the accounting period overcame the opposition of the participating 
branches and by April 1972, all the Confederation branches were participating 
in the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme. The exception was the 200 members 
of No2 lodge, NUBF, who finally entered the progr ... e on 30th September,l972. 
Therefore, the change over from the traditional indu.trial relations system 
was virtually ca.plete. 
The productivity bonus commenced at 2p per hour paid in July 1971, thus 
e.tabli.hing the interia productivity payment. In June 1972, the bonus 
payaent ro.e to ~p per hour, and then in October to 6~p per hour. However, 
agreeaent on the hourly productivity bonus was certainly not automatic and 
conflict free. It will be recalled (part two) that an interim productivity 
payment was .. de prior to the end of an accounting period, usually three 
months in advance. When the financial results became available, the first 
call upon thea va. to aeet the cost of the interim payaent. A8 to the 
.urplu., a variety of po •• ible u.es were available including whether to 
continue the productivity bonus or rai.e it, whether to make a lump sum 
payment to all participants, or to place an amount in the provisions fund to 
protect the productivity payment alain.t future adversity. Generally 
.. naCeDent favoured the latter and the union. were predi.po.ed to rai.inc 
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the productivity payment and to claiming the payment of any surplus 
immediately. This union attitude was not as irresponsible as might at 
first appear. The unions thought that any surplus, from which they might 
benefit, might easily disappear in the future. This would appear to be an 
inherent conflict with this type of programme. 
Another question concerned branch representation on the Production-Sub 
Committee, which was discussed towards the end of 1972. The Confederation 
wanted nineteen representatives on the Committee. Management accepted the 
need to increase Confederation representation, but not by the numbers 
suggested by the union; it proposed eleven representatives. However, a major 
difficulty surrounded the representation of powerful branches, such as Nol. 
There was no guarantee that their representation would be secured even with 
the larger numbers, given the existing election procedure through the Corby 
Joint Branches Committee. Therefore, management suggested that representation 
should take place on a territorial basis, that is, iron and steel, rolling 
mills, general services, commercial tubes and quality tubes. This idea, 
which aUnost made Nol branch representation certain, was acceptable to the 
union, and the final size of lSTC representation was then agreed at thirteen. 
Craft Unions, Negotiations 
A major objective of the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme was to 
establish a multi-union agreement with all unions participating on the Corby 
Productivity Council. Management's strategy in this respect had failed 
when the craft unions did not put in an appearance at the first meeting of 
the Council. As a result, the Production-Sub Committee was set up. Never-
theless, manageaent continued to entice the craft unions to enter the 
progr ... e with eventual succesi. The purpose of what follows is to trace 
how this change was achieved. 
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It was established in Part Two above that the craft audit had been 
successfully completed by October, 1970. Thus, the craft unions prepared 
for negotiations on the basis of the audit findings. In this connection the 
unions submitted a claim for a 33~ productivity bonus related to their basic 
hourly rate. The claim was not for 33~ in one step however, but for a 
cummulative build up over the three years of the proposed agreement. The 
unions were concerned that this minimum of one third bonus must be achieved, 
which was interpreted by manag~ent as a demand for a guarantee. This 
emphasis upon a one third minimum was explained by the craft unions' 
experience with the Magenta documents. For the craft unions believed they had 
given management a blank cheque on productivity,(21) but that they had failed 
to secure savings ca..ensurate with the craftsaens' earningl expectations. 
Thus, the craft unions at the outset harboured doubts about management's 
ability to generate sufficient savinas under the CWPP. 
Closely associated with this wage clai. was the craft unions' stated 
intention, .. de at this tiae, not to negotiate jointly with the production 
unions. This wa. a reversal of their previous policy and resulted for 
three reasons. 
Audit findings .howed that more maintenance savings were possible from 
better manpower usage, whereas production savings were to be had frOB 
t.proved plant efficiencies and reduced expenditure levels. This gave the 
craft unions the possibility of two "bites at the ch.erry". For example, 
they could negotiate a straight manpower productivity agree.ent, and 
subsequently negotiate e.try to the .are ca.prehensive productivity agreement 
on the basis of t.proyed plant efficiencies. 
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The second factor causing craft opposition to joint negotiations within 
the framework of the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme was that much of the 
manpower savings available to production workers derived from production 
operatives taking over routine maintenance tasks. This was not acceptable 
to certain tube works shop stewards, who sought to protect their craft status 
against encroachment by production personnel, as indeed they had also sought 
to do against the graded men in the earlier phase of productivity bargaining. 
A more important factor shaping craft attitudes and encouraging separate 
negotiations was the un.ettled national situation. During this period the 
NCCC lodged it. claim for an £8.20 per week productivity bonus for phase two 
deals under the More Effective Use of Maintenance Manpower. (22) This £8.20 
represented one third of basic 1969 earning.. Negotiation. were tough and 
stalemate was reached when the Corporation refused to rai.e the offer above 
£5.50 per week at 100 Performance Index. However, after considerable delay 
with sanctions iaposed, lifted, etc., it wa. agreed nationally that local 
agre .. ents yielding between £5.50 and £8.20 would be acceptable. Against 
this the Corby audit had revealed a most likely increase of £4.20 per week 
at 80 P.I. after three years. This was equivalent to £4.40 (that is, the 
Corporation'. £5.50 offer at 80 P.I.) showing the Corby deal at the low end 
of the national range. Given the uncertainty of the national .ituation and 
also the likelihood that no .elf re.pecting negotiating body will accept 
Ie •• than that achiaved el.ewhere, it va. little wonder that the Corby 
craft .. en'. policy changed towards the Corby-Wide Productivity Prograaae. 
In other word., the craft union. either had to obtain a .eparate agreement 
to aua-ent their productivity bonus before entry to the CWPP, or negotiate 
out.ide of it ca.pletely. Obviou.ly, .. nag .. ent in tryina to achieve one 
comprehensive multi-union agreeaent had a very difficult problem to handle. 
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Moreover, it was unlikely that the production unions would allow a separate 
deal with the craftsmen to be followed by the same agreement as that 
negotiated with themselves. 
Yet another difference between the craft and production unions in terms 
of timing was their respective attitudes to the number of jobs to be lost 
under the CWPP. By 1971/72 at national level the Corporation's rational-
isation programme was beginning to bite and between vesting day and April 
1971 soae 10,140 job opportunities had been lost.(23) Rank and file workers 
were protesting throughout the country and at River Don Work., Sheffield, 
due for closure, the unions won an important victory in 1972. Ri.ing rank 
and file protest encouraged national union leaders to take a tougher stand 
against redundancy and job los., although not to oppose the rationalisation 
program.e.(24) By April 1973 the National Committee of the AUEW (engineering 
section) voted to 'organi.e the fulle.t po •• ible support to all unions 
re.isting closures' in the indu.try.(25) Consequently, this rising tide of 
labour unreat throughout the ~ndustry was to influence events at Corby and 
the Corby craftsmen (in particular thOle in the tube works) were the first 
to articulate it. 
The Corby aanageaent formally rejected the craft unions' clai. for a 
one third productivity bonus resulting in the latter.' withdrawal from the 
progr ... e in Dec .. ber, 1970. The di.pute. procedure wa. invoked and the 
parties arrived at the Corporation's b.ad office in March, 1971. The aeeting 
referred the cl.~ b.ck to loc.l level with a recomaendation th.t the unions 
seek a reasonable incr •••• in e.rnings through • fora of cost reduction 
progr..... Subsequently, during May and June di.cussions were beld to 
evaluate •• ving. and in July .eriou. negoti.tion. ca.aenced. 
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In the period July to December considerable progress was made covering 
all aspects of the programme, including the consultative structure, graded 
wage structure, monitoring mechanism, the form of the interim productivity 
bonus and balancing payments, planned maintenance, and job practice changes. 
All that remained was the size of the intertm productivity payment. In 
December management offered 2p per hour - approxiaately £1.10 per week to the 
twenty one shift rota worker - which was rejected as too low. To avoid 
another deadlock management proposed setting up a working party to draw up a 
detailed implementation plan. The purpose was to identify savings which 
could be obtained quickly and thereby justify an increase in the interim 
bonus beyond 2p per hour. This tactic to bring forward savings had not been 
used with the production unions. 
The i~l .. entation plan gave priority to the lifting of certain 
restrictions, changes in job practices, reduction in the use of contractors 
and in overtime hours worked, and to the introduction of job cards for the 
planning of maintenance work. Unfortunately, the savings produced neither 
came near the £8.20 claimed by the NCCC nor satisfied the local craftsmens' 
co.adttee. Alain negotiations broke down during April and relationships 
between the parties deteriorated. At this point the probability of .. nage-
ment concluding an aareement within the framework of the Corby-Wide 
Productivity Prolr ... e seemed remote. 
The deadlock was broken by a change in .. naleaent tactics which, although 
successful in obtaini .. craft union entry to the prolr ... e, also broulht an 
end to cooperation between those unions. Craft union cooperation had 
ca..enced in the st.el works over the Malenta Book and had developed further 
under the CWPP audit. However, two year. of talking productivity with 
nothing tanaible to show for it was putting a strain on joint craft union 
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working. For example, the old sore between AnEW and EETPU over the latter's 
lack of cooperation under the Magenta Book, whilst obtaining the same 
payaents, was again opened up. Also, the UCATT(AUBTW) had nursed a dis-
content viz-a-viz the engineering unions fra. the earlier productivity phase. 
This union had not been a party to the Magenta documents resulting in a 
wage differential between them. During the stalemate the AUBTW saw an 
opportunity to conclude a deal with management and to eliminate the wage 
differential. Consequently, a quid pro quo was agreed whereby management 
obtained the entry of the mini-crafts (that is, AUBTW, BRTS and ISTC brick-
layers labourers) and in turn the unions obtained the wage increase. Thus 
the mini-craft unions entered the programae on 2nd June 1972, and accepted 
all its cardinal principles. In addition, the mini-crafts obtained the 
undertaking that if the other unions came into the programme on improved 
te~s, they could renegotiate. 
Meantiae the AUEW and EETPU had split, and their negotiations continued 
in parallel throughout the period May to September. The electricians were 
first to conclude an agreement, officially entering the programme on 30th 
July, 1972. Given the EETPU insistance upon £8.20 at 100 Performance Index, 
aanageaent proposed a two step approach to the union. The idea was to 
separate out the manpower perfor.ance aspects at the centre of the national 
disagreeaent fro. the yields, speeds and stoppages. In this way progress 
could be .. de on the aonitoring and participation elea.nts which were 
co.aon to all the unions. In other words, the £8.20 stumbling block should 
relate to manpower perforaance and expense aspects, to be dealt with 
subsequently. 
In financial te~ aanag .. ent had raised the productivity bonus fro. 
yields, speeds aDd stops fro. 2p to 4;p per hour. Subs.quently, an offer 
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of 2p per hour was made as an expense payment. This brought the productivity 
bonus up to 6~p per hour, equivalent to £3.57 per week to the twenty one 
shift rota worker. The union had now rejected the two stage approach and 
the argument centred upon the weekly bonus level. The union, of course, had 
no hope of winning anything approaching £8.20 per week, but was desperately 
trying to raise the weekly bonus payment. The eventual solution to the 
problem was to convert the entry payment - paid to others as a lump sum -
onto an hourly rate basis. This amounted to 3p per hour worked (not paid) 
which for twenty one shift workers brought the weekly payment up to £4.80. 
The extra 3p wa. to run from August to June 1973, when it would be dis-
continued. However, it wal hoped that the need to discontinue the payment 
would not arise due to increased savings fro. the programme. 
By August 1972, the AUEW was the only union remaining outside the 
programme. The union's attitude throughout the year had got increasingly 
hostile. Given that the progr ... e could not satisfy their earnings expect-
ations, the engineers attempted several tactics to break out of the CWPP. 
One tactic wa. a clatm for a .traight increa.e in tonnage bonus. The EETPU 
had lodged a similar claim. Management rejected thi. on the grounds that 
.ince the national productivity agreement of 1969, it wa. policy to consol-
idate the tonnage bonu. into the hourly rate.(26) Sub.equently, all local 
additions had to be productivity bonus payments. At the rejection of their 
cla~ the uuion int~ted their intention to i.,o.e .anction., including 
lightening strike., day. of c..,lete .afety workina, aad a ban on week-end 
working. By 14th June .anagement sought the intervention of the union's 
divisional .ecretary, who got the .anctions lifted and di.cussions continued. 
The AUEW'. second ploy was to lubait a draft efficiency propo.al. This 
wa. an orthodox productivity submis.ion containing items which the union 
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was prepared to trade off in return for the 6~p bonus. This was a more 
positive proposal which conformed to the national agreement. However, its 
philosophy differed from the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme, and further 
it offered much less to management for the 6~p than was required under the 
programme. In addition, the union made it clear that it wanted nothing to 
do with the monitoring mechanism of yields, speeds, stoppages and expense 
levels. In response management welcomed the union initiative, but insisted 
that the monitoring system and other main principles of the programme be 
included in any settlement. Clearly, management had decided to stand firm 
on the programme's essential features. 
In addition to the earnings aspect, the engineers' hostile attitude 
to the programme centred around the question of no job loss. Management 
had given the production unions a guarantee of no compulsory redundancy, but 
this was not enough to satisfy the AUEW. It was recorded above that the 
programme's proposals to give certain maintenance tasks to production 
workers caused anxiety. Other aspects of the CWPP added to this concern. 
For example, the proposal to centralise certain maintenance services on a 
site-wide basis held tmplications for job loss. Moreover, the rising rank 
and file hostility throughout the country to works closures and redundancies 
reinforced the Croby craft~ens resistance. However, within this 'anti-
progr ... e' policy of the union the emphasis varied between steel and tube 
works regarding the causes of the opposition. Both shared the earnings 
and 'no job loss' objectives but on flexibility/.ability and overtime aspects 
the tube .en took a tougher line. Also, the proposal to introduce twenty 
one shift rota working into the tube works would reduce overtime there, 
where craft ... n worked overti.e every week-end. These differences not only 
made aanag .. ent's task of securing an aareeaent more difficult, they also 
generated conflict within the District ea..ittee itself. 
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The AUEW eventually entered the programme on 23rd August, 1972. How 
did management achieve this? 
The financial settlement played an important part in securing the 
AUEW's entry. The union obtained the 6~p productivity bonus plus the £75 
lump sum paid to Nos 1 and 3 branches of ISTC. However, a problem arose 
over the funding of the £75 lump sum. Whereas the original participating 
branches and lodges were (after an argument) prepared to finance part of 
Nol and N03 branches entry, this attitude did not extend to the craft unions. 
The Corporation had financed £45 of the production branches entry but this 
left a shortfall of £30 for the crafts. This shortfall was financed by a 
neat piece of accounting footwork on manageaent's part. It was decided to 
pay the craft unions one month retrospective payment (in the AUEW's case 
for August) amounting to £20, and draw a further £10 from the "Discard Fund". 
The £20 retrospective payment was questionable enough but it was the £10 
which drew the production unions attention. Management decided that with 
the entry of the mini-crafts to the programme in June a craft Discard Fund 
should be established. The production unions did not agree with this line 
of reasoning. Manageaent had agreed with the unions that they would be 
consulted over the ter.s of craft entry in order to protect the interests 
of the production unions who .. de their agreeaents earlier. Of course, 
technically management did consult the production unions, but not on certain 
critical points which included the cash settlement and from where the cash 
would cOiae. Eventually .. nag.ent admitted their mistake in drawing frem 
the Discard Fund, and the Corporation had to finance the £10 per head per 
craftsman. But by this ti.e the AUEW had entered the progr .... e. 
However, the cash nexus 1s only part of the explanation bringing about 
the AUEW', entry. Just as t.portant was the use of tactics and external 
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pressures by management. Management's tactic to do a deal with the mini-
crafts was to divide the craft unions; this along with EETPU entry had the 
effect of isolating the AUEW. This injured the local AnEW's credibility 
in the eyes of their national officials who perceived the District Committee 
as a stubborn obstacle to the implementation of the CWPP. Therefore, the 
national officials exercised their influence on the District Committee to 
secure a settlement. Moreover, the local AUEW had become "boxed inti 
having already used the procedure agreement in early 1971, and been told to 
seek a settlement on a cost reduction basis. When this option was closed 
they attempted a straight tonnage bonus and a 'buyout' productivity 
approach. Theae avenues management successfully blocked by their commit-
ment to the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme. 
In thia aituation the engineera had only one way forward, to secure 
the best financial deal, and to save as much face as possible. On the latter 
point the union insisted that the agreement contain no reference to the 
programme, and that the central body be named the Engineering Committee and 
not a Sub eo..ittee of the CWPP. Further the union refused to have a clause 
referring to the development of a sick pay scheme as this would have 
associated it with the other trade unions. Another difference reflecting 
their more militant atand waa on the methods of rota working. On this the 
AUEW established joint regulation rights and not the consultative rights 
contained in the other agreementa. Nevertheless, on all the vital areas 
of principle the CWPP was accepted by the AUEW. 
On the 23rd of AUguat the agreement was reached, but it still required 
ratification by the ... berahip. Thia was arranged in a way that would 
have overcoae known opposition to the deal, and provides an intereating 
insight into how the union delivered the agreement. (27) On Tueaday 29th 
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August the agreed proposals were put to a mass meeting of all craftsmen 
on the site by the district secretary with a recommendation to accept. At 
Corby, up to this point, wage issues had always been put to the membership 
by their respective negotiators in the steel works, tube works, minerals, 
etc. On this occasion the negotiations covered the whole Corby site and 
the District Committee could legitimately put the issue to the whole 
membership. This decision provided a built-in majority in favour of the 
agreement as the most determined opposition came from the tube craftsmen 
who were in a minority. Some tube works stewards felt that this method 
of voting was wrong, and that the matter should have been remitted to the 
various sections. 
The strength of the opposition made itself felt, however. According 
to the local press,(28) 'As the mass meeting broke up 200 tube works 
engineering workers held a meeting of their own where they decided not to 
accept the decision of the majority'. However, the 'die was cast' and with 
the combined weight of a mass meeting, a District Committee decision, and 
the national officials of the union against them, the tube workers finally 
accepted the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme. 
Finally, before leaving the analysis of the manual workers negotiations 
a brief word concerning white collar workers is required. Initially the 
CWPP was not meant to cover white collar staff who had their own wage and 
salary structure. A part of the white collar pay structure was the annual 
salary review, and it was management's intention to compensate staff for 
any programme succel. by aeans of the salary review. However, during 1972 
and 1973, the Up.tanding Wage personnel (that iI, chargehands on semi-
staff condition.) claimed the CWPP bonus. Management refused to grant the 
claim and the chargehands imposed sanctions. These sanctions were quite 
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disruptive, as the craft chargehands had the support of their manual union 
brothers. Eventually management agreed to their inclusion only to run into 
difficulties with the Pay Board under the Counter Inflation Policy. A 
similar development took place with monthly paid staff including foremen, 
technical and clerical employees. Again management resisted the develop-
ment, the staff branches responded with sanctions, and were finally included 
in the programme. The funding of these white collar payments came out of 
the Corporation's share of the savings. 
As a result of these developments senior management were faced with 
two problems. The first was where to draw the line between those who 
contributed directly to the improvement of yields, speeds and stops and 
those who did not. The criterion of direct contribution which made sense 
conceptually was less easy to put into operation. For example, the tube 
division headquarters was located at the Corby works, with clerical 
employees doing s~ilar work to those employed directly by Corby works. 
Furthermore, a strike broke out with Nol4 branch (clerical tube works) who 
maintained that some of their members had been classified wrongly as they 
made a direct contribution to the CWPP. 
The second concerned management's judgement on this matter, influenced 
as it was by a unitary ideology. Senior management at Corby had belatedly 
accepted white collar trade union membership, but had not been converted 
to a pluralistic perspective. Corby management with a fair degree of 
paternalism saw nothing wrong with passing the fruita of the Corby-Wide 
Productivity Proar..me to their white collar employees through the integrated 
techniques of staff appraisal and salary review. Consequently, they were 
unable to understand and predict the development that white collar trade 
unionists would want the right to decide jointly with management their own 
productivity payment. 
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Part Four, Evaluation and Collapse of the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme 
The results of the programme will be analysed in terms of the criteria 
used in Part Two of this Chapter, that is, in achieving the programme's 
objectives, including the financial results; secondly the programme's achieve-
ment in advancing employee participation; and thirdly the programme's 
contribution to improving the climate of industrial relations at Corby. In 
addition, the analysis will examine the reasons surrounding the collapse of 
the programme in November 1974, some three and a half years after its 
commencement. 
Evaluation of the Programme including the Financial Results 
One important objective of the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme was 
the establishment of a comprehensive multi-union agreement. This objective 
was not achieved. In fact, the final position was four agreements covering 
manual workers and five white collar agreements. Although a common monitoring 
system was achi.ved providing uniform payments from yields, speeds, and 
stoppages, each agreement had its own separate expense monitoring arrange-
aents. AI a re.ult the coll.ctive bargaining arrangements became more central-
ised, but major divisions continued to exist and to create problems of 
diff.rential payaenta. 
Moreover, despite the separate alreements, management worked hard to 
establish a Central Corby Productivity Council, and senior aanag .. ent remained 
c~itted to this and the prolr .... •• objectiv.s throughout its .xistenc •• 
Neverthele •• , the separate alr .... nt. led to the proliferation of a large 
numb.r of parallel c~ttee. -.kina expensive demands upon the ti.e of 
.enior .. nal...ut. Thus, durina lat. 1973, and 1974, aanal ... nt a,ain tried 
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to set up a Central Council to improve and review the programme's results. 
It was envisaged that the Sub Committees, would remain in the medium term 
as negotiating bodies, but that the Area Committees would be abolished. As 
a strategy, management wanted to concentrate effort at plant level and 
improve coordination at the top. Also, it was hoped that the experience of 
joint union working would generate cooperation and in time one joint 
negotiating body. 
Management submitted their proposals to the various Sub Committees, and 
trade union reaction appeared favourable when the Trade Union Policy Group 
issued a statement in November, 1973. 
'It should be noted that the group has been active 
throughout the programse to establi.h a multi-union 
management council, and are at present still working 
to that end'. 
However, although the formal statement came out of the Policy Group, 
all was not well within it. Both within the Production-Sub Committee and 
Trade Union Policy Group the degree of conflict was now much greater than it 
bad been twelve to eighteen months earlier. This was partly due to changing 
circumstances in 1974, but also to the larger representation on the central 
bodies. In the latter ca.e, the deviant branches which bad oppo.ed the 
programse fro. out.ide were now in.ide, and for that rea.on more influential. 
It wa. said by the participants that th. climate on th •• e committees changed 
from on. of friendline •• to one of antagoni .. with much inter-personal 
bittern •••• 
For their part, the AUEW and IETPU, of whose participation management 
had been hopeful, did not attend the joint aeeting On l.t October, 1974. 
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These unions had signed the agreements against their will, and their 
hostility had continued throughout 1973 and 1974. For example, they gave 
support to the chargehands over the latter's struggle to gain entry to the 
programme. Also, they refused to implement parts of Appendix A, that is, 
they resisted the use of job cards, argued over the "no job loss" clause, 
and application of rota working. In particular, the craftsmen resisted 
changes involving the loss of jobs which reflected the increasingly militant 
attitude as it existed outside Corby. In summary, the craft unions may have 
been made to accept the agreement, but they showed no enthusiasm for it,nor 
cooperated with its implementation. 
The other major external influence upon craft attitudes was the national 
negotiations and agreement between the Corporation and the NCCC. A new 
national agreement on work measured incentives was concluded on 31st October 
1974, and furnished a payment of £0.25p per hour worked. This was the 
equivalent of £10.00 for a 40 hour week. Hence, at a time when management 
were offering to develop the programme, the eraft unions at Corby knew of a 
considerable wage increase in the pipeline. Thus, with no moral commitment 
to continue with the programme, and no economic pressure as in 1972, the 
craft unions refused to support the development. 
The other main design feature was the graded wage strueture through 
which manageaent a~ed to establish a .ore equitable, simpler and 
comprehensive pay system eovering all manual workers. AI explained 
previously (page 203) this design feature was part of the strategy to central-
ise the collective bargaining arrana .. ents. However, this desian proved 
u.possible to aehieve due largely to diff.rences in wage structure between 
production and aaintenance personnel, and to the craft union attitude to 
the proar..... AI a result, .. nag .. ent pushed ahead and won union acceptance 
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to a nineteen grade structure for production workers only. Another aspect 
of the wage structure change was to achieve a uniform 80/20 percent division 
in shift earnings. The purpose here being to reduce the considerable number 
of wage rate., and to provide greater earnings stability. This principle 
was agreed at central level, but negotiations were conducted at departmental 
level. Unfortunately, this objective was not achieved either, and in the 
steel works the number of bonus rates actually increased from 856 prior 
to the agreement to 974 afterwards. Also, the 80/20 percent split was never 
achieved in many areas, and divisions ranged from 67~ time/32~ bonus to 85 
time and 15% bonus. This outcome was partly the result of the multiplicity 
of deparcaental negotiations, and partly due to negotiations in 1971/72 being 
based upon 1970 datum year earnings. Generally, outputs for most plants 
were lower in 1971 than in 1970. In such circumstance. some groups benefit 
from the adjus~ent, whereas other. regarded the propo.al. al reducing their 
bonus potential. 
However, the ,reatest factor contributing to the failure of the 
production graded wale structure was the inability of the parties to resolve 
the wale anomalies probl... It will be recalled that under the graded 
structure, existing earnings had been reduced to plain shift earnings at 
40 hours, and then jobs slotted into the appropriate Irade. Of course, this 
method carried forward existiue wale anomalies into the Iraded structure. 
Por in.tance, the technique did nothing to resolve the dis.atisfaction 
ari.ina over the fact that a recruit into a hieber payina deparaaent would 
obtain a higher gradiue than a loueer .erviue employee, often doin, a more 
skilled job, in a lower payine deparbaent. Moreover, this discontent was 
increa.ed with the publication of the graded .tructure. In a steel works 
accurate infor.ation on specific job. i. very t.perfect owiue to the 
fras-ented collective bar,ainine arrangeaent.. However, with the centralised 
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structure and the provision of accurate information the number of alleged 
anomalies was much greater than either unions or management envisaged. 
In response to the anomalies outcry, a joint working party was set up 
(early 1973), which formulated a definition of anomalies and a strategy for 
dealing with them. The strategy was simply to invite the branches to submit 
alleged wage anomalies for Grades 1 to 5, deal with these, and then progress 
to Grades 6 to 10 and so on. In the event it was soon discovered that the 
attempt to sort out anomalies, of an across site nature, by a rough job 
comparison aethod vas too difficult. Increasingly, the parties came to 
realise that nothing short of a job evaluation scheme based upon a detailed 
investigation of job contents was required. Unfortunately, certain external 
constraints prevented the parties frOB adopting this solution. First, the 
Corporation announced its official blessing upon the Urwick Orr profile 
aethod of job evaluation, and would not allow Corby management to deviate. 
Second, the Corporation and the unions had conducted a pilot study at the 
Normandy Park Works, Scunthorpe, the results of which had been rejected by 
the NUBF. Hence, the NUBF at Corby would not cooperate with this method, 
and no progress could be .. de in this direction. 
Faced with these external constraints, local aanac .. ent proposed an 
evaluation .. thod ba.ed upon the zoning of jobs into croups of broad 
.t.ilarity. The idea vas to aaree crade .pan. for each lone and compare 
alleced anoaalies against acreed bencbaark jobs. Sa.. procres. vas .. de in 
establishina beDcbaark., and in the IODine of the more homoceneous croups 
acros. the Corby .ite. Unfortunately, difficultie. aro.e with the more 
.killed production job., and progre •• c .. e to a halt. Therefore, by early 
1974, both partie. v.r • .ovina off •• tabli.hed ca..on cround and taking 
divergent path.. Th. unions continued to stick to a strategy of • 
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qualitative job evaluation method, and to tackle the outstanding anomalies. 
On the other hand, management took the view that any method short of a 
comprehensive quantitative method was simply solving one anomaly to create 
others. Also, management were very conscious of the costs involved in 
the unions' proposals, and were not prepared to move without an attempt to 
establish the costs and the benefits to be derived. Consequently, management 
dragged their feet, relationships between the parties deteriorated, and the 
wage structure became frozen. 
Consideration must now be given to the programme's success in terms of 
financial performance. At the commencement of the programme management 
envisaged a £2 reduction in the cost per tonne despatched from the works. 
This cost reduction to be achieved by increased productivity, aavings on 
expense items, and by a reduction in the work force. In return, it was 
estimated and made known to the unions that the employees would obtain a 
productivity bonus of approximately £4.20 per week. This was calculated on 
the basis of a 50~ division between the Corporation and the employees. 
During the first year of operation the programme provided a balance to 
reduce the product cost per tonne by £0.60. In the second period (April to 
March, 1973) the balance deteriorated even further providing an allowance of 
£0.30 per tonne for cost reduction. This balance refers to the savings left 
to the Corporation after the productivity and introductory payaenta had been 
made to the ellployees. These introductory pa,.ents were "one off", however, 
and fell markedly durina the period April to Karch, 1974. In fact, at the 
time it was est~ted that if savinas could be sustained at the level of 
the previous period, then the Corporation's share would provide a balance to 
reduce cost per tonne by £1.30. In effect the six months to October produced 
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an equivalent surplus of £1.5 million, but then the programme generated a 
deficit of £147,320 in the second six months. This large deterioration in 
the balance was due to a fall in productivity in the period October to March 
1974, and also because the bonus was sustained at 6.5p per hour. 
Consequently, the cost reduction objective of £2 per tonne was never achieved 
under the programme. The actual savings generated and measured under the 
programme are shown in the table for the monitored six months periods. 
Table 6.2 
Financial Savings in the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme 
by Type of Saving (£), 1971-74 
Yields, Speeds Expenses Total 
and Stops 
April-Sept. , 1971 £197,727 £159,780 £357,507 
Oct-March, 1972 £551,515 (£ 78,379) £433,136 
April-Sept. , 1972 £445,502 £307,030 £749,532 
Oct.-March, 1973 £926,921 £538,239 £1,465,157 
April-Sept. , 1973 £716,102 £774,832 £1,490,934 
Oct.-March, 1974 (£232,601) (£ 19,719) (£252,320) 
April-Sept. , 1974 £ 34,624 £447,841 £482,465 
Total £2,639,792 £2,129,624 £4,726,411 
source: BSC, Corby Works 
The table reveals that the monitored savings totalled £4.7 millions, 
rising proaressively fro. April, 1971 to September, 1973 after which a 
deterioration set in. Aa mentioned above the deterioration was due to the 
decline in works productivity and to the Corporation sustaining the bonus 
during this period. In more detail, the productivity decline was the direct 
result of the fuel crisis associated with the coal miners strike of the 
period. This strike caused the use of unsuitable coking coal in the blast-
furnaces. Hence, by the ~ddle of 1974, Nos 1 and 2 blastfurnaces had 
chilled hearths, No3 was out of production for a rebuild, and N04 was givina 
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problems. Consequently, iron output fell to around 4,000 tonnes per week 
which compared with 21,000 in the previous year. These blastfumace 
problems in turn affected the rest of the work flow, and the strip mill 
output came down from 830,655 tonnes per week in 1973, to 414,772 per week 
in 1974. Of course, management tried to off-set this by importing steel 
into Corby, but the programme had suffered a major blow. In terms of 
monitored results the programme moved back into the black during the period 
April to September; however, the deficit continued to build up. 
~ mentioned previously the productivity payment of 6.5p was sustained 
during this troubled period and in fact, was raised to 6.96p per hour. This 
increase came out of a formula for payment purposes proposed by management 
and agreed with the trade unions. The formula paid half the difference 
between the old and new productivity rate, subject to a ~ 1.5p range, in 
any six month period. Management in introducing the formula had two 
objectives in mind. Fir.tly, the formula provided an automatic mechanism 
for adju.ting the six monthly payment, and this would reduce if not eliminate 
negotiations. Secondly, management had envisaged difficulties in negotiating 
a reduction in the productivity bonus and felt that the formula would 
facilitate lucb an eventuality. 
Aa a relult by March 1974, the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme after 
three year. of operation had generated .aving. of £4,234,946 million, but 
bad paid out £4,527,922 leaving a deficit of £283,976. Furthermore, the 
situation continued to deteriorate during April to September, 1974. To 
sustain the productivity pa,..nt and to avoid deficit the programme needed 
to earn around £800,000; in fact, only £482,465 wa •• aved. Therefore, the 
union. achieved the larler .hare of the .avingl; that i., more than the 50t 
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initially agreed. In fact, just prior to the financial deficits, the 
unions share was running at 71% after one year, 81% after year two, and 
79% by September 1973. These figures appear to indicate that the unions 
had done well out of the programme. 
However, it will be recalled that the audit phase of the programme 
had furnished an estimate of £4.20 per week for each worker after three 
years of participation. The next table pDovides some information on how 
near the programme came to fulfilling this aim. 
Table 6.3 
Bonus Earnings under the CWPP, 1974 
Weekly Bonus Payment, 1974* Total Overall Payment, 1971-74 
Production Worker,40 hours (paid~ £2.80 Production Worker £520 
" " ,21 shifts(paid £3.85 per man 
Craftsmen, 48 hours (paid) £3.36 Craftsmen £390 per man 
(includes introductory 
payment) 
source: BSC, Corby Works 
Thus the evidence supports the view that the programme not only failed 
to meet management's financial target of £2 per tonne cost reduction, but 
also the earnings target for the employees involved. In other words, the 
inability to achieve the cost reduction objective was not simply because 
the unions obtained all the savings - they also had suffered a short fall. 
Of course, the programme might have failed to lecure these financial 
objectives because it did not realise a sufficient increase in productivity. 
On this question there was impressionistic evidence that the programme had 
encountered much resistance; for example, branch and craft union opposition 
*lhese calculations are based upon 7p per hour and increased by the 
appropriate shift multiplier to obtain the weekly paid payment as 
opposed to the hours worked payment. 
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in 1971-72, the opposition of some middle managers, and the difficulties 
with the chargehands and foremen in 1972-73. Moreover, the interview 
programme revealed that the audit findings, although discussed, were often 
not implemented. One audit concerning blastfurnacemen (front side crew) 
revealed a 50% manpower utilisation and proposed a reduction of 25% in 
manning, but the blastfurnacemen refused to accept such a reduction. This 
large manpower reduction would have meant demotion to the labouring pool 
and the possible transfer of others to another part of the works. Also, 
with the job loss entailed the opportunity for further promotion within 
the same occupational group would have been small. Thus resistance developed 
despite the fact that it was on manning reductions that the programme offered 
its strongest incentive, that is, branches could retain up to 30% of the 
savings. Hence, the CWPP which guaranteed no redundancy, and contained a 
productivity bonus aimed to encourage labour mobility and flexibility across 
the works had again rather limited success. Such resistance to the transfer 
of workers has been noted in the literature by Dan Gowler.(29) Gowler has 
shown that under measured day work payment, employees resisted transfer to 
other work for economic and cultural reasons. 
The next table furnishes statistical evidence on labour productivity. 
The year 1974 has been excluded owing to the abnormal conditions prevailing 
in that period. 
Table 6.4 
Manning, Output and Productivity at Corby, 1966-73 
Year Manning Strip Kill. Output per 
( .. nual workers) Ou tpu t, Tonne. Man, Tonnes 
1966 8,629 729,984 83.9 
1967 8,543 723,497 84.7 
1968 8,521 754,982 88.6 
1969 8,500 771,571 90.7 
1970 8,897 768,477 86.4 
1971 8,714 720,378 82.7 
1972 8,965 742,266 82.7 
1973 8,441 830,655 98.4 
source I BSe, Corby Works 
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Output per man fluctuates from year to year due to different levels 
of activity at the works. Consequently, the years 1967 to 1969, and 1971 
to 1973, represent the best periods from before and during the programme, 
and also take account of the business cycle for comparison. These average 
productivity performances are revealed in the next table. 
Table 6.5 
Manning, Output and Productivity before and during the 
Corby-Wide Productivity Programme. 
Years Manning Output Productivity 
1967-69 8,521 750,016 88 tonnes per 
1971-73 8,707 764,433 88 " " 
source: BSC Corby Works 
man 
" 
The calculations show that output per man remained at 88 tonnes in 
both periods. Thus, the programme appears to have had little impact upon 
productivity, except that 1973 offers ground for optimism. In 1973, output 
rose as manning declined providing a 98.4 tonnes per man - a good eight 
percentage points above the previous peak year of 1969. Moreover, 1973 
was the programme's best year with all manual workers participating and 
the blastfurnace trouble not yet upon it. However, upon further investi-
gation it would appear that not all this increase in productivity was due 
to the programme. One factor contributing to the riae in labour product-
ivity during 1973, was labour turnover. The relevant turnover figures 
are as follows for the whole Corby Works:-
1971,20.11.; 1972, 16.51.; 1973, 26.41.; 1974, 27.41. 
During 1972, the works labour force rose to 8,965 largely as a result 
of the fall in turnover compared to 1971. This had the effect of keeping 
the labour productivity figure for 1972 down to 82.7 tonnes per man.(30) 
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Then, during 1973, and 1974, the upswing of the business cycle, caused 
employment prospects elsewhere to improve and the turnover figures at Corby 
jumped to 26.4% and 27.4% respectively. Thus, a considerable proportion 
(estimated at 20%) of the increase in labour productivity at Corby was 
attributal to voluntary turnover and not to direct manpower reductions under 
the programme. Other less quantitative evidence existed to show that all 
was not well with the programme during 1973. The Trade Union Policy Group 
expressed concern and emergency joint management/union meetings were held 
to discuss the acute turnover problem. These actions unfortunately revealed 
an attitude of mind of defending the status quo and not in making use of the 
opportunity which the turnover provided. All this happened not withstandin.g 
the fact that the audit forecast required manpower reductions of 22% and 14% 
for maintenance and production workers respectively. Thus, the programme 
was achieving some measure of improvement during 1972 and 1973, but not the 
productivity increases which management thought possible at the outset. 
Yet another test of productivity under the programme relates to the 
amount of overtime worked. It was establisped above that during 1973, the 
labour force reduced in size at Corby, and output per man increased. However, 
this might be explained by an increase in the number of overtime hours worked. 
Therefore, the next table shows a comparison between the years 1971, and1973, 
in re.pect of both manpower reduction. and overtime hours worked. The tube 
works, where the normal week was 17 shifts, provides the best test. 
Table 6.6 
Tube Works: Manning and OVertime, 1971 and 1973 
Manniq t Chaqe Overtime Hours % Change 
per man 
1971 3,916 5.5 
1973 3,863 -3.99 8.1 +47.2 
source: Bse Corby Work. 
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According to this measure the Corby programme's results do not come 
out so favourably. Thus, again part of the significant increase in output 
per man hour for 1973, would appear to be due to the increase in the number 
of overtime hours worked. The undernoted calculation attempts to quantify 
the contribution of the additional overtime hours.* Thus of the original 
19t increase in output (1971 to 1973) approximately 7% was due to the 
increase in overtime hours worked. This factor added to that of the labour 
turnover make the 1973, productivity figure less spectacular, although still 
positive at around 9%. 
Therefore, in conclusion the CWPP obtained only partial success in 
achieving changes affecting collective bargaining arrangements, the wage 
structure, and the trade union and management organisations. On the cost 
reduction side, the generation of £4.7 millions in saving. must be considered 
a major contribution. Unfortunately, the programme ended financially bank-
rupt, as it had to payout more to the employees than it had earned. Moreover, 
even with the unions obtaining the lion's share of the savings the programme 
was unable to meet the earnings target that was forecast during the early 
audit phase. In the end according to this analysis the programme failed 
to generate sufficient savings, because it did not achieve a sufficient 
increase in productivity. However, notwithstanding this statement, positive 
increases in productivity were achieved. 
* Tube Work.,1971 3916 men x 38 hours x 50 weeks • 71440,400, plus 1,090,123 overtime hours • 8,530,523 
720,378 output • 0.08 tODDes per hour 
8,530,523 hours 
Tube Work., 1973 3863 .en x 38 hours x 50 weeks • 7,339,700 plus 
1,567,079 overti.e hours • 8,906,779 
830,655 output • 0.09 tonnes per hour 
8,906,779 hours 
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Employee Participation and Communications within the Programme 
The other major objective of the programme which must be assessed is 
its success in improving employee participation and the associated communi-
cations system. Employee participation was not an original objective of 
the programme, but emerged later as a means of achieving the primary aims 
of efficiency and stability in the industrial relations system. Participation 
had been encouraged through the implementation structure which included 
Plant and Area Groups, Study Groups, trade union report back facilities and 
the joint publications group. Of course, the programme's success in these 
terml depended upon the criteria to be used. For example, if judged purely 
on the contribution made i~ securing increases in productivity and financial 
savings, already discussed, then the increased employee participation had 
only limited success. However, other criteria are available including the 
results of an employee communication survey held early in 1974 to mealure 
employee understanding of the programme; and absenteeism and labour turnover 
figures can also be used as indicators of employee satisfaction.(31) 
A major problem with a programme such al the Corby one il its sheer 
compl~ity and remoteness from the average shop floor employee. Complexity 
develops with the need to ensure equity of treabaent in the measurement of 
monitored savings. Due to changes in product mix the materials usage 
efficiency formula (32) had to be devised. Other complexities arose out of 
changes in the nature and eost of input .. terials, and in taking account of 
technological innovations. On the other hand, the employees found it 
difficult to identify with the progr ... e, partly because of its complexity, 
but also because of the progr ... e's t.aense size and range. For example, 
blastfurnac ... n could identify with the traditional tonnage bonus based 
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upon furnace output, but found it difficult to feel commibnent to a 
productivity bonus whose value depended partly upon the efforts of tube 
workers. 
Another cause of union discontent concerning complexity arose over the 
monitored figures themselves. The Corporation had trained certain leading 
lay union officials in the details of the accounting system. Nevertheless, 
on several occasions the results were challenged by the union and found to 
be WTong. Management explained these difficulties to their own satisfaction 
as due to inexperience in the staff and to inadequacies in the accounting 
procedures. Also, a new standard costing system was introduced in April 
1974, again overloading the accountants. However, from a trade union stance 
the figures appeared unreliable, and to be the subject of bargaining 
pressures. Thus arguments over aonitored results tended to create mis-
understanding and suspicion between the parties. One leading branch official 
put the matter this way, 'In theory the unions have access to the figures, 
but in practice manageaent control them'. 
Thus arguments about the programme's complexity and remoteness, plus a 
management belief that difficulties experienced in implementing the agree-
aents were due to lack of understanding, led to the promotion of a 
communications survey. This survey covered shop floor employees and 
supervisor., and its results are now discussed in summary form. A sample 
population of 500 was used of which nearly 300 persons responded. Section 
One of the questionnaire concerned the prolr ... e's objectives and an analysis 
of the results revealed a good understanding of these. In particular, 
respondents identified the programme with the long term future of steel 
making at Corby. Not too surpr1sincly, the employees in the steel works 
had a greater appreciation of this point than those in the tube works. 
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For instance, in steel making the ranking value was 5.6 compared to 4.34 
in tubes.(33) 
Section Two dealt with the principles of the payment system which were 
again understood well by the participants. On the other hand, SectiJn Three 
which contained the mechanics of the monitoring system was not well under-
stood. In this case only 13% of the sample gave the correct response to 
all three questions, and 51% to two or more questions. Section Four concerned 
the implementation structure including the purpose and functions of the 
various committees. Again, this was well understood, and in fact, the 
survey revealed that 22% had directly participated in the progranme's study 
groups. 
Section Five of the survey covered the impact and importance of the 
various sources of information about the programme. From the results the 
news sheets and posters were shown to have had a significant impact. More-
over, the survey interestingly revealed the trade unions to be a major 
channel of communication, and that little confidence was placed in manage-
ment as a source of information. Further, these findings applied not only 
to manual workers but also to supervisors. 
Therefore, the survey showed both manual workers and supervisors to have a 
aood leneral appreciation of the proaramae'. operation. However, this was 
not proof that the employees had a detailed grasp of the programme. In 
particular, the monitoring system and calculation of the productivity bonus 
were poorly understood. In other words, respondents understood the 
principle that if productivity went up or down, then so also did the bonus. 
However, the operation of this principle was blurred by a multiplicity of 
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factors including interim productivity ,ayments, entry payments, discard 
funds, material usage efficiency, and so on. Whether this lack of under-
standing of the programme's detail could be considered important for employee 
motivation was another matter. Certainly, management did not rely upon 
individual motivation in their initial strategy. This strategy placed 
emphasis upon works implementations plans to promote productivity, and the 
training of leading union officials to dispell misunderstanding and win 
employee commitment. 
In addition, the survey revealed a gap or break in line management's 
communications. This was a major tactical error on the part of the pro-
gramme's designers. It arose due to the reliance placed by senior manage-
ment upon the trade unions as a channel of communication. Of course, union 
cooperation and involvement was essential, but this was no excuse for the 
failure to inform and involve supervisors and lower middle management. The 
explanation for this error of judgement had much to do with management's 
ideology. As shown previously, both with regard to white collar trade 
union recognition and this groups entry to the programme, managementUs 
judgement was influenced by their unitary value system. In other words, 
the assumption was that these staff groups could be relied upon to abide 
by the decisions of their superiors, and there was no need to make special 
provision for them. However, as a result of the survey, management admitted 
their mistake, and introduced early in 1974, a training programme for 
supervisors. 
Therefore, a major question arising out of the Corby experience concerns 
whether or not such a progr ... e which was not clearly understood by the 
large majority of the participants can win their commitment to its 
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objectives? Certainly advocates of the similar Scanlon Plan insist that 
'employees must understand the results and have complete confidence in 
the method of measurement employed'. (34) 
The second approach to measuring the success of employee participation 
at Corby relates participation to the indices of absenteeism and labour 
turnover. Certain human relations writers referred to previously (page 201 ) 
argue that individual employees have a need to grow psychologically, and 
are prevented from doing so by modern bureaucratic organisation structures. 
These writers prescribe the adoption of participative structures associated 
with a supportive management style so that the employees can fulfill their 
higher psychological needs. Given this development employees will find 
job satisfaction, be more highly motivated, and committed to the organis-
ations objectives. However, the concepts of democratic and authoritarian 
management styles are difficult to operationalise and test in this context. 
Therefore, writers faced with this problem, such as Robert Gray in his 
study of the Scanlon Plan at Linwood, have used labour turnover as a 
measure. This mea.ure in addition to absenteeism, is applied to the Corbf 
study. 
The statistical evidence on absenteeism is contained in table seven. 
Table 6.7 
Man Shifts lost at Corby through Absenteeism, 1969-74 
Year Ending Iron and Tube Total 
December Steel Works Works 
1969 95,238 
-
-1970 92,860 83,364 176,224 
Corby-Wide Productivity Progr.mme 
1971 76,661 68,538 145,198 
1972 89,612 72,744 162,365 
1973 85,524 77,995 163,519 
1974 78,385 51,889 130,274 
source: BSC, Corby Works 
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The evidence shows a decline in absenteeism in all three columns. If 
absenteeism in the year 1970, is compared with the average for 1971-73, 
then the decline is approximately 16%. The key factors which might affect 
absenteeism, other than the programme itself are the level of output and 
the amount of overtime worked. For high output periods necessitate extra 
overtime working, which encourages high absenteeism as workers either get 
more fatigued or alternatively can exercise choice between work and leisure 
due to the higher earnings. However, at Corby output and overtime rose and 
absenteeism fell, as the next table shows. 
Table 6.8 
Output, Overt~e and Absenteeism at Corby, 1970 and 1973 
Year Strip Mill 7. Overtime 7- Absenteeism % 
Output Change Hours Change Man Shifts Change 
Lost 
1970 768,477 
-
1,090,123 
-
176,224 
-1973 830,655 ~7. 1,567,079 +437. 163,510 -7% 
source: BSC, Corby Works 
Therefore, in conclusion the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme can be 
said to have reduced the number of man shifts lost due to absenteeism, and 
that this may have been due to the extension of employee participation 
provided by the programme. 
Labour turnover was the other index found to provide a measure of work 
satisfaction under a participative programme. However, it has already been 
established above that turnover within an organisation was influenced by 
conditions in the local labour market and that this must be taken into 
account. Consequently table nine furnishes information on earnings at 
Corby before and during the programme, local unemployment rates, as well as 
turnover figures. 
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Table 6.9 
Earnings, Unemployment and Labour Turnover at Corby, 1969-73 
Year Earnings Unemployment Labour 
Craftsmen 1st Vesselmen East Mid Corby Turnover 
1969 £,28.57 £,27.88 
-
542 32.97. 
1970 £.30.60 £.30.84 31,900 610 25.77. 
Corby-Wide Productivity Programme 
1972 £.37.21 I £.37.25 I 43,000 852 16.57. 1973 £.45.10 £,46.09 29,800 541 27.47. 
source: BSC, Corby Works 
These figures show that under the CWPP earnings rose by 34.5~ (that 
is, averaging years 1972-73), unemployment in Corby town was up 14~. and 
turnover fell by 19.3~. Moreover, if the peak output years of 1969 and 
1973 are taken, the level of unemployment in the town was the same in both 
years (that is, 542 and 541 respectively), but the turnover figures are 
32.9t in 1969 and 27.4~ in 1973 respectively, decidedly less under the 
programme. Thus, when allowances have been made for changes in the level 
of employment in the local labour market the programme contributed to a 
reduction in the turnover figures. 
Of course, the criticism could be raised that the Corby-Wide Product-
ivity Programme improved absenteeism and labour turnover not by changing 
management's style from one of authoritarianism to participation, but by 
substituting a laissez-faire style. In the literature the three management 
styles of autocratic, democratic and laissez-faire have been identified 
in the work of Kurt Lewin and others.(35) However, at Corby the evidence 
of the communications survey clearly revealed a high degree of interest 
and involvement on the part of rank and file employees and a more thorough 
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understanding of the works operating problems on the part of lay union 
officials. 
On earnings, the increase of 34.5% (1970 to the average of 1972-73) 
seems creditable, but compares with a 32% increase for all manufacturing 
in the same period. Thus, the increase in earnings does not appear to 
have been a major factor reducing labour turnover. This influence will 
be considered subsequently when dealing with the programme's collapse. 
On the basis of this evidence, it would appear that employee partici-
pation made some contribution to achieving the programme's main objectives. 
The evidence is most strong when considering the indices of absenteeism 
and labour turnover. Moreover, the turnover aspect would seem to accord 
with R Gray's finding that a change in leadership style towards partici-
pation helped reduce turnover at Linwood. (36) Nevertheless, the 
communications survey revealed certain limitations and problems with the 
programme's participative aspects, and to these attention will be given 
later. Moreover, as shall be seen, participative programmes based upon 
human relations theory are no substitute for collective bargaining as a 
means of achieving change in industrial relations. For such programmes 
encourage management to seek integrative solutions to problems where none 
are to be had, and thereby to give insufficient attention to conflict over 
the distribution of resources. Meantime, consideration must be given to 
the wider question of improvement or otherwise of the industrial relations 
cl~te under the programae. 
The Clt.ate of Industrial Relation. under the Pro&ra.me 
Central to the a.sessment of the works industrial relations climate 
.as the degree of conflict between the parties. This requires an 
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evaluation of the statistical evidence, opinions of the participants, and 
an examination of the conflict resolving procedures. 
Regarding the statistical evidence, Corby was not a fruitful source of 
strike statistics, although some evidence did exist compared with the 
position prior to 1970. Consequently, greater reliance must be placed upon 
other measures of unorganised conflict. organised conflict meaning that 
range of collective behaviour including go slows, embargoes, overtime 
restrictions, etc., as well as strikes. Unorganised conflict means a range 
of individual behaviour including sickness, absenteeism and labour turnover. 
In the table below these measures are illustrated with a comparison between 
the years before and during the programme. 
Table 6.10 
Organised and Unorganised Conflict at Corby,1969-73 
Year Corby Corby Corby Corby(37) 
Labour Absenteeism Sickness Strikes 
Turnover Days Lost Days Lost Days Lost 
1969 32.91. 
- . - -
1970 25.77. 176,224 84,386 121,287 
Corby-Wide Produc ti vi ty Programme 
1971 20.11. 145,198 72,972 5,897 
1972 16.51. 162,365 85,422 45,540 
1973 27.41. 163,519 82,068 2,874 
source: BSC, Corby Works and DE Gazette 
All four Corby indices reveal an ~rovement under the programme 
compared with the years immediately before. Furthermore, in terms of work-
ing day. lOlt due 'to industrial diaputel the improved record at Corby runs 
counter to the situation revealed in iron and steel (average 1969-70, 
436,000 and 1971-73, 672,000 workiua days lost) and for the whole of the 
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United Kingdom (average 1969-70 8.8 million and 1971-73, 14.9 million 
working days lost). Again, the improvement in all these indices adds 
support to the previous sections evaluation of communications and employee 
participation under the programme. 
The statistical evidence bore out the opinions of many managers and 
union officials interviewed. A typical response of such people was, 'the 
CWPP may not have improved productivity significantly, but it did provide 
three years of relative peace'. 
The evaluation of the disputes procedure is justified on the ground 
that an efficient procedure regarded as fair will help to solve problems 
which otherwise might reach serious proportions. During the programme 
three disputes procedures were in being at Corby, that is, the Advisory 
Panel, the Production Protection Procedure both rising directly out of the 
programme, and the industry's traditional disputes procedure. In addition, 
issues were also discussed at Plant, Area and Works levels Committees. 
The production protection procedure was informal and considered by both 
parties to have made a useful contribution. On the other hand, the role of 
the Advisory Panel, was more controversial. In terms of efficiency, six 
cases were submitted to it, of which three of the panel's recommendations 
were accepted by the parties, and two rejected by management. A central 
probl .. revolved around the panel's powers or lack of thea. As mentioned 
previously the panel, unlike a Neutral Committee had no authority to make 
its decisions binding upon the parties. Therefore, although quicker than 
the Neutral eo..ittee, and .anDed by persons who knew the programme well, 
the defeated party could always reject its recommendation. Moreover, the 
unions increasiusly felt that to use the Advisory Panel prejudiced their 
252. 
case if they subsequently decided to take the issue to a Neutral Committee. 
Also, the Confederation's divisional officer was reluctant to invoke the 
industry's procedure on a case already heard by the Advisory Panel. Thus, 
the Advisory Panel resulted in strained relationships between the branches 
and the official union. The other problem concerned lay union panel members 
who might be a party to a panel recommendation made against the interest of 
their fellow trade unionists. Moreover, this role conflict was made more 
difficult by the fact that the employee panelists lived and worked in the 
local community. Such psychological pressures did not apply to Neutral 
Committee union representatives who came from outside of the town or 
district. Thus, the "scape-goat mechanism" whereby a local union official 
could accept an adver.e decision and blame outsider. was denied to the 
participants. In fact, this was the main argument against giving the panel 
authority to make binding decisions. Therefore, the Advisory Panel, although 
efficient with a 50t success rate, was not a long term solution, and its 
unpopularity increa.ed with t~e. 
Sub.equently, given these probl ... , national discu.sions were 
commenced to alter the Neutral CoBaittee procedure a. it applied to Corby 
Works. In particular, the di.cussion. tried to overcome the problem 
whereby Neutral eo..ittee members from outside Corby did not understand the 
implications of their decisions for the programme. In the case of ISTC a 
Corby Settleaent Committee vas agreed. This consi.ted of five persons 
includinc an independent chairman fro. outaide the industry, but vith 
knowledge of it. Al.o, the chairman va. given the power of a ca.ting vote. 
In addition, the eo..ittee va. to haYe the a •• istance of two assessors, 
one each from .. nag ... nt and union., who po ••••• ed detailed knowledge 
of the progr ... e. Thi • .-ounted to an interestina innovation to the 
I 
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industry's traditional disputes procedure at this level, and arose out of 
the CWPP. Unfortunately, the Committee never got into action with the 
collapse of the programme towards the end of 1974. 
The main inefficiency, and therefore criticism, levelled at management 
was the absence of clear procedural planning at the commencement of the 
programme. Confusion arose over which channel should be used to process a 
particular type of issue. For example, some plant managers would refuse to 
discuss industrial relations issues at Plant Committee, whereas others would. 
Consequently, the parties exercised a choice regarding the route through 
which to pursue a claim, which more often reflected their sectional interests 
and not those of the agreement as a whole. However, this procedural differ-
entiation problem was partly due to the way the Corby-Wide Productivity 
Progr ... e was developed. As mentioned previously, it was never a clear cut 
blue print designed in all detail. at the outset, and much of what became 
the programme developed from the interactions of the parties and from 
changing circuastances. Another reason for management's failure to plan the 
procedural aspects clearly was the constraint of the external procedure, and 
the right of each branch to have acce.s to it. Finally, the emphasis in 
the progr .... upon coop.ration and int.gration and not upon conflict 
resolution probably had loae effect on .. nageRent's failure to desiln 
procedur •• clearly. 
In conclusion, the clt.ate of industrial relations improved at Corby 
during the period of the progr .... - at least a ••• asured by the statistical 
evid.nce given above. Howev.r, all vas not coop.ration and in many instances 
groups r.fused to accept changes in working practices, and .everal retained 
a negative or at least a sectional attitude towards technological change. 
• 
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Moreover, if the improvement in productivity was built into the criteria 
of good industrial relations, then the picture gets even more clouded. On 
the balance of the evidence, the CWPP did improve the degree of industrial 
peace, but at a cost to the Corporation. The fact that the programme was 
in considerable debt has been established, and with that, attention can now 
be given to its final collapse. 
The Collapse of the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme 
The Corby-Wide Productivity Progr ... e was formally wound up at a joint 
meetine on 15th April 1975, with an agreed termination date of 30th November, 
1974. The official reason for the termination was due to the national crafts-
mens' aaree.ent of DeceDber, 1974. This agreeDent gave the craftsmen £10 
for acceptance of work aeasurad incentives, £5 of which could be paid as a 
lead in payaent. Thus, the progr .... which had taken three y.ars to achieve 
a pay.ent of £3.80 was suddenly overshadowed by this large increase.(38) 
In addition, the national agreement (clause two) consolidated into the hourly 
rate local payaents, including productivity payaents. Given the debt that 
the programme bad incurred, .. nag .. ent took the opportunity provided by the 
national agreeaent to terminate the programme. They argued that such an 
aaree.ent made the progr ... e redundant. 
The uniona for their part accepted the termination as they believed it 
to be in th.ir econa.ic intere.ts to do so. Management included in the 
teradnation offer, the con.olidation of the 6.96p p.r hour into the t~. 
rates, aDd agr •• d to wipe out th. progr ... e·s accu.ulated debts. Of course, 
given the prolr .... •• d.ficit th. uniona knew that to continue must 
ineTitably .. an a reduction in the productivity bonu.. Th.refore, the offer 
of con.olidation wa. attractive to the union., and the te~nation wa • 
.utually agre.d. 
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However, a deeper analysis reveals that the programme's collapse was 
the result of adverse changes in the external environment which undermined 
the design of the programme, and gave to those persons who had always 
opposed it greater influence to bring it down. These external changes had 
an important influence in reducing productivity and in allowing bonus earnings 
to fall behind the expectations of the participants. This in turn reduced 
morale and increased tension between the supporters and opponents of the 
programme. 
Under the programme wages at Corby compared favourably with those in 
other sectors up to 1973, as the next table shows. 
Table 6.1l 
Earnings at Corby and other Industrial Sectors, 1970-73 (1970-100) 
Year Corby Metal Manuf. Mech Eng. Shipb1d. All Manuf. 
1970 100 100 100 100 100 
1971 
-
109.2 112.1 115.7 114.6 
1972 115.6 120.1 125.2 122.7 128.8 
1973 143.1 144.0 142.0 139.2 143.3 
source: BSC, Corby Works and DE Gazette 
The table reve.l. Corby as keeping pace with earnings in metal manu-
facture ••• chanical engineering, and better than in shipbuilding. In addition, 
the table shows that after a poor year in 1972 Corby earnings leaped forward 
to catch up with the other sectors by 1973. Of course. 1973 w •• the year 
that the progr .... was fully operational with all the branches and the 
craft unionl participating. Moreover, a comparison with the Ravenscraig 
works reveals that the CWPP helped to close the gap between the two. This 
ca.parison could have b.en liiDificant, as a larae proportion of the Corby 
work force have haily links with Motherwell, where Ravenscraig is located. 
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Table 6.12 
Comparison of Earnings between Corby and Ravenscraig, 1970-73 
Corby Ravenscraig 
March March '.Change March March '7.Change 
1970 1973 1970 1973 
1st Vesselman,BOS £30.84 £46.09 +49.3 £45.47 £56.13 +22.8 
Keeper,Blastfce £32.60 £44.38 +35.8 £39.28 £46.13 +17.3 
Rollerman, Kills £41.45 £56.69 +36.7 £51.24 £61.96 +20.8 
Labourer, Blastfce £21.21 £31.96 +50.4 £20.04 £27.25 +35.5 
Craftsmen(21 shifts) £30.60 £45.10 +47.3 £32.59 £44.67 +36.9 
Average £31.34 £44.84 +43.1 £37.63 £47.23 +26.2 
Source: BSC, Corby Works and Ravenscraig Works 
However, if this earnings comparison is extended to 1974, a different 
picture emerges. During 1974, earnings at Corby remained at a standstill, 
at a time when large wage advances were made elsewhere. For instance, the 
indices for metal manufacture and the all manufacturing groups rose to 159.5 
and 162.7 respectively. Thus the NCCC national wage agreement of £10 per 
week can be viewed as just another example of the general inflationary wage 
settlements of the time. 
Given external inflation the programme was undermined in the sense that 
the productivity bonus was based upon monitored .avings and not a percentage 
of the craftsaens' national time rate. Hence, the £4.20 per week per man 
foreca.t by the audit of 1970, which helped establish employee expectations 
wa. outstripped by rising expectations fired by inflation. In other words, 
the £4.20 productivity bonus was by 1974 no lonaer the financial incentive 
(or motiv.tor) it had been in 1970. 
Therefore, frustration over the inadequacy of the bonus earnings grew 
and with it the belief that the programme was a management ploy to hold 
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wages down at Corby. This resenbnent towards the programme was further 
reinforced by the rising concern with redundancy and lost job opportunities 
in the industry. Therefore, those opponents of the programme who believed 
that they had been forced to accept it, acquired new arguments to mount an 
attack upon it. Of course, the monitoring system could have been redesigned 
to allow earnings to drift upwards or a new agreement could have been made, 
but this would have been interpreted by same managers as a sellout to the 
unions. 
The frustrated expectations of the participants were also affected by 
the programme's inability to secure the increase in productivity and savings 
first thought possible. Again poor performance was the result of both 
internal and external factors. It will be recalled (chapter five) that the 
programme was introduced in 1969 against a background of national concern 
with a new technical era in the steel industry. Corby management were 
influenced by this idea and thought the cost reduction programme would 
encourage their employees to develop positive attitudes to change. However, 
thil white hot technological age proved a myth at Corby. Certainly, lome 
new invesbRent wal undertaken, but it wal small stuff, and by itself did not 
require the sophisticated Corby-Wide Productivity Programme. In this sense 
Corby was deprived of • major advantage claimed for thil type of plan.(39) 
Consequently, Corby manageaent could be bl.med for m1sjudgement on this 
Icore, if this had been the only consideration. Notwithstanding this 
critici .. , however, the progra.me wal the firlt experiment of its kind in the 
steel industry, and for that manageaent can be praised for their imagination 
and courage in de.ianina a plan which contained many feature. in line with 
the be.t industrial relations advice of the 1960. and 19701.(40 ~ 41) 
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Another major external factor to damage the programme was the coal 
miners' strike of 1974. This strike, itself partly a result of inflation, 
caused unsuitable coking coal to be used at Corby with adverse consequences 
for blastfurnace productivity. This factor alone virtually destroyed the 
productivity potential for 1974, and although management maintained the 
bonus, an advance was out of the question. At this point the Corby industrial 
relations climate was dark with severe internal conflict between supporters 
and opponents of the programme. Obviously the Corby "cODlllunity effect" 
articulated in the previous chapter (pages129 and132) was not sufficiently 
strong to sustain the programme from its opponents. 
The communication aspect of the programme was another factor which may 
have played a part in its demise. As shown previously, aspects of the 
programme were ca.plex and difficult for the rank and file to understand. 
Featurea such 8S the material usage efficiency, the discard fund, and the 
non-monitoring of savings when strip mill production fell below 16 shift 
working, as in November 1971, were not well understood. This point appears 
to be supported by the argUBent of Lesieur and Puckett (42) that a 
succesaful coat reduction plan muat be based on every participant under-
standing its detail. 
On the other hand, the communications aurvey revealed that the rank 
and file employee had a good appreciation of the prolr ... e and in particular 
of ita purpoae to maintain ateel making at Corby. Alao, 22t of employees 
had participated in the prolr ... e's Study Groups. In addition, the 
progr .... contained fairly aophisticated procedures for the uniona to report 
back to their ..-berahip, and a publicationa group. Of course, manaleaent 
made aistakes and in particular failed to use lower level supervision as 
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an effective communications channel. Nevertheless, given the numbers of 
workers covered by the programme, the conclusion must be drawn that the 
communications system was adequate. 
However, communications between people are not neutral,(43) but are 
often used by one party to promote its interests and to influence the other 
party's attitude.(44) Thus, within the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme, 
management and leading trade union officials, both with supporters and 
opponents in their ranks, used the communication channels to their own ends. 
For instance, opponents would argue that management produced figures on 
savings, and when challenged by the unions would produce new and more 
favourable figures. Such actions made it look as if management had used 
the programme to deprive the workers of bonus. Consequently, as the 
programme continued, the complexity, along with the criticisms of the 
programme encouraged confusion and aistrust between management and workers. 
Aa a result, bargaining increased, and the power struggle, operating through 
the communications channels, brought on the programme's collapse, rather 
than poor communications per se. In other words, if the CWPP had not 
experienced organised internal opposition and adverse external circumstances, 
it would probably have survived with the level of rank and file understanding 
it achieved. 
This power struggle arose from differences in perception between those 
who saw the progr ... e as an instrument for good (that is, to save Corby 
works and town) and those who saw it as holding back wages and destroying 
the traditional structures of power and status. Thi •• trul&le became more 
acute over the progr .... •• centralisation of collective bargaining and wage 
structures. This evidence bas been presented earlier along with the reasons 
why certain branches and the tube works craftsmen in particular resisted 
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the programme. For instance, some branches valued their autonomy and others 
felt they could do better over wages if left to negotiate by themselves. 
These groups resented the constraint placed on their independence to bargain 
by the programme. 
Moreover, although the behaviour which expressed opposition to the 
programme was more noticeable on the union side, it also existed amongst 
management. Senior management influenced to some extent by human relations 
theory (namely, common objectives, employee participation and good communi-
cations) and unitary ideology consistently failed to see resistance from 
staff groups whose status and economic interests were also affected by the 
change. For example, deparbDental managers had their authority to bargain 
with the uniona reduced. This affected their status and possibly future 
promotion opportunities. Also, senior management failed to inform and 
involve the supervisors as a unionised group. Such difficulties with both 
staff and manual workers caused discord and hindered the achievement of 
productivity. 
In addition, external changes adversely affected Corby management's 
strategy to centralise the collective bargaining and wage structures. During 
this period the BSe was moving towards greater uniformity and centralisation 
in management organisation, and also in the industry's collective bargaining 
and wage structures. In particular, the Corporation policy of adopting the 
Urwick Orr profile method of job evaluation brought proposed developments 
in Corby's internal wage structure to a halt. The NUBF opposed this method 
and therefore progress towards this fo~ of refined quantitative job 
evaluation was ruled out. Consequently, Corby was forced to continue with 
the inadequate graded wage structure and the anomalies arising which added 
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to the level of dissatisfaction with the programme. In fact, it is arguable 
that if the Corporation had not been committed to the Urwick Orr method, 
then, some acceptable form of job evaluation might have been adopted at Corby. 
Finally, the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme failed because senior 
management was unable or unwilling to adjust to the changing circumstances 
of 1974. The programme was designed against a background of technological 
threat from new invesbDent in coastal works, and therefore, the need for 
management and unions to pull together to save Corby works and town. Hence 
the programme contained a strong human relations bias in emphasizing shared 
goals, employee participation and good communications. This ideology had 
a strong influence upon the actions of some managers, union officials and 
employees, but not on others who opposed the programme. The centralisation 
of collective bargaining and pay structures caused a lot of opposition both 
within management and with the trade unions, especially from groups who 
perceived these developments as a major attack upon their autonomy, economic 
interests and status. Nevertheless, given that the opposition had been 
defeated and forced to accept much of the programme, it probably would have 
survived if it had not been for the adverse external circumstances. Another 
factor ignored by human relations writers. (45) These external changes 
effectively undermined the £4.20 productivity bonus target, and destroyed 
any productivity improvement which might have been made in the critical 
year of 1974. Thus, constrained by these external factors, which encouraged 
even more forceful opposition, management required to adapt a more radical 
distributive bargaining strategy to raise wages at Corby and save the 
programme. (46) This senior management were not prepared to do and they 
decided to bow out gracefully when the craftsmens' national agreement 
presented the opportunity. 
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Part Five, The Theoretical Interpretation 
The hypotheses developed in Chapter Five argues that a change in an 
external variable relevant to the internal industrial relations system 
operating at works level will create conditions triggering off a process of 
change within the works. Several relevant external variables were identified, 
including product and labour markets, the Corby "coumunity effect", the 
wider technological context, incomes policy and the national productivity 
agreements of 1969. In the period of the formation of the Corby-Wide 
Productivity Programme the labour market position was easing with unemploy-
ment rising, and incomes policy was unimportant between early 1970 and 
November, 1972. However, all other variables continued to encourage change 
in industrial relations at works level. In particular, product market 
competition increased as did the uncertainty surrounding the technological 
threat. The national level discussions between the Corporation and the 
NCCC over the craftsmen's substantial productivity bonus claim were in 
difficulties. Thus, the period 1970 to 1974, was one of continued pressure 
to improve works operating efficiency and the stability of industrial 
relations. 
In addition, the first hypothesis holds that certain structural 
variables internal to the works have an important influence upon the parties' 
reactions to external changes. These are the organisations of management 
and trade unions, work. technology, collective bargaining and pay structures. 
Further the parties' reactions are not deterministic but influenced by their 
conscious perceptions and apprai.al of how these external changes affect 
their group interests. • These inter.ats are related to the groups economic 
wellbeing and status, including the need to secure control (or exercise 
power and autonomy) as a means to achieve or to defend these objectives. 
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Similarly, changes in the internal works situation might lead to a re-
appraisal by the parties of their interests. Therefore, whether management 
or trade unions decide to accept the traditional structures or to alter them 
is the outcome of reciprocal interactions between technological and social 
structures on the one hand, and group perceptions of their interests on 
the other. 
A second but related hypothesis argues that the greater the degree of 
structural autonomy and fragmentation, the more difficult it is for manage-
ment or trade union leaders to secure a change from traditional to new 
structures. In other words, authority and power devolved to deparbmental 
managers, work groups, branches, or union. increases the probability of 
resistance to change. On the other hand, a high degree of centralisation 
and uniformity in structures could just as easily enable leaders to oppose 
change as to facilitate it. The leaderships' response therefore is 
dependent again upon interactions between these structures and their 
perceived economic and status interests. 
Given the audit and the negotiation phases described above, what power 
have these hypothese. to explain behaviour at Corby? After tackling this, 
two further important questions are considered aimed at refining the 
hypothese.. First, if the various structural, economic and status factors 
are important independent variables influencing behaviour, which of these, 
if any, was mOlt significant in the Corby setting? Second, the argument 
which hal used the concepts of authority and power implicitly, must deal 
with thea explicitly within the hypothese •• 
From the tiae of the .tat ... nt of intent in June 1965, managers and 
trade union officials at Corby knew that the programme's propo.als would 
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place some constraints upon their traditional autonomies. Thus, from the 
outset of the audit, opposition to the proposals was in evidence from 
certain managers, branches,and trade unions. However, for the hypotheses 
to stand up, it must be explained why certain interest groups supported the 
programme as well as others opposed it. 
Compared with maintenance, the production workers had a more autonomous 
and fragmented union organisation, and more numerous collective bargaining 
arrangements in terms of bargaining units and levels. The hypotheses predict 
that stronger opposition to the programme's proposals to rationalise the 
wage structure and centralise the collective bargaining arrangements would 
be experienced from the production workers. This appears to have happened 
in that the maintenance audit was finished by October 1970, whereas the 
production audit took longer, and even by March 1971, it was only 74% 
completed. ~toreover, 13.5~ of production personnel were opposed to the audit 
at that date. In other words, during the audit phase the craft unions 
generally displayed a positive attitude to the programme, and their more 
centralised union organisation and collective bargaining arrangements helped 
progress. Furthermore, within the craft group the hypotheses predicts that 
the tube works craft .. en might be expected to be the most difficult. This 
appears to have happened. Table 6.1 (page 187) shows their response to the 
audit. In Chapter Five their earlier opposition to productivity bargaining 
had been explained in term. of structural difference. between steel and tube 
work. interacting with their respective economic interests. In the context 
of the CWPP audit, 180 job taak. were identified which could be taken from 
the maintenance workers and given to the production operatives to increase 
efficiency. Thi. wa. perceived by the tube work. craftsmen a. an attack 
upon their statu. and a. unde~ning their economic wellbeing by proposing 
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to reduce protective job practices. Furthennore, the centralisation 
implications of the programme did nothing to relieve the tube workers 
anxieties since any new central Joint Craft Committee was likely to give a 
majority to the steel craftsmen who out-numbered the tubemen by a ratio of 
2.3:1. It will be recalled from Chapter Five that the steel craftsmen did 
not share the tubesmen's aversion to job relaxation. 
Amongst the production workers several branches and lodges opposed the 
programme. However, all their reactions can be explained in terms of their 
commitment to the traditional structures which they perceived as securing 
their independence and serving their economic interests. The branches wishing 
to pursue their own small productivity deals (47) felt that they could do 
much better economically by not submerging their interest. in the proposed 
work.·wide .cheme. Moreover, the Corby programme even at the audit phase 
.howed it. intention of reducing branch control (and thereby branch autonomy) 
by .hifting the level of collective bargaining from departmental level to 
work. level. If the hypothe.e. explains the behaviour of the.e branches, 
what about N02 lodge and Nol branch? 
No2 lodge oppo.ed the programme because it meant accepting the applicat· 
ion of work aea.ureaent, for work mealureaent i. a control mechanism used 
by management to improve efficiency. Therefore, it was a .tructural factor 
to be oppoled if .een by the lodge to be promoting management's economic 
intere.ts at the expense of their own. Thi. lodge wa. unwilling to aive 
control to manageaent for .a.e hypothetical increa.e in eerning. once the 
audit finding. had been impl .. ented. Nol branch, on the other hand, by 
exclu.ion for. the Central Di.cu.sion Group felt that their .tatul and power 
had luffered. lD a .teel works, the statu. of sanual work group. are clo.ely 
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tied to relative earnings. Traditionally the melters' were the aristocrats 
of the industry whose skill and experience on open hearth furnaces enabled 
them to command high wages. However, over the years the meltera' wage 
differential has diminished, and today he,or his modern equivalent the vessel-
man, is no longer the highest paid manual worker in a steel works. This 
relative decline in income increased the melters' sensitivity concerning 
their status.(48) Therefore, Nol branch saw the Corby-Wide Productivity 
Programme as limiting their autonomy and power to bargain, and by denying 
them direct representation on the central decision making body was construed 
as an attack upon their status and income. (49) 
Just as some trade union groups were comaitted to the traditional 
structures so also were some managers in opposition to the programme. The 
traditional autonomous collective bargaining arrangements and chaotic wage 
structure implied that departmental managers had a high degree of authority 
and responsibility for the conduct of labour relations within their sections. 
Consequently, a local manager with good production results and a good labour 
relations record could expect promotion leading to a higher salary and status. 
The programme curbed deparbBental bargaining and with its intention to shift 
the level of bargaining would reduce the deparbDental managers authority in 
this area. Consequently, many middle managers opposed the introduction of 
the progr ... e preferring the flexibility of the traditional arrangements. 
On the other hand, just as some groups were against the CWPP so others 
favoured it for rather similar reasons related to their perceived economic 
interests and status. ~D&st the craft ... n, Chapter Five recorded how the 
steel works shop atewarda saw the traditional collective bargaining structures 
as an obstacle to efficient manpower utilisation, and thereby to be a,ainst 
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their members' long term job security. Job security was an important factor 
influencing attitudes at Corby, and many steel works craftsmen supported the 
programme which was linked strongly to the idea of saving steel production. 
Thus the steel works craftsmen's attitude to the programme was the same as 
during the earlier period of productivity bargaining. In this sense, their 
favourable attitude (based upon an external structural change in the 
technological context) acted as an independent variable to change the depend-
ent internal industrial relations structures. 
Given what appears to be two different attitudes by the steel and tube 
works craftsmen to the programme, how was progress made with the maintenance 
audit? Although attitudes differed there were also two important structural 
differences between 1970, and the earlier productivity bargaining phase of 
1965-69. In the earlier period the tube works were separate and free to 
bargain with a divided management about their own interests as they perceived 
them. Under the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme the tube craftsmens' 
interests were inextricably bound up with those of their steel brothers. 
First, the management organisation once divided had been brought together 
under the new managing director. Second, the Central Discussion Group was 
the first all Corby multi-union body. These changes in organisation 
effectively shifted any difference of approach to the centre of the union 
and management organisations. As shown above management and unions overcame 
tubes opposition to the audit by using the Central and Area Discussion Groups. 
Thus structural change in the direction of greater unity facilitated the 
progress of the audit. However, this difference between steel and tube works 
shop stewards became so strong when it cam. to the acid test of negotiating 
an agreement that a serious power struggle broke out. This power struggle 
will be dealt with subsequently. Meantime, it should be noted that the 
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widespread belief that the split between steel and tube works stewards was 
due to differences in the leaderships attitudes (some would say to political 
differences) is much too simplistic an explanation. 
The empirical evidence has established that a large number of branches 
and lodges cooperated with the audit and welcomed the programme, although 
it reduced their autonomy. Can the hypotheses account for the willingness 
of these branches to give up their commibDent to the traditional structures? 
Firstly, however, a theory held by some branch officials and based upon 
power disparities must be dealt with as a competing explanation. The strike 
of March 1969, involving No6 branch, led to the issue of dismissal notices 
(later withdrawn), to the disbandment of the branch, and to an order prevent-
ing the officials concerned from holding office in aaother branch for a 
certain period. These officials argued that this defeat of No6 branch by 
the union's Executive and management, made other officials accept the need 
for a more cautious approach in their dealings with management. Thus power 
at the time had shifted marginally in favour of management when the programme 
was introduced. This explanation although logically sound is not comprehen-
sive enough as it ignores other structural factors and much of the evidence. 
For several branches representing some l3~ of the labour force did not 
consent and remained in opposition to the programme for many months. In 
fact, Nol and Nol3 branches did not enter the programme until the spring 
of 1972. 
To return to the main theme of the argument, the basic hypothesis 
predict. that the branches will forgo their attachment to the existing 
social structure. if convinced that their economic position and status will 
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improve under the new arrangements. (50) Given the autonomous nature of the 
production union organisation, some branches and lodges felt they could do 
better economically inside the programme than outside of it. It is a noted 
criticism (51) of productivity bargaining that it favours employees working 
less efficiently, maybe in older plants, as against those working more 
efficiently in newer plants. Thus branches with little to sell by way of 
manpower reductions stood to gain from the programme which was based upon 
more than manpower savings. 
Secondly, some branches favoured the programme as an opportunity to 
improve their relative status and income through the graded wage structure. 
As previously noted, the wage structure was chaotic and many fet that others 
doing less skilled and responsible jobs were paid more. In particular this 
applied to people in the iron works. (52) Thus the CWPP would give these 
branches and lodges access to information which under the traditional system 
was very imperfect, and thereby an argument to improve their position. The 
following quote from a NUBF delegate to the Production-Sub Committee meeting 
of 17th June, 1971 provides evidence on this point. "The NUBF were looking 
to the productivity deal to make their average earning. soaething approaching 
decent in the coke ovens·'. 
A further reason was Corby's .urvival as a steel producing community. 
This concern and its t.plication. for the town and jobs was not the sole 
prerogative of the craft .. en. This view was strongly held by same branch 
officials, aeveral of whoa were a180 town councillors. These officials 
believed that the prolr ... e was lood for the works and community, and again 
shows the i~ortance of orientations established outside the workplace for 
behaviour within it.(53) The big difference between the production and the 
270. 
craft unions was that the latter had a more centralised trade union organ-
isation through which to argue and arrive at a decision, whereas the former 
had no committee structure with authority to make decisions which were 
binding upon the individual branches. 
However, the toughest test for the hypotheses lies in explaining how 
those branches, lodges and craft unions most hostile to the programme were 
made to negotiate their entry. 
An examination of the empirical material shows clearly the force of the 
structural variables as an independent influence upon the opposition parties 
decision to enter the programme. In the case of the production branches, 
once the productivity agreement and graded wage structure were implemented 
the option. open to these branches had virtually closed. With the majority 
of the production branches, full-time officials, and management committed 
to the programme, the deviants could not negotiate outside of its framework. 
Of course, Nol branch tried to negotiate its own separate productivity deal, 
but failed due to the constraining influence of the programme upon the other 
parties. In other words, for management to have negotiated with the deviant 
branches outside the progr ... e would have been to destroy it. On the other 
hand, the deviant branches could have exercised the choice to do nothing, 
but when their economic interests are taken into account this position 
becoaes untenable. The deviant branch official. could not afford to deny, 
for too long, the benefits enjoyed by other workers participating in the 
progr..... Caught between the structure of the Corby-Wide Productivity 
Progr.... and their ... berships desire for enchanced earnings the branch 
officials were forced to adjust their perceptions and to take a more realistic 
position. They had only two choice. open to them. One was to negotiate 
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entry on the best terms possible, or alternatively to engage in a long 
destructive strike aimed at pulling down the whole programme. 
Moreover, within the limitations of the programme, management and the 
Trade Union Policy Group worked hard to secure the entry of the deviant 
branches. On the structural dimension, the decision to allow a measure of 
devolved collective bargaining over manpower savings was one such device. 
This innovation allowed the branch to retain up to 30% of manpower savings 
for local negotiations within the framework of the graded wage structure. 
At the economic level, management and the Trade Union Policy Group tried 
several tactics to encourage entry. These ranged from the initial refusal 
to implement the graded wage structure until all the branches were partici-
pating, to the concessions made over the price of entry. 
The other main structural change influencing the entry of the deviant 
branches was the establishment of the Production-Sub Committee. This was 
the first central production body with authority to conduct negotiations. 
All previous institutions such as the Corby Works Joint Branches Committee, 
the Association of Trade Unions, and the Production Discussion Group during 
the audit phase were consultative bodies. In addition, the programme had 
established the Trade Union Policy Group as the central production union 
institution. Both these bodies took a ··Corby-Wide" view of management/union 
relationships. Thus, when the argument developed between participating and 
deviant branches over the price of entry, it was the Trade Union Policy 
Group which proposed a solution, the principle of which secured a compromise. 
Therefore, under the programme, the Production-Sub Committee and Trade Union 
Policy Group became more powerful bodies necessitating further structural 
reform. This took the form of increasing Confederation representation. 
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Furthermore, by structuring the representation on an area basis the hostile 
branches were virtually guaranteed direct representation on the Production-
Sub Committee. 
Clearly, then, these structural constraints were important determinants 
of the deviant branches leaderships' decision to enter the programme, but 
so also was the experience of the struggle itself which caused a readjustment 
in the officials' perception of what was possible. In other words, through 
a process of interaction between the officials initial perceptions of 
reality and the structures of the programme behaviour was changed. 
The craft negotiations also indicated the importance of the hypotheses 
in explaining the entry of these unions to the programme. However, whereas 
with the production unions, management was able to obtain the support of 
most branches before gaining acceptance of the hostile branches, with the 
craft unions the situation was quite different. The craft unions had a more 
centralised union organisation, more centralised collective bargaining 
arrangements and wage structure which they used during the negotiating phase 
to oppose the programme. The circumstances surrounding their opposition 
were explained earlier. These in essence, concerned factors (both internal 
and external) such as the implications of the programme for craft status, 
and the opportunity the audit revealed for giving them two "bites at the 
cherry". In addition, the external NCCC wage claim encouraged earnings 
expectations above what was achievable under the programme. Also the tube 
craftsmen in particular resisted the job loss proposals and this attitude 
became stronger with the workers rising concern over redundancy in the 
industry. Therefore, management's strategy was to continue the programme 
with the production unions, and secondly, to attempt to divide the craft 
unions in order to break up the opposition. The first success was achieved 
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with the entry of the mini-craft unions. The AUBTW and the bricklayers 
labourers were not restricted by the NCCC claim. Hence they were more easily 
enticed into the programme on the basis of a quid pro quo, which restored a 
previous wage differential between themselves and the AUEW and EETPU. By 
breaking away from the engineering unions, the mini-crafts were only pursuing 
their economic interests, as indeed, was the total craft group viz-a-viz the 
production unions. 
This was the breakthrough which put the craft unions on the trend towards 
acceptance of the programme. Both unions tried hard to avoid these structural 
implications and, like Nol branch before them attempted to negotiate an 
agreement outside of it. However, in the face of union sanctions, management 
stood firmly by its commibnent to the programme's principles. Finally, the 
EETPU entered at what seemed the respectable bonus of £4.80 per week. This 
value was simply window dressing however, to save the union's face. Never-
theless, the effect of the EETPU's entry upon the AUEW was to isolate it and 
eventually undermine the union's resistance. In particular, the AUEW's 
national official brought pressure to bear upon the District Committee. 
Therefore, the AUEW negotiators were in precisely the same position as 
Nol branch had been earlier in the year. All manual workers were in receipt 
of the productivity bonus, and the only way open to the negotiators to satisfy 
their members pressure for a wage increase was to accept the programme. This 
the union did, subject to obtaining the best return possible for their 
members. As shown previously the union pushed up the entry price ( unjust-
ifiably according to the production unions), and obtained guarantees on 
"no job loss" beyond those achieved by other unions. Nevertheless, these 
were essentially marginal adjusbDents, which in no way disguise the fact 
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that a union strongly opposed to the programme was made to accept it. 
In answer to question one posed abov~ it can be concluded that the 
basic hypothesis appears to furnish a useful explanation of the negotiating 
phase of the programme. However, the behaviour of the craft and production 
unions was so different during the audit and negotiating phases that a little 
further explanation of the second hypothesis's predictive value is called 
for. The argument was that the more fragmented and autonomous the structural 
variables, the more difficult it was for management or trade union leaders 
to direct change in the traditional structures. Consequently, has manage-
ment's success during the negotiating phase with the more autonomous 
production unions falsified the hypothesis, or was it due to the solid 
opposition of the less autonomous craft unions? 
Certainly the craft unions had used their more homogeneous collective 
bargaining and wage structures, and union organisation to facilitate the 
programme's progress during the audit phase, and to hinder it during the 
negotiating phase as predicted by the hypothesis. Also, the craftsmen's 
clear wage objective of 33~% productivity bonus, and their subsequent fixation 
with the national wage claim for £8.20, and their no job loss policy, provided 
the circumstances for their tough opposition. Compared to this the production 
branches had no clear economic aims, simply adopting a flexible and pragmatic 
approach to the audit. However, it was the change in the structural factors 
combined with the parties' perceptions of their interests which gives 
support to the hypothesis. 
The most significant change for the production workers was the establish-
ment of the Production-Sub Committee and Trade Union Policy Group. With the 
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formation of these centralised institutions the autonomous and fragmented 
branches gradually became part of a more centralised union structure. In 
addition, the union hierarchy was further developed by the inclusion of both 
the Confederation and NUBF full-time officials. Thus, changes in union 
organisation, plus the graded wage structure, and more centralised collective 
bargaining arrangements, as they came in, provided for the production unions 
a more unified and centralised structure than existed for the craft unions. 
Such change enchanced the influence of the union leaders who supported the 
programme over those who did not. In other words, this change in social 
structure acted as an independent variable helping to bring about acceptance 
of the programme by its opponents. 
On the other hand, the craftsmen, using their centralised structure to 
oppose the CWPP, had to undergo a structural change for progress to be made. 
This was achieved by shattering the unified craft structure and by making 
separate agreements with the mini-crafts, EETPU and AUEW. Hence, management 
in pursuit of efficiency engineered a change in this structural constraint. 
Moreover, the reorganisation which took place was not a massive change in 
the direction of increased autonomy and fragmentation of the structural 
variables. Although joint multi-craft union working was lost in the steel 
works, the uniform wage structure remained intact, and new formal collective 
bargaining arrangements were forged. The craft wage structure between steel 
and tube works had been brought into line after the 1970 strike, but no 
formal collective bargaining arrangements had been establlshed. These 
collective bargaining structures were altered for both the EETPU and AUEW 
under the programae's negotiations, and was most dramatically revealed in 
the case of the AUEW. Conflict continued to exist between steel and tube 
works shop stewards over the priority to be given to craft status in the 
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negotiations. Moreover, the District Committee overcame the tube works' 
opposition by putting the draft agreement to the whole membership for 
ratification. This act was a departure from the traditional method and 
formally established a new bargaining unit. Hence, under the programme the 
AUEW District Committee became more directly involved in negotiations than 
had been the case under the more fragmented system. Consequently, the part 
played by the District Committee verifies the hypothesis that the influence 
of union leaders to secure change in structural variables is enchanced by 
the degree of uniformity and centrality within the union's organisation, and 
by the collective bargaining arrangements. 
Nevertheless, these structural constraints are only part of the 
explanation and a more comprehensive understanding is obtained through a 
process of interaction between the relevant structures and the peoples' 
perceptions and attitudes. Clearly there was a process of adjusanent taking 
place in the craft groups perceptions of what was attainable. Their 
experience of proposing various alternatives to the programme(that is,straight 
tonnage bonus and the efficiency agreement), and finding these avenues 
blocked caused the leaders to adjust downwards their aspirations concerning 
higher wages and status compared with other groups, and led finally to an 
acceptance of the programme. The fact that a separate tube craftsmens' 
meeting decided initially to reject the majority decision was due partly 
to the rank and file's definition of reality being out of line with the 
craft leaderships'. 
The second question posed above concerned the problem of allocating an 
order of priority to the various factors in terms of their explanatory 
power. 
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The most difficult problem concerns the separation of the economic 
and technological variables and the allocation of priority between them. 
For instance, it was not possible on the evidence available to decide 
whether the failure to establish one bargaining unit for production and craft 
workers was due to economic or technological factors. From the economic 
perspective the audit had revealed the scope of differential savings in 
favour of the craftsmen, plus the external NCCC wage claim. This appears 
to have caused the craftsmen to change policy from one of joint negotiations 
with the production unions to one of separate negotiations. However, on 
further examination these savings were only partly economically determined 
through the need to increase the craftsmen's effort to relieve shortages in 
the craft labour supply. It was also technologically determined through the 
relaxation of restrictive job practices, shaped by earlier technology. More-
over, even the national wage claim was influenced by similar economic and 
technological factors. ~ shown in the early Chapters ISTEA and later BSC 
both evolved a strategy to reduce the maintenance costs in the product and 
to partly meet the craft labour market shortage experienced throughout the 
post war period. However, the NCCC's strategy and power to improve the 
craftsmens relative position in the industry's wage league was enhanced not 
only by the labour shortage, but also by technological changes which increased 
the skills and nuabers of craft .. en relative to production workers. The 
November 1964, Efficiency, Qualification and Service Agreement, and the 
HEUMM agre .. ents were in recognition of these developments. Therefore, both 
these variables appear to be so inextricably interwoven in their effect 
upon the craft .. ens perceptions and behaviour that no further insight can be 
obtained by pursuina the question beyond this point. 
If this probl .. cannot be resolved here, what further allocation of 
priorities can be .. de? The evidence appears to suggest a certain order of 
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or sequence of variable interaction and therefore priority between them. 
Management initiated the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme to achieve the 
objectives of improved efficiency, control, and stability in industrial 
relations, and to achieve these objectives it was considered necessary to 
change management and trade union organisations, centralise collective 
bargaining arrangements, and to rationalise the wage structure. Thus, 
management's decision can be regarded as a conscious act and therefore an 
independent action within the works industrial relations system. However, 
the decision was made in response to perceived external economic and 
structural changes such as the deterioration in the product market situation, 
and the wider technological threat of the coastal works. (54) In other words, 
management consciously articulated and formulated a framework for action in 
response to their perceived economic and status interests. Consequently, 
the first changes took place within management's own structure, with the 
appointment of the first all Corby director in March, 1969. This was followed 
by the appointment of a senior industrial relations manager. These changes 
in management organisation appear necessary for the later fOnDulation of an 
industrial relations strategy. 
Hence, changes in management organisation claim priority over the new 
collective bargaining arrangements. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence 
shows also that the flow of influence was not just in the one direction, 
and that changes in the collective bargaining structure also influence 
management organisation. For e~le, the change to the more centralised 
collective bargaining and wage structures reduced the departmental manager's 
authority to deal with deparbaental wage issues. 
Another inter.stine effect of the change in the collective bargaining 
and wage structures was its influence upon trade union organisation, 
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particularly in the case of the production unions. HA Clegg has argued (55) 
at the international level, that the collective bargaining arrangements 
in various countries have a significant independent influence upon trade 
union organisation in those countries. This study provides evidence to 
support such a proposition at the Corby Works level. The strategic innovat-
ion of the productivity programme created the Production-Sub Committee, and 
in turn the Trade Union Policy Group. The latter was the first central 
production union body with authority to negotiate with management. Further-
more, as the programme matured the powers of the central bodies grew. As 
a result, they made decisions within the framework of the new collective 
bargaining arrangements which previously had been made by the autonomous 
branches within the traditional structures. An insight into the central 
institution's increased influence can be obtained from the fact that the 
branch officials competed for membership leading to the reorganisation of 
the Production-Sub Committee in late 1972. Further evidence was the role 
played by the Trade Union Policy Group in finding a solution to Nos 1 and 3 
branches entry to the programme, and also this institution's role in strike 
situations under the auspices of the Production Protection Procedure. 
However, the direction of the causation was not all one way and the 
evidence suggests that changes in trade union organisation can influence 
the shape of the collective bargaining arrangements. In fact, J. Mortimer, 
chairman of ACAS has suggested just such a criticism of HA Clegg's work. (56) 
For instance, at Corby in 1964-65 before the Magenta agreements, the 
direction of influence worked this way round. It will be recalled,(57) that 
the EETPU convener in the steel works proposed a strategy in response to 
his assessment of the union's econoaic intere.ts. This strategy involved 
enticing the more powerful AnEW into establishing a joint multi-union 
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committee. From this organisational base the unions proceeded to negotiate 
the Magenta productivity agreements which changed the craftsmen's collective 
bargaining structure. Again, under the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme, 
the craftsmen saw their economic interests and devised a strategy to achieve 
their objectives, that is, the 33~ wage claim. However, in this instance, 
the craft unions' economic interests required opposition to joint working 
with the production unions, and eventually opposition to the programme itself. 
Therefore, in this case, there were two simultaneous flows of pressure 
operating in opposite directions, that is, one from management through the 
CWPP to secure craft union conformity, and one from the craft unions to avoid 
conformity. This resulted in strain upon the existing institutions and 
something had to give. Consequently, the Joint Craft Committee broke up, 
and management failed to achieve the Central Corby Productivity Council 
within the one comprehensive agreement. Notwithstanding, such was the 
influence of the programme's design (that is, the common monitoring mechanism) 
that despite the separate agreements and inter-personal bitterness, the 
craft and production unions were forced into joint working arrangements. 
These took the form of joint participation in Plant Efficiency Groups, and 
in working parties such as that dealing with the 16 shift activity level. 
In addition, the works technology factor must be placed within this 
sequence of cau.ation as a variable influencing behaviour. In Chapter Five 
the work of L Sayles was discussed (see pagesl74-l77 ) and it was concluded 
that the works tecbnololY had an important influence on collective bargain-
ing and the wage structures at Corby. Other writers, for instance Joan 
Woodward (58) have emphasized the influence of technology as a factor shapinl 
manalement oTganisation and control systems and through this industrial 
relations outcoaes. Within the hypothesis developed here, works technology 
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comes in sequence after management consciousness. This is based upon the 
assumption that management in defining the situation can see opportunities 
to make profits, or the need to improve productivity in the light of an 
external or internal change. Given the objectives formulated by management 
a suitable technology and production system is chosen. Of course, in the 
case of the Corby works the technology was established but changes were 
required in it to facilitate technological integration and to reduce costs. 
Given this new works technological constraint, management then devised a 
suitable management organisation to secure its objective of efficiency and 
also control. 
Within the hypothesis trade unions do not choose or design the works 
technology. They do however define their interests in response to the works 
technology and consciously formulate objectives to exploit the situation 
and to protect their members job security by exercising control. In this 
way the union can mitigate the influence of the technological variable. For 
example, in the wider development of trade union organisation the craft 
unions with their early emphasis on unilateral job regulation show such a 
rational response to the handi-craft technology of the early 19th century. 
Whereas in the late 19th and early 20th centuries union organisation altered 
(even for the craft unions) to accommodate the advance of mass production 
technology. Also, at Corby the steel works craft unions saw that a change 
in works technology towards greater integration outdated many of their 
established job practices. Aa a result, they altered their own organisation 
and proposed change. in the structure of job regulation. 
The diagram below tries to illustrate this sequence, the transmission 
of influence and the interaction between the variables. 
ness and 
Object-
ives 
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The diagram emphasized the importance of two way interaction between 
the parties' definition of their economic interests, given their situation, 
and the relevant structural variables. The articulation of a parties 
economic interests can either be a response to an external change such as 
the technological threat of the new coastal works, or to an internal cha~e 
such as the craft unions decision to seek separate negotiations in the 
light of the audit findings. The outcome of this interaction process 
between external and internal works structural variables and the parties 
definition of their social reality was a change in their behaviour. The 
diagram also shows the operation of a feed back mechanism by which a change 
in the parties' behaviour might alter any of the internal factors such as 
the collective bargaining arrangements, and also modify the external factors. 
For example, improved internal efficiency will ease the external product 
market constraint. 
However, most significant the diagram shows the probable direction or 
priority of action within and between the variables. Thus, if either 
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party perceives a change in their economic or status interests they will 
develop a strategy to pursue these. This strategy will probably tackle 
the structural constraint which is most easy for that party to change, 
then through this variable alter the factors more difficult to change. For 
management the factor most easy to change was management organisation, 
followed by the collective bargaining arrangements, then indirectly through 
collective bargaining structure the trade union organisation, especially 
where it was well established as at Corby. (59) From the union side, the 
strategy formulated in 1965 supports this argument; that is, the trade 
union organisation was the easiest to alter, followed by the collective 
bargaining arrangements, then, indirectly through the collective bargaining 
arrangements, management's organisation. Again, unions find it hardest 
to alter, directly, management organisation, and can most easily change it 
by this indirect mechanism. 
Therefore, the pursuit of this second question leads to a refinement 
of the original hypotheses or to a third hypothesis that the most effective 
way to change the relevant structural and behavioural variables is to work 
through the sequence of priorities identified above. 
The third question raised earlier concerned the concepts of power, 
and authority, and their place in the three hypotheses. Clearly, power 
broadly defined as influence, pressure, coercion and so on, was central 
to the changes at Corby. Examples of the use of power were given above 
when referring to the role of the Trade Union Policy Group, and also when 
the tube works craftsmen accepted the programme against their will. 
Moreover, the importance of power as a key explanatory variable has been 
identified in the literature by M Poole. (60) Poole identifies the power 
base of workers as related to the exercise of power, to latent power as 
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revealed in union organisation, and to the workers willingness to challenge 
management authority. Also, he accepted that management had an important 
influence on work place behaviour. He illustrated this by showing that 
management were able to keep discussions on payoff the agenda of the Wonks 
Council meetings in a Sheffield steel works. Consequently, both the 
hypotheses developed here and Poole's theory accept the importance of power 
and the structural variables of trade union and management organisations as 
factors explaining behaviour at the work place. 
Where Poole's theory and that developed above diverge concerns the 
priority given to, "the values and organisation of shop stewards as the 
decisive explanatory variable". (61) Poole claims that this theory provides 
a more comprehensive explanatory framework of work place behaviour than that 
developed by competing theories. These include the 'technological deter-
minants' (Sayles and Woodward), the 'orientations of workers' (Goldthorpe), 
and the 'situational determinants' school (Daniel). However, Poole appears 
to fall into the trap of seeing one variable, namely, power, exercised 
through trade union organisation, as dominating all others, and therefore, 
would seem to undermine his own claim to have developed a more comprehensive 
theory. 
The thrust of the argument developed above shows power as a factor 
arising out of the interactions between a party's consciousness of reality, 
its will, and several structural variables. Therefore, power enters into 
the parties' calculations when formulating their strategy to pursue their 
economic and status objectives. Thus, the exercise of power to achieve 
behavioural change appears to be a function of the party initiating the 
strategy, (either management or trade union) and of the intermediate 
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variables of management and union organisation, works technology, and 
collective bargaining and wage structures. The sequence of causation estab-
lished above showed that the most likely order of priority for management 
was to tackle those factors where its power was greatest (that is, control) 
and to work through these to influence those factors where its influence 
was weakest. 
Similarly, if a union commences a strategy for change, then, power will 
probably be brought to bear initially on trade union organisation which in 
turn enchances its power to alter collective bargaining arrangements and 
the pay structure. The change in collective bargaining and pay structures 
in turn strengthens union influence where it is weakest, that is, to alter 
management organisation and behaviour. Poole's theory appears to take no 
systematic account of the important variable of collective bargaining 
structure as an independent factor explaining behaviour. 
Further the concept of power has often been discussed as the ability of 
one party to coerce another party to accept something against its will, (62) 
and also of one party having the right to make decisions which are acceptable 
to the other party. The latter is related normally to some moral imperative 
which legitimizes (gives authority to) the power of the order giver and 
diminishes the need for coercive power to obtain compliance. This legitimised 
power or authority has normally been based upon the assumption of shared 
values or beliefs. Industrial relations systems (63) and job regulation 
theories, (64) which have had a significant influence upon academic writing, 
are grounded in such an assumption. Thus, although both theories incorporate 
the existence of a plurality of competing interest groups,(65) nevertheless 
interest group competition has been regarded as conducted within a framework 
underpinned by some higher level shared value system. (66) Therefore, both 
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systems and job regulation theories accept that interest groups will exercise 
restraint in the use of their power, if they see, that not to do so will 
endanger the system's survival. 
How useful then, was this shared value system, and the ideas of 
legitimised power and authority, in explaining the change from the traditional 
to the new industrial relations arrangements at Corby? Chapter Five revealed 
that Corby management had placed much stress in their public announcements 
on the need for employees and management to pull together. Management 
believed this would improve the product's competitiveness, and the townvs 
future employment prospects. This appeal to the works and town's survival 
incorporated a value shared by all the participants. Moreover, the evidence 
shows that many key union officials accepted the legitimacy of the CWPP due 
to their concern over the town's future. On the other hand, some hostile 
branches and craft unions obviously attached greater priority to their own 
sectional interests, rather than to the general interest as claimed by the 
programme. Therefore, the shared common values which influence some peoples 
behaviour, were nevertheless not strong enough to overcome the opposition of 
some other groups, even in the Corby circumstances. It was the strength of 
the opposition which reveals the weakness of consensus theories with their 
underlying assumption of shared values. 
It would appear that social action theory developed by D Silverman,(67) 
in which people within a definition of their own social reality formulate 
their objectives, might provide a better explanation. The social action 
perspective is further discussed by SHill (68) who argues that some social 
structures, rules, and nonns have a moral force attributed to them, but this 
is not based upon a consensus of values as in systems theory. Hill accepts 
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that structures, rules and norms generated in interaction can exercise 
an independent influence upon behaviour; but further that changes in inter-
action (behaviour) will ultimately alter structure, rules and norms. He 
puts the point this way: 'if a work group consistently breaks a rule, and 
has power to prevent management enforcing this rule, then the new action 
becomes the norm and the old rule ceases to operate as a standard of 
behaviour'. 
At Corby, some people saw the programme as in their interests, whereas 
others, namely the opposition groups, had they possessed the power viz-a-viz 
the programme's structure, the official union, and the cooperating branches, 
would have established their own rules. Indeed the craft unions and Nol 
branch attempted to negotiate their own separate productivity deals. Thus, 
for these opposition groups, ideas of legitimacy and consensus surrounding 
the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme had little meaning. 
Moreover, these hostile groups were coerced against their will to accept 
the programme. However, if coercive power has meaning it cannot be seen in 
personal terms, that is, in terms of a managing director or full-time 
official instructing local union officials to sign the agreement. Both 
craft unions and production branches were much too powerful for such a sbnple 
tactic to work. Nevertheless, the local union officials were coerced into 
accepting the agreement; but the power which coerced them arose out of 
their changing view of the situation, associated with the need to secure 
their members' economic interest., and interacting with the structural 
variables of the programme. Convinced that the balance of power was against 
them, these lay union officials refrained from disruptive strike action, 
and acquiesced in the programme's requirements. (69) 
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This ends Part Five which analysed and explained at a more abstract 
level the audit and the negotiation of the Corby-Wide Productivity 
Programme. It was shown that the hypotheses developed in this and the 
previous Chapter provides reasonable explanations to the questions raised. 
The next Chapter attempts to analyse the industrial relations change at 
Ravenscraig Works and to again test the hypotheses developed above. 
• 
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Chapter Seven 
Industrial Relations at Ravenscraig Works, 1964-70 
The chapter examines, industrial relations at Ravenscraig, and also, in 
so far as it is relevant, that of the Scottish steel industry. Part One deals 
with the background factors which are essential to an understanding of the 
development and functioning of the works system. These factors include the 
government decision to locate the new steel strip mill at Motherwell, the 
works technology and the product and labour markets. Part Two analyses the 
objectives and structure of both management and trade union organisations. In 
addition, this section analyses the collective bargaining arrangements and 
wage structure, plus some of the main problems inherent in them. Part Three 
attempts to evaluate the state of industrial relations in the period 1964-70. 
Finally, Part Four returns to the hypotheses, developed in Chapters Five and 
Six above, with the purpose of testing their explanatory power. Chapter Eight 
deals with productivity bargaining at Ravenscraig, and assesses its contributio· 
if any, to solving the problems of change identified in this and previous 
Chapters. 
Part One, The Background to Ravenscraig Works 
The public announcement that a new strip steel plant was to be built at 
Ravenscraig Works, Motherwell was given by the Prime Minister to Parliament 
in November, 1958. The industry, through the British Iron and Steel Feder-
ation, had for some time discussed the need for extra capacity with the Iron 
and Steel Board. The Board was the government's watch dog on prices and new 
invesbDent for the industry. However, although the industry was well aware 
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that any new strip steel invesbnent would create excess capacity - at least 
for a time, the decision was made to go ahead. The decision to locate the 
plant in Scotland was also influenced by social factors, namely rising 
unemployment in the region during the late 1950s. This unemployment, largely 
structural, was closely associated with the continuing decline of the 
traditional industries concentrated in the area. These included Shipbuilding, 
coal mining and textiles. In response, regional pressure groups lobbied 
Parliament trying to get any new jobs which the steel industry had to offer 
to be located in their region. The influence of these social factors was 
such that it was decided to split the new invesbnent between Ravenscraig and 
Newport in South Wales. However, on straight economic grounds, the extra 
capacity ought to have been built in the one location. 
Colvilles Limited however did not initially welcome the government's 
proposal to build a strip mill at Ravenscraig. In the 1950s the company had 
constructed a number of production units at the site including a coke oven 
battery, a sinter plant, blastfurnaces, and also open hearth steel making 
facilities. The output of these units was used to supply the existing 
Colvilles mills in the Motherwell area. Moreover, in the longer run the 
company had planned to build a new plate mill at Ravenscraig. For in the 
company's view, there was not sufficient demand in Scotland for wide-strip 
products to make the investment profitable. Nevertheless, the company altered 
ita attitude, when the govertSent, in association with Richard Thomas and 
Baldwins (still a nationalised company), threatened to invest in a new steel 
ca.plex at Granaeaouth. This Granceaaouth investment would have broken 
Co1vi11es virtual aonopo1y of steel production north of the border.(l) 
As a result, the company submitted propos.ls to the Iron and Steel Board 
covering the developBent of a bot strip mill and extra iron and steel makina 
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capacity at Ravenscraig, plus a cold reduction mill at Gartcosh some 13 
miles to the west. These proposals were accepted by the government. 
The additional capacity took the form of one coke oven battery, a much 
larger sinter plant and b1astfurnace, a basic LD melting shop, and a slab 
and hot strip mill. Of these developments the hot mill became operational 
in December 1962, and the sinter plant in 1963. The basic oxygen shop 
appeared one year later in 1964.(2) Both the new strip mill and the melting 
shop were funded by the government. Thus, Ravenscraig Works reached techno-
logical maturity in 1964, a state which was not disturbed until 1974. By 
1974 Bse was investing in a new continuous casting plant, and in extra steel 
making capacity. These developments were part of the Corporation's strategy 
to concentrate the bulk of production into five major works throughout Britain. 
The layout of the works as it existed between 1964-74 is contained in 
the next diagram. 
Diagram 7.1 
Production Layout at Ravenscraig Works. 1964-74 
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The new technology at Ravenscraig was highly integrated with molten 
iron tapped from the blastfurnaces and conveyed by torpedo ladle to the 
melting shops. The melting shop converted the iron to steel ingots which 
then progressed to the slab mill. The slab mill fed slabs to the hot strip 
mill and, also to the Dalzell Works plate mill. Slabs enter the strip mill 
where they were reduced to wide-strip and rolled automatically into large 
coils. The coils were dispatched either to Gartcosh for finishing or direct 
to customers. Yet another part of the strip mills output was cut up into 
sheets and dispatched directly to customers. 
The introduction of both the hot strip mill and the basic oxygen steel 
making process were of great importance to the Scottish steel industry. Both 
plants were new to Scotland, and their implications for industrial relations 
will be traced subsequently. However, most important, the basic oxygen 
process had the effect of speeding up the production flow by eliminating 
technological discontinuities between iron and steel works. This factor was 
discussed in Chapter Two, page 18, in the context of the general steel 
industry. 
R Pryke (3) has shown Ravenscraig's technological capacity to be badly 
out of balance. The coke ovena at one end of the works and the strip mdll 
at the other both had greater capacity than had the ateel plantae In other 
words, the ateel making facilities at approximately 30,000 tonnes per week 
were a bottleneck compared with the strip mill which could produce in excesa 
of 40,000 tonnea per week. Moreover, in the early 1960a the aoaking pit 
reheatina capacity (for heating inaots to the correct temperature for 
reduction to alabs) waa very inadequate. Colvilles however, had little 
incentive to put thia at ... tch right due to the difficult product market 
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situation. Consequently, these large under-utilised plants kept the unit 
costs of steel production high, and this badly affected Colvilles profit-
ability as a company. 
The product market into which Colvilles attempted to sell strip steel 
was well supplied with established producers such as John Summers of Shotton, 
and the Steel Company of Wales at Port Talbot; thus, competition was 
extremely fierce, with both Ravenscraig and Llanwern (Newport) entering the 
market at the same tLme. Furthermore, due to the control exercised by the 
Iron and Steel Board, competition was not price competition, but based upon 
the quality of the product and the ability to meet delivery dates. Column 
three of the next table shows the company's lack of success in penetrating 
the market up to 1968. 
Table 7.1 
Colvilles Sales of Strip Steel 1964-72 (tons) 
Year Co1villes Total Total U.K. Co1villes Share Colvilles Export 
Sales, Tons Market Tons of U.K. Market 7. of Total Sales 
1964 256,464 2,325,592 ll't N.K. 
1965 289,536 2,388,776 12.1't N.K. 
1966 312,000 1,820,208 17.1't N.K. 
1967 320,060 2,095,652 15.2't 52.5~ 
1968 414,725 2,380,332 17.41. 56.1~ 
1969 561,654 2,486,898 22.51. 21.71. 
1970 618,315 2,814,549 21.9~ 16.6't 
1971 548,274 N.K. N.K. 43.9't 
1972 516,306 2,326,902 22.11. 52.5't 
source: Ravenscraig Sales Deparbaent 
Penetration by the company va •• lov and compared with the more equal 
aarket distribution of 221. after nationalisation, mu.t be con.idered poor. 
After 1968, order. were admdni.tered by the Briti.h Steel Corporation 
partly on the basis of loadina the various aill. efficiently. However, 
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prior to 1968, Colvilles inability to penetrate the market successfully 
had a lot to do with the poor quality of the product made at Ravenscraig. 
For this management must take the bulk of the blame. For instance, there 
was a total lack of expertise at senior management level in strip mill 
technology, and also, there was a slow conversion to the employment of 
quality control specialists. This defect in the management organisation 
partly led to a major shake up in the senior management hierarchy in 1965. 
The other market problem concerned Colvilles inability to meet delivery 
dates, even with surplus capacity at the works. This objective wa. 
seriously hindered by the poor climate of industrial relations. As a result 
the Company were forced into the export market which, as Table One shows, 
took over SOt of Ravenscraig output up to the time of nationalisation. 
Unfortunately for the Company, export prices were between £15 to £20 per ton 
le.s than prices in the damestic market with its tariff protection. Hence, 
with low output and high costs, unprofitable sales, and a difficult 
industrial relations climate, Ravenscraig turned out to be thoroughly 
unprofitable for Colvilles. 
The final background factor worth consideration wa. the local labour 
market. It was believed by both .. na,ement and trade union offieials at 
Ravenseraig. that the reeruibDent of green labour had mueh to do with the 
works industrial relations and produet market problems. It was argued 
that during Ravenscrai,'s phase one development (that is, middle to late 
1950.). experieneed per.onnel were reeruited from other Colvilles works. 
However, during Ravenserai, phase two (that is. early to mi~dle 1960s) 
the.e works were not in a position to shed labour. and the slab and strip 
mills were manned by (deseribed eolourfully) "buteher •• bakers and eandle-
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stick makers". Also, it was argued that a large number of coal miners 
were brought in from the declining coal industry. Therefore, the common-
sense explanation put forward by those involved, was that the phase two 
recruits unlike those of phase one. brought with them values which were 
foreign to the industry's peaceful customs and traditions. These men had 
high instrumental values (4). and were prepared to engage in strike action 
in breach of the industry's procedure. 
The next table furnishes information on the previous work experience 
of the new entrants. 
Table 7.2 
Ravenlcraig Manning: 
Personnel with Previous Experience of the Steel Industry 
Phase Two Manpower, 1965 Manpower Establishment, 1975 
Total Previous '7. of Total ?revious 1. of 
Manning Steel ex-Steel Manning Steel ex-Steel 
Industry Workers Industry Workers 
Slab Mill 28 26 92.81. 132 40 30.51. 
Slab Dresaing 30 28 93.31. 92 41 44.51. 
Hot Strip Mill 42 20 47.67. 83 21 25.07. 
source I BSe, Ravenscraig Works 
The table show that the original phase two manninc was dominated by 
workers with previous experience of the iron and steel industry. Also, 
although not ShOWD in the table, the nuaber of ex-coal miners was 
surprisingly low, that is. 7.6'7. of· the slab mill mannin&, 6.57. of the slab 
dressin& bay, and 9.5'7. of the strip mill. Moreover. in the strip .ill 
where the proportion of workers comin& direct from other steel works was 
lowest, four of the six top occupations were manned by .en with previous 
steel experience. Consequently, the assumption that these inexperienced 
workers established anti-work ,roup attitudes to supervision, ,roup noras. 
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etc., was most unlikely. Furthermore, an examination of the strike 
statistics (to be dealt with later) show that the hot strip mill with the 
lowest percentage of experienced steel industry men, was the least strike 
prone of the three groups. 
Therefore, it would appear that green labour was not as significant 
a factor in explaining behaviour at Ravenscraig as the participants inter-
viewed believed. The question of what factor or factors were more domiuant 
will be considered in Parts Two and Three. 
Finally, Ravenscraig was very tightly manned compared with equivalant 
works elsewhere in the U.K. Apparently, management applied the standard 
manning which existed in other Colvilles works to the larger units of plant 
at Ravenscraig. 
This concludes the examination of the background factors; consideration 
must now be given to the details of the industrial relations system at 
Ravenscrai,. 
Part Two, Industrial aelations at Ravenlcrai, Works 
This part coaaences with an analysil of .. na,ement's organisation and 
attitudes, followed by the trade union organisation, and then the parties' 
collective relationships. 
Mana, ... nt's Or,anisation 
At Ravenlcrai, Works, in the aiddle 1960s, only the .. nual trade 
unions had recognition, and therefore, indultrial relations in this sense 
concerned a liaited nuaber of production and engineering .. na,erl. 
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Functional executives other than industrial relations specialists were in no 
way involved. The organisation chart on page 302 shows the formal manage-
ment structure as it existed in early 1966. At this time, industrial 
relations at Ravenscraig were handled by line production and engineering 
aanagement who were held directly responsible for all labour issues arising 
within their jurisdiction. This gave to the various works and deparaaental 
managers (given the nature of the collective bargaining arranaements) a large 
degree of autonomy over many negotiating issues. So strong was this autonomy 
and the attitudes regarding it, that little coordination existed between 
various deparbDents across the works with regard to wages, discipline and 
other labour issues. 
Moreover, the labour strategy pursued by Colville's senior management at 
Ravenscraig was a defensive one, with little determination to initiate change 
which would promote a Nworks-wide" strategy. Obviously, in those years this 
was not thought desirable as it would have limited the degree of autonomy 
enjoyed by the various managers. 
At the same tiae this autonomy was subject to the constraints of 
Scottish and national collective aare .. ents, and to some extent to the 
authority and advice offered by the Colville's personnel services function. 
The group personnel services function was located at Dalzell Works, some two 
miles .. st of lavenscraig. Study of the formal organisation chart shows 
Colvilles to have a Director of Personnel, appointed in 1965, who had full 
director status and ... bership of the aain Colvilles board. Beneath and 
responsible to h~ the personnel, trainina and industrial relations functions 
divided into sections with a ,roup labour manaser directly responsible to 
the Director. He, in turn was aided by two assistant chief labour officers, 
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Diagram 7.2 
Organisation Chart: Ravenscraig, 1966 
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one of whom combined the task of Secretary to Nol Division of the ISTEA. 
From there the line of authority within the deparanent went straight to the 
Ravenscraig works labour officer, who had one assistant labour officer to 
help him. 
In te~ of procedure this meant that the works labour officer dealt 
with trade union clatm. in their early stages. These might subsequently 
involve the Group Labour DeparbDent at higher stages within the works. 
Alternatively, if an issue, was of obvious and critical importance, the chief 
labour manager's involvement would be more immediate. In summary then, the 
works labour officer was in a line relationship within the Colvilles 
personnel function, with the total function offering an advisory service to 
line manageaent. 
Strong dissatisfaction with this set-up first surfaced around 1965, 
voiced by the general manager, Ravenscraig and Cartcosh. He claimed that 
the service was inadequate, and that a gap existed between Colville. group 
personnel function geared to the total group of companies and the special 
needs of Ravenseraig who.e problems were significantly different from the 
other works. These difference. were largely due to the technololY and the 
product market problem. of the strip works. Nevertheless, other reasons for 
the dissatisfaction did exist. One such reason concerned the total numbers 
in the personnel function itself. Colvilles Limited employed some 20,000 
people of whoa about 12,000 were .. nual workers. These workers were employed 
in ei&bt major vorks, in several ..-ller enaineering works, and in ancillary 
activities such as bric~kina. This total empire was .erviced by two men 
of .enior .. nag .. ent status, assi.ted by four labour officer. at the general 
office, two at Ravenscraig, and one labour cum personnel officer at Gartcosh 
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Works. None of the other works had full-time labour officers. Another 
reason for the dissatisfaction was the strong commibDent of Colvilles to 
ISTEA. As a result the personnel director and chief labour manager spent 
much of their time and energy in the service of the Association's standing 
and policy making committees. This applied not only at the London end, but 
also in the ISTEA's Scottish Division which Colville's, with a virtual 
monopoly of steel production, dominated. The only other affiliates outside 
of the Colvilles group of companies was Clydesdale Works of Stewart and 
Lloyds, Parkhead Works of Beardmore Company Limited, and the Northern Works 
of Baird and Scottish Steel Company which Colvilles partly owned. Given 
this employer association orientation and the above ratio of personnel staff 
to employees, it was little wonder that a gap existed and the service offered 
by the Group Labour Office to Ravenscraig Works was not all that was desired -
at least in the opinion of the new general manager Ravenscraig and Gartcosh. 
At Ravenscraig itself, the works labour function was heavily overworked 
as it attempted to service deparbDental managers with soae 3,200 manual 
workers. This ratio of labour specialists to line managers and employees 
was such that it reinforced the autonomy of line manag .. ent in the sense that 
the labour function had little formal authority or influence in the works. 
In fact, there was no policy statement, even oral at this tiae, instructing 
line mana,eaent to discuss labour probl .. s with the works labour deparbDent 
prior to takina a decision. Similarly, no instruction was liven that 
.. na,ers should not bave for.al meetina_ with trade union representatives 
without the presence of the labour deparbDent. What influence the department 
had vas dependent upon the initiative of individual managers who brought 
their problema to the deparbDent for advice. 
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The role of the works labour deparbnent in those years was to give advice 
when asked on current wage claims, to interpret the various national, area 
and works collective agreements when disputes arose over their application; 
to attend joint management/union meetings when possible to aSlist the depart-
mental and engineering management - the latter always taking the chair; to 
prepare statistical information to counter union wage claims; to write up 
collective agreement. which even then were formally and precisely written, 
and to keep a record of such negotiating meetings. 
Furthermore, at the informal level the influence of the works labour 
department continued to have severe constraints placed upon it. For example, 
all management from departmental head upwards had separate dining room 
facilities. On the assumption that thil represents a point of contact and 
an opportunity for managers to discusl with each other their problema in a 
private and unofficial manner, the works labour officer, who vas denied these 
facilities was not privy to discussions of plant problems. Again this gave 
weight within the status and communications structures to the deparbDental 
managers in their relationships with the works labour department. Thus, 
given itl pOlition in the management hierarchy the works labour deparbDent's 
ability to influence, coordinate and coni train management autonomy on labour 
ilsuel, was very It.ited. In effect, this power va. pOlse.sed by the more 
senior group labour managers, however, as mentioned previously, they were 
not clo.e enough to Ravenscraig. In addition, there wa. no work. level 
Itrategy of a positive kind to take them in that direction. 
A final realon for the dis.ati.faction expressed by the new general 
manager, concerning the service offered to Ravenlcraig by the group labour 
department, wa. due to an upheaval which took place within Colvilles senior 
manageaent itself. Thi. involved the dismissal of the previous general 
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manager at Ravenscraig, and as part of the change a new post, Director of 
Personnel and Labour Services with full board status was established. The 
new personnel director had been the company's managing director (Works). (5) 
However, the creation of this personnel post did not mean that Colvilles 
attributed greater importance to the personnel function, it was more the out-
come of the reshuffle within the management hierarchy. The need for this 
management change had come about because of the difficult production and 
market problems faced by Colvilles strip works. 
The new general manager came from the Steel Company of Wales (strip 
producers) primarily to sort out the Ravenscraig problem. In fact, he was 
the first senior manager employed by Colvilles with direct experience of hot 
strip mill practice. Both the previous general manager and the managing 
director (Works) were experts in blastfurnace practice. This change reflected 
the importance that the Colville Board now attached to the Ravenscraig 
problem, and in particular to the quality of its strip steel. Therefore, 
after an initial period of settling in, the new general manager turned his 
attention to the industrial relations area, and from this point on a new 
strateaY developed for both Ravenscraig and Gartcosh Works. 
The new aeneral m&nager's plan contained two eleaents. One a.pect was 
to raise the status of the personnel function at Ravenscraig, and thereby 
to limit the laraely autonomous and fragmented activity of the works manaaers 
as described above. The second aspect involved increasing the autonomy of 
the strip works viz-A-viz the Colvilles Group Labour Office. 
As a first step, in July 1966, a nev personnel manager-Ravenscraia and 
Gartcosh WQrks vas appointed. This post was of much higher status than that 
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of the works labour officer in the management hierarchy. The manager 
concerned had direct access to the general manager, and to the other works 
level managers. Moreover, the general manager made it clear, verbally, to 
the Ravenscraig senior managers that the new personnel manager had authority 
to determine works level personnel policy and to coordinate labour activities. 
Consequently, all wage claims, manning issues, disciplinary cases, etc., 
were to be routed through the personnel deparbDent. Eventually, by late 1967, 
the personnel manager had replaced the various works and departmental 
manalers as chaiman of the management side in negotiations with the trade 
unions. Therefore, increasingly the personnel department came to make 
executive decisions on labour matters. Furthermore, if a dispute arose 
between line and functional manageaent, the general manager acted as 
arbitrator. These developments were pushed further in 1968, with the pro-
motion of the works labour officer to the new status of Industrial Relations 
Manager. These developments at Ravenscrail were similar to those which had 
taken place at Port Talbot Works where the new general manager had previously 
beeu employed. 
This change resulted in soae internal manageaent conflict, for not all 
works level managers Alreed with the curtailment of their decision making 
authority in the personnel area. Iu particular, the new personnel .. nager 
experienced difficulties with those manalers who remained caamitted to the 
traditional syst .. of authority. The traditional and foraal Iystem continued 
to .mphalize the Ravenscraig persoDDel depart.ent'l direct line of responsi-
bility to the Group Labour Office. lor instance, Ravenscraig Works managers, 
when it suited th_. would ipore the general .. nager's policy by takina 
their probleas directly to the Group Labour Office. This ,ave the Group 
Labour Office an influence which it could use to resist any separate 
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policies formulated at Ravenscraig. Moreover, the degree of conflict was 
heightened by the company's formal organisation which had not been altered 
as it affected Ravenscraig. Thus, although the Ravenscraig policy tightened 
up by coordinating management's internal activities at works level, the new 
general manager could not establish a formal and separate policy for 
Ravenscraig and Gartcosh. In fact, this remained the case up to 1970, when 
the British Steel Corporation set up its product divisions. Nevertheless, 
some innovations were made at Ravenscraig during this time which were not 
made at other Colvilles works. These included the establishment of a Works 
Consultative Council for Ravenscraig and Gartcosh, and a suggestion .cheme. 
Therefore, in conclusion, it can be said that the general manager had 
only liaited success in proaoting a separate formal policy for the strip 
work.. These changes were most effective at the informal level within 
Ravenscraig management organisation, and in those areas outside the estab-
lished collective bargaining and wage structures. The company's industrial 
relations policy, enshrined in the attitudes of the Group Labour Office, 
showed a strong commibDent to the employers' association and the traditional 
collective bargaining arrangements. Thus, the new general manager was 
unable to obtain the autonomy for Ravenscraig which he desired viz-a-viz 
the rest of the Colville. company. 
Trade Union Or.anisation 
At Iavenscraig there were nine independent trade union. with recog-
nition representina .. nual .-ployees in negotiations with management. The 
absolute and relative sise and to loae extent importance of the various 
unions can be .een in the next table. 
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Table 7.3 
Ravenscraig Works, Trade Union Membership, 1973 
Iron and Steel Trades Confederation 
AUEW (Engineering Section) 
EETPU (Electrical) 
ASBSMSW (Boilermaker s) 
UCATT (Bricklayers) 
EETPU (Plumbers) 
ASBSMSW (Blacksmiths) 
UCATT (Woodworkers) 
Transport and General Workers Union 
(6) 
2,633 
374 
202 
131 
95 
67 
18 
10 
141 
source: I5TC Divisional Office and Ravenscraig Personnel DeparbDent 
The TGWU represented workers in canteen and cleaning services, and are 
of no further interest in this study. The AUBTW(UCATT) represented all time 
served bricklayers, who at Ravenscraig a. at national level, had their own 
collective bargaining arrangements. They, also are of no further interest. 
The focus of interest revolves around the reaaining uniona, who with certain 
qualifications, fall into two major occupational groups, that is, ISTC 
representing production and service workers and the six maintenance unions. 
In more detail the Confederation organised workers in traffic, power, 
general and bricklayers labourers as well as production workera. In addition, 
they organised the craft.-ens' mates who in most steel works are in msaber-
ship of the craft unions - this included Corby. The NUBF does not operate 
in Scotland and worker. who belong to it in England and Wales are in member-
.hip of the Confederation. 
The union's membership of 2,633 was partly .ustained by the existence 
of a post-entry closed shop at the works. No formal agreement existed, but 
an inforaal understandiug did. The procedure was for branch officials to 
approach a new recruit, who would be expected to join the union after some 
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unspecified time period. Refusal to do so led to problems when the workman 
concerned was due for promotion within the works. Furthermore, at Ravenscraig 
a document existed which outlined a procedure for dealing with members of 
the union who had fallen into arrears with their dues. The document was 
signed by the divisional officer of the union, but not by the management, 
who nevertheless implemented it. In such cases the branch official would 
approach management giving the cire~stances of the person concerned and 
asking for his dismissal. After ensuring that all alternatives had been 
explored concerning the repayment of the aan's arrears, failure to do so 
resulted in dismissal. In these two ways ISTC attempted to sustain 
membership at the works. 
However, a disparity occurs if the 1973 membership figure of 2,633 
is compared with the 2,905 employees that the union had the ri&ht to 
organise. Although this shows a high density figure of 91~. nevertheless, 
the number of non-unionists was a matter of concern to the Divisional Office, 
(7) and it was a factor making for the union's agreement to certain changes 
which took place in trade union organisation around, 1971. 
Within the works, ISTC membership divided down into eleven branches. 
Th. following table shows the size of these branches and the work groups 
and occupations covered. 
311. 
Table 7.4 
ISTC Branch Membership at Ravenscraig Works, 1973 
Ravenscraig Nol Branch 156 
(melters, vesselmen and all pitside grades) 
Ravenscraig No2 Branch 98 
(power station personnel and waste heat boilermen) 
Ravenscraig No3 Branch 298 
(coke ovens and by-products) 
Ravenscraig No4 Branch 131 
(locomotive crews and mobile cranes) 
Ravenscraig No5 Branch 122 
(bricklayers labourers) 
Ravenscraig No6 Branch 325 
(ore handling, sinter plants and blaatfurnaces) 
Ravenscraig No7 Branch 306 
(craftsmens mates, greasers and platelayers 
in the Iron and Steel Works) 
Ravenscraig No8 Branch 685 
(dab mill, slab yard, dressing bay and hot strip) 
Ravenscraig No9 Branch 151 
(hot sheet finishing and dispatch) 
Ravenscraig NolO Branch 182 
(craftsmens labourers in mills) 
Ravenscraig Noll Branch 179 
(charger and crane drivers in the melting shops) 
source: BSC, Ravenscraig Works 
Each of these branches of ISTC was located in the work_, and was 
governed by a committee consisting of the officers of the branch, and three 
others. (8) The major officers were the President, Branch Secretary and 
Branch aepresentative. Branch stewards exist for collecting membership dues, 
but are not shop stewards in the enaine.ring industry sense. These branch 
officials have for.al authority within the union's goveromental framework 
to interview .-ployers in the works on matters which affect the terms and 
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conditions of employment of any member or members of the branch. The 
important officials regarding day to day dealings with management are the 
branch representative and secretary. Moreover, Rule 19 (9) dealing with 
shop disputes, spells out the autonomy of the branch and the right of its 
officials to meet representatives of the employer with a view to obtaining 
a settlement. However, the branches did not have authority to call strikes 
which lay with the union's Executive COUDcil.(lO} 
The branches of the Confederation, then, have authority to deal with 
and negotiate various work place issues with management, and as will be 
shown subsequently these issues were considerable. Moreover, it is in this 
sense that ISTC is a democratic union meeting certain important needs of 
the meabership. Furthenaore, the importance of workplace negotiations to 
the meabership, would appear to have heightened the feeling of branch 
autonomy by encouraging a separate identity on the part of the branches 
over collective bargaining issues. This it will be shown later, was clearly 
reflected in their strike behaviour. 
In the years 1964-70 Ravenscraig appeared to have had one aajor union 
covering all production and service workers. However, in reality, and over 
many issues, there were eleven ... 11 branches (averag. size 239 .embers 
each) all purauiDi their own goala, most of which did not coincide with 
thos. of the other branches.(ll} 
ADother Confederation body existed at Ravenscrail which was known as 
the Worka Joint Branches eo..ittee. This body .xisted from the earlieat 
daya and conalsted of representatives from iron, .teel and .ervice branches. 
Subsequently, th.s. branches were aug.ented as new develop.ents took place 
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in the form of the mills. The Committee consisted of delegates from the 
branches who in turn elected a chairman and secretary. The latter were in 
no way full-time lay union officials. This institution was authorised in 
the rules of the union, (12) which are worth quoting in full: 
'For the purpose of coordination and consultation on matters 
of common and general interest to members, the Executive 
Council shall authorise where it considers necessary, the 
establishment of Joint Committees at Works where there are 
a number of branches of the organisation or in an area 
within the division. It shall draw up standing orders under 
which the Committee shall function so as to ensure that they 
do not in any way encroach upon the autonomy of the branches 
nor interf.re with the functioning of negotiating machinery 
existing in the various sections of the industry.' 
The Ravenscraig Ca..!ttee appeared to have worked very much within 
th.se fonul rules in its relations with management. With regard to matters 
of comaon and gen.ral int.r.st, it did on rare occasions meet senior manage-
.ent to discull luch issue. a. physical amenitiel, meals, and transport to 
and from work. However, it was not a negotiating coaaittee and in no way 
interfered with branch autonomy. In fact, it was denied that the joint 
committee even pasled information betwe.n branches concerning wag. lettle-
.ents, the secr.tary of the com.itt.e (13) noting that I "ISTC branches 
consid.r vage agr .... nts perlonal to themselv.I." Th.refor., the Works 
Joint Br.och.s eo..itte. confor.ad yery much to the rule book, and at this 
t~e was an unimportant body within the Ravenscraia industrial relations 
syst_. 
Th. c~tt.e vas illportant in another respect. howeyer, which had to 
do with the internal political proce .. within the union. RaYenscraig 
branches aet to influence d.cisions to b. taken at Divisional Branch 
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Officers Conference, and at the Divisional Heavy Steel Conference. Within 
the union the foruer was primarily concerned with passing resolutions on 
social and political issues. The latter body debated and sent resolutions 
to the Executive Council on wages and conditions of employment. Of course, 
all the Divisions of ISTC send in such resolutions, but it was the 
Executive Council who decided between them. This procedure, in the absence 
of a national delegate conference, puts greater power into the hands of 
national leaders on such issues. Moreover, it left the union open to charges 
of being right wing and uDdemocratic. However, this national situation must 
be balanced against the high participation of rank and file members which 
the union constitution allows branches at works leve1.(14) In addition, 
the Scottish Divisional Heavy Steel C~ttee elected ten delegates to the 
Standing Coamittee which in turn appointed five delegates to the Heavy Steel 
Central Negotiating eo..ittee who represent the Scottish Division in 
national negotiations with the employers. 
The use made of the Ravenscraig Joint Branches Coamittee viz-A-viz 
manag .. ent, a180 reflected the jefensive strategy pursued by the Colville 
company, and its high commibDent to deparbBental autonomy on labour matters. 
However, it will be recalled that fra. the middle 1960s on, a struggle was 
taking place within the management organisation itself over industrial 
relations policy. Also, as the Ravenscraig personnel depar~ent's influence 
increased, much of the deparaaental managers autonomy was constrained. 
Nevertheless, the traditional syst .. continued to receive support fro. the 
Group Labour Office, and therefore industrial relations policy did not 
chanae at the formal level. In addition, the traditional system of auto-
nomous and fra~ented bargaining received support throughout the period 
from the equally fraa-ented trade union organisation. Hence, even if the 
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new general manager had wished to change the traditional collective bargain-
ing arrangements, and had not met with resistance from within management, 
there might well have been resistance from the Confederation. 
The ISTC Divisional Office was staffed by a divisional officer assisted 
by two divisional organisers. At Ravenscraig, the Confederation's membership 
seemed to be well served by their full-time officials. There was frequent 
face to face contact through visits to the works to handle members grievances. 
This was probably due to various factors such as the concentration in the 
siting of the major steel works, the high incidence of strike activity, the 
branch structure, and the nature of the collective bargaining arrangements 
and payments system. Moreover, the ratio of full-time officials to Confeder-
ation membership compares well with the craft unions.(15) 
The strategic aims of the Divisional Office formulated in the early 19605 
are of greatest significance to the development of industrial relations at 
Ravenscraig. When the Ravenscraig phase one plan was developed, (that is, 
coke ovens, sinter plant, blastfurnace and open hearth shop) the Scottish 
standard of manning (giving Ravenscraig tight manning as mentioned preTiously) 
and earnings had been applied. This was so although the units of plant at 
Ravenscraig were larger than those existing elsewhere in Scotland. However, 
with the Ravenscraig phase two development, which included items of plant 
such as the hot strip mill, slab mill and basic oxygen shop, the situation 
was quite different. These units of plant were new, and no direct Scottish 
comparisons were possible. Consequently, both management and unions switched 
their attention south of the border to search for comparisons. 
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In particular, the Divisional Office of the union made comparisons 
with the high paying strip producers in north and south Wales. The union's 
attitude was that Ravenscraig sold strip steel at the same fixed price in 
the domestic markets as other strip preducers, and that the operatives 
should be paid the same wage. o Evidence for this assertive strategy can 
be seen in a quote from a letter sent by Colville's chief labour manager to 
the Director of ISTEA, (16) "In particular he (the Divisional Officer) 
has now made a claim for a revision of the provisional rates at Ravenscraig 
hot strip mill on the grounds that they are inadequate and do not match 
the rates paid at Spencer Works. From our negotiations so far in connection 
with the hot strip mill, it has become evident that he is relying wholly 
on manning, rates and earnings at similar plants in the south, that is, 
Steel Company of Wales, Summers Shotton Works, and Richard Thomas and 
Baldwins-Spencer Works." Further evidence of the union'. developing 
strategy can be obtained from its submission made to the Industrial Court 
over a revision in the labourers tonnage bonus at Ravenscraig.(17) The 
relevant passage. are contained in sections 25 and 21. Section 25 states, 
"the Confederation had always claimed that earnings at the work. should be 
comparable with those of s~ilar modern plant. in the steel industry else-
where in Britain such as Shotton, Spencer and Port Talbot." Again, section 
21 reads, "In the Confederation'. view compari.on. in the pre.ent case must 
be .. de not with other Scotti.h works, but with comparable leading iron 
and steel plants in Enaland and Wale., and particularly with the strip mill 
.ection of the industry." 
Clearly the union'. Divi.ional Office responded to the opportunity 
pre.ented by the technological innovations and formulated a .trate,y who.e 
central purpose wa. to break through the lower Scottish standard of 
earnina'. Further evidence of this lower standard of aamina' a. it 
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applied to craftsmen will be given later. Finally, this more assertive 
strategy coincided with the appoinbnent of a new divisional officer to the 
Glasgow office. 
The Craft Union. 
As shown above there were six craft unions at Ravenscraig in the period 
1964-70. It was also noted from member.hip figures that the AUEW with 374 
members was the largest of the.e. The union organi.ed all fitters, turners 
and most of the semi-skilled craft •• en including riggers. The next large.t 
union the EETPU had 202 members and organi.ed the electrician., electrical 
fitt.r., in.trument mechanics, and a few other a •• istants .uch as lampmen. The 
third large.t union, the Boilermaker. (ASBS~SW) with 131 members, organised all 
plater., welder. and a few semi-skill.d burners. The remaining three union. 
were very IBUch ... Uer, that is, the Plumbers (EETPU) with 67 members, Black-
ami ths (ASBS~SW) wi th 18 member. and the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers 
(UCA'M') with 10 joiner. at the work •• 
The ..-b.r.hip of the craft union. wa. partly su.tained by the .xi.t.nce 
of a pre-.ntry clo •• d shop. Th.re wa. no foraal written Alr .... nt, but no 
craft..an would be employed at the work. unless he po •••••• d the appropriate 
union card. When a non-uaionist applied for a job, h. was inform.d by the 
personnel d.parba.nt to .ecur. a cerd fra. the local branch, and on obtaining 
the card, to .tart work. Con.equently, craft union ... ber.hip at Raven.craig 
wa. One hundred percent. 
aepre.entation within the craft union. was orlani.ed along the followiac 
line'l (18) Each individual union had .everal .hop steward. elected by s.ction 
and ... 11 work Iroup. in the various deparbaent.. In effect, this .eant that 
each deparbaent not only had a .hop .teward for each individual union, but 
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also for the different occupational groups within one union. For exa.ple, 
the AUEW had separate .tewards for fitters and riggers. In turn, all the 
.teward. within a particular union elected a convener to .peak on behalf of 
their union. 
The Ravenscraig Joint Shop Steward. Comadttee con.i.ted of the convenera 
of the individual cr.ft unions, who .lected from amongst th .... lv •• a conv ... r 
aad .ecr.tary, who became the principal officer. of the ca.dtt.e. The purpose 
of this c~ttee w.s to pursue with manageaent any qu •• tion which concerned 
the interest. of the craftsa.n, and which .ffected aore than one uuion. SuCh 
matt.r., •• will be .hown .ubseque.tly, often took the fo~ of neloti.tions 
.bout .dditioaal p.yment •• nd p.rticul.rly workina .~ana ... nts. Hov.v.r, thi. 
w ••• ot to •• y th.t e.ch individual union had not and could Dot h.ve .ep.r.te 
interests which it pursued with _nagement outside the joint cOlllDittee 
.tructure .s for ex.aple with discipline and dia.i ••• l c..... On bal •• ce 
how.v.r, the degree of int.r-craft joint working w.s high .t Rav •• scr.ig. !he 
situ.tio. w •• thus very differ.nt from that at Corby. 
The Work. Joint Craft eo.u.ttee w.s p.rt of the fomal tr.de union struc-
ture i. the i.du.try, .nd •• a 1.,ittmAt. in.titution ••• re.dily grant.d 
r.coanitioa by 8ADa&eme.t for collective b.rg.iniaa purpo.... Source. for 
this legitt.acy .re to b. found by reference to the Scottish proc.dar. &gr ... 
.. nt (19) .... betw •• n the Scotti.h Iron aad Steel Tr.d •• Joi.t eo..itt •• 
(SISTJC) aDd Mol Division of 1ST!! in 1957. Thi. agr ..... t, in turn, fits 
within the national agr ..... t .. de b.tw •• n the National Joint Tr.d. Dalon 
Crafua ••• ' Iron an. St •• l ec-itte. (l.t.r the HCCC) .nd ISTIA. Th. aatio .. l 
proc.dur ... r .... at r.f.r. to, .nd .11ows i. cl.u.e 5, for n.gotiatio .. 
b.twe.n ......... t •• d r.pr •••• tativ. •• of the cr.ft union •• t works lev.l. (20) 
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Another feature of the relationship between the joint com.ittee at 
Ravenscraig and the SISTJC concerned representation on the latter\ negotiatiDa 
ca..ittee. The constitution of the SISTJC followed the model laid down at 
national level and allowed each affiliated union to have a minimum of one 
representative on the committee, with additional representation aareed at local 
level on the basis of the affiliated meabership. In Scotland all trade union 
full-time officials were members of the committee with at least oae lay union 
representative from each aaion. The joint committee appointed a chairman aDd 
secretary with the latter the main driving force in its day to day deliber-
ations. Alain, in accordance with the model constitution, the SISTJC elected 
a neaotiatina committee which consisted of five persons, that is, chairman and 
secretary, plus three others. One of the three was a full-time official~and 
the reaainine two were shop stewards from works within the area or district. 
The neaotiatine comaittee al.o had powers of cooption. However, unless the 
cooption powers were used, there were only two lay representatives on the 
ca.mittee from the eleven works in membership of Nol Division, ISTIl. In fact, 
the Ravenscraig craft .. en had no direct representation on the Scottish negob-
iatine com.ittee, and this would see. to have been one eleaent in their 
appare.t lack of ca.mitaent to Scottish area n.aotiationa. 
rinally, there is the question of the relationship bet.een craft and 
production unions at Ravenscraig. lD the period 1964-70 the relationship c .. 
be taken as at best indifferent, and at t~es one of crisis and hostility to 
ODe another. There were various rea.ons for thi.. ODe rea.on, con.idered 
previou.1y, va ... naa .. ent's preference for the traditional autoaoaous and 
fras-ented structure which facilitated local baraainina by the production 
uaioa braDChes, but not by the craft uaious. The explanation of this will 
bee ... clearer after the collective baraaining arranaeaents of both aDMP' h.ve 
320. 
been discussed. Other reasons for the hostility related to lack of under-
standing encouraged by different union oraani.ations and the different com.it-
ments of production and craft workers to the industry. These attitad.s had 
much to do with the industry's historical develop.ent, technological advance-
ment, and with the culture and ideologies which had developed within and 
between the two groups. 
Tbe Collective BargainiDi ArraDiements and Problems Ari.iDl 
In the following analysis the work force i. again divided into maintenance 
and production workers, including service workers. Tbeir methods of job 
regulation, factors which have already been a.sociated with baraainina 
structure. (see Chapter Five, page 142), are then used to analyse this aspect 
of the industrial relations systea. In addition, the analysis will then 
attempt to identify and explain the major industrial relations probl .... 
The .. intenance workers fall into two main catelories, craftsman and 
non-craft .. en. The craft .. en and seat-skilled as mentioned preyiously were 
oraauised into six craft unions. The others, the non-craft .. en, vcre oraaDise. 
in Ia.e.scraia branches 50s 7 and 8, which covered such occupational croups 
as craft .... s mates, Ireaser. and .toremen. The craft unions viII be dealt 
with fir.t. 
ODe .ianificant differenee between craft ... n and production workers va. 
that the for.er bad relatively .uch Ie.. to baraain about at works le.el. CD 
vace. this aaounted to a fev extra par-ant. for workiaa vith special tools, 
which in .al.e te~, rarely ..aunted to acre than 2d per hour aboYe the 
hourly rate of 4/11.21. These extra. vere nor.ally necotiated at deparbaental 
le.el between the local enaineerina .. neaer and the .hop stevard of the 
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appropriate union. Much more important, however, was the amount of collective 
bargaining which occurred over abnormal condition money (ACM), that i., extra 
payment to compensate for dirt, oil, grease, dust, fumes, etc., encountered 
on the job. Negotiations over this issue were important to the developaent 
of subsequent events. 
Raven.craig had paid ACM on the ore preparation and sinter plants from 
the late 1950.,(21) but not in o~er deparbaent.. In this period new capital 
development brought into operation the bigger and dirtier N02 .inter plant in 
1963, and the new basic oxygen .hop in 1964. Both the.e plant. gener.ted a 
lot of fine du.t which the extraction equipment could not handle effici.ntly. 
As a re.ult, pres.ure be,an to build up fro. the Joint Craft eo..ittee to 
.pread the ACM payment. to these newer units of plant. 
Al.o, .bout 1964, discussion. were going on .t Scotti.h lavel b.tw •• n the 
SISTJC aad Nol Division of ISTEA, in order to est.bli.h a p.,.ent for aain-
teuKe cr.ft.en working on jobs .Ireed 10c.lly, within e.ch work •• to be 
exce •• ive1y dirty. The divi.ional .gre .. ent bee ... oper.tive in October, 1965 
and paid 3d p.r hour for perforaiq a,re.d dirty jobs. III addition, there 
w.s • .tn~ p.yment of four hours, .nd • free i •• ue of overall •• v.ry six 
IIlOIlthS. This a,reament .pplied to all work. in Nol Divi.ion, includiuc 
Bav.nscr.il_ 'or. tbae the lavenscrai, Joint Cr.fts eo..ittee WeDt .10Ul 
with the Scottish 1eYe1 neloti.tiona, and pre.sure at the work ••••• d off. 
Howev.r, vb.n the Scotti.h disc ••• ion. were n.ar to coap1etion aDd th.ir 
•• b.tance kDowD, the &av ... crai, craft .. n decided to break out aDd pur.ue 
their OWD cla~. They .rl.ed that Rav.n.crail due to it •• is., t.chDo1olY 
... inferior worki .. conditions differed fro. the r •• t of the Scotti. work •• 
Thus the lav.uscrail cr.f~n considered theaselve. outside the divi.ional 
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dirty work agreeRent, and although management tried, the agreeaeat waa never 
applied at the works. 
With the refuaal of the Raven.craig craft .. en to accept the divisional 
aarecaent, the committee again exerci.ed pressure to secure extra payments 
in exce.a of the 3d obtained at Scottish level. Ravens craie manaa ... nt'. 
response was to re.i.t and offer the divisional aCEe .. ent. MOreover, liven 
their c~taent to the traditional bareailline atructure., maue_ent were 
unable at fir.t to perceive the need for a coordinated .trategy at work. 
level to meet the Joint Craft Committee'. pre •• ure. Con.equently, aelotiat-
ion. were conducted in a piece aeal and ad hoc aaDOer by deparbaental encineers 
and local .hop .tewards. The up.hot was, that in at.ost every department 
whole list. of ACK job. were acreed aDd separate value. eatablished for .ach 
job. This development re.ulted in literally huDdr.d. of ACK rates throughout 
the work •• (22) Soae aea.ure of the .ignificance of Rav.Bacrai, ACM .e,otiab-
iODS caa be .een fro. the followin& figure.. In 1965, .aae 65t of craf~ 
received 19/- averaae ACK or 4.8t of a craft..an's earaines ba.ed upon 50 
hour. per week. By 1968, this filure had risen to 46/4 or lOt of a crafts-
..... eaminas, calculated on the .... basi.. Thu., the RaveRscraie crafts-
.. n achi.ved their a~ by .ecuriDi 4;d per hour averac. ACK payment. 
At thi. point, ia 1968, the Bavenscrail persoanel depart.ent be, .. to 
recoani.e the -ani tude of the ACM probl. and bec.e cOllVinced tha t ... 
initiative w .. required to obtain control. Thi. took the fora of a WDrk.-
wide ACM aar .... nt .e,otiated directly betwee. the works PersoaRel Daparbaant 
aad the Joi.t Craft eo.aittee. The aare .. ent divided the work. into four 
area. for ACM purposes, that ia, ore preparation aDd siater plant., ba.ic 
oxygen .hop, open hearth .hop, and the remaining iron works ar.a. Ko pa,..at 
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was made in the mills. The agreement made a flat payment per hour for 
specified jobs in each plant, and the highest payment was in the .inter plant. 
It became operative 1n 1970 and te~nated all local departmental IIreement. 
reducing the number of rates from literally hundreds to four. 
Thi. shift in the level of collective bargaining, on the one hand from 
deparbaental to work. level, and on the other, from divi.ional to the works 
level, had the effect of reducing the negotiating powers of both deparbaental 
engineer. and the Group Labour Office. Thus the change met with .0IIe resist-
ance from both quarters. What then brought about this chaaae in lU11agements 
traditional attitude? 
There were several factors at work. First the Joint Craft Ca.aittee 
favoured the development as a means of establishing control oyer its own 
..-bers a. baviDg the right to negotiate this ~ortant i •• ue would enhance 
the ca..dttee's .tatu.. On the management side, the change in attitude could 
be traced to the increa.iDg influence of the new personnel manager. Since 
his arrival at Baven.craig he had increa.ed the degree of coordination in 
aana.eaent', re.pon.e to union cla~s. This was achieved by obtaininc 
authority for the per.onnel deparbaent to negotiate and make agree.ent. with 
the union., although this strategy left the traditional collective bargainiac 
and .a,e .tructure. in tact. But with the conclu.ion of the craft .. en'. ACK 
agr .... nt an bmovation had taken place at the formal lev.l wi tb a change in 
the collective bargainiDg arraDgeaents and in the wage structure it.e1f. 
rurther.ore, the Group Labour Office was power Ie.. to oppo.e the chance partly 
because the Bav.n.crai, craft .. en had di •• ociated tbemae1ves from the divi.ion-
a1 dirty work aare ... nt. and were creating difficulties at Bavenscraig. 
A third factor which increased the personnel manager's influence within 
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the management decision-making process was the provision, for the first time, 
of systematic information showing the amount of ACM paid, and the upward 
direction of the trend. ACM payments had not been part of the official wage 
structure until the divisional agreement of 1965, and therefore they had 
grown up at Ravenscraig in a semi-informal fashion.(23) Thus, during most 
of the 1960s, a system developed whereby each deparbDental engineer negotiated 
a aeries of piece-meal agreements, and the specific workman's hours were 
recorded at a given ACM rate. This record was sent by each engineer to the 
pay officeo At the pay office, the clerks simply worked out each man's 
entitlement for pay purposes. In other words, no senior manager in the 
organisation knew the amount of cash paid out in the form of ACM, what this 
constituted as a proportion of the craftsmen's earnings, or whether the amount 
paid out had increased, fallen, or remained stable over the years. Hence, 
when the personnel deparbaent, on its own initiative,(24) established the 
information, it became clear to all that the previous strategy (offering the 
divisional dirty work agreement, whilst leaving departmental engineers to 
negotiate) vas a failure. Therefore, Ravenscraig personnel deparbaent's 
arlu.ent that a works-vide ACM agreement would increase management control 
eventually won acceptance. 
These, then, vere the wage issues negotiated within the works, both 
being the subject of formal and precisely written documents made at depert-
aental and works level. Moreover, all the agreements vere open eDded, except 
the works-wide ACM agreement which contained a fixed two year period. 
However, the rules regulating other issues were much .ore controversial 
and fell within the area of unilateral regulation by both -.nagement and 
union. On the question of aaaning, there was no agreed standard manning as 
with production workers. Here, management reserved the right to alter the 
craft labour force upwards or down wards as Circumstances dictated. Also, 
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the method of rota working did not apply universally as with production 
workers, as only one third of craftsmen worked on continuous shifts. The 
day shift craftsaen worked in this period frOB Monday to Friday with over-
time - usually two night. and a Saturday and a Sunday. Saturday, for social 
reasons, was a difficult day on which to get the required manpower. Never-
theless, manag .. ent did not have a problem getting the maintenance men to 
work overtime, except when the unions decided to use its withdrawal as a 
sanction to achieve so.e other objective. On the other hand, when trade 
deteriorated and management attempted to reduce overtime unilaterally, the 
Joint Craft ComBittee challenged their decision. 
In the period 1964-68, the work. rules were not written down. This 
caused .uch confusion and opposition when management impo.ed sanctions to 
enforce thea. Further, the ab.ence of written rules allowed .cope for 
departaental aanacers to exercise discipline without much recard to co -
ordinatina di.cipline across the work.. Again, this probl .. was tackled by 
the new per.onnel manager who devised a written work. rule book which went 
soae way to coordinating the degree of punisbRent aeted out to offenders. 
Of cour.e, craft .. en were subject to the ... e set of works rules as product-
ion worker •• nd st.ilar probl .. s arose over individual infrina .. ent., and 
lack of con.i.tency in the applic.tion of the rule •• With craft .... , however, 
the disciplinary probl ... and general challenae to aanaaerial authority 
..... d auch .ore ext.a.ive than with production worker.. lor exa.ple, in 
the year. 1964-66, out of the nineteen strikes by .. intenance worker., ten 
or 53~ fell within this catelory, whereas the comparable ficure. for prodacb-
ion workers were forty three .trikes of which ei&hteen or 41~ fell into the 
discipline/authority area. The craft unions also disputed such ibe .. as the 
rilht of staff to .s. tools on jobs cla~ed by craft .. e., aDd the use .. de 
by ........ nt of coatractors in the works. On thi. latter question, the 
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Joint Craft Committee eventually agreed with managemeat that contractor. 
would only be employed on new fabricating work and not on maintenance work. 
Althouah this t.proved the .ituation, it did not .olve it, partly becau.e at 
the .. rgin this di.tinction became blurred. The uaion. exerci •• d job 
demarc.tion rule. unilater.lly but this did not .ppear to g.n.rate .. ch 
conflict. Thi. v •• prob.bly due to .ccept.nce on the p.rt of -.n&g .... t; 
but .lthouah .cceptance might reduce conflict, it w ••• lao indic.tive of 
inefficiency. (25) 
Much of the abOY. negotiation. were coaducted at deparbaental level, 
althouah in the ea.e of the contractor. i •• ue, n.gotiationa oft.n took place 
.t work. lev.l. Cons.quently, the cover.ce of both forael .nd infoxaal 
.. r .... at ... br.c.d l.rg.ly the loc.l work group. conc.rned. On the whole 
then, the a_ber of i •• u ••• ubj.ct to forul joiat r.gul.tion w •• rather 
Darrow, with a au.b.r of other i •• ue •• ubject to ..... g __ t pr.roaative •• 
iacr ••• tasly challeag.d by the union.. OVer the.e latt.r i •• ue. -.a&g".nt 
va. oft.n forc.d to aeaotiat •• 
At Scotti.h area level there vere two t.portaat .ub.tantive aar .... nt. 
wbich applied to bven.cr.ic. The fir.t and lea.t 1IIportant "a. the 
Divi.io .. l Hot Work qre .... t (26) which appli.d to ., .. h.arth .hop. 
throupout the Divi.ion. iacluding lav.n.craig. TIl ... veucraig craft_en 
did not oppo.. the application of this .ar ..... t a. th.y did ~e dirty 
work .. r._t. 
SecOlully, th. tODDq. bonus aare .. nt va. laUch IIOre Ulportut ill the 
..... of prOYidilll anoth.r i .. ipt iato the laveu.crai, cr.ft ... ' • 
• tr.tqy. TIl. alii of the toanaae bonus va. to aiv. the .. iDte~. aen a 
.hare of the prolp.rity of their vorks, although th.y did Dot eontribute 
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directly to output. This bonus could contribute .omethina like 17t of the 
craftSllens eaminas , depending upon the amount of overtime worked. The 
aethod of calculation wa. simple; the parties alreed a .UB (in the 1965 
aareeaent,60/- per week) aad this was divided by the standard output to 
furnish a bonus rate per ton, which was than multiplied by actual weekly 
output. In theory the actu.l output OUCht to be the lame a. the staDelard 
output. 
However, at Raven.craig and Gartco.h the actual payaeat w •• 10/- per 
we.k bicher. Thi. partly reflected the difficulties the nel0tiators had in 
establisbina a .tandard tonnaae for the relatively new Raven.craig Work., 
.ubject a. it wa. to technolocical cbaaa. up to 1964, aad who.a output. 
wara low ralative to capacity. Therefore, the •• t~ted .tandard toDDaae 
.t lav.uscraig wa •• ub.equently out. tripped by actual tODD&ce.. However • 
.. cb .. re difficult to ••• e •• , va. the acca..odatioa .. d. ~y the divisioRal 
.elotiator. to coatain the mdlitaucy of the laven.crail craft.aen who were 
pre •• ina to .chiev. eamine. in line with tho.e paid at the Welsh .trip 
work.. Thi. appears to bave be.n a factor, e.pecially in the liaht of the 
ACM it .. &ad the laveascraic craft .. en'. break-away ov.r that i •• u •• 
Certain .. r ..... t ... d •• t national l.v.l applied to laveR.cr.ig Work •• 
Th • .a.t t.portaRt iacl ••• d the national hourly r.t. of 4/11.21 (1964-69), 
the Aourly co.t of liviac addition. the Moveab.r 1964 'fficieney 10/- p.r 
••• k pl •• extra p.,.ant. for S.rvic •• nd Qualific.tion., • rot. extra 
p.,..at p.r hour for coatia.ou. rotatiac .hift •• lift bour. (or .hift 
.llowanc •• ) for back(2.00 pa - 10.00 pa) and uight (10.00 pa - 6.00 .) 
.hifta, pr __ for .. ek •••• nd ov.rtiae working, holid.y •• ud holiday-with-
pay .. tit1 .... t.. .taadard ... kly hour •• aad finally the au.r •• teed week 
·cr ...... t. 
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Given the purpo.e and functien of the procedural rules (de.cribed on 
page 145 .bove), the craftsmens' procedure .greement w.s formally written 
.nd .greed in 1957, repl.cing the cu.toa and pr.ctice which h.d built up 
over the ye.r.. The .greement (27) formalised recognition for collective 
barg.ining purpo.es to all craft .. en in ... bership of the sign.tory unions. 
Also it .-ph.sized th.t iron and steel v.s • sep.r.te indu.try - probably 
due to the •• tablished pr.ctice in Scotland whereby steel cr.ftamen followed 
up to this tt.e encineering industry rates.(28) The agreeDeat alao contain-
.d • pe.ce cl.use outl.wing the u •• of s.nctions during • dispute by either 
..... _ent or ullions prior to the proc.dure having been. exhausted. 
The procedure cont.ined v.rious stages .t which issue. could be 
illiti.t.d and .atters dealt with arising fra. the lower l.v.l., where f.il-
ure to .,r •• had b.en record.d. These stag.s .llowed • wort.aa to "rai.e 
aay .. tt.r" illitially with his for..-n .Ild failing .gr .... nt, for the shop 
stew.rd to .ppro.ch the dep.rta.nt.l .anager. "aia, if IlO s.ttl ... nt vas 
re.ch ••• third •• tiq vas .rr ..... b.we.1l the work. Ullal.r (at RaV.Il •• 
craig the chi.f eDli ••• r) .•• d shop stewards. It ".s .t the third sta •• that 
~ aar ..... t .... .pecific ~.f.~euc. to .. tt.r. affecttDa .or. thea o.e 
.. ion and allowed for r.pr •••• tative. of the Work. Cr.ft ••• •• eo.utte. 
to ••• t the works ..aaaer. Oft. f.ilure to .gr.e • fourth st .. e i .. olvi .. 
the previous persODD.l plus the full-tiae offici.l of the union concern •• 
wa. arraDled. If the is.ue involv.d IIOre than olle Ullin, then the repre •• 
antativ •• of the SISTJC would be r.pr.sent.d .t the works. The fifth stage 
vu ext.rul to the work. ad .llowed for a joiat sub·c~ttee of .ix 
..,loy.rs· r.pr •• entativ.. (inclu.i .. three ISTEA officials) aDd six u.ioll 
r.pr .... tativ.. (includiDl thr.e SISTJC r.pres •• tativ •• ) to b. h.ld. If. 
fallare to agr •• vu .till r.corded thell the l.sue went to a full Division-
al Conf.r.ace to b. h.ld within four week. of the request being made. This 
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was the only point at which a ttme ltmit was mentioned. On failure to 
aaree, provision va ... de for voluntary arbitration, or .lternatively 
reference of the i.sue to the national office of ISTEA and the UDiORS 
concerned. 
There w.s no procedur.l differentiation, the procedure being formally 
u •• d to handle all disputes (for example clau •• 2 (9) "workman desiring 
to raise any .. tter") including even those consider.d by ....... ent to be 
p.rt of th.ir pr.rol.tives, such a. over the u.e of contr.ctors in the work~ 
The right of recognition .nd repr.sentation for .hop stewards, eT.n the 
richt of the Joint Shop Stewards Com.1ttee were clearly spell.d out in the 
.Ir .... nt. Th. is.u.s on which the shop stew.rd. had the riaht to Degotiate 
were not sp.cified and the phr.se "to raise any _tter" could be taken to 
... n th.t it appli.d to .11 i.aues, or altern.tively only to tho •• vbich 
........ t consid.red not to b. part of th.ir pr.roc.tiv •• , a1Ad ther.fore 
the .ubject of joint reculation. Giv.n the date the -ar •• eat vaa .ade, 
this l.tter aeanina is the IIOre prob.bl., but the choice of word. OWiously 
left roo. for confusion. CD the question of facilities the procedure acr.e-
aent .aid IlOthina. Here UDaI __ nt allowed .hop atewards, nbject to 
p.rai.siou of th.ir t..ediata aup.rviaion, rea .... bl. acc... to all aa.bers 
orcw •• d by their aaion. Tbi. applied to all uuiou coav ... r. ad to the 
CODY.Der aDd a.cretary of the Joiat Craft eo..itt.e. Thia proved r.atrict-
iva aa taa craft uaiou ..... r.hip va. .catt.red throuahout the works. 
eoa.eq ... tly, CODYener. often want.d to ... t to diacua. i •• ue. between 
til_.lv •• of c~. iat.r •• t, but no .. eti.a of this type were allowed in 
the werk.. Thi., in tura, cr.at.d probl ... for intra a" int.r-unioa 
c~icatiOllS, and ... tina. wer. h.ld outaide the works cate. at lunch 
tiae, which of teD. r ••• lt.d in a lock out ael a work .toPP .... 
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Management for their part had the right to expect workers not to impoae 
.auctions uutil the procedure had been exhausted. However, although the 
procedure was agreed for the Scottish area, this made little difference to 
the behaviour of the Ravenlcraig craftsmen, who struck work frequently in 
breach of procedure. 
Bargaiuing uuit sizes varied greatly amoqst craft.ea, frOll the indiTid-
ual union pursaina its own discipline case to the Works Joiut COmmittee 
dea11ug with .. uag_ent ou such i.sues a. a "make ap" ia t01llUlie bOilus earn-
iags, or the nelotiatiou of the ACM acre .. ent in 1970. In the waaes area 
the IIOst iJlportant it_ vas the nelotiation of ACM payaents and the.e throuaJl-
out the 1960., vere laraely conducted within the departaeats. Therefore, am, 
one a,reeaent cOTered only a ... 11 proportion of the total craft force. Of 
course, this created a tendency for work group competition aDd leap frOlling 
leadine to autoncaous and frepeated bargainiug. In the proeedural context, 
the pro),l_ for "ul __ nt wa. alway. to solve the ilaediate probl., with 
little attention given to the repercuI.ions of luch settlaaeats upon other 
Croups. Thus, aiven the collectiTe baraaiuiaa aud maDaa .... t oraaaisation 
of the period. the works personnal department role vas e •• entially a fira 
fightlna one in which little coordination vas achieved. However. a. shown 
abOTe, from .round 1966, a proee •• of chanae v •• underw.y withia - ..... ut.s 
oraaalsation. Thls chance illTolved the personnel dep.rtlaent pl.yina • -.ore 
influenti.l role, olle outc.e of which vas the works-vide ACM a,re.at. 
18 d.a11", with 1l000-cr.ft .... ref.reace will be _de to craft.ell·s 
.. tes, who coutituted by far the laraest llUIlber of worker. ill this Iroup. 
III aany way. the cr.ft _tea vere ia a pecuUar position. On the cae haad 
they vere .. lateUKe wodr.ers, the Jullior p.rmer. of the cr.ft __ .nd 
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therefore were required to follow the craft union.. On the other hand, they 
were in membership of the Confederation, which was the largest .nd most 
powerful union in the industry and this led to certain difficulties viz-a-
viz the craft unions. 
The labourers' branches negotiated at deparbaental level extra p.yments 
per hour for ... bers with additional skills or usinc certain items of equip-
.ent, for .in.t.nce enaineerioa cr.ne lift.. These extras were not a .ignifi-
c.nt it .. in • lUll'. eaminas. ACN paJlllent. however were a IIlOre significant 
f.ctor, vi th the cr.ft mate receiviq two thirds of the ... p.iel to the craft-
.. eD. Th. br.nch offici.l. were di •• atisfied with this perce_teae &Dd made 
many un.ucce •• ful attempts to h.ve it .ltered. They .rgued that the •• te 
got ju.t •• dirty a. the craft ... n, not two third. as dirty. Noreoyer, to 
uke .. tter. wor.e, maDag.ent oft.n negoti.ted with the craft uniORs, and 
then autamatically appli.d the .ettl .. ent (.t two third.) to the .. te •• 
Th.re were few job. uDique to the ute.. In one way this undemiDed the 
.tatu. and iJlportance of the labourer's br.nch offici.ls, .nel ,helped lener.te 
re •• nt.ent between the two group.. This was a further rea.on for the l.ck 
of under.tandina which existed between the craft .. en and the Confeder.tion. 
With rea.rd to other is.ue. such a. overt~e, hours of work, rota 
.. thod. of workina, works rules, di.cipline, etc., the branch offici.ls f.ced 
the .... probl... •• the craft .hop .tew.rd. and re.ct.d in the .... way by 
chall.naing mana.eaent decisiona. Thu., the collective barg.iaina arr.Dle -
.ent. of the craft ut.. clo.ely followed tho.e of the cr.ft .. en iD the 
substantive s.na •• 
The tonaaae lHMau ••• r .... llt w.s made .t divi.ional leyel for all works 
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except Ravenscraig and Gartcosh.(29) At Ravenscraig the agreement again 
reflected the union's strategy to treat the Colvilles strip works separately 
from the other works. The Confederation won this point under a Neutral 
Committee settlement (30) in the light of an Industrial Court recommendatio~ 
(31) The Neutral Committee awarded bonus earnings in excess of those paid 
at other works in the Division, that is, approximately 29/- compared to 
25/- per week. 
At the level of Nol Division, the craft labourers situation was differ-
ent from that of the craftsmen. The labourers hourly base rate (2/2.89 in 
1966) was a divisional agreement (32) whereas the craftsmen's was based on a 
national agreement. Furthermore, as a base rate it was plussed up by the 
.elters' (75%) sliding scale agreement. 
All the other rul •• affecting th. craft labourer'. rates and conditions 
at lavenscraig were det.rmined at national level. The mo.t important of 
the.e included: the hourly cost of living payment, the aelters' slidinc 
scale, the rota extra for continuous shift working, gift hours (or ahift 
allowance.) for back and night shifts, overtime and weekend premiu .. , holi-
days and holiday with pay entitlement, the standard weekly hours per week, 
and the guaranteed week agreement. 
Tbe labour.r.' procedure took the .... customary form as that of the 
production worker.. However, the problema experienced and rai.ed within it 
were the .... a. those raised by the craft .. en. Therefore, when an is.ue 
vas rai.ed in procedure and not settl.d it went through the various stag.s 
and eventually reach.d Neutral Comaittee level. The probl ... , rights, 
responsibilities, and faciliti •• of the branch officials vera alao .~lar 
to tho.. of the craftsaen. Similar also were the lize of the bargaining 
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units and the resultant procedural problems. These problems partly resulted 
from management's organisation and the collective bargaining arrangements. 
At Ravenscraig, lubstantive rules for production workers were mainly 
decided at departmental level between the departmental manager and the branch 
officials, although issues often moved up the procedure before settlement was 
achieved. At the works, wages in the fo~ of base datal and base ahift 
tonnage bonus ratea for particul.r work groups were settled .t thia level. In 
the case of the tonnage bonus r.tes, these are normally based on some standard 
output of • particul.r piece of pl.nt to produce an .greed level of bonus 
earnings to the work group. The tonnage bonus element in a IUn' s gro.a shift 
earnings could constitute .nything up to 40t of total earnings. 
There w.s one important exception amongst production workera to thia 
d.tal/bonus w.ge make-up .nd that was the open hearth shop meltera. Th.y 
were paid on the national "Brown Book" .greement which g.ve the .elter • 
• traight tonn.ge e.rninga. The only time element in th. weae ••• the then 
current coat of living p.yment. The Ravenacraig .elter. remained on thi. up 
to l.te 1966, when they negoti.ted a wage structure near.r to th.t of the 
production workera .t Scottish Divi.ion.l level. 
Another fe.ture of the production workera collective .gr .... nt. in the 
.teel indu.try, and Raven.cr.ig w •• aD exception, ••••• t.t .. ent writt.n 
into the .greement th.t w.ge r.tea would remain unalt.red, aubject only to 
• ch.ng. in working pr.ctice.(33) The l.tt.r r.f.r to org.ni •• tional or 
technologic.l change which al tered in aom. w.y the working arr •• _ent. of 
• group. AD .xaaple would be the introduction of radio communication. for 
loca.otiv. driv.ra. Her. the union would clai. that the change had created 
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additional duties, although in effect the radios might have made the job 
of the drivers easier. 
The production agreements were open ended in form, that is, they had no 
fixed terminal dates written into them. Furthermore, on wage issues the 
agreements were formal, well and precisely written, commencing with a preamble 
followed by a clause cancelling the previous wage rates and establishing the 
new rates, and finally, signed by the representaitves of the employer and 
the union.(34) 
The coverage of such wage agreements were often quite ... 11 and complex, 
for exaaple they might cover a whole department al with the blastfurnacemen 
or a sub-section of a deparbaent. AD illustration of the latter was the 
open hearth shop with its four leparate units in a department employing about 
344 employees. ODe unit consisted of the melters attending the steel .aking 
furnaces; a second the pitside grades responsible for teeaing the liquid 
steel into ingot moulds. Both groups belonged to Ravenscraig Nol Branch. 
Then, there were the machin .. en responsible for the transport of metal, and 
charging furnaces with hot metal and cold scrap. They had their own Noll 
Branch. 'iaally, there were the labourers whose primary function was to 
fill-in (by turn) on production jobs on a temporary basis to cover for 
holidays, sickness, and absenteei... The labourers were in aeabership of 
Ravenscraig Ho8 Branch. This situation described for the open hearth shop 
could be repeated for other depart.ents throughout the works, and shows that 
the vaga datarmiaation process was influenced by a multiplicity of ... 11 
bargaining units. 
The .aDDing of units of plant and the method of shift rota working vere 
the subject of for.al job regulation. Manning negotiations were not .11 
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that common and normally only became an issue if the work lo.d of a group 
went up markedly, or if a new unit of pl.nt was installed, although, the 
practice in other works with s~ilar equipment provided a rough guide. In 
this period there was no question of work study techniques being u.ed to 
establi.h manning standards. At Ravenscrail, nearly all production oper.t-
ives worked five or .ix shifts per week, with. day, or two d.y. off, f.lliog 
on various day. of the week.(35) However, the bwenty one .hift rot. did not 
apply to the ,l.badll which worked a twenty shift week, and the hot strip 
adll .nd finishing deparbBents where the normal seventeen .hift. were 
oper.ted. 
The existence of .greed .tand.rd manning .nd rot. aethod. of work ina 
me.nt th.t overtime was not a problem amongst production worker.. Av.r.ge 
hour. worked in the adddle 1960s were .bove the st.nd.rd week of 42, but not 
by much. For exa.ple, production work.r •• t the open hearth .~p .v.r.ged 
44.86 hours work.d. Any ov.rtim. worked w •• due to .b •• nt •• i .. or .icku •••• 
Th. introduction of new or ... 11 chang •• in equi,.ent wa •• su.lly not. 
probl .. , th.t i., th.r. was no h.rd .t.tu. quo. Di •• gr ..... t. did occur, 
however, ov.r r.te. to b. p.id for the job, .nd •• nction. w.r. often t.po.ed 
vb.n negotiation. lot protract.d and difficult. But, here .,.in a practice 
.xi.ted .t laven.cr.i, a. .t Corby which helped to ov.rcaae this probl .. , 
by p.,..nt of the n.v rate. retro.ctively. Thi. encour.ged .... ' ... nt DGt 
to del.y ne,oti.tion. too long .nd the worker. to .ccept the chaDae without 
t.po.ing .anction •• 
All the .bov. i •• ue. were the .ubject of for.al written rule.; but th.re 
were other is.ue. which did not COR. within the .cop. of for..l .'r .... nt •• 
Many of th ••• i ••••• were the subject of aan.,.ri.l prerog.tiv •• nd 
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unilateral regulation. The most important were the works rules (dealing 
with time keeping, absence from work, payment of wages, etc.) discipline 
and dismissal, and redundancy. 
With regard to discipline and dis.issal, branch officials, like the 
shop stewards, often, but not always, challenged management decisions. More 
accurately, the principle of .. nagement's right to impose discipline was not 
challenged, but inconsistencies and anomalies, seen by union officials betwee~ 
the degree of punisa.ent given for a particular offence in one deparbaent 
compared with another, were challenged. Of course, this was the probl .. 
which the new personnel manager tried to tackle around, 1968. In addition, 
branch officials often challenged management, not because they thought 
workers were bl .. eless, but in order to try and reduce the degr.e of punish-
ment. Thus, lay union officials often acted in the role of advocate in their 
... bers' interests. The upshot of all this was that aanagement often found 
themselves, after exercising discipline, havinl to nelotiate out of a 
situation which was explosive. However, the decision to reinstate or reduce 
the severity of a suspension was often covered by senior aanag ... nt info~ac 
branch officials that they had done so for considerations of lenieRcy. 
Siailarly with redundancy, management's decision to aske X aen redundant 
was challenled and followed by nelotiation between the parties. 
Production workers in turn t.poaed unilateral rules upon aaaag ... nt. 
The .oat illportant was promotion by seniority. For example, when a worblaa 
entered lavenscrail, he joined either the iron, steel or aills labouring 
pool. He then by turned on a temporary basia onto one of aeveral pr~tion 
linea. 'inally, he cho.e a line when a vacancy occured. ODce on the bottoa 
job the .. n advanced up the proaotion line (ladder) to the top position on 
the b •• i. of .eniority. ~e of theae proaotion line. were long and it took 
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many years to achieve the top job.(36) Trade union control over the promot-
ion line was accepted by management. Although with regard to the top job 
such a8 that of mill rollerman, management could hold different views on the 
suitsbility of the next most senior candidate. In such circuastances 
management challenged the seniority rule as its operation was likely to 
adversely affect production. The seniority rule as suggested previously was 
also used by the union to enforce its closed shop policy. For the branch 
would refuse promotion to an "out of compliance" member. (37) The above 
factors created internal proble.s for the branch, for instance, if a .. n vas 
refused promotion he became a "sticker" in his present job, and two or three 
stickers effectively abolish promotion. Hence, Confederation branches were 
intimately involved in the problems of ao-dnisterina the prOllotion lines. 
For production workers, rules .. de outside the works with the exception 
of those affecting melters after 1966, were made at national level. The 
collective agre .. ents included: the annual wage round which added a flat 
sua or percentage per week to earnings for the standard week, a ~nt.ua 
earnings level for labourers, a sliding scale addition at 75t which vas 
added to all base shift datal and tonnage bonus rate. to give gros. shift 
eaminas, and the .onthly cost of living par-ent. The stan4ard hours per 
week, shift overtime and week-end preaiu.a were also regulated at national 
level. In addition, the guaranteed week agre .. ent, holidays and heliday 
with pay entitl .. ent and the extended workina week agre .. ent which-applied 
to the mills were .. de at this level. 
ID teras of proc.dural rules the ISTC had recognition to repr .. ent 
production a" .. lnteaeace worker. for collective bargaining purpo.e.. The 
c •• toaary procedure va. well establi.hed and the various steps known to 
aanaaer. and braach officials .t Ravenscraig. The doae.tic procedure 
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contained three levels, that is, deparbDental level between managers and 
branch officials, works level between works manager (.ubsequently the 
personnel deparbDent) sad branch officials, and again at work. level with 
the addition of the union's full-time offici.l. If a failure to agree was 
recorded at all the doaestic levels, the issue went outside to a Neutral 
Committee. Above this level was a National Sub-Committee staae for dealing 
with national issues and from time to time with an unre.olved di.pute comiua 
up from the work.. Finally, arbitration could be invoked if the p.rtie. 
would agree. There was no customary time limits to th •• e various .tage •• 
At thi. point it is neces.ary to consider the question of the Neutral 
eo.adtte. and the manner in which it operated .t Raven.crai, Work.. These 
eaa.dttees in the period prior to nationali •• tion were n.utral in the sense 
th.t the uniou's divisional officer arr.uged for two r.speeted lay offiCials 
from a company not conc.rn.d with the di.pute, t. h.ar the c.... The 
employer's .ide would do likewi.e. The four neutrals, one of whoa was 
elected chairman (u.ually a manager), sat in for.al se •• ion aDd heard the 
.tat .. enta of the ca •• - both verbal and written - presented b¥ both parties. 
The union side wal always led by a full-time officer acea.panled by the 
branch officiala eoneerned. The employ.r'. aide, by the .. naaera concerned, 
the per.onnel department and the local secretary of the ISTIA.. The peraollllel 
deparbaent prepared all written and statistical evidence. After hearinc 
the case, which might involve an adjournment after the initial stata.ent • 
• 0 that the c_ittee Idaht .ee at fir.t hand the work place concerned, the 
Neutral. retire into closed .e •• ion in order to h ... er out an aare ... nt in 
the liaht of their remit and the evid'ance pre.ented. Alteraatively, they 
Idght fail to ear.e or refer the is.ue back to work. lev.l for .ettlement 
with c.rtain reca..eadaUons. Mo.t important, however, was the Neutral 
eo..ittee'. pl.nary power. to make deci.ions which were binding upon both 
parti ••• (38) 
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The only exception to this formal procedure was that both sides usually 
made informal contact with their respective Neutrals on the evening prior 
to the meeting to ensure that they understood the strong points of their 
respective ca.es. 
The Neutral Committee stage of procedure was not used more than a couple 
of times a year at Ravenscraig, although this was said to be much more 
frequent than at other Scottish works. Some evidence (39) was available on 
this which shows the number of recorded claims submitted at Ravenscraig in 
the years 1969/70. Of the 140 claims submitted, 62 or 451. were either 
dropped or settled at stage one of the procedure, 48 or 341. at stage two, 
28 or 201. at stage three, and only 2 or 11. reached Neutral eo..ittee. The 
kinds of issues that the procedure dealt with predominantly related to 
wages 771., and discipline 101.. Quite clearly then, the doa.stic negotiators. 
d.alt with the large majority of clailU at the works. 
There wa. no procedural differentiation at the works. The procedure 
was used a. an all embracing channel to process all i.sues wheth.r these 
were considered legitimate or not by manageaent. With regard to faciliti.s, 
these did not .. ount to much in the period. Branch officials were allowed 
reasonable access to all members organis.d by their branch, .ubject to 
permi •• ion by their .upervi.or to leave the job. Si~lar provi.ion wa. 
made for official. to attend joint management/union aeetinas. However, no 
formal provision wa. made to allow aeeting. in work. t~e, alth.uah .bort 
infor.al one. were held. Neverthel ••• , on balance, given the way the 
indu.trial relation. sy.t .. was organised in the works, th ••• faciliti •• 
..... d to r.fl.ct the structural needs of the sy.t... Thus, th.r. was no 
pressure fro. the production union, unlike the craftsmen, for an exten.ion 
to faciliti ••• 
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Management for their part had a customary expe~tation that workers in 
dispute would abide by the procedure and not impose sanctions until it had 
been exhausted. However, it did influence behaviour, although as shown 
subsequently, branches certainly did impose sanctions in breach of the 
customary procedure. Moreover, strike action was almost always unofficial 
and in breach of Rule 19, clause 2 of the union's rule book. 
Finally, procedure agreements are also concerned with jurisdiction and 
the coverage of particular collective agreeaents. As shown above, at 
Ravenscraig the bargaining units were very small, often sub-deparbaental in 
character, and with more than one union branch in a deparbaent. Given this 
situation, disputes processed through the procedure were primarily concerned 
with the resolution of a specific work Iroup~ problem. Unfortunately, a 
solution which satisfied one particular group, often created a problea for 
some other group in this very autonoaous and frac-ented bargaining systea. 
This, in turn frequently triggered off a claim by another group in order to 
re-establish what they considered to be their proper place in the works wage 
and status structure. Furtheraore, the Neutral eo..ittee procedure 
reinforced the legitimacy of this in that it gave the ... 11 work group the 
right to pursue through the branch a cla~ to an outside institution, 
irrespective of the effect upon other groups. Moreover, given the remit 
of the Neutral eo..ittee and the collective bargaining arrang .. ents, consid-
eration of the other work groups' problems were shut out. S ... evidence 
of this dyna.ic process at work will be presented later in connection with 
the strike in the power service deparcaent. Therefore, in the procedural 
context what existed was a system of work group competition which threw 
up a multiplicity of clai .. which in turn put a strain upon the effective-
ness of the procedure. 
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The main production worker problems were related to the internal works 
wage structure, and also to the wage relativities between work groups. For 
wage negotiation purposes production workers were organised into eight 
branches and within each branch there were several work groups. Normally 
a work group was associated with a specific promotion line with jobs manned 
up over three shifts. The method of payment rose progressively as the 
workers proceeded up the promotion ladder. This system was functional from 
an organisational point of view, in that it provided workers with the goal 
of praaotion and higher rewards. Thus, promotion lines increased the workers 
job satisfaction, and thereby integrated to some eKtent their interests 
with those of the organisation. Problems can and did arise within the work 
group, however. For example, a change in working practice affectinl lower 
level jobs only, might, if treated in isolation, result in a narrowing of 
internal group wage differentials. When this happened dissatisfaction 
built up .. ongst the more senior workers. This was u.ually expressed as 
follows: "why should X who is on the bottoa job and employed for only six 
months get paid only 1/- per shift less than Y when he is on the third top 
job and been employed for five yearsl" Piec .. eal changes like these 
required to be watched by management and planned ahead if possible. H0w-
ever, liven the bargaining arrangements, this type of problem was not 
uncommon. In .uch circumstances the branch was involved in sorting out the 
problem, although they often had difficulty reconciling the conflicting 
interests between lower and higher paid men. But at lea.t the opportunity 
was there within the bargaining structure for management and union to 
handle the problem intelligently. 
Thi. was a central problem concerning wage differentials internal to 
exi.ting bargaining units. However, attention must be given also to 
probl ... between the different bargaining units. The next table shows the 
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works wage structure as it existed in April 1966, commencing with the highest 
paid occupation and average wage within each bargaining unit. 
Table 7.5 
Bargaining Units at Ravenscraig,Top and Average Wage, April 1966. 
Slab Kill Hot Strip Basic Oxygen 
Soakin& Pits Kill ShOE! 
Kill Operator £43.06 Heater £38.00 1st Vesselman £37.01 Average Wage £24.57 Average Wage £25.90 Average Wage £29.04 
Qeen Hearth Shoe(40) Basic Oxy&en ShOE! QEen Hearth ShOE! 
1st Melter £36.97 Teemer £35.16 Teemer £34.20 Average Wage £28.32 Average Wage £22.79 Average Wage £23.34 
Blastfurnaces Ore Handlin& Sinter Plant 
Keeper £30.80 Operator £26.91 Operator £26.03 Average Wage £25.20 Average Wage £23.82 Average Wage £22.57 
Basic Oxylen ShOE! Coke Ovens Maintenance 
Stripper Crane £25.85 Heater £25.46 Craf taman £25.34 
Average Wage £23.97 Average Wage £22.02 Average Wage £25.34 
Power Services Q2en Hearth ShOE! 
Switchbrd Attd £25.20 Charge Weigher £23.17 
Average Wage £21.85 Average Wage £21.46 
Coke Ovens Traffic Maintenance 
By Products £23.09 Loco Driver £21.38 Craft Mate £20.96 
Average Wage £21.62 Average Wage £19.83 Average Wage £20.96 
source: BSC, Ravenscraig Personnel Deparbaent 
The above table does not give complete information on all bargaining 
units and, in fact, covers 1,814 production and maintenance worker. out of 
an approximate total of 2,776. However, it does cover most of the important 
bargaining units with the notable exception of the dispatch and hot sheet 
finishing deparbaent. The table shows several features of the wage structure 
that are worth noting: 
(a) The relatively high position of the slab and hot strip mill deparbDents 
and the basic oxygen shop groups. 
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(b) The 1st hand melter, held as the traditional aristocrat of the industry, 
was not the top paid occupation at Ravenscraig. 
(c) The further one moves from the finishing end of the works (that i.,mills) 
back through the steel works to the iron works (that is,blastfurnaces, 
ore handling and coke ovens) the lower down the wage league top occup-
ations are to be found. 
(d) The average wage for the promotion line can diverge significantly from 
the top wage. This partly reflects the degree of skill to be found in 
the total line as opposed to the top occupation, and also the outcome of 
negotiations as described above. 
(e) Finally, although the craftsman was placed fourth, in average earnings 
he occupies a very low position in the wage league of top occupations. 
The table identifies seventeen bargaining units which are independent 
of each other in the context of pursuing their own interests to the aaxiaum. 
Given the collective bargaining and wage structure characteristics, and the 
manageaent and trade union organisations described earlier, there was no 
pressure on the small bargaining groups to take account of their actions 
upon others. Also, as discussed previously, support for the independent 
pursuit of branch and work group interests within the e.tablished structures 
.t .... d from the Divisional Office strategy which sought to obtain .. ~ings 
comparable with those paid at the Welsh strip aill.. this expectation and 
opportunity arose due to the introduction to Ravenscraig and Scotland of 
hot strip .tll technology for the first time. the union decided to use this 
technological ianovatiou a. an arguaent to break the established pattern of 
Scottish vace rates which were lower than those paid in Wales and in some 
parts of BDCland.(41) Consequently, pressure built up from the union side 
to this end. 
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Management, on the other hand, attempted to resist this development, and 
not just for the obvious reasons that employers never want to pay more. For 
the Confederation were seeking comparable earnings at a time when Ravenscraig 
was producing about half or less of the tonnage of those works in the south. 
(42) Taking the strip mill screw operator as an example, at Ravenscraig in 
1965 he was paid £5-3/- gross per shift for 740 tons through the strip mill, 
whereas at Spencer Works (Llanwern) the equivalent operator was paid £6-1/-
gross per shift for 1,331 tons, and at Shotton £7-3/- gross per shift for 
1,671 tons. If the Ravenscraig operator on the above rate. had been producing 
at Spencer or Shotton tonnages, his gross shift earnings would have been 
£7-7/- and £8-1/- respectively. Therefore, by 1965, in the .ense of potential, 
the Ravenscraig mill operators were ahead of workers in those two works. 
Thi. was management's dilemma: on the one hand, it was caught with the con-
straint of union pressure pushing for higher earnings, and on the other, was 
unable to get production up due to various difficulties, namely, lack of 
success in the product market, the works technically out of balance, and to 
industrial relations difficulties. In fact, the hot strip mill designed to 
produce around 45,000 tons per week, could only manage about 12,500 tons in 
1965 - a good trading year. Therefore, management's frequent promise. to 
workers that future tonnages and earnings would be better were not fulfilled, 
and as a result became more and more regarded as simply "pie in the sky". 
Consequently, union pressure continued for higher earnings irrespecti.e of 
the se.erity of the constraints upon aanagement reSUlting in (as will be 
shown later) a hiah strike incidence at the works. 
Further.ore, the arau.ant that aaven.craig'. industrial relation. 
troubles were cau.ed by the initial recruitaent of green labour who did not 
appreciate the peaceful tradition. of the Iteel indultry, appears hollow in 
the light of this analy.il. Undoubtedly, the basic factor causing labour 
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unrest at Ravenscraig was the lower earnings paid compared with the same 
occupations in the south; coupled with the same technology, and the .ame 
wide-strip product. These changes presented the union with the opportunity 
which it took. However, the fact that the green labour araument was widely 
believed and has persisted to the present day, suggests that it might have 
served .ORe other function. This matter will be investigated further in a 
later section. 
MeantiBe, the labour problems which initially commenced in the mills 
could not be confined to that area. The mills were .een by other workers to 
be .oving ahead in the earnings league. This caused dis.atisfaction among 
the reaainder in the various deparbaents, branche., and craft unions. A good 
exa.ple of this causation at work can be illustrated by union behaviour in 
the open hearth .hop. The open hearth shop initially had only one branch, 
Ravenacraig Nol, for production workers, although there were three pra.otion 
line., that i., aelters, pitside and machineDeD. The .elters were the highllt 
paid group to whom the wage differential. of the others were related. Thi. 
wa. reinforced by yeara of hi.tory and culture in the trade. Howeyer, a. 
eaminas advanced in the mills di.sati.faction grew in the meltina shop and 
pre. sure built upon branch official. to regain their po.ition in the works 
vaae structure. Unfortunately, the Nol Branch official. were restricted by 
the _lters Brown Book, a natioual piece work agreement, which ruled out 
local bargainina oyer such thinas a. a chanae in working practice. Of cour .. , 
they could haYe pushed for the pitside and aachinamen, but that would have 
.. ant an ero.ion of e.tablished wage differentials within the baraaiRina uRit. 
Ae a direct result of the branch officials' lack of militancy, the aachineaea 
eventually broke a .. y in 1964,(43) and e.tablished their own Ravenscraig Noll 
tranch. Tbis act allowed the aachin .. en to enlace in local negotiations free 
346. 
fra. the constraining influence of the melters. Furthermore, tbe me1ters 
the.aelves bec .. e increasingly dissatisfied with the Brown Book for the above 
reasons, and they c .. e off it in 1966.(44) The n.w agreeaent made at Scottish 
area level allowed them to engage in local barg.ining on the b.sis of a ch.mge 
in working practice. 
Yet .nother factor influencing the establisDaent of Noll Branch w •• tbe 
briuaina on atre .. of the basic oxygen shop in 1964. This steel .. kine 
proc.ss de.cribed in Chapter Two p.ge 18 was to revolutionise the work flow 
by spe.ding up the tr.nsmission of molten i~on to finished ste.l. As expl.ined 
previously this inno •• tion reduced the signific.nc. of cert.in techno10lic.l 
buffers existing in the traditional tecbnololY and made the work flow much 
.ore interdependent. Consequently, the machineaens' power incre ••• d .. rked1y, 
as did th.t of other work groups such a. b1.stfuraaceaen. In other words, 
work groups whose pre.ious strike .ctivity ailht reduce the .01 ... of works 
output, could now shut down production co.p1et.1y. 
This .nalysi. furai.h.s .nother illu.tration (the first concern.d cr.fts-
.an) of how the production union and it. branches r.sponded to the chauaed 
circu.atances .t Ba •• nscrail brought on by the technological inao.atio... In 
both th.s. c •••• the exi.ting collective bar,.ininl .rr.ngeaents .nd w.,. 
structure were ch.lleaced, then broken up .nd rep1.c.d by •• w .or. fr ..... ted 
.rr ....... t.. Howe.er, i. the ca.e of the cr.ft .. en the .boYe ... lysis con-
.titutes only on. str.nd in the .rluaent, the other wa. related to their 
dis •• tisf.ction with their low wage positiou iu the indu.try.(45) Like Hol 
Branch .. It.rs, the ".enscrail cr.ft .. ens' .arnines were lar,ely det.r.ined 
.t hiaher l .. els i. tbe collecti •• barlai.ina structure outwith th.ir direct 
control. r.rther the 1965-10 inca.es policy ai&ht b.ve contribut.d to the 
347. 
di •• atisfaction experienced by both groups. This effectively curtailed wage 
increases at national level, and in the craftsmens l case the hourly rate 
reaained at 4/11.21 per hour between November, 1964 and March 1969. Thus, at 
a t~e when the craft unions and the melters were constrained at national 
level, the production branches were much less subject to the scrutiny of 
income. policy and could more easily negotiate wage increase. at deparbaental 
level. Of course, for the craft .. en, the industry had an anawer to this in 
the for. of the More Effective Use of Maintenance Manpower agreements, but 
these were slow to develop. Hence, the Ravenscraig craft .. e •• dete~nation 
to exploit the ACM i.sue, and to avoid the divisional level agreement. Also, 
the aelter. rejection of their national Brown Book agre .. ent. 
The upshot of all this wage ca.parison activity wa. to heighten the 
degree of conflict between work groups and between workers and manasement. 
Con.equently, in the manner described above, it may have had the effect of 
moving the whole va, •• tructure up at a fa.ter pace than otherwise would have 
been the case. It i. also possible that the heishtened conflict may have 
had a detriaeatal effect upon productivity_ 
Part Three, EYaluation of the Ravenscraia Industrial Relations Slst .. 1964-70 
Thi. part attempt. to evaluate the condition of industrial relations in 
the period 1964-70, and to provide a backaround for what happens in subsequent 
years at Ravenscraia_ 
Tbe state of health of an industrial relations syst .. iavolves a value 
juda ... nt based upon q.alitative and quantitative criteria. As in previous 
chapters tkis will take the fora of aeasurina the incidence of strike activity, 
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the labour productivity of the employees, aDd of observing whether the earn-
ings of employees bave outstripped their rate of rise of productivity.(46) 
Moreover, to complicate aatters further, these three criteria, even if they 
were adequate, can be in conflict with one another. For example, a company 
algbt bave a low strike record and therefore seem healthy, but this could be 
acbieved by paying inflationary wage increases. Alternatively a high degree 
of peace alght be associated with poor efficiency due to aanag .. ent acceptinc 
restrictive job practices. The only way in which such conflicts can be 
resolved is for a party to decide priorities between objectives; which can 
be included in its overall strategy. 
At Ravenscraig the overall aanag_nt objective:·was to secure higher 
output and therefore productivity froa a plant which was very IlUch under-
utilised. This was necessary to relieye the ca.pany·s adverse financial 
position. A further objective was to achieve greater stability in the 
industrial relatio.s syst .. in order to improve perfor..nce in the product 
.. rket by .. etiq deUvery dates. To judge this frOil a aanaa ... nt perspectiYe 
will require an exa.ination of the strike incidence, which in this period was 
well doc~nted, secondly, to look at productivity which was not so well 
docuaeated; and finally, to give some consideration to the earnings position. 
Strikes, of course, are only one .easure of the degree of opposition, 
tension and conflict within work organisations. In many respects strikes are 
DO more thaD the "tip of the iceberg"; consequently, the strike incidence of 
a particular industrial relations syst .. is a very inaccurate guide. Neyer-
theless, subject to the fact that conflict can be both orgenised and unorla~ 
i.ed (.ee Chapter Six, page 250 ) strikes are one guide, and as the works 
strike fiaures cover all stoppages of one hour and above, it is a much better 
iadicator than the Departllent of &lployment statistics. The Departllellt of 
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Employment record strikes involving more than ten workers and those which 
last more than one day, plus any in which the aggregate number of working 
days lost exceed one hundred. Furthermore, as notification is voluntary, 
the Ministry may fail to record some strikes which otherwise would qualify 
by the criteria. 
Al.o .trikes are not necessarily destructive, but can make a positive 
contribution to an organisation's wellbeing. For instance, a management, 
aware that a decision .. de will be challenged by the work force are likely 
to think and reflect ~re before making it. This might improve the quality 
of decision aaking. Secondly, as shown above, absence of strikes does not 
.ean the absence of conflict. Moreover, in taking an overt form, management 
are giYen .. mina of .-ployee dissatisfaction, and can take reaedial action. 
Also, knowledge that the work force can exercise this strength may encourage 
manag ... nt to t.prove efficiency. In turn an increase in productivity may 
generate additional incaae, and make it easier to reconcile conflicting 
inter.sts between the parties. 
Strike Criterion 
The following table .bows, at Ravenscraig, the total nwaber of strikes' 
lockout., and provides a breakdown between production and maintenance workera. 
Table 7.6 
Strik.s and Lock-Outs at RaYenscraig 1964-10 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1910 Total 
. 
ProductioD 6 21 10 2 9 24 21 109 
Maint .... c. 1 6 6 5 5 6 5 ~ 
Total 13 33 16 11 14 ~ 26 149 
source. BSC, IaY.nacraig Per.onnel Departaent 
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Most significantly these figures reveal a high coincidence between 
.trike behaviour and the peak years of the steel business cycle, that is, 
1965 and 1969/70. As a result strikes were lowest at Ravenscraig in the 
reces.ion period of 1966/67. However, for rea.ons associated with Raven.-
craig's difficulties in penetrating the product market, output at the works 
grew throughout the 1960s, making a direct comparison between Ravenscraig 
outputs and strikes less meaningful. Nevertheless, on the assumption that 
the unions at Ravenscraig made wage comparisons with other .trip producers 
whose output. (and worker. bonus earnings) rose and fell with the level of 
bu.ine •• activity, the relationship holds.(47) 
Secondly, Ravenscraig would appear to be a very strike prone plant with 
a strike record of 1.6 veek. per strike in 1965, and 1.7 veeks per strike in 
1969. Unfortunately, it va. not possible to make direct compari.on. with 
other .teel work. including Corby as the evidence was not available. (48) 
Another feature of the above table va. the improvement in .trike activity 
between the peak yeer. 1965 and 1969/70. This improvement in strike 
behaviour appears to have been due to both the limited structural change. 
which vere taking place in the indu.trial relation. .y.t .. and to the 
relative t.provement in earnings. These explanation. will be con.idere. 
lat.r in this chapter and in the next. 
A further point .hown by the table va. that the maintenance worker • 
.... to .trike le •• than production worker.. Thi. applies even When allow-
ance vas .. d. for the iareer nuaber of production workers. (49) This findine 
throw. doubt upon the indu.try'. accepted orthodoxy. For the ideololY of 
the indu.try .upports the viev that production workers are hiahly ca..ttted 
to the productiGD process vberea. craft ... n with their univeraal skills are 
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not. This belief was based upon the idea that earnings, skill and status of 
senior production workers are specific to the industry and not transferable. 
Also, that production workers are more responsible, as some operate continuous 
plant which must sustain heat (for example, coke ovens and blastfumaces). 
Hence, if these units were to go out due to strike action, the cost would be 
tremendous and the men might have no jobs to return to when the strike had 
finished. Consequently, craftsmen, who have transferable skills, do not share 
this responsibility and commitment, strike more frequently. What truth this 
belief holds, if any, might be related to strike days, that is shifts lost per 
man multiplied by the number of men on strike. This point will be taken up 
again later. 
Table 7.7 considers the distribution of strikes by duration both in total 
and between production and maintenance workers in the period 1964-70. 
Table 7.7 
Strikes by Duration at Ravenscraig 1964-70 
Total One Day Two Day Three Day + Three Day 
Strikes Strikes 1. Strikes ,. Strikes ~ Strikes ~ 
Production 109 46 42.2 33 30.2 9 8.2 21 19.2 
Maintenance 40 20 50.0 15 37.5 3 7.5 2 5.0 
Total 149 66 44.2 48 32.2 12 8.0 23 15.4 
source: BSC, Ravenlcraig Works. 
This table shows that 44.2~ of all strikes in the period lasted less 
than one day and a further 32.2~ less than two days, a total of nearly 76.4~ 
of all strikes. This may have been indicative of protest stoppage., uled 
by worker. to draw attention to grievances which louehow were overlooked 
due to defective institutional arrangements. It seems remarkable that both 
production and maintenance workers were in this position. A1IO, there 
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seems to be a tendency for production workers' strikes to last longer than 
those of maintenance workers, that is, of the 23 strikes lasting more than 
three days, 91% were production strikes. Again, this finding contradicts the 
established ideology of the industry. 
The issues over which strikes have taken place are given in the next 
table. 
Table 7.8 
Strikes by Cause at Ravenscraig 1964-70 
Wages Discipline Authority Manning Redundcy Miscel 
Production 50 46% 28 26% 18 16% 2 
-
1 
-
10 
-
Maintenance 18 45% 14 35% 8 20% 
-
- - - -
-
Total 68 45.6% 42 28.1% 26 17.4% 2 1.3% 1 0.6% 10 6.7% 
source: BSe, Ravenscraig Works 
The total figures in this table show that some 46% of strikes took place 
over wages, with 52% concerned with issues which management believed to be 
within their prerogative. The remaining 2% were attributed to manning over 
which production workers had the right to bargain. This table provides 
further evidence of workers challenging management's authority as described 
earlier. The individual disciplinary issue was obviously an important one 
and reflected partly the inadequacy of the procedural arrangements, and most 
certainly, the lack of consistency in the application of the unwritten works 
rules. 
If the above was the case, then the management at Ravenscraig prior to 
1967/68 were not well prepared to meet the challenge. It will be recalled 
that at that time management's strategy was characterised by a hard defensive 
attitude associated with a highly fragmented and autonaaous organisation. por 
example, of the fourteen maintenance strikes over authority relations, elab' 
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were related to meetings held outside the works gate at lunch tiae. These 
meetings sometimes lasted longer than the scheduled meal bre.k, .Dd aanageaent 
would refuse to allow the men to return to work for the remainder of the 
shift. (50) Hence, management did not see why they should help to satisfy 
the needs of workers and their shop stewards by making it easier for them to 
discuss their particular interests and problema whilst at work. In other 
words, there were communication difficulties on the craft union side which 
management would not or could not ea.e due to their ideology, and in this 
sense management forced the above action. However, this type of strike 
disappe.r. frOB 1969 as the works personnel deparbDent's influence increa.ed, 
and the facilities granted to union officials improved. This was one piece of 
evidence indicating that certain structur.l changes contributed to the ... 11 
i~rov .. ent in the strike record between 1965 and 1969/70. 
Therefore, aanag .. ent's traditional attitude of ke.ping the vnions .t 
aras length clash.d with the workers desire to have • larger .ay in d.cision 
making, and consequently many strikes occurr.d in the authority r.lations are •• 
Given the official collective bargaining .nd w.ge structures of both 
production and maintenance workers a larger number of production worker strike. 
adght have been expected over wage.. This expectation wa. not borne out a. 
both group. had roughly 45~ each. However, this fact can be .xpl.ined by the 
iacr.... in bargaining over ACM i •• ue. and the d.ter.dnation of the craft"lD 
to i.,rove their po.ition in the industry'. wage league. 
Yet aaother difference between the group. wa. the nuaber. .triking 
whether directly or in .,-pathy with each other. Of the forty .. int.Dance 
.trike., fifteen involved all the work. craft .. en .topping tocether, the 
r ... i •• er were confined to depart.eutal craft groups or to oue uaion a. with 
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disciplinary cases. Many of these deparbDental strikes arose over local ACM 
clat.a, and on eight occasions the Roll Shop craft .. en and assistants struck 
to improve their productivity bonus.(51) On the other hand, the Confederation 
had only one occasion when the whole membership stopped work all together. 
This rare event occurred in Septeaber, 1970 and resulted from a letter sent 
by management to strikers in the power services deparbDent. The letter infer:-
med each person that failure to return to work by a certai. date would entail 
termination of their contract of .-ployaent. 
This action arose out of a wage cla~ by the power serTices branch. 
Manageaent could not .eet this claim to the branch's s.tisfaction and the 
branch struck work in July, August and agaia in Septeaber. It was a serious 
dispute which reduced the supply of electricity to the work., and there~y 
di.rupted production. Nevertheles., the branch had the right und.r the 
custoaary procedure agre .. ent to pur.ue its cla~ to a .ati.factory coaclu.ioa. 
Thus, although work Iroup', br.nche., and union. were haraed by the di.pute, 
everyone looked on anxiou.ly, but felt that they had no right to interfere. 
raced with the third .erious stoppage ia a few IIOnths .... ' ... nt decid.d to 
force a .olutioa by threateaiug the di.-1 •• al of the .triker.. ~ediately 
the whole of ISTe .topped work, plu. the craft .. en. This action brought tbe 
di.pute to a head, national official. were iavolved, aad the .,apathy .trike 
wa. over in 24 hour.. Moreov.r, the power .ervice. braacb returned to work 
two day. lat.r. 
The iat.re.till, point about thi. di.pute wa. that .... ' ... nt, whether 
coa.cio •• ly or not, chang.d the 1.sue la di.pute fra. a .... cla~ to .. e of 
.... di-.1 •• al. Thi. va. uaprecedented and out.ide the constraint. of th. 
traditional collective bargaining and trade union .tructure.. Hence, the 
other branches did not feel inhibited over their involveaent on this i.sue as 
they did on the wage issue, although they suffered from the power aervice's 
strike. 
This difference in behaviour was one .ore reason why the two Iroups had 
difficulty in underatanding the actions of the other. For exa.ple, craft .. en 
often felt that ISTC .ember. 'blackle"ed' againat one another. Hovever,fraa 
a production worker's view point this behaviour waa perfectly orthodox and 
there was DOthilll wrone with it. The reaaona for theae were to be found in 
the differencea of atructure and ideology between groupa but prt.arily the 
fo~er. Production workera were not only ... bera of ISTC, but of eight 
branchea and the union rule. which lafeguarded branch autona.y did not allow 
one branch to call a,-pathy action in aupport of another. But thia val 
probably the leaat t.portant realon, aud what really aattered val the ialue 
at ltake, and the particular work groupl direct intereat ill the oateoae. The 
.oat ca.aon aDd t.portant i •• ue waa wa,ea and the work group'l ideatity vaa 
larlely ahape. by the collective barlainine arrana .. enta on thil ialae. Thus 
in a .yat_ where one brueb or work Iroup puraue. ita 0VIl v .. e claia, only 
they are directly concerued and if the nelotiationa let protracted only 
they will feel obliled to t.pole aanctiona to fiaht for their objective. 
Further.ore, the collective bargaining arrana..entl did no' I~ly 
coiacide with braach organi.ation, and this va. reflected ia the atrike 
behaviour. As a reault, • .-ber. of the .... braach did aot aapport on. anotb.~ 
durilll .trike action. lor euaple, it would app.ar that prc.otioa li ••• with-
ia ISTC breaches coaatitate au~u. work Iroup. for collectiYe bar,ala1111 
purpoae. which u.. the .. di.. of the branch to puraue th.ir particular 
iatere.t.. Tbaa, if, a. ill the op.n h.arth .hop, the pit.id. went on .trik., 
the •• It.r.' ..... r. of the •• e branch, .. y or .. y Dot giYe their support 
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depending upon how they perceive their interests. If they had little direct 
inter •• t a constitution.l attitude was likely and a br.nch meeting c.lled to 
discus. the strike. But in this shift working indu.try a br.nch meeting may 
take up to two day. to org.nise, and by that tt.e the di.pute may be over. 
(73t of strikes lasted two days or le •• ). 
Thu. the production worker., a. opposed to the craft .. ea, exhibited 
behaviour which va •• ore fragaented, aad u.ually affected only .... 11 group 
of people at anyone tt.e. In other word., certain .tructur.l fe.tures 
which included the autona.ou. branch, and the fras-ented collective barg.in-
ina .nd p.y .tructure, helped to divide the production worker. loy.ltie •• 
Inde.d, extra .ub-.tructural f.ctor. such •• proaotion line •• nd .bift 
p.ttern. created econaaic interest group. who from t~e to tt.e, depeadiaa 
upon the i •• ae, •••• rted .n independent line within or without the br.ach. 
Therefore, the occ •• ion w •• r.re indeed when Confederation br.nch •• were 
motiv.ted to .trike work together. 
Finally, the industry's bellef th.t the cr.ft.en were .ore strike proue 
thaa the productioa workers miCht be .xpl.iaed by the above differeace in 
beaaviour be~.en the two ,roup'. For due to their re.pective collective 
b.r,aiaiag .tructur •• the typical production strike iDYo1ved ... 11 auaber. 
whereat the typical craft .trike coyered lUIly aore workers. HeDee craft 
.trike. were .ore e •• i1y reportable and noticed by the public. Also, civan 
the voluntary Dature of the report1na sy.t_, the Departant of latploJIMat 
va. aore likely to notice .ad check with the .-ployer over a .trike iDYolYi1ll 
larce aaBber., aDd the employer knowing this va. more likely to report the 
• trike. 
In conclulion then, Ravenlcrail wa •• hilhly Itrike prone workl, and 
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according to this strike criterion the condition of industrial relations 
could be said to be unhealthy, althouSh improving. Nevertheless, it will be 
recalled that managements overriding objective was to increase productivity 
.nd thereby ease the financial constr.ints upon the comp.ny. Given thi • 
• itu.tion .. naseaent had no alternative but to resist wage clat.a so long 
.s tonnages remained low. This clash between trade union pressure for hisher 
e.minas and manaaeaent r.siltance w •• facilitated by the latter's stroua 
com.ibaent to the tr.ditional industrial relations structures, and to the 
aDsence of • positive strategy. Thus each .utona.Gus work group pursued 
its interests through the fr .... nt.d collective barg.iaing .rr.ng ... nts ia 
an effort to k.ep its place in the works w.ge le.gue. Further.ore,. large 
nuaber of strikes were not over .ages .t all (46\), but ov.r discipline .nd 
authority relationships. On this issue aanageDent were not pr.par.d for a 
.ore participative approach, .gain shoving their lack of positive thinking. 
However, althouah the .bove applied for aost of the 1960s, nevertheles., 
as shown in Part Two, .igns of a change w.re evident. Pro. roughly 1961/68 
ouwards th. works persODDel depart.ent incr.ased ita influence, the d.pa~t­
ment fayouring a .or. centralis.d and coordinated response to tr.de union 
pressure. With regard to the production workers, chanaes bad to be .... at 
the inforaal lev.l due to the external opposition of the Group Labour Office. 
The major exception .... the craft.ens· ACM agre.ent over which the depart-
.ent e.tablish.d a new lev.l of bargainiq. But due to the ACM acr .... nt·. 
late arrival, ia 1910, evaluation of is influence on behaviour ... t be left 
to the next chapter. The other iaportant chang. to occur within -naae-
.. at·s or,aai.atioa was the ea.ier acc.s. which the appoiat.eat of a high 
stat.s persODDel _ua,.r gaye to the shop ste.ard.. In additioa, the .. re 
participativ. -naa.eat Ityle adopted by .enior maD&g .. ent in the fora of 
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the Works Council, an4 the facilities this offered to lay union officials 
helped. 
This downward trend in Ravenscraig strike .tatistics is all the more 
reaarkab1e giyen that the steel indu.try was becoming more strike prone.(52) 
A te.t of this explanation (that is, the change in manag .. ent organi.ation) 
would be to assume that .trike. lasting one day or le.s were protest strikes 
seeking the attention of management. Hence, if fro. 1968, stewards found 
it easier to obtain management's attention more quickly, then the nuaber of 
such strikes should drop. This in fact happened for craft .. en, between 1965-
67 there were eleven such craft strikes, whereas in the period 1968-70 these 
fell to six. The figures for production workers showed no change, however. 
Productivity Criterion 
In the steel industry (which is highly capital intensive) differences 
in labour productivity between works are dependent upon the following 
factors:-
(a) The nUBber of men .-ployed. 
(b) The output per unit of plant •. 
The latter depends on the .ize of the unit which follows the ceneral 
rule - the biaaer the plant the greater are the econo.ies of scale to be 
achieved. Secondly, the higher the rate at which the plant operates, the 
greater will be labour productivity. Ravenscraig as a new works, was 
initially tightly manned (see page 300 ), at lea.t by British standards. 
Also, the aiddle 1960s wa. a period during which the .teel industry wa. 
awakiaa to the fact that foreign .teel producers by comparison, had very 
auch lower ratios between labour inputs and steel outputs.(53) 
What then were outputs like at aavenseraig in those yearst 
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Table 7.9 
Weekly Output per Han at Ravenscraig 1965-70 
Slab Mill Slab Handling and Hot Strip Mill 
Years Man Hours Output Output per Han Man Hours Output Output per MIll 
1965 4,998 20.104 4.0 tons 8,568 12,311 1.4 tons 
1966 4,998 18,627 3.7 tons 8,568 11,177 1.3 tons 
1967 4,998 26,491 5.3 tons 7,266 14,740 2.0 tons 
1968 4,998 26,438 5.2 tons 9,576 18,541 1.9 tons 
1969 4,998 27,386 5.4 tons 8,568 17,673 2.0 tons 
1970 4,998 32,800 6.5 tons 8,568 21,105 2.4 tons 
Source. BSe, RaveDscraig Personnel DeparbDent 
The decline in tonnages during 1966 was a reflection of an overall fall 
in demand for strip products. Secondly, slab aill output was greater than 
the hot strip ai1l output due partly to a loss in weight in the production 
process, and partly due to Ravenacraig being a big supplier of slabs to other 
Colville works - especially Dalzell plate aill. Thirdly, the upward trend in 
output could have been due to better performance in the product aarket after 
nationalisation. 
The aan bours col.-n for the slab .tIl reaained stable between 1965-70 
because it was a standard aamliq per shift, and the shifts worked remained 
constant. However, the strip mill aan hours rose and fell owing to the chaaae 
in the nuaber of shifts worked. Again, the labour productivity on both units 
of plant would appear to have improved duriDg the period. 
The above are the key statistics. How then did lavenscraig perfo~ in 
teras of the productivity criterion? Thi. wal difficult to deteraine 
precisely, in practical teras, for although there was an ideal design capacity 
for the e,ui,.ant, it i .. ored envirouaental obltacles such a. production 
bottlenecks, quality probl .. s, and industrial relations difficultie •• (54) 
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Probably the best way to test productivity performance in the period i. to 
make comparisons with what had been achieved in more recent years. Table 
7.10 provide. this information. 
Table 7.10 
Weekly Labour Productivity, Ravenscraig April 1965 and 73 
April 1965 April 1973 
Man Output Output per Man Output Output per 
Hour. Man Hours Man 
Slab Mill 4,998 20,104 4.0 ton. 4,998 38,651 7.7 ton. 
Strip Mill cS.. 
Slab Handling 8,563 12,311 1.4 ton. 9,576 26,894 2~8 tons 
Source: BSe, Ravenscraig Personnel DeparbBent 
Both the.e year. represent peak years in the .teel trade cycl. and, as 
.hown, the production work.rs incr.ased their productivity in the .lab adll 
by 92.5~ and 100~ in the .trip mill. Thi. achievem.nt wa. remarkable and 
provides evidence that in the lliddle 1960. output per IUn at Rannscraig Wa. 
low. Al.o. it •• t be borne in Iliad that no t.chnological chauge. took plac. 
in the inter~ although ..aller piec .. eal advances w.r. IUde.(55) 
Giv.n the figure for 1973, it would app.ar that in 1970 labour product-
ivity at Rayen.craig had .till sa.. way to go. Nev.rth.l •••• cl.arly by 1970, 
ca.par.d with 1965. labour productivity was mGYiug in the right dir.ctio •• 
Thi. was • furth.r indic.tion that indu.tri.l r.l.tiona .t the work. t.proved 
toward. the .Del of the 1960.. Hovey.r. giv.n the f.ct that the work. was 
tightly ..... d on the production workers .ide, the i.cr •••• in productiyity 
could only c .. fr. extra output through the Ilill. Thi. l.rg.r output i. 
turn v •• d.p .... nt upon "y.n.craig securina •• ize.bl. .har. of .trip .teel 
orcl.r •• 
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On the .. intenance side, it was even more difficult to determine labour 
productivity in this period as these workers do not have the same direct 
influence upon output a. production workers. Moreover, .tatistical infor-
mation for the period was not accurate and this deficiency prevents the same 
quantitative exercise given above being completed for production workers. 
Notwithstanding, the few indicators which did exist are used below to 
evaluate .. intenance labour productivity. 
The amount of overt~e worked at Bavenscraig was considerable and seemed 
to reaain .uch the sa.e irrespective of output level. For example, in April 
1966, avera,e hours worked by shopaen were 49.28 and for outside men 47.20(5~) 
living a caabined average of 48.5 hours.(57) Moreover, approximately one 
third were on continuous rotating shifts with less opportunity for overt~e 
above the standard 42 hour week. When this i. taken into account the outside 
day shift craftsaens' hours rose to 50.04.(58) These figures of 49.28 and 
47.02 are the highest in the Scottish area with the exception of Gartcosb. 
Further, the figures compare with the aeports weighted average for twenty 
two works of 44.3 (shopaen) and 44.7(outside men) r •• pectively. In addition, 
the situation doe. not seem to have improved during the remainder of the 
1960s. For example, by April 1969, average hours for outside men at Bavens-
craig were 50.68, although works output bad gone up during the period. Most 
certainly, given the ... 1ysis considered previously, the craft ... n us.d 
overtime a. another •• ans of raiSing their earnings in the 1960.. However, 
in this context it was probably evidence of poor manpower utilisation a.ongst 
maintenance workers. This same point had been identified in some o~er 
industries. (59) 
Another indication of the poor use of maintenance manpower at Bavenscraig 
was the abs.nce of any planned maintenance system. In the steel industry 
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there was a traditional attitude, especially amongst rotating shift crafts-
men, that their job was to work hard during a breakdown and to relax when 
the equipment was working well. This attitude meant a lot of time wasted 
if not just spent sitting around. A planned maintenance system on the other 
band attempts to raise the degree of utilisation by giving the maintenance 
force routine job. of a checking and preventative character. This helps to 
spread the work load and to reduce the numbers of men required to meet a 
crisis. Moreover, even if manacement had embraced the idea there were no 
work study personnel available to implement it. Iu fact, the first work 
study .. nacer was recruited by the orcanisation in October, 1967. 
Consideration of the strike statistics revealed little conflict over 
items such as job demarcation and the mobility of labour within the works. 
Of course, the tension. often generated by management's basic desire for 
efficiency and that of the work force for security, may have taken other 
fo~. More probable was the ab.ence of pre. sure at this time, by manage-
ment, over these issues to secure greater labour productivity. Otherwi.e 
labour acbillty and job demarcation disputes would bave featured more in the 
strike fiaures. 
Finally, strikes contribute to low productivity in that they disrupt 
output, althouah to simply calculate lost tonnage which employer. often do 
for public relations purposes has often been misleading. Nevertheless, at 
Ravenscraig several additional losses were involved. For example, in the 
slab mill, which worked twenty shifts per week (the twenty first was down 
tt.e for enaineering maintenance), it was not easy to regain lost output by 
workina extra shifts as in some other industries. Moreover, if .trikes are 
frequent, they take away certain eConomies to be derived from longer product-
ion run.. They al.o up.et the scheduling of different orders and make for 
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delays. This led to customer dissatisfaction, and was a critical problem 
at the works. The meeting of delivery dates and establishing a reputation 
for reliability was important, and one of the significant forms of compet-
ition left, given the maximum price arrangements determined by the Iron and 
Steel Board. 
In conclusion, there was a fair amount of evidence to show that, overall, 
labour productivity was improving, but still could have been improved. By 
the end of the 1960. the scope for improvement in labour productivity amongst 
production workers was l~ted, although as the output figures for 1973 have 
shown productivity was still to improve markedly. On the other hand, the 
labour productivity of maintenance workers appeared to be unsatisfactory and 
in need of substantial improvement. 
Earnings Criterion 
The point was aade above that management can ensure relative industrial 
peace at a works and even increase productivity (factors which indicate a 
healthy organisation) but, in doing 80, might have paid more than was 
necessary and thereby added to inflationary wage increases. At Ravenscraig 
given the Confederation's strategy to push up earnings to a level comparable 
with those paid in the Welsh strip works, manageaent were subjected to 
considerable pressure. Of course, they tried to resist this pressure, but 
certain factors .. de it difficult to do so. These included the great cost 
that a protracted strike inflicts upon a capital intensive works. Moreover, 
again the collective bargaining structure was of relevance to managements 
decisiou.. Por, given the ... 11 size of the bargaining units, manaa .. ent 
were ta.pted to concede a vage cla~ which appeared to add little to total 
co.t. in it.elf. However, aaainst this evidence of factors making for 
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inflationary wage increases, the bonus system favoured management. Given 
the average bonus element of 25% in shift earnings, a 1007- increase in out-
put would only double the bonus proportion of earnings. Thus, in a works 
where productivity was rising labour costs per unit of output should be 
falling. Table 7.11 provides information on the relationship of the product-
ion workers earnings to the rate of increase in productivity. 
Table 7.11 
Earnings and Productivity, Ravenscrai, 1965-70 (April each Year) 
Strip Mill 1965 1969 1970 Total 7- Change 7. Change per ann 1 
1965-69 
.1.965-70 
urn 1965-70 1965-69 
Avera,e Wale £.22.73 £29.19 £32.24 28.27. 41.837. 6.97. 8.37. 
Avera,e 
Produc ti vi ty 1.4 2.0 2.4 42.17- 71.47- 10.57- 14.37-
Tons per .. n 
Source a ISC, Ravenscraig Personnel Deparbaent 
Table 7.11 a,ain uses the peak output years of 1965 and 1969/70 and 
showa that the rate of rise in earnings did not outstrip the rate of rise in 
productiYity, that la, the averace productivity rise per .. n per aDDU. 
between 1965 and 1970 was 14.37. whereas earnings rose by an averace of 8.37. 
per aDD... However, it aust be r .... bered that production comaenced froa 
a very low base in 1965, and the t eamin,. were already cOliparable wi th 
those paid at Lla ... m. Therefore, it would appear that wages outstripped 
productivity at RaYenscraig in the period up to 1965 when the Confederation 
was d..andina eaminas equivalent to those paid in the south, but tonnages 
were low. Then, between 1965 and 1970, the bonus system as explained above 
contained the rate of rise in eaminas to an amount lower than that of 
produc ti vi ty. 
The .. inteDaDce workers situation was difficult to as.e.s due to lack 
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of .tati.tical data. There was .ome evidence tbat earning. were ri.ing 
rapidly in thi. period. The craftsmen, like the production worker., a. 
indicated by their .trike activity, were deteradned to obtain .arnings 
clo.er to tho.e paid in the W.l.b strip work. and to improve their relative 
po.ition in the work. wage 1.ague.(60) Evidence of tbi •• trulIle wa. 
pre.ented above by reference to ACM and overtime level. whicb seem to bave 
been .-oue.t the bighe.t 1n the .teel indu.try. Moreover, in terms of earn-
in,. drift, the craft .. en. nation.l bourly rate fell ••• proportion of 
the .ctu.l bourly r.te p.id .t the work. (excluding ov.rti.e, tonnage bonu., 
and co.t of livina par-ent), that 1., from 92.7t in 1965 to 84.2t in 1968. 
In conclu.ion, thi. chapter ha. identifi.d .nd .naly.ed the major 
probl ... f.cing Raven.cr.i, work. in the period 1964 to 1970. a.,.rding 
the condition of indu.tri.l relation. the evidence .bow. th.t .t the commen-
c_nt of the p.riod th •• e were in a poor .tat.. Howev.r, with the .ppoint-
aent of • ne" , ••• r.l __ .... r .nd tbe .ubs.qu.nt chanae. in una,_ent 
ora.Di •• tloD .11 thr.e indic.tor. (th.t i., .trike., productivity and earn-
ina.) .bow • .ea.ur. of 1.,rov .. ent. Cle.rly, .oa ... jor probl ... reaaiDed 
.uch a. th. hiah .trike incid.Dc •• nd the ne.d to improve productivity .till 
furth.r. 'l"Ia ••• _1'. the .. in probl ... which f.ced .. nag ... nt •• th. work • 
• nt.r.d th. 1970.. Al.o, iD 1969 the indu.try h.d concluded the n.tional 
productivity acr .... nt in order to tackle r.ther .imil.r probl.... Th.re-
for., the n.xt chapt.r on Raven.cr.ig continue. to de.l with the.e probl ... , 
but vi.wed iD the ligbt of the national productivity .gr .... Dt •• 
P.rt rour, !be Th.oretic.l IDtezpr.tation 
Thi •• ection tuma to th. bypothe.e. developed .nd te.ted 1n the 
chapt.r. on Corby Work.. Here.n .tteaapt 11 made to a ..... their expl.n-
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atory power by applying them to Ravenscraig. Each hypothesis will be tested 
in turn. 
The relevant external factors influencing industrial relations behaviour 
within the works were identified above in Part One. These included the 
government decision to locate a new strip mill at Ravenscraig. Associated 
with this decision was the range of problems created for the Colville 
company in penetrating a new product market. This penetration was made 
particularly difficult by the surplus of strip steel capacity and the absence 
of price competition both of which favoured the established producers. Such 
difficulties in the product market created acute financial problems at the 
works. Also, the technological changes resulting from the government decision 
were si&nificant in their impact. These changes encouraged the unions to 
widen their pay horizon. to include the higher paying strip mills in the south. 
Yet another factor was the labour market and in particular the argument that 
Ravenscraig was forced to employ green labour. However, in this case the 
influence was more ideological. Finally, this was a period of incomes policy 
which would appear to have had a differential effect upon production and 
maintenance workers' behaviour. Nevertheless, the upshot of these chancing 
external factors was to create pressure for change within the works industrial 
relation. ay.tem. Therefore, according to the hypotheaes condition. had 
emerced to which the parties would respond, and it is to this question the 
the.ia turn •• 
The hot .trip mill became operational in December 1962, but it was 1965 
before a new ,eneral manaaer arrived at Ravenscraig, and July 1966 before 
the appointaent of a ne. per.onnel m&na&er. This lagged response to chanced 
circ~tancea by the ca.pany is explained (in te~ of the first hypothelis) 
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by .. na,eaent's ca..it.ent to the traditional structures of the industrial 
relations systea. In other words, aana,eaent tried to manale within a 
fr ... work of industrial relations established at older ateel works and 
adopted at Ravenscrail. Evidence of management's behaviour was identified 
above in their interactions with and through a fralRented works technology, 
collective bargaining and wales structure, .ud with the autonaaoua multi-
uaioa orlanisation. Hence, deparbaental and work. level MDa,eaent had 
coaaiderable authority to de. 1 with labour i •• ues, and central coordination 
v.s veak due to the low status accorded to the works personael dep.rtment. 
Noreoyer, the Group Labour Office itself wa. not adequately staffed, and 
the seDior .auaa ... nt had their t~e taken up by the .-ployers' a •• ociation. 
Thi. strone c~ta.nt to ISTEA wa. indicative of the cOlllpaIlY'. consenative 
policy .Dd identification with the traditional structures of the industrial 
r.l.tiona sy.t ... (61) 
Parther. the Ireen l.bour .rluaent used to expl.in Baven.cr.ia'. 
troubl.s can b.st b. und.rstood throuah the hypothesi. that str.ctur.l 
f.ctors are a .. jor influence upon the parties behaviour. 'or ..aac ... nt 
to .raae that Ireen l.bour with instr_ental y.lue., who did DOt uud.r-
staDd the iadustry's custalla, vere nsponaible for the trouble. of the 
worka .howa that ........ nt consid.r •• the .tructur •• correct. In oth.r 
word., the ar ••• l.bour axplaaation w.s functional to tho.e r •• pon.ible 
for p.rsODD.l policy, for it reinforced the belief that their b.haviour 
va. corr.ct i •• ccordanc. with the exi.tine .tructur... Th •• for ...... 
.. at • lar.. p.rt of the .D.lW'er to Ilava.cr.il' s probl.. wa. the laps. of 
tiM aIUl til. c01Miiti01ling of the Ir •• n l.bour force by the traditi ... l 
• truc bar... Of cour •• , .uda a. explaaat10n refl.ct.d ai.under.undine •• 
to the ba.ic f.ctors c •• sine the probl... How.ver,.. tiae p •••• d with 
ao siaaificaat t.proy ... nt in .icht, the Colville. bo.rd fin.lly .rticul.ted 
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anew their econOlllic interests and a management shake up took place. The 
n .. leneral aanaler and special director brought with him a different 
fr...work of analysis. Howev.r, before pursuina the chaaa.s it is necessary 
to consider the position of the trade unions. 
In cOlllpl.te contrast to .. nag_ent the trade unions responded to the 
ext.rnal chan&es by for.ulating a strateay to improve their economic 
.. llbeina. As established in pr.vious aections the Confederation'a 
Divisional Office claiaed wale increases in line with those paid in southern 
.trip .d1l. for cOlllparabl. occupation.. But the union did not find the 
fras-ent.d and autono.Qua union and aana,eaent or,anisation. a hindrance in 
purauina this objective. In fact, the existing .tructura1 factor. positi-
v.1y facilitated the develo~nt, in the .ense that the strip aill 
r.pre.ented .an&1 .. ent's .ast vulnerable point. lor any wid.r bar,aining 
UDit which included occupation • .-ployed in the other Scotti.h work. (for 
~le, such as in the open hearth .hop) could only weaken the unioo'. 
arl ... nt. lurther.ore, liven the frea-ented and autonGaou •• tructure of 
the ISTC branche. the Divi.ional Office only needed to break throu&h tba 
Scotti.h .taDClard of eamina. in the .trip till for the other braoche. to 
exert pr •••• r. by th .... lv •• to r.tain th.ir po.ition in the work. wal. 
1...... Thi., va. pr.ci •• ly what happ •• ed, and a. a con •• quence the level 
of .trik. activity incr.a.ed throuabout oth.r part. of the work •• 
rurth.~r., the chain reactioD ov.r va,. clat.. va. a1.0 t.chno10,. 
ieally iuflueac.d, and not ju.t a que.ti.D of branch ••• eekiac to pur.ue 
th.ir .c..-ic int.r •• t. &lid .tatu.. Ai thouah at Raven.crail the UIli t. of 
pleat war. put dowa • .,arataly (that i., bla.tfurDaca., open h.arth .hop, 
slab .tll, .te.) thay war. c10 •• 1y interdep.nd.nt, aDd many of the wale 
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cla~ submitted in the later 1960. by iron works branches made direct 
ca.parisons with the higher paid groups in the steel works and mills. This 
vas not the tradition in the industry which in previous years built iron and 
steal works, and often mills in different locations. Moreover, this tradition_ 
al separateness va. partly reflected in trade union organisation (for example, 
in Encland and Wales the NUBr organise ironworkers(62) and ISTC steelworkers), 
and in the collective agrea.ents (for'example, mills and steel works had 
.eparate national agreements). However, Ravenscraig was a large modern 
technolo&ically integrated works, and this vas increased when the basic 
oXfaen shop c .. e into operation in 1964, providing a speedy and continuoua 
workflow. This change in works technology appears to have caused the work 
Croups at the iron works end to redefine their perceptions by increaSingly 
identifyina with the total workflow rather than simply their part of it. 
Therefore, iron and coke workers came to question why such differentials in 
waae rata •• hould exist within the same workflow. (63) 
MaDaa ... nt's reactions to such wage claims was to argue that the Ravens-
craia bla.tfurnace and coke workers were amongst the highest paid in their 
ra.pecti.e industries. This reflected traditional thinking by which the 
bla.tfurnac ... n were ca.pared with other blastfurnacamen elsewhere and not 
with .. Iter. etc., within their own works. Consequently, during negotieUoDl 
both partia. exparienced difficulty under. tanding the position of the other. 
TIna. it would appear that IUnag_ent faUed to understand the influence of 
cbaqiDl tec.hnololY upon the workers expectation. owing to their cClllDitaent 
to tha traditional .tructure.. HovaYer, ... nagement's position can also be 
.... r.tood by reference to thair econom.c interests. For it wa. undoubtedly 
ill ....... nt·. iaterests within the fr .. ework of the exi.Ung .tructure. to 
iaaore the .r ..... t. of the iron workers. Again, this reveals the difficulty, 
••• t Corby, of att.-ptiaa to sep.rate out technological and economic 
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influences upon behaviour. Nevertheless, clearly the change in technology 
.alt be conaidered a major factor influencing the workers' perceptions of 
their econa.ic interesta. Moreover, it placed a strain upon the existing 
collective bargaining arrangements, and in particular helped to break up the 
.. lting ahop bargaining unit with the establishment of Noll Branch. 
Thia part of the hypothesis could be tea ted further by reference to 
.. inteuauce workera, but probably enough has been said to illustrate the 
point. The aecond hypotheais referred to the degree of fragmentation and 
autona., in the structural factora and their influence upon changes in the 
indultrial relationa SYlt .. , and argues that the greater the degree of 
Itructural autonomy and frae-entation (that is, devolved power and authority) 
the .ore difficult it is for -.nAgement or union leader. to exercise influence 
in the direction of chanae in the intere.ts of their .embers. Conversely, 
althougb a bigb degree of organiaational centrality can facilitate change, it 
allo prOTidel leadera with resources to oppose change if they perceive this 
.s contrary to their own and their group's economic interelts. 
Th. new gen.ral .anaa.r, unlike hi. predecelsor., was not conditioned by 
or Itrongly c~tted to the industry's traditional .tructures. Previously 
he had worked with the Steel eo.pany of Wales which bad left ISTEA in 1957w 
~st the independent polici.s pursued by the company was a productivity 
acr .... nt (dilculaiona c~.nced in 1964) ai.ed at rationalising the wage 
structure aDd at altering the collective baraaining arrangements.(64) As 
a result of his background, the general aanaaer viewed Ravenscraig'a problems 
.ifferantly, and set out to tackle the twin product market problema of 
... lity and ~e ... ting of •• livery dates. In particular, the new.anager 
... clearly the relationsbip between disturbance within the industrial 
relationa syst .. and the works inability to meet delivery dates. 
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The new strategy aimed to achieve a measure of autonomy for Ravenscraig 
viz-a-viz the Colville group; and secondly to alter some of the industrial 
relations variables to secure greater coordination and control within the 
works itself. The most important changes occured within management's 
organisation with the appoinbnent of a high status personnel manager and the 
granting of greater influence to the works personnel department to control 
the activities of line and engineering management. Another significant 
change was the establishment of a Works Council which embraced all the unions 
on the site. 
As predicated by the hypothesis, the strategy met with only limdted 
success in this autonomous and fragmented industrial relations system. For 
it was in those areas where the works personnel department obtained greatest 
control that the main changes were achieved in the traditional structures. 
For example, between 1967 and 1969 every wage claim came to be discu.aed 
between line management and the personnel department, and gradually the 
latter's influence grew into a negotiating role. In this way a meaaure of 
centralised control was secured over the traditional system of manageaent 
autonomy, and to that extent greater consistency was injected into the 
bargaining process with the branches. However, the reform waa operated 
essentially at the informal level. There was no written policy statement on 
the matter which allowed some works level managers a~ Ravenscraig to bypass 
the personnel department and go straight to the Group Labour Office. For 
any formal policy statement specifically applied to the strip works would 
have necessitated a change in Colvilles overall personnel policy, and thi. 
would have been resisted by the Group Labour Office. Hence the autonomy of 
Ravenscraig viz-A-viz Colvilles other works was not achieved. 
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In fact, this was the significance of the Works Council which was a 
formal innovation and therefore a change in company policy as it applied to 
Ravenscraig. Thus, although the Ravenscraig personnel department could do 
nothing, even if it wanted, to change the existing collective bargaining 
structure, it could only innovate outside the established industrial relations 
structures at the official level. Therefore, the Works Council which formally 
established jOint discussions with all the unions on certain matters can be 
regarded as a substitute for more radical change in the formal collective 
bargaining arrangements. In this way Ravenscraig management attempted to 
develop a works-wide consciousness in the work force which was not possible 
otherwise, given the fragmented collective bargaining arrangements and union 
organisations. 
Hence, with the exception of the change in the influence of the Ravens-
craig personnel department, the parties on the production workers side 
continued to pursue their economic interests largely within the traditional 
structures. 
By contrast, on the maintenance workers side, there was one significant 
change in the formal collective bargaining arrangements and in the waae 
structure. This applied to the ACM payments whose ne,otiation had developed 
in an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion between local engineers and shop st ... rd~ 
An ACM agreement was originally made for No 1 sinter plant, but with the 
introduction of No 2 sinter plant (1963) and the basic oxycen shop (1964) 
pressures to extend the payments increased. This resulted in the dayalop-
.ent of an informal, autonomous and fragmented bargaining system, but in 
this case the rafo~ was achieved by a works-wide ACM agre .. ant. Does the 
hypothesis explain success with the maintenance workers? 
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To examine the hypothesis requires an investigation of the relevant 
structural variables and how they interact with the perceived economic 
interests of production and maintenance workers. The craftsmen had a more 
centralised trade union organisation with their Joint Craft Committee and 
its hierarchy of shop stewards. Thus, according to the hypothesi., on this 
factor, the more centralised union organisatiGn would facilitate the union 
leadership's influence over the membership. The evidence at Ravenscraig was 
that the senior craft stewards in breaking out of the divisional dirty work 
agreement, and in concluding a works-wide ACM agreement, managed to secure 
considerable influence. Moreover, from around 1966 onwards the Joint Craft 
Committee favoured a works-wide agreement on ACM, but at that time management 
resisted the suggestion. Therefore, until management could be convinced no 
progress was made. By contrast the production branches were highly autonomous 
and the union fragmented in its dealings with management. Thus no works level 
union organisation existed, and hence no central influence within the union 
on bargaining matters. Even the union's Divisional Office initiated claims 
and reacted to problems within the framework of fragmented collective bargain-
ing arrangements. 
The wage structure and works technology were also more uniform in their 
effect upon the craftsmen than upon production workers. Previously, it vas 
established that the craftsmen had a national hourly rate and a divisional 
tonnage bonus, whereas the production workers t~e and bonus rates were 
negotiated within the various departments. In the technological context 
the craftsmen applied their universal skills to different units of plant. 
This was reflected in the tonnage bonus payments which were based upon the 
caabined hot aetal output of the iron and steel sections. Production workers, 
on the other band, worked on plants which demanded different skills from the 
respective operatives, and again the pay system reflected this. 
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This analysis reveals that significant differences existed in the 
structural variables as they influence maintenance and production workers. 
In addition, the greater uniformity and centrality provided an opportunity 
for the craft union leaders to exercise an influence in the direction of 
change. However, according to the hypothesis whether union leaders decide 
to favour or resist change is dependent upon their perceived economic 
interests. Thus the craft union leaders objectives must be considered 
further. 
With the growth of ACM payments at Ravenscraig the Group Labour Office 
responded in 1964, and commenced negotiations through ISTEA's No 1 Division 
with the SISTJC. The outcome was the divisional dirty work agreement of 
1965 which applied at Ravenscraig. Nevertheless, the Ravenscraig craftsaen 
rejected the agreement and decided to seek their own settlement at the work •• 
The Committee argued that Ravenscraig was technologically different from 
the other works and the working conditions were more adverse. Also, in 
pursuit of their members interests the CaaDittee sought an ACM settlement 
which would throw payments commensurate with craft earnings in the Welsh 
strip works. Therefore, to achieve these ends, the Ravenscraig shop stewards 
challenged the traditional collective bargaining arrangements, in this case 
ISTEA and the SISTJC, which were considered to be a constraint. However, 
this action does not explain the Committee's desire for a works-wide agree-
.ent, for the craftsaen could and did continue to lodge clatm. at depart-
mental level. The reason appears to have been related to the Joint Craft 
Coaadttee's status and their need to secure leadership. The continuation of 
autonomous and frasaented bargaining at deparbDental level obviously 
constituted a threat to the Committee. ror departmental negotiations allow 
local shop stewards to win concessions on this important issue, and not the 
Joint eo..1ttee. Thus, the Committee sought a works-wide ACM agreenent. 
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During 1966 management continued to offer Ravenscraig craftsmen in ACM 
negotiations the divisional dirty work agreement, but were required to 
settle at values above this. Hence bargaining on the issue continued at 
departmental level in an ad hoc and piecemeal manner. However, at this 
time changes were beginning to take place within management's own organis-
ation as the works personnel department increased its influence. This trend 
towards standardisation and centralisation of decision makina in turn brought 
the works personnel function to favour a works-wide ACM agreement. Against 
such development, however, was the Group Labour Office which remained 
committed to the divisional agreement. Nevertheless, by 1968 the evidence 
in favour of a change had become overwhelming. Por the first time the 
evidence included figures showing the rapid rise in labour cost brought on 
by fralMented bargaining over the ACM issue. Armed with this information 
the power of the Ravenscraig personnel department increased whilst the 
position of the Group Labour Office ~akened. 
Therefore, in response to their economic interests management decided 
to seek a reform of the collective bargaining and wage structures. Moreover, 
at this point management's aims coincided with those of the Craft eo..1ttee, 
and the chanae came in 1970. Again, therefore, this second hypothesis would 
appear to have explained events at Ravenscraig fairly satiafactorily.(65) 
Finally, the third hypothesis identified at Corby Works a causal 
relationship or sequence of priorities between the variou. factor. relevant 
to the chanae process within the work. indu.trial relations syst~ The 
first assu.ption i. that a party which articulated a change in it. econa.ic 
interests will for.ulate a strategy and pursue those objectiv.s. Further, 
if one or .ore of the existing industrial relations structures constrained 
the party in the pursuit of its a~s, then, providing the party had 
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sufficient power, (itself structurally influenced) it would challenge and 
attempt to alter these structures. Thus, given the probability that the 
party's power will be strongest within its own organisation, change will 
commence there. Then, if necessary, change will occur in the collective 
bargaining and wage structures where the party's influence i. less strong. 
Finally, due to refo~ of the collective bargaining structure change. will 
occur in the organi.ation of the other party where the initiating party's 
influence is weakest. Of cour.e, the causation may not comaence with a 
party'. con.ciou. intere.t. (the independent variable) operating upon the 
structural factor. (the dependent variable) as described above, but instead 
a party'. economic intere.ts and .ubsequent action may be dependent upon a 
change in some structural variable. For instance, at Raven.craig the tech-
nology change caused manageaent to readju.t their organi.ation all be it 
informally, and the union to exploit the opportunity to secure higher earu-
ing.. However, given that the process of interaction can operate in bGth 
direction. the remaining question to investigate is how well this third 
hypothe.is explained events at Ravenscraig. 
Manageaent'. relationship. with the production workers provide. an 
illustration of how difference. within the initiating party can weaken the 
transmis.ion proce •• in the cau.al .equence of variables. The Colville.' 
.. nageaent were divided over how to react to the Ravenscraig probl... The 
establi.hed ca.pany per.onnel policy and the Group Labour Office favoured the 
tradi tional .y.tea, whereas the new manager. at Raveacraia wlahed to ino-
vate. The outcoae of the internal struggle which developed was little formal 
chanae in llaD&gea.nt oraanisation (that is, Ravenscraig r ... ined subject to 
the authority of the Group Labour Office) or company policy. Tbua, there 
vas DO chance in the fonaal collective bargaining arra ... ent., vage 
.tructure, or union organisation. NOtwithstanding thi., however, there .a. 
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a limited change at the informal level within that part of management's 
organi.ation where the new general manager had greatest control. Here the 
works personnel department was given greater influence within Ravenscraig 
itself. 
The above development had two consequences for the transmission sequence 
identified previously. Firstly, as the works personnel department took over 
negotiations with the unions greater coordination and control was exercised 
over manageaent's response to union claims. However, the transmission of 
this change in management went no further, as the collective bargainiag 
structure and uniom organisation remained as fragmented and autonomous as 
before. Secondly, the Ravenscraig management established the first Works 
Council within the Colville. group of companies. This set up the first 
central institution at RaYenscraig which provided an avenue for discussina 
jointly works-wide problems. Moreover, the need for a central institution 
vas such that the Works Council, although a consultative body, made joint 
decisions on certain matters. These decisions did not take tbe form of a 
collective agreement, management merely stating in the minute that an under-
standing had been arriYed at. In this sense the Works Council vas a sub-
stitute for a change in the formal collective bargaining arrangements. Neyer-
theless, this for.al deyelopment in the area of joint consultation did haYe 
aD influence upon trade union organisation. For the Works Council brouaht 
together for the first tt.e all unions at RaYenscraig in a joint relationship 
with Il&U&g_ent. In addition, the Council provided lay union officials with 
easy access to senior management, and also facilities to .eet and discuss 
the agenda prior to the Council aeeting. MoreoYer, this gaye a role to the 
Coatederation's Joint Branches Comadttee in union/aanagement relations which 
preyio.sly did not exist. This had significance in that it represented the 
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first sign of centralisation within the Confederation's work place 
organisation. 
Clearly the sequence of causation did not work in the case of the 
production workers because management as an organisation did not formulate 
an official policy aimed at altering the collective bargainina and trade 
union organisation variables. Also there was DO presaure from the oppoaite 
direction as the ISTC Divisional Office were content to pursue their object-
ives through the traditional structures. On the other hand, there waa 
evidence that change within the Ravenscraig manageaent organisation did lead 
to the setting up of a Works Council which in turn had some influence upon 
trade union organisation. In this way the aequence of priorities between 
the variables retained their order, but the influence was much weaker than 
was the caae at Corby Works. However, when the Ravenscraig craftsmen are 
considered the situation was different, and the causation obserYed at 
Corby clearly identified. 
The craftsmen at Ravenscraig responded to the external and internal 
chanaes by articulatina a strategy to separate off Ravenscraia fro. other 
worka in the Scottish area. Clearly, with a wage atructure whose el"'nta 
were negotiated at a level above the works, that is, outwith their control, 
thia vas a difficult taak. In other worda, the Ravenacraig craft .. en had 
to force ..uaa .. ent to negotiate outaide of Nol Diviaion, ISTIA, aDd also 
had to break out of the SISTJC for this purpose. DuriUC thia fi&ht to 
eatablish thia ri&ht the Craft eom.ittee bec .. e an influential body forceably 
led by the AUEW CODYener of the eo..ittee. Therefore, on the union aide a 
chaD&e had taken place in the atatua of the Craft eo..ittee which .. a exert-
ing presaure to have the collective bargaining arrangeaenta altered. 
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Furthermore, if such a change had occurred then changes would follow within 
the management organisation. Here departmental engineers would no longer 
negotiate over ACM, and the Group Labour Office through the ISTEA would 
have recognised the Ravenscraig managements right to do so. 
In practice the Craft Committee were able to achieve only part of their 
strategy. They rejected the divisional dirty work agreement ea. resisted 
manageaent'. ISTEA'. and SISTJC's pressure to have it implem.nted. N.v.rthe-
less, given the official management commitment to traditional structures the 
craft unions by theaselves did not have sufficient power to make management 
negotiate at works level. Therefore, to achieve their objective of higher 
earnings, the uniona continued to submit ACM claims at departm.ntal lev.l, 
and the fragmented bargaining system continued to develop. Thus, the pressure 
initiated by the Craft Committee to alter the collective bargaining arrang._ 
ments and vage structure had a limited success in the face of official 
management opposition. 
Howev.r, when the changes within management'. own organisation are taken 
into account showing the weak.ning in the official epposition, th.n signifi-
cant r.for. occurred. It will be recalled that the Ravenscraig personnel 
deparbBent c .. e to favour a central works agreement on the i •• ae, and the 
provision of statistical evidence showing the upward trend in ACM payments 
.trengthened their hand. In other word., given the Craft Com.dttee's 
det.rmination not to accept the divisional agreement, and the need for manace. 
ment to control labour costs,(and achieve more stable industrial relation. on 
the illae) the decision was .... de to secure a works-wide agr.ement. Thus the 
obj.ctive of .... nag ... nt and trade unions eventually coincided on the iSlue. 
Finally, thil change in management organisation which changed the collective 
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bargaining and wage structures also altered the craft union organisation. 
This latter change took the fOnD of increasing the Craft Committee's authority 
over its membership by negotiating, and subsequently helping to administer 
the works-wide agreement. 
Thus, the third hypothesis when tested against the facts of the 
Ravenscraig situation would appear to give a reasonable explanation of events 
a t the works. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Strategy for Change at Ravenscraig Works 
includiDi the Influence of Productivity Bargaining. 1970-74 
The period 1970-74 involved significant changes in industrial relations 
at Ravenlcraig, and this chapter attempts to analyse the transformation 
including the use made of productivity bargaining. Part One identifies the 
.. in probleas facing the parties, considers their strategic response, and 
includes the productivity agreement., taking maintenance and production 
worker •• eparately. Part Two evaluates the results including the contribution 
of productivity bargaining. Part Three attempts to test the power of the 
three hypothe.e, developed previou.ly to explain and predict event" and to 
.ake a further refineaent. Finally, this Part will also identify differences 
and .imilaritie. in the respective .trategie, for change at Ravenacraig and 
Corby Work •• 
Part One, Probl ... and Strate,y includiDi Productivity Bar,ainiDi 
Bayen.crai,'. main probl .. va. to t.prove it. financial position and ita 
reputation by securina a larger .hare of the product market aDd by meeting 
deliyery date.. Nationalisation changed the sales operation from one based 
solely upon the ca.aercial .ucca.s of a particular company or group to a 
stratelY which took account of the aconOllic loading of mill. throughout the 
Corporation. Also in thi. period a n" ,roup director for aavenserai, and 
Gartcosh Works vas appoi.ted in early 1970, who .. de it plain to unag.ent 
aDd URions that Rayenscrai, .ost secure a larger share of the Corporation's 
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strip orders. Given the history of low tonnages and a record of frequent 
strikes this objective would be difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, the 
director set about formulating a strategy whose central objectives were to 
raise output per aan and thereby reduce costs per unit of output, and to 
t.prove the taage of the works by reducing the strike frequency. 
For senior ..nageaent the strike problem was related to two .. in factors, 
poor c~ications and inequities in the wage structure. Therefore, the 
.. in industrial relation. objectives were to improve communic.tion. between 
aaDa, ... nt, unions and .-ployees, and to compress the domestic •• g. structure. 
Both ai .. wer. an attempt to achieve greater stability and win greater 
.-ploy •• involvement in the decision making proce.s. Management believed 
that if the union. and employees could identify .ore with Ravenscraig'. 
probl ... th.n productivity would incre.se. In addition, productivity bargain-
ina va. to be us.d to t.prove l.bour productivity, especially .aDng.t main-
teDaDC. workers. However, as will be seen later, productivity bargaini~ was 
coaaid.red a .econdary aethod of aehieving the.e objeetive.. It i. now 
n.e •••• ry to con.ider the way that management attellpted to fulfill its 
.tratel1. 
A Woru Couneil had be.n .et up in 1966, and with it faciliti.s for 
uaion offieials. Thi. was eouider.d a .. jor innovation in the UDion-llan&&e-
.... t dialoa... Th. Council'. prt.ary purpo.e was to break dowa. the dearee of 
.... ieion b.twe •• the partie., and to provide .n in.titution for union 
inolv .. at ia vorks-viele probl.... However, alaost every participant int.r-
viewed took the vi_ that the ala vas aot reali.ed in the period 1966-69. 
Moreover, by 1969 th. Works Couacil hael aL.ost collapsed. Thi •• as partly 
•• e to the transfer (aro .. 1968) of the aeneral manager who hact created the 
Co.acil. la ... itioa, the craft unions had created difficulties for the 
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Council and for a time withdrew altogether. They were clearly suspicious of 
.. nag_ent'a motivea and referred to it as a It tea and bun party". Hence, for 
the above reaaona, the Worka Council failed to fulfill its intentions and as 
an "ocean wave" which .wella to • height it again fell back and petered out 
on the ahore. 
OD arrival at Ravenscraig the new group director made it known that he 
vaa committed to a fora of joint consultation.(l) Moreover, by this time 
joint consultation waa Corporation policy. At Ravenscraig a two tier consult-
ativ. c~tt •• atructure was eatabliahed. The structure consiated of three 
works level coaadttees aeeting bi-aonthly, and a top joint Ravenscraig and 
Gartcosb ec-ittee which •• t ev.ry alt.rnative ..onth. The lower cacaitt.es 
were deaip.d to involve aiddle management many of whom retained traditional 
authoritarian attitudes regarding aaDa,eaent prerogatives. The Ravenacraig 
and Gartcoah ec-ittee vaa chaired by the group director htmaelf. Al.so. it 
vas seen by the .-ployee participants as more iaportant than their previous 
Works Council. Th. interviewees put forward two main reasons for this. 
Firat the frankneaa and ca..it.ent of the new director who aaid wh.n inter-
vi ..... "I tell th .. that it'. their (ahop atewarda) worka". S.cond, senior 
........ nt furnished ..or. d.tailed infor.ation on costs, sales, prodUction 
probl ... and plaDUe. repaira; also on works p.rformance which waa compared 
with the Corporation's aDDual operating plan. In addition. the dir.ctor 
iDYolve. the Joint Conaultativ. eo..itte. in the settleaent of industrial 
relatiaa. probl ... .ore than the previous ,.neral mana,.r involv.d the 
Works Council. 
jaothar el ... nt in the .tratesy to t.prov. ca.municationa was the 
ca.ai •• ioaiac in 1970 of an .-ploy •• attitude survey.(2) The survey con.is~ 
ad of a qua.tiODDaira coyerina the llaDual work force, and vas followed up 
with .. ati ... s batween _naaer. aDd th.ir subordinates to discuss the results. 
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Interestingly, the survey revealed that the three categories (100 questions 
were merged into 13 categories) receiving the least favourable response were 
aauaceaent 35~, pay 37~ and communications 45t. Therefore, the .urvey 
reinforced the director's initial i~re.sion that communications were poor 
and that traditional management attitudes were an important factor affecting 
this. Thu., the attitude survey belped move manageaent and the work force 
in the direction intend.d by the Joint Consultative Comaittee. 
A third change which helped to improve communications was the establish-
.eDt of the Corporation product divi.ions in 1970. This change had the 
effect of giving to the Scotti.h group strip division personnel manager more 
independence in local affairs.(3) Under the previous structure (national-
isation 1967-70) the old companies had been grouped on a regional basis, 
which left the Colville. Group Labour Office intact, under a different name. 
Now with the product division the Ravens craig personnel department's line of 
authority went .trailht to the .trip division Headquarters at Galbfa, Cardiff. 
AD exception to this structure were the maintenance workers and melters who 
bad collective aar .... nt• ba.ed on the Scottish Area (that i., the old ISTEA 
Nol Divi.ion). A .. jor outcoae of th. change was an increase in the nuaber 
of staff .-ployed in industrial relations at the works. The next diagram 
.h~ the .-ployee relationa function a. it existed in 1973. 
Diaar .. 8.1 
Indu.trial Relation. Departaent at Ravenscraig, 1973 
Group P.r.onnel Manaa\r, 
I 
Staff .elations Officer 
I 
Per.ODDel Officer (.taff) 
Raven.craig and Gartcosh 
• Manager Employee Relations, Ravenscraig aDd I Gartcosh 
Senior E.p1lyee Relationa Officer 
Employee Reiations Officer-Coke and Iron 
Employee Relation. Officer-Steel , 
J.ployee Relations Officer-Mills and Craft 
Employee Reiations Officer-Development 
.oarce. 1SC.IaY ... Cr a1& Per.onnel Departaent 
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This diagram shows the increase in the numbers employed (compared with 
that given in Chapter Seven, page 302 ) although the increase is partly 
accounted for by the rise in white collar unionism in the late 1960s. Not-
withstanding this development, by 1972/73 Ravenscraig employed six special-
ists compared with three in 1966 to manage the problems of manual workers. 
The upshot was an increase in the influence of the personnel department and 
an improvement in communications. Coaaunications improved because the 
employee relations officers were able to get out of the office more. In 
this way employee grievances were given prompt attention, whereas under the 
previous organisation such grievances could fester and subsequently blow up 
into major disputes. 
Yet another channel facilitating communications between management and 
unions was the appointment in the late 1971 of an employee director 
representing Ravenscraig. The employee director scheme established with 
nationali.ation appointed repre.entatives of workers to participate on the 
regional boards (later divisional boards, then divisional committees) of 
the Corporation.(4) However, Ravenscraig was originally represented by an 
employee of Lanark.hire Works. Then, with the product division reor,aa1s-
ation, and the appointment of new employee directors in 1971, Rayenscraia 
obtained it. own representative. This employee director bec .. e involYe. in 
decision making at various levels in the Corporation's hierarchy. Moreover, 
he was amongst the first to be appointed (by the Corporation'. chair.au) who 
did not require to relinqui.h trade union office.(5) the RaYe .. crai, 
employee director continued as a branch official and althou,h he ,aye up the 
day convener.hip (discussed below), neverthele •• remained iuvolye. with 
union activities at the work •• 
The final institutional change aimed at improving communications betwe~ 
391. 
the parties was the agreement to establish three full-time day conveners, 
namely the chairman and secretary of the Confederation's Joint Branche. 
Committee and the convener of the Joint Craft Committee. These lay officer. 
were provided with private accomodation, telephone, access to typing faCilities 
and so on. In addition, they were free to attend all branch negotiating 
meetings and also joint consultative and safety meetings. Further they had 
direct access to senior management at Ravenscraig, and for purposes of 
negotiations, the craft and production union conveners participated in an 
advisory capacity, in each others' meetings. This proposal was first raised 
by the Joint Craft Committee around 1966, and was rejected by the Group 
Labour Office. Its rejection was another reason why the Craft eom.ittee felt 
that management were not serious about improving communications in the 1960s. 
However, by 1970, the attitude of management altered. 
The most obvious benefit the change brought to management was the 
facility to obtain quick contact with an experienced union official when a 
, lightning dispute occurred.(6) Moreover, with rotating shifts often no 
branch official wa. on the shift in which a strike occurred. Aa a result, 
manageaent had to find an official from outside the plant to prevail upon 
employees to remain at work to allow the grievance to be dealt with by senior 
management. The day conveners who straddled two shifts (that is, 6 .. ~pa 
and 2-1Opa) could be brought into action quickly. Another benefit was the 
ability of the day CODYeners to "open doors" in the manageaent orgaDisation 
closed to the departmental steward or branch official. For exaaple, a 
dispute could arise in which the local supervisor or manager would delay 
making a decision for fear of establishing a precedent. Howeyer, a day 
CODYener who assessed the situation a. serious could t.Bediately obtain the 
attention of .enior management and thereby obtain a decision. 
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Another benefit sought by management from the day conveners was an 
increase in the degree of coordination and central control over trade union 
activities. The previous chapter established that sectional strike behaviour 
was highly disruptive to Ravenscraig's integrated work flow. The power 
service's strikes of 1970 were recorded in some detail to illustrate the 
point. Therefore, it was part of management's strategy to increase the 
influence of the Joint Branches Committee and Joint Craft Committee by build-
ing further the domestic union hierarchy. This centralised development would 
inject a works-wide perspective into sectional disputes from the trade union 
side. In other words, the day conveners, due to their comprehensive juris-
diction, would in time develop a works-wide concern which would be built into 
sectional wage negotiations. 
However, this centralised strategy and the fo~ it took, met with 
several difficulties arising both from inside and outwith Ravenscraig. The 
Corporation was not unsympathetic to the Ravenscraig request to establish 
the position of full-t~e day convener, but would not give the proposal its 
official blessing, although it did not stand in local management's way. 
Consequently, the 'day convener agreement' regarding status, rights and 
facilities was discussed in great detail, but no formal written agr .... nt 
was ever made. In fact, the Corporation's attitude seems to have been artic-
ulated in the literature where it is argued (7) that the granting of de-jure 
richts can .ake it more difficult for management to withdraw those right. 
under adverse conditions. Also, the Corporation may not have wished to 
admit the concession publicly. 
On the other hand, the trade unions reaction to the day convener proposa~ 
was aixed. The Joint Craft Committee favoured the idea, but the Conf.der-
ation'. attitude created problem.. The Confederation originally wanted each 
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branch to have a full-time secretary on day shift. Management were prepared 
to discuss the principle, but the union had to agree to a significant 
reduction in the number of branches. Management's proposal was discussed 
within the union but no agreement was reached. In fact, although Divisional 
Office favoured a reduction in the number of branches, branch disagreement 
was too great, and in particular Nos 1 and 11 would not agree to submerge 
their identities.(8) After failing with this policy management found that 
most of the branches favoured the appointment of the day conveners, but that 
the Divisional Office was now the problem. 
Divisional Office saw the proposal as a threat to the established union 
organisation and to the distribution of power within the union. For a day 
convener interfering with the autonomy of a branch was unconstitutional. 
Moreover, the establishment of a lay hierarchy organisation which operated 
between the branches and the Divisional Office would reduce the latter's 
influence with the branches. As a result of management pressure, the 
Divisional Office eventually gave in, but insisted that the traditional 
union structures be upheld. This was achieved by insisting that the day 
conveners be established on an informal and advisory basis to assist the 
branches and full-time officers; and that they retain the formal roles already 
established, namely secretary and chairman of the Joint Branches Committee. 
In other words, the Confederation's traditional structures as they existed 
outwith Ravenscraig placed a severe limitation on the type of agreeaent 
established within it.(9) 
Thia explanation adds to that offered in the Royal eom.iasion's Reaearch 
Paper where the argument is put forward that shop stew.rda prefer de-jure 
right. on procedural matters. (lO) However, the Reaearch Paper'. explan-
ation is based upon the assumption (contained in paragraph 48) that work 
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place informal arrangements do not usually conflict with the te~s of the 
industry-wide agreements as in engineering. Clearly, in the case of the 
steel industry, these informal proposals to change procedural arrangements 
(that is, day convener involvement in branch negotiations) did conflict with 
the formal structures, and resulted in opposition from some branches and the 
Divisional Office.(ll) 
Notwithstanding these objections the Divisional Office did stand to 
derive certain benefits from the day conveners. First the day conveners 
would control more effectively the non-unionist problem identified in Chapter 
Seven. (12) Second the day conveners could and were used by the full-time 
officers during an industrial dispute. The Divisional Office recognised the 
day conveners could possess greater knowledge of a particular dispute and 
thereby gain the trust of the men involved.(13) Finally, the full-ttm. con-
veners were an extra communication channel from the works to the Divisional 
Office. This was important as, on occassiona, a branch impoaing aanctiona 
might wiah to delay Divisional Office involvement in order to presaure -.o&&e-
mente To have the sanctions removed management often communicated with the 
full-time officera asking for their intervention, and this could be seen by 
thoae in dispute as union officer involvement at management t • request. 
The second main item in management' a strategy wa. to tackle the ill.tab-
ility within the industrial relations aystem arising from the wage structur •• 
Management identified two aspects of the wage problea. Fir.tly, due to th. 
succe •• of the union's strategy in the 1960s, production workers were hiBbly 
paid, but .till producing low tonnages. Therefore, the strategy had to 
induce the •• m.n to produce at much higher toonaae. and at the .... t~. 
ensure that .arnings would not increase proportionately. To obtain th ••• 
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higher outputs, management placed heavy reliance upon winning the employees' 
commibnent through improved communications and involvement in the decision 
making process. The strategy's success will be evaluated in Part Two of this 
chapter. Secondly, inequities in the wage differentials across the works 
were another cause of instability. Hence, workers of longer service and 
greater skill resented the higher pay of those with less service and less 
skill in other deparbnents. This attitude had largely been responsible for 
the establishment of No 11 Branch in 1964, and, the power service's strikes 
in 1970. Furthe~ore, management's concern with the problem was reinforced 
by a rash of strikes which broke out amongst coke oven workers in 1970 and 
again in 1973. The coke oven branch had previously struck work on four 
occasions between 1964 and 1969, then in 1970 they stopped work seven times. 
Consequently, the strategy attempted to narrow the wage differentials across 
the works. This wage compression was to be achieved by containing the higher 
paid and being more accommodative to the lower paid work groups. 
The wage strategy involved greater coordination and control at works 
level, but, unlike Corby, the strategy was not to be assisted by a change in 
the formal collective bargaining arrangements. Instead, the personnel 
deparbnent with its increased authority would pursue a more standardised 
policy. In addition, the day conveners (as argued above) would hopefully 
develop a works-wide perspective which would be brought to bear upon sectional 
wage pressures. In other words, in the absence of a formal change in the 
collective bargaining arrangements, manageaent were trying to achieve the 
same end by informal means on the union side. 
It is now neces.ary to consider the contribution of productivity baqala.- i 
ina to the strategy. Unlike Corby, Ravenscraig management did not foraulate 
and negotiate a comprehensive productivity agreement. They either ignored or 
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considered irrelevant those clauses in the national agreement which hinted 
at the creation of an institution at works level to secure the benefits of 
increased productivity. (14) This attitude will be considered further in 
subsequent sections. Meantime, it is sufficient to note that partial 
productivity agreements were negotiated with the production branches. These 
agreements will be considered after the more important maintenance product-
ivity agreement. 
Maintenance Workers. Productivity Negotiations 
Management sought a more comprehensive approach to improving maintenance 
labour productivity. Comprehensive meaning that greater numbers were covered 
(that is, 1,111 in 1971) and also in the range of issues covered. Nonethe-
less, the decision to use productivity bargaining was only partly of Ravens-
craig management's choosing. The early chapters of the thesis explained the 
national background to the More Effective Use of Maintenance Manpower 
proposals of 1967. Given Colville's strong commibaent to the employer's 
association, discussions were commenced in Scotland immediately ·after the 
Eastbourne Conference. (15) Colville's management decided on a two stage 
approach, and that the agreement would cover all their works in membership of 
Nol Division of ISTEA. This latter decision was thought desirable due to 
the close location of these works in the Mothervel1 area. Detailed proposal, 
were drawn up and submitted to ISTEA's National aeview Committee in Septeaber 
1967 to obtain the latter's approval. This was given, and the productivity 
plan wa. submdtted to the SISTJC in October 1967. 
Broadly part one of the plan aimed to reduce restrictive job practices 
to t.prove internal labour mobility, to introduce a planned maintenance 
control system and to reduce the numbers of craft .. en and mates. Part two 
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These proposals quickly met with resistance from the trade unions and, 
in fact, the part one agreement was only concluded in October, 1970. The 
BoilermAkers Society rejected outright point six of the 26 points which stated 
"the use of burning equipment is not the prerogative of boUermakers. All 
trades will use burning equipment when required to do so". The same Society 
had a similar objection over "tack welding". Here the Boilermakers were 
exhibiting behaviour noted elsewhere in the literature(17), which was related 
to their concern with job security. In other words, the union feared that 
others would take over their work and thereby reduce their status and the jobs 
available to their members. This problem was solved in the negotiations when 
management agreed to narrow down their initial proposals. The final agreement 
read, "Those crafts not in membership of the Boilermakers Society will 
••••• 
only use hurning equipment for such destructive maintenance operations as the 
burning of bolts, burning of gears from shafts, plates, sections, etc. welders 
will burn and weld for plumbers". (18) Nevertheless, subject to this delay, 
most of the 26 points were readily accepted by the craft unions. 
The organisation of the craft unions was another aajar eau .. of del.,. 
When the productivity plan was submitted to the SISTJC, the latter's negot-
iating com.ittee consisted of the full-time officials plus two shop ateward •• 
At first the procedure was for each union to hold evening meetines of shop 
atewarda to di.cuas the progress ~f the negotiations includinc the proposals 
to chance the vorkinc rules. This wa. a cumbersoae procedure and progress 
was .low. Also, it appeared to the employers that the full-t~e officials 
were not confident in being able to cOlDit their m.bers to the chanae. 
proposed. Consequently, the parties agreed to include in the necotiatiag 
coaaittee a shop steward frca each of the works. This, as shown in aaapter 
Seyen (pace 319 ), ... permissable under the SISTJC powers of cooption. 
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However, the apparent lack of confidence of the full-time officials had to do 
with the nature of productivity bargaining, compared with the more traditional 
bargaining. On this occasion the SISTJC was involved in discussing detailed 
changes in the working practices of the various works, and the negotiating 
committee required detailed knowledge to respond more quickly to management's 
proposals. (19) 
Another reason for delay was the breakaway by Ravenscraig and Gartcosh 
craftsmen from the Scottish Area negotiations in early 1970. The Joint Craft 
Committee's action may have been partly related to the above point, since for 
some considerable time they had had no direct representation upon the SISTJC 
negotiating committee. However, a more likely explanation was the belief held 
by the Ravenscraig craftsmen and mates that they could negotiate a better wage 
deal on their own. The Ravenscraig lay officials arrived at this decision as 
a result of various factors affecting their interests. The employer. proposals 
as they affected the mates asked Ravenscraig to contribute 46.8~ of the man-
power reductions, although they constituted 38.4% of the total work force. 
Given that the Scottish Area scheme proposed to pool the savings and to 
provide -an equal distribution per man (that is, an equal distribution between 
mates and an equal distribution between craftsmen, but at two different rates 
so that wage differentials would be .. intained) the mates felt that they stood 
to gain more by standing apart from the other works. Thus, the craft mates 
led the craft .. en out of the Scottish negotiations and not the other way around. 
For their part the Bavenscraig Joint Craft Comaittee believed that auto-
na.y would allow thea to pursue their objective of seekiDg wage parity with 
the craft .. en in South Wales. This union .trat.gy wa. reinforc.d by the 
eo.aitt •• •• r.c.nt hi.tory in .stablishing autonomy over the ACM i.lue. In 
addition, the change to product divisions brought BaYenacreig aDd Gartcolh 
, 
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under the direct supervision of the strip division's Head Office in Cardiff. 
Therefore, if they could establish works level negotiations, and if a failure 
to agree was arrived at, the Craft Committee argued that they had the right 
to take the matter up with the strip division management at Cardiff. Clearly, 
in order to break out of the existing structures, the Joint Craft Committee 
required not only a view as to what best served their economic interests, but 
al.o the power to push through the change in the face of opposition and the 
commibDent of others to the established structures. 
In the struggle which ensued Ravenscraig management refused to negotiate 
with the Committee unless the full-time officials agreed. The pressure was 
al.o re.i.ted by the Mid Lanark District Committee of the AUEW ~o proved 
difficult. Apparently, some District Committee members were reluctant to see 
Raven.craig establish a separate agreement with the possibility of a higher ., 
bonus settleaent. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the full-time officials 
eventually gave their consent, and the shop atewards entered into negotiations 
with the Scottish strip mill management. However, although successful in 
this re.pect, the Scottish full-time officials agreed to the chanae only on 
the ground that the Ravenscraig and Gartcosh craftsmen remain within the 
Scottish procedure agreeaent. In other words, the Raven.craig Joint Craft 
Committee had sufficient power to establish a new bargaining unit (covering 
lavenacrai, and Cartcosh), but not enough power to establish a n.w procedural I 
arrangeaent ter.lnating in Cardiff. In the latter case the opposition fraa 
the Scottish officials was reinforced by the national union official. plus 
the Corporation, who coabined to support the traditional arrangements. 
When negotiations ca..enced between Ravenscraig and Gartcosh shop steward 
(the full-t~e official. did not take part) and the Scottish strip division 
.anaaeaent, the latter offered the s .. e proposals aa has been made to the 
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unions at Scottish level. This offer included a wage increase of 1/9d per 
hour. The wage offer was unacceptable to the stewards who wanted desperately 
to negotiate a larger wage increase. But the Scottish Area negotiations had 
to a large extent set the framework of any strip divi.ion agreement. There-
fore, the same owenty six points on job demarcations, as indeed, the same 
maintenance control system were agreed. On manning reductions the initial 
Scottish Area proposals sought a reduction at Ravenscraig of thirty seven 
skilled men and seventy five mates. However, the strip division agreement 
achieved a reduction of fifty three mates and eighteen riggers. Interestingly, 
this was the first time that management had ever discussed the maintenance 
manpower establi.hment with the unions, but management were careful to retain 
their right to vary the manning with changes in circumstance •• 
The main difference beoween the Ravenscraig and Scottish agreement. was 
the introduction of day rotas at Ravenscraig. The day shift men worked Monday 
to Friday with overtime in the evenings and on Saturday and Sunday. The 
introduction of day rotas gave management greater control, but did not 
eliminate overtime which wa. built into the agreement at 42.5 hours worked 
(the standard week was 40 hours). At Ravenscraig the workmen regaTded Over-
time as involving an element of choice, and on this ba.i. Saturday vas a 
difficult day to .an the plant. The day rota brought Saturday into a .. n'. 
normal v.ek. Also, und.r the rota 1/6 of the work force wa. off •• ch d.y 
r.sting, and -.nag ... nt r.garded this .s • re •• rve pool to be u.ed in an 
emerg.ncy. For the d.y rota managem.nt .gre.d to p.y an extra 3d p.r hour, 
bringing the strip aar.emant to 2/- p.r hour for cr.ft ... n. Ther.for., th. 
Raven.cr.ia craft .. en were .ucc ••• ful in obtaining. w.g. incr •••• (£4.20p 
p.r we.k .t 42 hours work.d) in advanc. of that aare.d at Scottish Area le~l. 
However, this diff.r.nti.l wa •• hortlived, for a f .. month. later the other 
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Scottish works agreed to introduce the day rota and the extra 3d was paid. 
The other major change brought about by the HEUMH, Part One agreeaent 
concerned procedural rules. A Works Review Panel (waC) was set up to hear 
disputes arising over the application and iuterpretation of the agreement. 
The parties envisaged that a comprehensive agreement of this type would 
involve more disputes of right. The wac, slotted into the procedure prior to 
the stage which would involve representatives of the SISTJC. The Committee 
consisted of five members, two managers and two shop stewards not directly 
involved with the dispute, and a chairman from the personnel deparaaent. the 
chairman had no vote. The Committee proceedings operated in the same way as 
the Neutral Committee, with each party presenting its verbal and documentary 
evidence, calling witnesses and so on. Unlike the Neutral Committee, how-
ever, the wac whose findings were issued in writing, had no binding authority. 
The Committee's success or otherwise will be reviewed in the next section. 
Finally, the craft union agreement for Ravenscraig and Gartcosh Works 
was concluded and operated from April, 1971. 
The craft mates agreement on the other hand met with local difficulties 
and was not implemented until May, 1971. In fact, the branch officials 
refused to sign the agreement, and it had to be signed on their behalf by the I 
union's divisional organiser. The crux of the problem was the differential 
payaent of 2/- per hour to craftsmen and the 1/6d per hour proposed for the 
mates. Of course, the previous ACM differential had been a caule of resenb-
ment between the grades, as was also manageaent's preference for giving 
priority to the craft unions when dealing with maintenance workers. On thi. 
occaSion, the branch officials argued that their members were makiac the 
largest contribution through demanning. 
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Finally, £3.15 of the craftsmen's productivity bonus was consolidated 
into the hourly rate in August, 1971. The consolidation had the effect of 
increasing the hourly rate by 1/6d, and earnings by more due to overtime 
working. The craft mates' bonus was also consolidated. 
The MEUMM Part Two will not be analysed in depth in this thesis. This 
agreement was the subject of considerable delay and, was not implemented 
until June, 1974. The delay was partly due to a national level disagreement 
over the cash settlement (discussed previously), and partly to the Pay Board. 
Apparently, the Pay Board insisted that the agreement had to show savings 
prior to payment. These delays push any genuine evaluation beyond the end 
of the 1964-74 period with which the thesis is concerned. Notwithstanding 
this, the major elements contained in the agreement will be outlined as they 
reveal the parties' intentions. 
Phase Two was principally concerned with the introduction of work 
measurement and financial incentives. Unlike Phase One, the firm of PA 
Consultants was hired to assist with the design of the scheme, to provide 
expertise on planned maintenance, and to help aell the programme to the work 
force. One of the main a~s was to establish work groups for financial 
incentive purposes. These groups varied from four men to much larger groups 
of one hundred. Hence the craftsmens bonus was to be related to much amallel 
teams than had ever been the case previously, but not to individual effort. 
Another design feature was the involvement of workers in the development of 
job values and in slotting individual work values into job categories. For 
this purpose a number of work study men and subsequently categorizors were 
appointed from the shop floor. Training for these personnel, plus the shop 
stewards, was provided by the Ravenscraig work study department. In 
addition, management issued a regular news sheet to all employees providina 
information on the scheme and its progress. 
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Given a considerable increase in labour productivity management proposed 
to reduce the manning at Ravenscraig and Gartcosh by 225 (Ravenscraig 185) 
skilled workers. The unions considered this figure much too high and by 
the end of 1973 had agreed to a reduction of 60 men. Moreover, the craft 
unions would not accept compulsory redundancy and insisted that the erosion 
of manpower take place through natural wastage. The Confederation which had 
accepted a reduction of 53 mates under Phase One accepted a further reduction 
of 148 over the two works (127 at Ravenscraig). Again the union's divisional 
organiser had to sign the agreement as the branch officials refused to do 
so. (20) 
On the earnings side the Phase Two deal was to bring a considerable 
increase in productivity bonus. For the craftsmen this amounted to £9.15 
per week with a performance level between 98 to 102, and for mates £5.76. 
However, these figures for craftsmen and mates have to be deflated by £3.15 
and £1.26 respectively, as these monies were residual bonuses already paid 
under the previous schemes.(21) Thus the Phase Two increase for craft.-en 
was £6.00 and for mates £4.50 per week. (22) 
Production Workers l Productivity Negotiations 
At Ravenseraig a number of productivity agrea.ents were negotiated 
with the Confederation's branches. Prior to the 1970-74 period three agre .. 
ments had been concluded covering storemen, mills and the sinter plant. 
The stores agre .. ent arose out of the need to reorganise the location 
and adainistration of the stores. This initiative reduced the nuaber of 
men employed in the stores from 42 to 27. In addition, stor .. en under the 
agre .. ent were desi&nated as classes 1,2, and 3 with graded job respoasi-
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bilities. In effect, the agreement introduced a promotion ladder where 
none had previously existed. The agreement raised the status of the job 
which in turn was reinforced by an increase in wages. 
The actual negotiations were conducted in two stages because the store-
men were in membership of different branches. This was unhelpful for when 
the mills stores negotiations came round the Ravenscraig No8 Branch officiall 
held out for wage rates in advance of those agreed by No7 Branch for the 
iron and steel works. Of course, this inter-branch rivalry was not 
uncommon at Ravenscraig. 
The two other productivity agreements of the late 1960s .rose out of 
the 40 hour week national agreement for shift workers. Chapter Pour 
(p.ge. 73 to 76 ) analy.ed the background to the 40 hour week .greement. 
The .greement involved a reduction in the standard week from 42 to 40 hour. 
at no extra co.t to the industry. Therefore, in return for the 51. increa.e 
in .hift rate., the union agreed to a 51. reduction in standard manning. 
The aegotiation. covering the 51. manning reduction were to be c.rried out 
at dep.rtaental level. 
At Bavenscraig local di.cus.ion. were commenc.d with the branche •• 
The .tIl. agreement which cover.d 328 men .ucce.d.d in r.duciDg the 
.tandard manning by only two men, but the sinter and ore h.ndling plant 
a,reem.nt •• et with more succe... A manning reduction in exce •• of 51. wa. 
achi.v.d (in f.ct, l2~1. in the .int.r pl.nt), but the branch won th. right 
to n.goti.te .n agre ... nt ov.r the .aving. in exce •• of 51.. Mo.t of the 
branches cl.iaed the incr •••• in rate. whilat refuaina to cone ••• any 
r.duction in manning. Alt.rnativ.ly some branches (wh.re it w •• practical 
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a8 in team working) agreed a different formula, whereby although the 42 
hour week rota continued to operate each man accumulated two hours per week 
and took an extra day off without loss of pay each month. This depletion 
in the manning was not made up as the remainder of the crew performed the 
extra duties. (23) 
Clearly, then, the national 40 hour week agreement did not pay for 
itself at Ravenscraig. For their part the union was not of much a •• istance 
to management in getting the agreement implemented. The Divi.ional Office 
.. de all the correct noises, but was unable to persuade the obstinate 
branchea. In turn the branches argued that although over manning might 
apply to the industry, it did not apply to their particular unit. which 
were tightly manned. Management believed this argument and accepted the 
po.ition by implementing the 57. wage increa.e acro •• the work.. Neverthe-
le •• , this argument must be regarded with some sc.pticism, a •• ome of the 
branch •• unable to reduce manning did .0 lat.r when it .ore cl.arly suit.d 
th.ir int.re.t •• 
Th.r.for., productivity bargaining wa. not a major ianovation at 
Rav.n.craig in the years prior to 1970. However, in November 1969, the 
Confed.ration .igned the national productivity .'r .... nt, and it i. 
nec •••• ry to inve.tig.te ita implic.tion for .ub •• quent productivity 
barg.ining. 
In the year. 1970-72 th.re were five major .gr .... nt. involviBg 
Conf.der.tion br.nche., aft.r which productivity b.rl.iniua p.tered out. 
Manag ... nt would couider a wage a.ttl_.nt only wi thin the fraaework of 
the national productivity agr ... ent, .nd ••• hown l.ter, this .... t • de. 
ma1Uliua of the pl.nt. concerned. Local maug_ent therefore took no 
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initiative in introducing productivity bargaining, and simply responded to 
branch wage claims within the framework of the existing collective bargain-
ing arrangements. 
The open hearth melters' concluded the first agreement in February, 
1970. It was argued in the previous chapter that the melters were the 
traditional aristocrats of the industry whose sensitivity had increased due 
to the relative deterioration of their position in the wage league. The 
next table shows that the deterioration continued in the years taBediately 
prior to the melters' productivity agreement. 
Table 8.2 
Ravenscraig Works: Earnings of Selected Top Occupations, 
April 1967-69 
1967 1969 1. Chanae 
1st Hand Melter £36.97 £39.77 7.5 
Bricklayer £24.04 £26.59 10.6 
B.Fce Ke.p.r £31.87 £34.23 7.4 
St. Pt. Operator £27.79 £32.58 17.5 
Sl.Mill H.ater £36.12 £39.50 9.3 
Mill Operator £43.32 £47.14 7.9 
source: BSe, Ravenscraig Personnel DeparbBent 
Except for the blastfurnace keeper all occupations improved relative 
to the melter in the earnings leaaue. Moreover, the bricklayer who worked 
in clos. proximity on the furnace stage had done much better in percentage 
te~s. The larae incr.a.e in the .inter plant operator's position is 
explained by the productivity agreeaent of 1968. No dOUbt this latter 
alr .... nt did not ao unnotic.d by the .elters, and aiven the national 
procluctivity alre.ent they saw this .s the only avenue open to thea to 
restore their rel.tive position. H.nce the .elters who refused to reduce 
"1lIlina under the 40 hour week .gr .... nt did so wh.n it came to th.ir ova 
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The agreement reduced the manning from 54.6 to 37.8 men. Of the 17 men 
made redundant, 50~ applied for voluntary redundancy and the remaineer return-
ed to the labouring pool to await further promotion. (24) In addition, the 
agreement formalised a number of duties previously performed info~lly, ..a 
also reallocated the 4th hand melter's and dipperman's duties as these jobs 
disappeared. 
Increasingly management tried to persuade Nol branch to widen the cover-
age of the agreement to include the boxfiller (25), and pitside personnel in 
membership of the same branch. However, the melters refused and insisted on 
the savings being confined to their own occupational group. Both managers and 
full-time union officials when ssked about this considered that the melters 
were just greedy. Of course, in a sense they were greedy, but given the 
collective bargaining arrangements and the melters' desire to improve their 
relative position in the works wage league thil attitude was understandabl •• 
The wage structure also caused the melters to take a I.lf centred vi.w, for 
they traditionally were paid under the National Brown Book Agr .... nt (up to 
1966), whereas the pitside's wage structure was quite different. Cons equ.ntly, 
the wage structure was an important factor distinguishing the two groups. 
The melters' productivity agreeaent trigger.d off discuslions with the 
pitlide perlonnel and also with Noll branch in the op.n h.arth shop. The 
machineaens' agreeaent (Noll Branch) commenced in April, 1970 and reduc.d the 
manning from 57.2 to 41.8 men. The pitside quickly followed, starting in 
May, 1970. The latter deal r.due.d the manning by 8.4 men, that is, fra. 
37.8 to 29.4. Neither agr.ement resulted in direet r.dundaney as all the 
displaeed men went back to the labouring pool. Both th •• e wage cla~. were 
the dir.et outeome of the group's desire to maintain th.ir po.ition relative 
to the .elters. 
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The power services branch concluded a productivity agreement in 1971, 
which involved demanning and some additional duties associated with the 
bringing in of a fifth boiler. In addition, certain changes were made to the 
wage structure. For those operatives working within the power station the 
bonus was consolidated into a time rate and a new graded wage structure 
established. Operatives working in the production deparbDents, such as the 
waste heat boilermen, were separated off, with their bonu. related directly' 
to the production units. This particular productivity agreement wa. the out-
come of the 1970 work stoppages (recorded in the previous chapter) aid the 
recommendation of a Neutral Committee. Althou,h the partie. tried to comply 
with this recommendation they only succeeded in reducing the standard manning 
from 79.7 to 74.9. 
Finally, the traffic branch concluded a productivity a,reement in 1972, 
involving a reduction in manning from 122.6 to 111.5 men. Here mana,"'nt 
took the opportunity to obtain the extended use of radio telephone equipaent 
which involved some extra duties for the men concerned. Intere.tiaaly, this 
agreement was the first to apply work measurement outside of the maintenance 
area under the national agreement. 
Clearly, then, productivity bargaining at Ravenscraig, even under the 
national productiTity agreement was on a small scale. The agre .. ents th~ 
selTes were partial and negotiated within the framework of an autonomous and 
frasaented collective bargainius system. Why ~ageaent decided to pursue a 
strateay of piece-aeal partial agreements, and not attempt to initiate a 
coaprehensiTe progr ... e as at Corby will be considered in a subsequent 
section. Even so piece-aeal productivity baraaining might have been used to 
coapre.s the internal works wage differentials which manag .. ent belieTad to 
be a cause of instability in the industrial relations system. Whether 
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productivity bargaining had this effect or not will be evaluated in the next 
part of the chapter. 
Part Two, An Evaluation of Management's Strategy including 
the Productivity Agreements 
This section will evaluate the results of management's strategy, and 
also consider the contribution of productivity bargainine_ The approach will 
be to assess initially the more general features of the strategy and then 
deal with the contribution of productivity bargaining. Manageaent's strategy 
contained two main objectives, namely to increase output, and to achieve 
greater stability in industrial relations. The means by which these ends 
were to be achieved placed a heavy emphasis upon improved comaunications 
including employee involvement in decision makine; it also involved compress. 
ing the wage structure. Therefore, productivity bargaining was given the 
subsidiary although important role in achieving these objectives. The 
evaluation which follows will make use of the three criteria developed in 
the previous chapters, namely indices of industrial conflict, output per man, 
and the rate of change in earnings. This part concludes by testing the 
strategy's success in compressing the wage structure. 
Strike and Absenteei .. Criteria 
The previous section had shown that management had instituted a nu.ber 
of structural changes to improve communications and to increase coordinatioa 
~t works level. These changes included the formation of a two tier joint 
consultative comaittee system, the establishment of three full-ttae day 
conveners with improved facilities, a more democratic style of mana,em.nt, 
and an increase in the authority and manpower of the personnel deparbaent. 
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Therefore, the question is, how effective were these changes in securing 
improved stability? The next table extends the figures shown in table 7.6 
(page 349) up to 1973. 
Table 8.3 
Numbers of Strikes or Lockouts among Production and 
Maintenance Workers at Ravenscraig Works, 1964-73 
(excluding bricklayers and their labourers) 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Production 6 27 10 12 9 24 21 5 
Maintenance 7 6 6 5 5 6 5 4 
Total 13 33 16 17 14 30 26 9 
source: BSe, Ravenscraig Personnel Department 
1972 1973 Total 
11 22 147 
1 1 46 
12 23 193 
The table establishes a clear improvement in the total strike incidence 
for the years 1971-73 compared with the years 1964-70 before the strategy. 
For example, in the period 1964-70 the annual average number of strikes was 
21.2 whereas in 1971-73 these fell to 14.6 with a progressive reduction in 
the number of strikes for the peak years of the steel business cycle, that 
is, in 1965 thirty three, 1969 thirty, and 1973 twenty three strikes. fUrther_ 
more, if Ravenscraig was to be compared with the general strike trend in the 
iron and .teel industry, then clearly the works improved its strike 
incidence at a t~e when the number of industry strikes were increasing. 
Such a strike comparison shows that the average stoppages per anaua in the 
industry rose from 128.2 (1964-70) to 148 (1971-73) whilst falling at 
Ravenscraig.(26) 
Moreover, Table 8.3 shows that the maintenance workers' strike activit, 
improved .ost markedly from an average per year of 5.7 (1964-70) to 2 per 
year. Moreover, of the four strikes in 1971, three were called by the 
executive. of the various craft unions in opposition to the 1971 Industrial 
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Relations Act. Of the three remaining strikes (for the 1971-73 period) two 
concerned discipline and one a safety issue. This reduction in maintenance 
worker strike activity can partly be explained by the introduction of the 
works ACK agreement in 1970. The ACM issue accounted for about 45% of all 
maintenance strikes between 1964 and 1970 (see Table 7.8 Chapter Seven, 
page 352). In addition, the parties, during interview, associated the improvec 
strike position with other structural changes. Management felt that the day 
conveners had made a significant contribution, and the Joint Craft Committee 
emphasized the easier access to and speed of decision making which they 
attributed to the greater authority of the personnel department. 
On the other hand, not all the branches responded positively to manage-
mentes new centralised strategy as Table 8.4 shows. 
Table 8.4 
Number of Strikes by Production Workers at Ravenacraig, 1964-73 
Departments 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Ave Strik. 
1964- 1971-
70 73 
Coke Ovens 
-
1 
-
2 
-
1 7 
-
3 7 1.5 3.3 
Blastfurnace 1 3 1 4 - 4 2 1 - - 2.1 0.3 Open 8th Shop 2 5 - 2 1 3 1 - - 1 2.0 0.3 
Basic Ox Shop 4 3 2 2 1 5 2 2 2 3 2.7 2.3 
S NiUs/SDB 
-
5 3 5 3 9 5 2 5 6 4.3 4.3 
Hot Strip NiP 
-
1 
-
1 4 3 2 
-
1 4 1.5 1.6 . 
Hot Sheet Fin 
-
7 3 
-
2 2 1 2 2 2 2.1 2.0 
Power Service. 
- -
1 
-
1 
-
3 
- -
1 0.7 0.3 
Traffic 
- -
1 
- - -
2 
- - -
0.4 0.0 
source, BSC, Ravenscraig Personnel Depar~ent 
The strike prone departaents of the works are: the slab adll, the ba.ic 
oXJ,en .hop, hot .heet finishing and coke ovens. The only depart.ent who.e 
strike record sianificantly deteriorated during the latter period wa. the coke 
ovens. Apparently the coke oven branch saw the structural change. a. detri-
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mental to their interests. The next table gives more evidence to show that 
the coke workers were falling behind other groups in the wage league.(27) 
Table 8.5 
Earnings for Top Occupations including average for the 
Respective Bargaining Units at Ravenscraig, 1966-70 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Coke Ovens 
Heater £25.46 £24.52 £26.04 £29.73 £32.27 
Ave Wage £22.02 £21.95 £23.24 £26.36 £29.02 
Blastfce 
Keeper £30.80 £31.37 £32.22 £34.57 £39.28 
Ave Waite £25.20 £26.79 £27.16 £29.21 £3'tt51 
Sinter Plt 
Operator £26.03 £27.79 £29.45 £32.58 £35.83 
Ave Waste £22.58 £24.43 £26.14 £29.75 £33.04 
Open Hth 
1st Melter Brown £36.97 £38.63 £39.77 £49.37 
Ave Wage Book £28.32 £29.15 £30.13 £42.07 
Power Srv 
Swit Bd Ate £25.20 £26.41 £27.18 £28.45 £31.82 
Ave Wage £21.85 £23.00 £23.72 £23.71 £27.07 
source: BSC, Ravenscraig Personnel DeparbDent 
'7. Cha~e 
25.9'7. 
31.7'7. 
27.5'7. 
36~i~ 
37.6'7. 
46.31-
33.51-
48.51-
26.3'. 
23.9'7. 
The branch wanted autonomy to pursue its wage claims without the 
constraint exercised by the day conveners. Moreover, given the higher output. 
of the 1970s the interdependence of the work flow was becoming more important 
and thereby increasing the power of the coke worker.. Consequently, the 
branch would have nothing to do with the day conveners and refu.ed thea acce •• 
to their meetings. A further indication of their increa.ing militancy was 
the election of new branch official. and their formal withdrawal from the 
Joint Branche. Committee in 1970. Eventually, after .everal strike. the 
branch officials were di8mds.ed from office in 1973 by the Confederation'. 
National Executive. Following this event, the branch rejoined the Joint 
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Branches Committee and cooperated with the day conveners. Thus, it would 
appear from the strike evidence that management's strategy to bring a works-
wide pressure to bear upon sectio.na1 interests through the trade union organ-
isation met with some limited success. 
Adequate labour turnover figures were not available as a measure of 
employee dissatisfaction. Therefore, the absenteeism figures are used as a 
substitute on the assumption that if the strategy improved communications and 
increased involvement, then employees would identify more with the strategies 
objectives and absenteeism would diminish. Table 8.6 provides evidence on 
this. 
Table 8.6 
Absenteeism at Ravenscraig Works, April 1969, 1971 and 1973 
1969 1971 1973 
Hours Wk Hours Lost Hours Wk Hours Lost Hours Wk Hours Lost 
7. '7. 1-
Production 88,712 8,304 9.3. 84,526 9,500 11.2 91,826 9,139 9.9 
Maintenance 54,679 4,462 8.1 52,400 3,776 7.2 52,741 3,021 5.7 
Total 143,391 I 12,766 8.9 136,926 13,276 9.6 144,567 12,160 8.4 
source: BSC, Ravenscraig Personnel Department 
The table shows that a decrease occurred in total absenteeism between 
April 1969 and 1973; but the detailed evidence is mixed, especially amongst 
production workers where absence figures deteriorated in 1971 and thea 
improved in 1973. Using the coke oven workers as an illustration, in 1969 
they were a relatively low absentee group with a percentage of 7.7, compared 
to the average production figure of 9.3, but by 1973 they had moved nearer to 
the average at 9.4, compared with 9.9. Hence, the coke worker.' di.satis-
faction with their position in the wage league and their opposition to the 
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new strategy was reflected in their absentee figures as well as in their 
strike figures. On the other hand, the morale of the maintenance workers, as 
measured by absenteeism, improved continuously under the new strategy. 
A"reasonable conclusion is, that, in terms of conflict as measured by 
the indices of strike and absentee figures, the new strategy appears to have 
met with a measure of success. Also, the strategy experienced greater 
difficulties with production than with maintenance workers. This improvement 
was all the more remarkable given the increase in preductivity achieved a. 
shown in the next section. 
Productivity Criterion 
As mentioned previously, productivity improvement at Ravenscraig depended 
largely on obtaining extra orders from BSC, and on getting longer undisturbed 
production runs. The success of these objectives had a direct bearing on the 
climate of indu.trial relations, in terma both of employees producing the 
extra output and by stopping work less frequently. Given the strike contri-
bution above, the next table shows the improvement in output and productivity. 
Table 8.7 
Weekly Output per Man Hour at Ravenscraig Works, April 1969,1971 and 1973 
Years and Man Hot Metal OUtput per Strip Mill Output per 
Grades Hour. OUtput(x) Man Hour OUtput Man Hour 
Production 
1969 88,712 52,841 0.59 tonnes 17,673 0.19 tonnes 
1971 84,526 48,414 0.57 .. 21,212 0.25 .. 
1973 91,826 56,649 0.61 .. 26,894 0.29 " 
Maintenance 
1969 54,679 52,841 0.96 tonne. 17,673 0.31 tonne • 
1971 52,400 48,414 0.92 .. 21,212 0.41 II 
1973 52,741 56,649 1.07 .t 26,894 0.51 .. 
Total 
1969 143,391 52,841 0.36 tonne. 17,673 0.12 tonne • 
1971 136,926 48,414 0.35 .. 21,212 0.15 .. 
1973 144,567 56,469 0.39 It 26,894 0.18 II 
". 
source: BSC, Raven.craig Personnel Deparbaent 
(x) Hot metal output includes the production of the bla.tfurnaces, open 
hearth shop and basic oxygen shop. 
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The peak years of the steel business cycle, that is, 1969 and 1973, 
provide the most interesting comparison, although the cyclical trend is 
disguised at the hot strip mill owing to the strategy's success. Hot metal 
responded to the cyclical changes as the blastfurnaces and melting shops were 
utilised more fully prior to 1910. This fuller utilisation was due to 
imbalance in works capacity (R Pryke), and to slabs produced at the works 
going to Dalzell Works. Thus, the total figures show that hot metal output 
per man rose from 0.36 tonnes in 1969 to,O.39 tonnes in 1913, that is, by 87.. 
whereas strip mill output rose from 0.12 tonnes in 1969 to 0.18 tonne. in 
1913, that is, by 50t. In addition, the maintenance workers appear to have 
made the largest contribution to the productivity improvement, namely lit, 
compared with the production workers 2t on hot metal, and 64t compared with 
53t in the strip mill. Clearly then, management achieved the extra orders 
for Ravenscraig and succeeded in improving production per man partly through 
the strategy described in part one of this chapter. 
A further question to be considered under this criterion is the contri-
bution made by productivity bargaining to the improvement in output per man. 
Here an attempt will be made to quantify the contribution .. de by new 
techniques by emphasizing manpower reductions, although other factors such 
as job enlarg .. ent may al.o have contributed. 
Section one showed that five productivity aareements ~re concluded in 
the period 1970-73. These aareements involved a total manpower r.duction of 
56.4 .en or 2,369 .. n hours per we.k(that is, 56.4 x 42 hours) and if it 
had not b •• n for these aar .... nt., the production workers man bours of 
91,826 would have been hieher by 2,369 in 1973. This arauaent held. in that 
the reductions w.r. from standard manning levels. Consequently, alth.ulb 
extra personnel were hired to cope with the larcer outputs of 1973 (28), 
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these men were not used to fill the jobs which had disappeared from the 
standard manning. 
The next table estimates the contribution of productivity bargaining to 
the improvement in output per man for production workers. 
Years 
1973 
Table 8.8 
Estimated Contribution of Productivity Agreements 
to Output per Man, Ravenscraig, April 1973 
Man Hot Metal Output per Strip Mill 
Hours Output Man Hour Output 
Actual Man Hours includint Productivity Agreements 
91,826 
Output per 
Man Hour 
0.29 tonnes I 56,649 I O. 1 tonnes I 26,894 I 
Man Hours excluding Manpower due to Productivity Agreements 
1973 94,195 I 56,649 I 0.59 tonnes I 26,894 I 0.28 tonnes 
source: BSC, Ravenscraig Personnel Department 
Output per man would have been less without the contribution of product-
ivity bargaining. However, the contribution of productivity bargaining can 
be seen to be very small, about 3~ of the improvement in output per aan hour. 
This, verifies the conclusion drawn previously that productivity bargaining 
for production workers was on a small scale, and a subsidiary aspect of 
mana,ement's overall strategy. 
The maintenance agreement's contribution to improved productivity is 
more difficult to measure on the above lines. Management believed that the 
26 points and, in particular, the labour mobility claule was beaeficial. 
The mobility clause allowed craftsmen to be .witched from their normal work 
plac •• to a aajor break down and thereby reduce production lo •• e.. However, 
the 26 points by theaaelve. could not be expected to make a major contri-
418. 
bution as many were nothing more than a codification of existing custom and 
practice between the various trades. The only real change concerned the 
boilermakers as described in Part One above. 
Nevertheless, altheugh the codification of working practices may have 
contributed little new, it did change the maDDer in which disputes were 
handled in procedure. Under the productivity agreement many more disputes 
arose over differences of interpretation and application. Consequently, the 
parties' used the Works Review Panel to obtain an authoritative declaration 
of their rights under the agreement. Previously nearly all disputes were 
.traight conflicts of interest. 
It would appear from the strike evidence that the wac must have played 
some part in the marked reduction in the number of maintenance work stoppages. 
For instance, of maintenance worker strikes, 17.41. in the period 1964-70 
concerned authority relation •• (29) Of course, some of these problems were 
.olved by the new strategy's provision of facilities for shop .tewards to 
have easier access to management. Notwithstanding this. some disputes did 
concern restrictive job practices, and the refusal of craftsmen to move fraa 
one unit of plant to another within the works. From the comaencement of the 
agreeaent the WRC handled thirty disputed cases until the end of the period 
under review. The Committee's decisions were accepted by the craftsmen On 
all occasions except one. when the Boilermakers' Society took an is.ue to 
the next staae in procedure. In fact. 80 committed were the craftsmen to 
the wac that on one occasion they used it against management. In this 
instance .. naa .. ent had invoked the call-out agreement (that is, called a 
craft ... n into the works at night to affect a repair) instead of u.ina the 
80bility clause. thereby transferrina into the department a craft...u fr~ 
another part of the works. On the other hand. the craft mates did not make 
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much use of the WRC and considered its operation unsatisfactory. Although, 
the branch officials concerned had refused to sign the agreement, they were 
caught up in it, and therefore made use of the wac twice without success. 
Thus, on balance, it is reasonable to conclude, that this particular 
change in the collective bargaining arrangements was of considerable benefit 
to the achievement of management's overall objectives. 
The introduction of the day rotas was another aspect of the agreement 
which might have been expected to improve productivity. The previous chapter 
established that day craftsmen worked some 50 hours per week (April 1966) and 
that the level of overtime varied little with the state of trade. Table 8.9 
shows the hours worked for the periods before and after the agreement's 
introduction. 
Table 8.9 
Ravenscraig Maintenance Workers, Average Hours Worked per Man 
before and after the MEUMM, Phase ODe 
Period Average Numbers Average Man Average Houra 
at Work Hours Worked Worked per Man 
612171 to 
10:4171 1,084.2 53,399.6 49.2 
Productivi ty Agreementa Introduced 
17 :4171 to 
19:6:71 1,129.5 52,606 46.5 
419171 to 
16110171 1,053.2 49,441 46.9 
aourcel BSC, Ravenscraig Personnel DeparbBent 
The table does not separate out day worker. from continuous shift 
workera; hence, the filurea fa1l to show the true reduction in overtime 
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worked amongst day men. Also, the period 12:6:71 to 28:8:71 has been excluded 
as this covers the main holiday period, and as a consequence hours worked per 
man were higher.(30) Nevertheless, the day rotas did reduce the average work 
week per man from 49.2 to 46.7 hours, although by April 1973 hours worked had 
again risen slightly to 47.6. Moreover, the day rota's contribution can be 
considered even more significant, for 1971 represented a low point in the 
steel business cycle, whereas 1973 was a high point. 
Also, Phase One of the productivity agreement reduced the manning by 53 
mates and 18 riggers. Table 8.10 attempts to quantify the contribution of tbe 
manning and overtime aspects to the improvement in maintenance output per man. 
Years 
1973 
1973 
Table 8.10 
Ravenscraig Pbase One MEUMM, Estimated Improvement in 
Output per Han, April 1973 
Han Hot Ketal Output per Strip Mill Output per 
Hours Output Man Hour Output Man Hour 
k,tual Man Hours including Productivity Bargaining 
52,741 56,469 1.07 tonnes 26,892 0.51 tonnes 
Man Hours excluding Manpower due to Productivity Agreements 
I 1 0.79 tonnes I 26,894 I 58,162(31) 56,649 0.46 tonnes 
source: BSe, Ravenscraig Personnel Department 
Alain, as with production workers, the table sbows that the contribution 
of productivity bargaining was small and constituted about 10~ of the 1973 
output per man. This figure represents the minimum contribution of product-
iyity bargaining as there is no way of disentangling the agreement's contri-
bution fra. the longer production runs or indeed improved communications. 
Therefore, although the maintenance agreement contributed more than those of 
the production workers to productivity improvement, nevertheless, productivity 
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bargaining played a much smaller role than other aspects of management's 
strategy. Even assuming that the problems encountered with the craft mates 
had not occurred, it is doubtful if the conclusion would have been any 
different. 
EarniDiS Criterion 
Management were faced with the problem of achieving a substantial break-
through in productivity and at the same time attempting to ensure that ea~ 
ings did not rise proportionately. The previous chapter showed that earnings 
were high at Ravenscraig in the middle 1960s but tonnages low, and as output 
rose the rate of growth in earnings was slower. However, could this be sus-
tained in the period 1970 onwards, especially with the need to motivate 
workers to produce more? This problem was complicated by the fact that an 
element in management's new strategy was to narrow the spread of wage differ-
entials. Such an objective would mean an extra disincentive for the more 
highly paid groups; although management hoped to benefit from a reduction in 
strikes. Again, the contribution of productivity bargaining to the narrOWing 
of wage differentials will be investigated later. 
Table 8.11 compares the rate of rise in earnings and productivity in 
the period 1965-69 and 1970-73. 
Table 8.11 
Ravenlcrai, Workl, Comparison of Earnings and Productivity Rates,1965-73 
Strip Mill &. Ave.t Chanae 1970 1971 1972 1973 Ave.1- Chaqe 
Slab HaDdlina p.a. 1965-69 p.a. 1970-73 
Average Wage + 6.9 £32.24 £32.23 £34.54 £43.62 + 8.8 
Average Pro-
ductivity per +10.5 2.4 ts 2.4 tl 2.3 ts 2.8 ts + 4.1 
Mall Hour 
lources ISC. bv.nacraig Personnel Department 
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At first glance the table indicates that the improvement in strike 
incidence and productivity was bought with inflationary wage increases. How-
ever, this conclusion ignores the fact that 1965 as a productivity base year 
wa. very low, whereas by 1970 output was much higher. Therefore, the scope 
to t.prove productivity per man was less in the 1970s and the 161. (or 4.1\ pa) 
wa. a reasonable achieveaent. Secondly, the general wage inflation of 1971-73 
di.torts the earnings side of the equation if the comparison is made on a 
t~e .erie. ba.is. Hence, a more realistic approach would be to compare the 
rate of ri •• in earniugs at Ravenscraig with those at Corby and in the steel 
indu.try in leneral. In Chapter Six on Corby, Table 6.12 revealed that earn-
ine' at Raven.craig for .elected occupations rose by 26.51. in the period 1970-
73 and at Corby by 43.11.. Al.o, Table 6.13 shows that earnings at Ravenscraig 
ro •• 1 ••• fa.t than tho.e for aetal manufacture as a whole. Furthermore, 
av.ra, •• arnings for thirty one ste.l work. in 1973 (32), show. Ravenscraig 
bot .trip .!ll operative. to be paid above the average (that i., £43.62 
c~.r.d with £40 for the Corporation) for the occup.tional group. but were 
r.nk.d below .leven other work.. Therefore, .lthou,h earnings .t Ravenscrai, 
out.tripp.d productivity in the period, neverth.le •• , the str.t.gy was .uccess-
ful according to the e.ming. criterion. 
It i. nov n.c •••• ry to con.id.r the contribution of productivity b.rgain-
ine to the •• mine.-productivity relation.hip. Th. main que.tion to be 
coalid.r.d i. wh.th.r the productivity .,r.e.entl p.id for themselvel. Th. 
productiOD work.rl' agreeaents con.i.ted of manning reductions, and four of 
th. five aar .... nt. did p.y. Th. av.r.,. di.tribution of total .aving. in 
f.vour of the br.nch •• w •• 66.5~ Th. one exc.ption w.s the power service. 
agr .... nt which .av.d £6,850 pa, but p.id out £9,285. Notwithstanding thil, 
th. five productivity agreement. generated a total saving. of £69,161 per 
.... 
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annum even allowing for the power service's deficit. Moreover, these savi~s 
were immediate and with the subsequent wage increases rose further. For 
example, the melters' agreement achieved an initial savings of £132.00 per 
week, but by February 1973 this had risen to £270 per week. Therefore, the 
production workers' agreements made a small contribution to improving product-
ivity and to containing the rate of rise in wage costs per unit of output. 
On the other hand, the quantitative contribution of the maintenance 
agreeaents to improving wage costs of the product are more difficult to assess. 
The MEUMM Phase One agreement in terms of wages cost £4,103 per week or 
£205,150 per year.(33) However, savings arising from the introduction of the 
day rotas and manpower reductions have to be off-set against this cost. This 
calculation proved difficult to make and required several assumptions.(34) 
Given these assumptions, .avings amounted to £3,229 per week or £161,450 per 
annum providing a los. of £43,700 per year. Nevertheless, this los. must be 
regarded as the worst possible calculation, and given the less quantifiable 
aapects, the agreement possibly broke even. Furthermore, although overtime 
subsequently rose from an average per man of 46.7 (1971) to 47.6 (1973) this 
wa. a.aociated with a considerable increase in maintenance productivity. 
The second aspect of the new strategy concerned the compression of 
internal wage differentials. Previously it was argued, that management 
believed thil to be the cauae of the high strike activity in 1970 amo1'l&st 1h.e 
p~r aervice's and coke oven workers. The next table contains information 
on the earui.a of top o~~upationa wi thin the various bargainin& units. 
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Table 8.12 
Ravenscraig Works, Occupational Earnings Analysis, April 1967-73 
Occupa tions Earnings Actual Wage Earnings Actual Wye ~ change 
1967 Ave. Wage 1973 Ave. Wage 1967-73 
Roller, SIb Mill £,43.32 1.43 £.61.98 1.31 + 43 
Screw Op,Hot S Mil £,40.60 1.34 £.61.38 1.30 + 51 
Vessewn, BOS £.38.25 1.26 £.56.13 1.19 + 47 
Melter, OHS £.37.00 1.25 £.55.16 1.17 + 49 
Heater, SIb Mill £.36.12 1.19 £.52.87 1.12 + 46 
Teemer, OHS £.32.79 1.08 £,48.53 1.03 + 48 
Keeper, Bltfce £.31.87 1.05 £.46.13 0.98 + 45 
Operator, St PIt £,27.79 0.92 £,43.55 0.92 + 57 
Operator, Ore Prep £,27.65 0.91 £.39.78 0.84 + 44 
SB Atted,P Service £.26.40 0.87 £.41.61 0.88 + 58 
Craftsmen £.24.60 0.81 £.44.69 0.94 + 82 
Heater, COvens £,24.52 0.81 £,41.87 0.88 + 70 
Charger, OHS £.22.86 0.75 £.40.70 0.86 + 78 
Loco Drv, Traffic £.21.84 0.72 £.39.53 0.83 + 81 
Craft Mate £.19.29 0.63 £.34.02 0.72 + 1.28 
Average Wage £.30.32 £,47.19 
source: BSC, Ravenscraig Personnel Deparbnent 
Table twelve reveals a substantial narrowing of the wage structure range 
at Ravenscraig from 0.80 in 1967 to 0.59 by 1973. In addition, if the popu-
1ation is divided into two groups, consisting of those above and below the 
average wage in 1967, then, the average wage increase of the top group between 
1967 and 1973 is 47.3~ whereas that of the lower group is 71.4~. Therefore, 
the work groups at the lower end of the wage league table made considerable 
advances in the period. Moreover, this improvement appears to correlate 
positively with the improvement in the strike activity of the groups concexned. 
The coke ovens appear to be a mjjor exception to this earnings/strike 
improvement correlation. For the coke oven heater improved hi. earnings 
considerably (that is, by fifth best at 701.), and yet 1973 was a major strike 
year in that deparbnent. This might be explained as the exception that break. 
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the general rule. More likely, however, their behaviour had more to do with 
the group's belief that militant action paid. Table 8.5 showed that the coke 
oven heater had fallen marginally behind other top occupations in the period 
1966-70, but Table 8.12 showed that his position improved by 70% between 1967 
and 1973. Consequently, experience prior to 1970, may have caused the coke 
workers to take militant action leading to the election of new branch officials 
and to non-cooperation with the full-time day conveners. This militancy 
appears to have paid off for them in that their relative wage advance came in 
1970-73. In fact, the heater's wage improved by 23% between April 1972 to 
April 1973. Management wanted (and to some extent the full-time day conveners) 
to improve the coke workers position in the wage league, but not by so much 
that other work groups would feel left behind. Eventually, encouraged by their' 
apparent success coke oven militancy brought the intervention of the union's 
Executive Council which dismissed the officials from office. 
Finally, productivity bargaining would appear to have contributed to the 
narrowing of the wage structure. Many of the productivity deals covered those 
bargaining units at the bottom end of the wage league. For out of the top 
group in Table 12 only the melters and the teemers concluded productivity 
agreements. Conversely, in the lower half of the table, the craftsmen, the 
mates, power servicemen, traffic personnel and machinemen in the aeltina sbop. 
all concluded agreements. 
To conclude, management's overall strategy for the period 1971-73 appears 
to have been successful compared with the period 1964-70. In particular the 
.trategy a. measured in te~s of strikes, productivity and eaminas criteria, 
showed a marked improvement. In addition, productivity bargainina made a 
contribution to the strategy's outcome, although it played a subsidiary role. 
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Why productivity bargaining played such a minor role at Ravenscraig compared 
to Corby will be considered within the general theoretical framework of the 
next section. 
Part Three, The Hypotheses Applied to Ravenscraig, including a 
Comparison between Ravenscraig and Corby Works. 
The most interesting question, in terms of the hypotheses, was the 
attempt by Ravenscraig management to implement a strategy which did not lead 
to a formal works-wide change in the collective bargaining arrangements as at 
Corby. Before pursuing this question, several important external changes 
which influenced the Ravenscraig parties' actions in the direction~f succes •. 
ful change must be mentioned. These included: The Corporation's decision to 
administer sales from the centre, hence providing Ravenscraig with an 
opportunity to secure a larger share, and thereby, to produce higher outputs. 
Secondly, the national productivity agreement of 1969 encouraged the local 
parties to seek new ways to improve efficiency and stability in work. 
industrial relations. Thirdly, the Corporation's change to product diviSions 
allowed local management more autonomy to formulate a strategy which suited 
the needs of the strip works in Scotland. Fourthly, the Corporation's 
proposed development strategy of the early 1970s held implication. for job 
security at Ravenscraig. Nevertheless, although these external change. 
removed some existing constraints and provided some new opportunities, the 
hypotheses hold that the parties' response to, or formulation of a stratelY. 
can only be understood in terms of the interactions between their perceived 
intere.ts, as these relate to internal structural variable.. In other worda. 
whether a change in the relevant external factor. elicit. a re.poa.e from 
the parties to alter the internal structural variables or to coufora to thea 
depends partly upon their view of the circumstances and what be.t aerve. 
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their interests. 
Surprisingly, at Ravenscraig management articulated a strategy to improve 
efficiency and stability in industrial relations, but did not make use of the 
opportunity presented by the national agreement to alter formally the collect-
ive bargaining arrangements and associated wage structure. Instead, manage-
ment's strategy attempted to increase the informal influence of the personnel 
department and the full-time day conveners, and by formal means such as the 
two tier joint consultative committees, an employee attitude survey, and 
through the employee director. By these means management attempted to improve 
employee and union involvement in decision making and to enhance the degree 
of centralisation in work place relations. What then explains management's 
lack of will to alter the formal job regulation structurel 
Here,three possibilities present themselves:-
(a) Management were so committed to (and conditioned by) the existing 
structures that they did not see the need to alter them, or alternatively, 
had no power to alter them. 
(b) Management were uncommitted to (not controlled by) the existing structure. 
but saw them as serving their interests. 
(c) Kana&ement saw the need for change in the existing domestic structure., 
but did not pursue the formal solution on the grounds of cost, due to the 
low probability of a successful outcome. 
aegarding the first proposition, the evidence is that Raveuscraig 
management were not completely dependent upon or conditioned by the tradition-
al structure.. In the previous chapter it was ShOWD that Raveuscraia had 
sought a ae.sure of autonomy from the Group Labour Office, but that this 
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initiative had largely failed. Subsequently, with the establishment of the 
product divisions the Group Labour Office constraint was removed.(35) How-
ever, there is no evidence that management seriously intended to use this 
new freedom to change the traditional collective bargaining arrangements at 
the formal level at Ravenscraig. 
The second proposition suggests that Ravenscraig management found the 
existing structures to serve their interests. Again, the evidence is to 
the contrary; for example, the absence of a centralised collective bargaining 
structure on the issue of the 40 hour week. This national agreement inteaded 
to be implemented at no extra cost in fact incurred extra cost due to the 
resistance of many branches. In addition, Ravenscraig experienced many of 
the problems met at Corby such as competitive wage bargaining between the 
branches resulting in a high strike incidence. Initially management att~d 
to get the Confederation to reduce the number of branches. However, again, 
this attempt at centralisation failed due to branch resistance and was 
eventually dropped. 
Given the rejections of propositions one and two, it would appear that 
the third proposition must provide the answer to the question posed above, 
that is, that Ravenscraig management chose a less formal alternative because 
they calculated that the formal approach as used at Corby would prove too 
costly. The history of difficulties experienced in attempting to alter the 
structures of management and the Confederation had a considerable influence 
on this decision. 
Moreover, the Ravenscraig strategy with its emphasis upon communications 
and employee involvement in management problema was probably more in line 
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with management's own ideology. It will be recalled that the group director 
when interviewed said, "I tell them that it is their works". This ideological 
statement however, may have been to promote management's control. In other 
words, due to the growing pressure upon management authority from the 
employees, the strategy was an attempt to re'tain control by making a show of 
sharing it.(36) Further, reference to the role of ideology will be made 
subsequently, when the discussion turns to an explicit consideration of power. 
Notwithstanding the influence of ideology, management's perceptions of 
the difficulties and cost involved entered into their decision and is 
illustrated when a comparison is made with Corby Works. The most significant 
difference between Ravenscraig and Corby Works, as it affected the objectives 
of efficiency and stability, concerned the input/output equation of the two 
works. Corby was operated to full capacity (when product demand waa avail-
able) and the main problem was to reduce input costs per unit of output. On 
the other hand, Ravenscraig had never operated at full capacity, therefore, 
the main problem was to raise production to reduce unit costa of the product. 
At Corby the need was to maximise internal job flexibility and labour mobility 
which required changes in the formal wage structure and collective bargaining 
arrangements. (37) However, at Ravenscraig output per worker could be 
increased by greater commitment to production targets and by reducing the 
strike incidence. Thus, at Ravenscraig, the traditional structures were not 
as severe a constraint as at Corby. In other words, the costs involved in 
the change at Corby (that is, some management and branch/union opposition) 
were off-set by the benefits, whereas at Ravenscraig the costs involved in 
achieving a formal centralised collective bargaining structure might have 
proved greater than the benefits. It is for the same reason that productivity 
bargaininc .a a means of change played a subsidiary role. 
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The other significant difference between the two works which affected the 
collective bargaining arrangements concerned management's own organisation. 
At Corby a formal comprehensive agreement was necessary to integrate the 
minerals, steel and tube works management structures. At Ravenscraig a fonnal 
unified management organisation had always existed, although conflict existed 
between the Group Labour Office and Ravenscraig over policy. This difference 
in management organisation encouraged Corby to adopt a formal centralised 
control structure, and Ravenscraig to pursue change at the informal level with 
the production workers, and at the formal level with the maintenance workers 
where the benefits were more obvious. 
This idea that management calculated the costs and benefits associated 
with competing courses of action constitutes a refinement to the hypotheses. 
Nevertheless, this refinement fits within the framework of individual and 
group interests interacting with the key structural variables as identified. 
The second hypothesis developed above argued that the greater the degree 
of centrality within management and work place union organisations the greater 
the influence of the leaders to assist or resist reform. At Ravenscraig in 
the period 1970-74 the craft unions were more centralised than the production 
branches and, given their favourable attitude, management'. iniitiatives met 
with little opposition as predicted by the hypothesis. The major change 
affecting maintenance workers was the MEUMM agreements which altered working 
practices, the wage structure and the procedure for handling disputes. This 
agreement was part of the national developments described in Chapters Three 
and Four, and delays occurred in negotiations due to the national parties' 
disagreement over the level of monetary settlement. Nevertheless, (for 
reasonl given in the earlier chapters) the MEUMM was seen by the craftsmen as 
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broadly in their interests and the deal went through without too much 
difficulty at Ravenscraig. 
On the other hand, management's strategy, albeit informal, met with 
greater difficulty from the production workers. The strategy was to use the 
augmented and centralised personnel department and full-time day conveners 
to compress the wage structure. Opposition to the strategy came initially 
from the Confederation's Divisional Office which had used the fragmented 
bargaining system for the union's ends in the early 1960s; but by 1970 the 
resistance was due more to the implications of the proposal for the full~ 
time day conveners and their influence upon the distribution of power within 
the union. These problems were solved for two reasons. First, by 1970 (for 
reasons to be given subsequently) the Divisional Office was as concerned as 
management to improve Ravenscraig's strike image. Second, the Divisional 
Office insisted that the day conveners must have an informal and advisory role, 
However, the greatest opposition to the centralised strategy came from 
those branches who saw it to be a restriction upon the pursuit of their 
interests; in particular, the higher paid branches. Consequently, the strike 
records of these branches did not improve in line with the overall works 
improvement although neither did they deberiorate. This absence of deterior-
ation was attributed in the interviews to the role of the full-time day 
conveners. Nevertheless, as explained previously, the opposition of the coke , 
oven branch was so intense that they withdrew from the Joint Branches 
Committee. 
It is this act'on by the coke oven workers which reveal. a possible 
weakness in the Ravenscraig strategy. The weakness can be •• en more clearly 
if a comparison is made between the recalcitrant branches at Ravenscraig and 
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Corby Works. At Corby a formal centralised structure was established in 
the form of the Production Sub-Committee (the central collective bargaining 
institution) and the Corby Trade Union Policy Group which used their authority 
to induce and pressurise successfully the deviant branches into conformity. 
At Ravenscraig there was no such formal central authority, and therefore the 
influence brought to bear on the opposition branches was weaker. Consequently, 
when the coke oven branch got very disruptive, the Confederation's external 
authority had to be used. Therefore, a strong similarity existed between the 
coke oven branch at Ravenscraig and the AUEW at Corby. In both cases there 
was no formal centralised authority at work place level to relate workers' 
aspirations to the desired bargaining units, and in both cases the external 
authority of the union was used to force an accommodation. 
This conclusion that the absence of a high degree of formality and 
centralisation in the collective bargaining arrangements, management and 
union organisations at Ravenscraig represents a possible weakness, has been 
challenged by HA Turner, G Roberts and D Roberts. (38) Turner et al have 
argued that the degree of standardisation (that is, the exiatence of policy 
and procedures), formalisation (that is, written policies and procedurea), 
expenditure on personnel specialists, and the provision of ahop steward 
facilities are associated with an increase in the aize of organiaationa. 
From their research they conclude, that the greater the degree of theae 
characteristics and the provision of shop steward facilities the higher i. 
the strike incidence measured by working day. lost (aee pages 37 and 74). 
Thia they say contradicts certain hypothesea of the Donovan Commisaion 
(pagea 3 and 4) which are: that industrial relations will be improved by more 
effective and orderly collective bargaining at company and factory _vela, 
by the formalisation of procedures, and by the provision of shop ateward 
facilities. 
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In addition, Turner's research stands in opposition to the conclusions of 
this thesis regarding industrial relations at Ravenscraig and Corby Works. 
The one exception is with regard to the degree of formalisation which was less 
at Ravenscraig than at Corby. Turner argues that standardisation and formal-
isation implies more bureaucracy, and that this would increase rigidity and 
thereby the number of working days lost. Such a conclusion dld not appear to 
be a consideration of the Ravenscraig management in formulating their strategy. 
As argued above, they went for informality in the collective bargaining 
structure of production workers because the cost of implementing a formal 
structure appeared greater than the benefits, and that the difference between 
the Corby and Ravenscraig strategies is best explained by the varied circ~ 
stances of the works. Notwithstanding this, Ravenscraig management certainly 
attempted to achieve more orderly and effective collective bargaining arrange-
ments, and to this end increased the degree of centralisation and standard-
isation, expenditure on personnel specialists, and the provisions offered to 
shop stewards. 
Moreover, the validity of the Turner et al methodology is questionable. 
Their research covered some 45 firms in various industries, and due to 
difficulties with the data they were forced to resort to DeparbDent of Employ-
ment statistics on strikes as the only source providing common definitions 
for comparison purposes. The study then proceeds to assemble statistical 
tabulations and correlations between different variables. Such a method 
(even with the best will in the world) must run the danger of selecting data 
which fits easily the statistical techniques. This thesis has revealed the 
inadequacy of the published statistics as they apply to the steel industry. 
For at Ravenscraig the craftsmen measured in strikes per operative were less 
than the production operatives, and this contradicts the published statistics. i 
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The third hypothesis says that a priority or sequence could be identified 
whereby one independent variable operating upon a dependent variable could in 
turn change a third dependent variable. Therefore, the eventual industrial 
relations outcomes (such as a change in employee motivation or a reduction 
in strikes) was the result of this multiple sequence of interaction between 
the key factors. Moreover, this sequence of interaction relates to the 
concept of power and can be thought of as a transmission of pressure from one 
factor to another.(39) In the foregoing argument this had been articulated 
most clearly in terms of a conscious management response to some external or 
internal change leading to the formulation of a new strategy. Initially, the 
new strategy was likely to alter the works technology, then management's 
organisation working through collective bargaining and wage structures to a 
change in trade union organisation. 
can be initiated by the trade union. 
Alternatively, the sequence of causation 
However, the union did not have the 
same influence upon works technology and unless management complied, the 
probability of a successful outcome was much le88.(4O) 
A significant event at Ravenscraig was the establishment of a new 
bargaining unit covering the strip works for the craftsmen and mates. In 
tenDS of the hypothesis the Ravenscraig Joint Craft Committee saw that their 
interests would be better served by breaking with the Scottish Area negot-
iations. The external change which brought this response was the Corporation': 
decision to establish product divisions, reinforced by the Committee's recent 
successful experience with the works ACM agreement. The Joint Craft 
Committee formulated a new strategy which included the aim of setting up a 
new procedure agreement terminating in Cardiff. However, the primary purpOie 
was not structural change for its own sake, but the selection of a more 
appropriate means for direct comparisons with the higher paid Welsh craftsmen. 
Needless to say, the Ravenscraig management initially resisted this 
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development. Their reaction was not surprising given that they were a 
party to the Scottish Area collective bargaining arrangements, and had 
relationships with the union organisation as it existed outside Ravenscraig. 
The break in the deadlock came when the Joint Craft Committee obtained 
pennission from the SISTJC (where its power was greatest) to negotiate an 
agreement outside of the Scottish Area discussions. However, although this 
decision established a new bargaining unit, pennission was granted on the 
understanding that negoitations would be conducted within the framework of the 
Scottish procedure agreement. In other words, the craftsmen created their 
own bargaining unit (i.e. persuaded management to agree to a bargaining unit 
which suited their interests), but their initial aspirations were modified 
by their experience of the environmental structures. Once the internal union 
problem was solved management agreed to negotiate at the strip-works level. 
In turn the new agreement increased the autonomy of the Ravenscraig manage-
ment viz-a-viz the Scottish Area negotiations. Further, the new agreement 
altered the industrial relations outcomes by increasing maintenance product-
ivity and by reducing the number of maintenance strikes. 
This same sequence of multi-variable interaction can be traced with the 
production workers. The hypothesis predicts that the new strategy will 
initially result in a change in management's own organisation. At Ravenscraig 
this happened with the 1970 increase in the authority and numbers in the 
personnel department. However, the strategy did not attempt the next stage, 
that is, to alter formally the nature of the job regulation structure. 
Instead, management initially tried to change directly the Confederation's 
organisation, by securing a reduction in the number of branches. This tactic 
failed due to the resistance of saae branches. Nevertheless, the difference 
in the approaches of Ravenscraig and Corby managements provides an 
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opportunity to test the validity of the third hypothesis. At Ravenscraig, 
it would appear that management's strategy, to alter union organisation 
directly, failed because it attempted to by-pass an important intermediate 
variable in the sequence. In the absence of a formal change in the coLlect-
ive bargaining arrangements, management's strategy was that much less 
effective in bringing deviant branches into line. Therefore, at Ravenscraig 
the chances of a successful outcome were reduced.(4l) 
Nevertheless, Ravenscraig management faced similar problems to those at 
Corby (generated by the traditional system of collective bargaining) and 
therefore sought greater control. Consequently, they attempted to alter 
the collective bargaining arrangements at the informal level by injecting a 
works-wide perspective (that is, increasing the degree of standardisation and 
centralisation) into the bargaining arrangements through the personnel 
department and the day conveners. 
This type of analysis would appear to be of critical importance to the 
industrial relations practitioner. According to KF Walker (42) a test of 
an industrial relations theory is its usefulness in helping practitioners to 
bring about or avoid certain Changes. He goes on:-
"This implies that the theory indicates what are the 
important factors to operate on, and what effects of 
specific operations on these factors will be." 
In te~ of the hypothesis the advice offered to an initiating party 
is to for.ulate a strategy which first reorganise. the limdtiug factors 
within the party's own organisation and then procedes to operate upon the 
key variables in the order identified to maximise the causal effects. How-
ever, notwithstanding this advice the Ravenscraig strategy wa. clearly a 
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success and shows what can be achieved by less formal means subject to the 
calculation of costs involved in changing a formal collective bargaining 
structure. 
Now consideration must be given to the concepts of power and authority 
and to their explicit place within the hypotheses. It was argued in Chapter 
Six ( page 284 ) that power to achieve behavioural change appeared to be a 
function of the party initiating the change and of the intermediate variables. 
The period 1970-74 at Ravenscraig provides several examples of the balance 
of power behind the parties' conflicting ends. 
In Chapter Seven it was argued that the Craft Committee favoured a 
work.-wide ACM agreement because the continuance of fragmented bargaining 
constituted a threat to their leadership. Once the works-wide agreement 
was made the Committee were jointly responsible with management for its 
administration and interpretation, and their status rose accordingly. This 
view (in terms of power) receives support from the work of E. Batstone et al 
(43) who argue that, "a convener will have le.s trouble and hence will 
achieve greater power if, instead of having to argue about issues, or havina 
to squash or amend the initiatives of others, he is able to develop a 
situation in which members .ee it as his right to decide what are the 
problema and how they should be handled." 
Moreover, the .ame writers .uggest (page 10) that the continued accept-
ance of .hop floor leadership by rank and file members ha. to be worked for. 
Alain, this idea help. to illuminate the Craft Committee's decision to 
e.tabli.h a nev and separate bargaining unit in the pursuit of their 
econ~c objective.. By breaking out of the Scottish Are. negotiations and 
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concluding an agreement in advance of the Scottish settlement the Committee 
reinforced its authority with the membership and with management. 
Secondly, management's proposals for the election of full-time day 
conveners had an effect upon the distribution of power within the Confederation 
at Ravenscraig. This caused the Divisional Office initially to resist the 
development and to accept it subsequently only on the basis of informal 
advisory status for the conveners. In effect, management were proposing to 
increase the centrality of the lay officials in work place organisation. This 
change would make the Divisional Office more dependent upon the lay officials. 
(44) Nevertheless, having noted these WTiters' contributions to the nature of 
power, these hypotheses argue that the placing of power on an operational 
basis arises out of and is influenced by the multiple interactions of the key 
structural variables. For example, if the Ravenscraig management's initiative 
on this issue had included a change at the formal level in the collective 
bargaining structure, then, the Glasgow Divisional Office response, as at 
Corby, would have been different. At Corby the formal change in the collective 
bar,ainiD& arranaements and in union organisation created no threat to the 
Divisional Office, as the full-time officials were placed at the head of the 
union side of the Production Sub-Committee. Hence the formal change in the 
structure ensured the maximum influence for the full-time officers of the union 
So far, the above distinction has treated power and authority as arising 
out of interests (alma) and the institutional arrangements created. However, 
behaviour is also influenced by dominating ideas and beliefs. It was part of 
aaDa& ... nt's strategy to promote the idea that Ravenscraig was the employees' 
works aDd that its prosperity depended upon the dearee of responsibility shown 
by the work force. This ideology of common interest at Ravenscraig was also 
u.ed by aanageaent et Corby. Through the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme 
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management promoted the ideology of common interest and thereby tried to 
influence attitudes toward integration within the system. But the conclusion 
drawn from the Corby evidence was that the hostile branches and craft unions 
gave greater priority to their sectional interests; moreover if they had 
possessed the power, then this would have been used to destroy the CWPP. 
Therefore, the Programme was sustained and the opposition overcome (for a 
time) by those in authority, that is, by management and trade union leaders 
who favoured the agreement, operating through the power contained within the 
ideology and the institutional structures. Consequently, the conclusion was 
drawn that a social action perspective helped explain events at Corby. Never-
theless, the above hypotheses show that structural factors such as product 
markets and technology (emphasised by systems theorists) and management and 
union organisations and collective bargaining arrangements (emphasised by 
job regulation theorists) strongly influenced people's attitudes and behaViour 
at both Ravenscraig and Corby. 
On the other hand, on the face of it, the idea of a basic ideology 
shared between management and unions appears to fit the facts at Ravenscraig 
for this period. After all, the strategy was an undoubted success. The rate 
of rise in earnings was kept below that at Corby and in general metal 
manufacture; moreover productivity increased and the number of strikes fell. 
Other more impressionistic evidence, derived from interviews, showed that 
union officials believed themselves to be much more involved in works problema. 
A senti.ent expre.sed frequently by union officials waa that they had 'grown 
up' in the period after 1970. Clearly, the suspicion and mistrust which had 
doadnated the parties relationship. during 1964-70 wa. largely overcome. 
Thus, there can be no doubt that in the sense of participation the trade 
unions' power and authority grew under the new strategy. 
440. 
Given the difficulties in obtaining a high trust response, what then 
explains the apparent consensus and trust between the parties at Ravenscraig 
in this latter period? (45) The most likely explanation is that given the 
parties' view of the external problems, they pulled together to promote 
their Works interests viz-a-viz that of other works in the Corporation. In 
other words, certain external changes had taken place between the periods 
1964-70 and 1971-74 which caused the parties interests and goals to coincide 
rather than to conflict. Ravenscraig, as did Corby, experienced uncertainty 
regarding its future development in the years 1971/72. This uncertainty was 
not relieved until the Corporation's declaration of its 'Ten Year Development 
Strategy' in February 1973.(46) The strategy gave Ravenscraig a central 
place in future developments. Therefore the ideology on common interest was 
not a~ed solely at changing internal behaviour, but also at improving 
Ravenscraig's image in the eyes of the BSC decision makers at headquarters. 
(47) Consequently, the power of the ideology, as reflected in the high trust 
relationships between the parties, allowed the lay officials to take 
cognizance of the external constraints and to work for the achievement of 
this objective. The role of the Ravenscraig employee director played an 
important part in this as a member of both parties. In this sense, the 
strategy was seen by the Ravenscraig unions as treating their interests as 
ends and not as means. 
Given this positive attitude and the centralisation of power achieved 
by the Craft Committee and the lay full-time day conveners, the union leader-
ship took a longer run view of their members' interests. Thus they resisted 
or defeated wage pressure and strike activity from the opposition branches. 
Incidently, this same proposition was used to explain the behaviour of the 
shop stewards at the Corby ateel works in the context of the 1966 Magenta 'I 
a,reeaents. Similarly, on the management side, the balance of power had 
441. 
altered, moving away from the more autonomous line management to the more 
centralised personnel department. In addition, the new group director 
supported this change. 
Thus, the power of ideology had the effect of heightening both manage-
ment and the union leaderships' awareness of Ravenscraig's internal and 
external problems. It therefore helped both parties to formulate a strategy 
of industrial relations reform aimed at improving productivity and reducing 
the strike incidence. In turn the parties worked through the key variables 
as predicted by the third hypothesis, that is, they altered initially their 
own internal organisations, then the collective bargaining arrangements and 
pay structures, and finally changed behaviour within the other party. In 
addition, the power of the respective leaderships' was enhanced by the 
increased degree of centralisation, standardisation and formality, as predict-
ed by the second hypothesis. These institutional reforms allowed the leaders 
to organise and resolve differences in perceptions by individuals and the 
various groups to arrive at a uniform management and trade union view. (48) 
Hence the weakness of social action theory, that the subjective meanings 
attached by workers to objective events are unstable and make prediction 
impossible is shown by the hypotheses to be limited by the internal key 
structural variables, that is, the Ravenscraig collective bargaining arrange-
ments and the institutions of job regulation. 
In conclusion, the hypotheses developed in this and the chapters on 
Corby, plus the concept of power in both its institutional and ideological 
forms, go a long way towards explaining events at Ravenscraig in this 
period. 
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plus 49.2 - 47.6 • 1.6 hours saved per man. Therefore, 1.6 x 1,205 
manning • 1,928 man hours; 3,493 + 1,928 • 5,421 man hours saved. 
Therefore, 52,741 + 5,421 = 58,162. 
32. BSC, private document 
33. This figure is based upon 1,084 maintenance personnel (see Table 8.9) 
which consisted of 656 craftsmen and 428 mates. Therefore, 656 x £4.20 
bonus at 42 hours • £2,755, and 428 x £3.15 • £1,348. The sum of the 
two is £4,103. 
34. It was assumed that the average hourly rates prior to the agreement were 
£0.61 and £0.46 for craftsmen and mates respectively based upon 49.2 
hours worked and 56 hours paid. Therefore, the 2.5 hours per man saved 
by the introduction of day rotas amounted to £1.25 and £1.15 re.pective1) 
Thus, 656 craftsmen x £1.52 - £997.1 and 428 mates x £1.15 • £492.2, 
or summed £1,489. The reduction of 53 mate. and 18 riggers saved 
£1,739, furnishing a total of £3,229. 
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35. As previously explained the Colvilles Group Labour Office disappeared 
with nationalisation, but the same personnel remained in charge of 
the Scottish Area of the Scottish and North West Group up to 1970. 
36. H Ramsay, Participation: The Shop Floor View, BJIR XIV N02 July, 1976, 
page 137 
37. NBP!, Report on Payment by Results, HMSO 1968. Fragmented PBR and bonus 
~mes mitigate against labour mobility. 
38. HA Turner, G Roberts and 0 Roberts, Management Characteristics and Labour 
Conflict. These authors also include the degree of centralisation in 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
the management structure, but find no statistical correlation between 
the size of establishment and the various levels of centralisation. 
A graphic expression of this transmission process was given in Chapter 
Six, page 282 
Examples of successful union initiatives given in the text which were 
first resisted by management were the Corby steel works craftsmens' 
productivity initiative of 1965, and the Ravenscraig craftsmens' ACM 
initiative of 1966. 
J Eldridge, op cit, pages 220-221. Eldridge discussing a redundancy at 
Consett Works in the early 1960s provides evidence of the weakness of 
the Joint Consultative Committee and the ISTC Joint Branches Committee 
in implementing a works-wide policy on redundancy amongst deviant 
branches and the NUBF. 
KF Walker, Towards Useful Theorising About Industrial Relations, BJIR, 
-Dec. 1970, page 309. 
E Batstone et al, Shop Stewards in Action,page 12. The authors 
distinguish three aspects of power: (a5 makers of decisions (b) who 
identifies and shapes the issues (c) who plays the major role in creatin8 
and maintaining the larger ideology and perspective. 
OJ Hickson et al, "A strategic Contingency 
Power", Administrative Science Quarterly. 
categories of centrality, substitutability 
ing power. 
Theory of Intra-Organisational 
These writers use the 
and dependence when discuss-
45. A Fox, Man Mismanagement, page 99. Fox has argued that 'there can be 
institutionalised trust or distrust which is embodied in social arrange-
ments, decisions and policies which men seek to impose on each other'. 
Here Fox is postulating that organisations which allow employees to 
participate obtain a high trust response from employees, whereas those 
which deny participation elicit a low trust response. 
46. Cmnd 5526, BSC: Ten Year Development Strategy 
47. A similar strategy was pursued by management and workers at Govan Ship-
builders in July 1979, when they agreed to work their summer holidays 
to meet delivery dates on the Polish order. One month later British 
Shipbuilders announced their rationalisation plan which included the 
closure of certain shipyards. 
I 
445. 
48. Walton and McKersie, op cit, Chapters 7 and 8. This process could be 
identified with the authors intra-organisational bargaining and 
attitudinal structuring. 
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Chapter Nine 
Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly summarise the main conclusions 
and to pull together the hypotheses. The study traces industrial relations 
reform in the British steel industry in the period 1964-74, and the use made 
of productivity bargaining. 
Chapter Two identifies the main factors underlying the industry's poor 
performance in this period, namely increasing international competition, 
foreign technological advance, increasing trade union militancy, and govern-
ment intervention to keep prices down. Taken together these factors caused 
low productivity, rising industrial unrest and a disastrous decline in the 
industry's profits. 
Chapter Three investigates the response to this situation by examining 
the employers' strategy aimed at improving productivity and promoting stabilit} 
The strategy proposed the negotiation of two productivity agreements, one 
for maintenance workers (1967), and subsequently one covering all manual 
workers(1969). Productivity bargaining was seen at that time by management 
as a technique offering very significant advantages and seemed an appropriate 
tactic for pursuing reform in a unionised industry. The new Bse also sought 
reform of the industry's fragmented collective bargaining structure, but 
failed to secure an NJIC, and had only limited succe •• in winniD& the agree-
ment of the Trades Union Steel Industry Consultative Committee to new 
bargaining arrangements. 
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Chapter Four deals with the productivity agreements that were concluded. 
The Corporation was unable to extend as far as planned its prerogatives over 
the use of work measurement and manning; also it failed to achieve the 
degree of joint union coordination hoped for at national and local levels. 
However, it did achieve the first multi-union national agreement on Income 
and Employment Security. Since the success or otherwise of the agreements 
can only be judged at local level, Chapters Five to Eight deal with the reform 
of industrial relations at Corby and Ravenscraig Works. 
Chapter Five describes Corby's traditional system 1964-70 and traces the 
origins of productivity bargaining. A most interesting question was why the 
steel works craftsmen responded positively, whereas the tube craftsmen resisted. 
The evidence revealed the existence of several differences between the two 
works. First, the industry's rationalisation strategy (to divert new invest-
ment away from inland locations) posed a greater threat to the steel works. 
Second, the attitude of the steel union leadership was favourable and that of 
the tubes not. Third, the more centralised union hierarchy and standardised 
collective bargaining arrangements allowed the steel union leaders to exercise 
influence in the direction of reform. Fourth, separate management organis-
ations allowed divergent policies to be pursued at both works. Nevertheless, 
after a good start the effectiveness of the steel works agreement deteriorated 
and the tube works agreement collapsed. Hence by 1969/70 there was a need 
for a new initiative to reform industrial relations and this question il 
taken up in the next Chapter. 
Chapter Six deals with the comprehensive Corby-Wide Productivity 
Programme introduced in 1970 and abandoned early in 1975. Although introduced 
under the national aareements it met with considerable opposition. Two 
important questions are asked in this Chapter:-
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(i) How was the opposition overcome? 
(ii) What explains the programme's collapse? 
The opposition branches and craft unions were induced and partly coerced 
into accepting the CWPP. Management and lay union officials supporting it 
maintained a tough attitude, and this associated with the new institutional 
arrangements, plus support from national officials, overcame the opposition. 
The programme's collapse was due to adverse external circumstances in 1974 
combining with internal opposition. The opposition groups coerced into the 
programme obtained greater influence and were able to undermine both manage-
ment and union commitment to it. Hence the CWPP operated successfully only 
in 1973. 
The study then turns to the Ravenscraig system and the causes of poor 
industrial relations in the period 1964-70. It concludes that Ravenscraig's 
strip mill technology allowed the unions to make wage comparisons with the 
higher paid groups in the south. As a result, Ravenscraig experienced further 
fragmentation of its collective bargaining arrangements which encouraged 
higher earnings, low productivity, and a large number of strikes. Management 
responded to these problems with a more uniform personnel policy operated 
through a more powerful Personnel Department, but this development was 
severely limited by the Group Labour Office. Therefore, with the exception 
of the maintenance Abnormal Condition Honey agreement, no other significant 
reform took place. 
Reform at Ravenscraig and its achievement are taken up in Chapter Eight, 
which begins with a description of management's strategy to involve the 
unions more in Ravenscraig's problems and to compress the domestic wage 
structure in which wide differentials were a major source of instability. 
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The creation of BSC's strip division and the arrival of a new group director 
gave Ravenscraig greater autonomy to pursue its own policy. To this end the 
influence of the Personnel Deparbment was further increased, and the office 
of full-time day conveners created. For maintenance workers, an important 
productivity agreement was concluded providing marked benefits. However, 
the most interesting question was the lack of an attempt by management to 
formally alter the production workers collective bargaining structure. In 
contrast to Corby, Ravenscraig's problem was the need to raise output per 
man in a situation where capacity had never been fully utilised. Therefore, 
to formally centralise the collective bargaining arrangements might have 
increased resistance and thereby the number of strikes. Consequently, manage-
ment relied heavily upon centralisation in their own and in the unions 
organisation, and upon informal coordination in collective bargaining. This 
strategy successfully compressed the domestic wage structure and helped 
reduce strike activity. 
In addition to the above conclusions, it was felt necessary to develop 
three hypotheses to explain within a systematic framework the process of 
industrial relations change at both works by refining job regulation theory 
( and to a lesser extent systems theory) as applied to factory level refo~ 
Collective bargaining arrangements are emphasised as a key variable in the 
process. The first and second hypotheses are developed in Chapter Five, to 
explain and predict the reaction and interaction of management and employee 
groups to changes in their awareness of their interests as they either react 
to a structural change or attempt to introduce a new one. The second 
hypothesis refines the first by adding greater precision to it. prediction~ 
The third hypothesis is not developed until Chapter Six, but it is more 
comprehensive and incorporates the other two by establishing the sequence 
or priority of interaction between the variables. Thus, the hypotheses are 
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sequential and are to be regarded as an integrated whole. All three 
hypotheses are tested again in Chapters Seven and Eight where similarities 
and differences with other work are again noted. 
The hypotheses can incorporate productivity bargaining because they 
are concerned with the problems of changing established industrial relations 
structures. Indeed, at Corby where the change in the collective bargaining 
arrangements was formal, productivity bargaining was used with some success. 
However, at Ravenscraig where the collective bargaining arrangements of 
production workers were not formally altered, formal productivity bargaining 
was not used. Nevertheless, the reform strategy was a success, and the 
predictions of the hypotheses were shown to be valid. 
The hypotheses are now stated and followed by two brief supporting 
examples to illustrate the theoretical conclusions of the thesis. 
Hypothesis 1 A change in one dimension of a collective bargaining 
structure can have sufficient power to alter behaviour in the direction 
desired; and equally a change in a party's awareness that its interests 
could be better served can lead to an alteration in a structural factor 
considered an obstacle to achieving its objective (or the creation of a new 
structural factor). 
Hypothesis 2 The more centralised, standardised and formal the character-
istics of the key structural variables (that is, collective bargaining 
arrangements, management and union organisations) the greater the power 
available to the respective leadersbips to secure reform. Equally leaders 
can use these structural variables to resist reform if perceived as 
detrimental to their own or their members interests. Conversely, if the 
key structural variables are informal and fragmented allowing power to be 
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devolved to fairly autonomous work groups, unions or managers, then a 
proposed reform will meet with greater resistance. 
Hypothesis 3 Once a party's strategy has been formulated the probability 
of success will be increased if a specified sequence of variable interaction 
is adhered to. For management the sequence runs from awareness, to changing 
the works technology, to management organisation, to the collective bargaining 
arrangements and finally to an alteration in union organisation and behaviour. 
For the union the transmission mechanism is weaker and runs from awareness, 
through union organisation, to the collective bargaining arrangements, and 
to changes in management organisation and behaviour. 
The first illustration deals with the second hypothesis and is taken 
from Chapter Eight. It highlights the conclusion that a high degree of 
centralisation, standardisation and formality in the key structural variables 
can put power into the hands of leaders. At Ravenscraig the centralised 
Personnel Department increased formality and standardisation in policy while 
the day conveners increased the production and craft workers' awareness of 
BSC's rationalisation plan and the implications for redundancy. Thus, both 
senior management and union leaders used the key structural factors to 
resolve differences between the various interest groups and thereby to 
facilitate reform. Another example is given in Chapter Five where the Corby 
steel works convener was able to achieve a similar change. On the other 
hand, examples are given from both Corby and Ravenscraig confirming the 
prediction of the hypotheses that where the key variables are informal and 
fragmented, and where power is devolved the leader's position is much weaker. 
This is seen in Chapter Five in discussing the Corby tube craftsmen and in 
Chapter Eight in examining the Coke Oven Branch at Ravenscraig. 
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The third hypothesis and the conclusions that follow from it is 
illustrated by reference to Chapter Six. Corby management initiated the 
CWPP against the background of the Corporation's rationalisation strategy. 
Lmprovement in Corby's productivity required greater integration of the work 
flow and changes in management's own organisation. In turn the strategy 
required new collective bargaining institutions and the setting up of a 
Trade Union Policy Group. Chapter Eight provides an example of the trans-
mission process operating the opposite way. Here the Ravenscraig Joint Craft 
Committee initiated a strategy, established a new bargaining unit, and 
changed the role of management. 
Finally, the hypotheses attempt to synthesize the more formal systems 
and job regulation theories with the subjective social action perspective. 
Chapters Five to Eight note the reactions of different groups to external 
changes and show the differences in their attitudes as being organised and 
controlled by the degree of centrality, standardisation and formality in 
the institutions of job regulation and their collective bargaining arrange-
ments. 
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Appendix One 
Calculations of the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme, Materials 
Usage Efficiency. 
Stage One 
Total Output 1,457 tonnes Product x 729 tonnes, Product y 728 tonnes 
Standard Input 1,720 tonnes Product x 810 tonnes, Product y 910 tonnes 
Actual Input 1,830 tonnes 
Datum Actual Yield 
Datum Standard Yield 
Datum MOE 
1,475 x 100 
1,830 
1,475 x 100 
1,720 
79.57. x 100 
84.51. 
Stage Two Monthly MOE 
79.57. 
84.51. 
947. 
Total Output 968 tonnes Product x 216 tonne. Product y 752 tonne. 
Standard Input 1,180 tonnes Product x 240 tonnes Product y 940 tonne. 
Ac tual Inpu t 1,220 tonnes 
Monthly Actual Yield 
Monthly Standard Yield 
Monthly MOE 
Stale Three 
Actual Input 
986 x 100 
1,220 
986 x 100 
1,180 
79.47. x 100 
821. 
79.47. 
827. 
96.91. 
1220 tonnes x 96.91. 
947. Datum MUE 
1,259 MOE 
Therefore, 1,259 - 1,220 tonnes • 39 tonnes of material laved that month. 
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Appendix Two 
Calculations of the Corby-Wide Productivity Programme, Stoppages 
Stoppage Hours in Datum Period x 100 
Actual Manned Hours in Datum Period 
Monthly Stoppage Allowance 
Datum Stoppage Percentage 
Actual Manned Hours x Datum Stoppage Percentage 
100 
Monthly Stoppage Allowance - Actual Hours Stopped = Hours Saved or Lost 
Per Month. 
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Appendix Three. 
; CL..:ORlilITlw.: C? ;,G?"=~ zm !.lade on the 'I",,:::l:TY S:':CO;;U DAY of ~, 
;;INETEZlf FIUi:Dili::D and sr:{':'Y Syrm between !.8SSl1.S. COLVILLES LTD., 
I'.AVE:;::>CRlIlG STEZI;::ORiCS, ;,:OTilEil.,i:::LL and HE£1lliSEli'l'AT:::73S OF 'l'!!E 1,~NTE1fArCE 
CR..\J!""I'3i.:EN employed II. t PO\'il~ SERVICE:; DZP;'u,'i'! ZIfT, R/,V;:;;;SCn.UG l'IORKS. 
WHEREAS a claim . was submitted by representa.tives of the I,Iaintenance 
Craftsmen for a revision of the sxistiIl8 abnormal condition money p~em;s 
made to Craftsmen for maintenance work carried out at the Power Station and 
for 'l:he inclusion of additional Plant areas and WIlEREAS ·the Employers 
took cognisance of the prevailing Plant conditions and WHEREAS at a 
meeting held on 22nd June, 196i agreement was reached. 
IT IS :,OW AGREED AS FOLLOWS 1-
1. That the following items, namely, Inside Boiler Drums, Economiser 
Bends and Superheater Header Chamber (all paid within 24 hours of 
Boiler coming off pressure) as specified in the agrsement made on 
24th April, 1959, shall be and are hereby cancelled. 
2. That the abnormal condition money allowance of ninepence (9d.) nett 
per hour shall be paid to craftsmen working on jobs inside and out-
si~e boilers 'above the Boiler P~el Floor level in the Power Station. 
This allowance ahall be subject to a minimum payment of four hours 
per occasion (maximum of two occaSions) in EJJr,f one working da;y. 
3. This agreetr.ent shall take effect On and from 6.00 a.m. Sunda;y, 4th 
June, 1967. 
4. Clause 3 however, shall be subject to the provisions of the Government'3 
Prices and Incomes Policy. 
FOR AND ON BSE.<\.LF OF TEE n,~LO)s?'S FOR AND ON BI:."F.ALF OF TEE um:orr 
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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT made on the THIRTIETH DAY OF OCTOBER, NINETEEN 
HUNDRED and SIXTY NINE between THE BRITISH STEEL CORPORATION, COLVILLES 
DIVISION, RAVENS CRAIG STEEL WORKS, MOTHERWELL and the IRON AND STEEL 
TRADES CONFEDERATION, (RAVENSCRAIG NO.1 BRANCH) on behalf of MELTERS 
employed at RAVENSCRAIG STEELWORKS 
WHEREAS the Employers and the Confederation undertook discussions 
to increase productivity and efficiency on the part of the Melters 
employed in the Open Hearth Shop and WHEREAS various discussions took 
place to determine the change in manning and methods of work and WHEREAS 
finally at a meeting held on the 30th October, 1969, agreement was 
reached. 
IT IS NOW AGREED AS FOLLOWS:-
1. The undernoted occupations, manning, consolidated datal and tonnage 
bonus rates shall be and are hereby cancelled. 
Consolidated Rates 
Manning 
per Shift Datal T/B Rates 
Occupation 3 Furnaces Rates d. eer ton 
Hot Metal Cold Metal 
Up to OVer Up to OVer 
4,OOOT 4,OOOT 2.400T 2,4ooT 
ls t Hand Mel ter 3 67/1.52 3.157 4.28 4.312 6,573 
2nd Hand Melter 3 57/7.90 1.828 2.946 2.389 4.523 
3rd Hand Melter 3 52/10.19 1.172 2.279 1.437 3.499 
4th Hand Me1ter 3 48/2.28 .593 1.612 .618 2.475 
Hot Metal Cold Metal 
Dipperman 1 37/4.34 .341 .445 
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2. The revised occupations, manning, consolidated datal and tonnage 
bonus rates of each Furnace crew shall be as set out hereunder. 
Consolidated Rates 
Manning 
per Shift Datal T/B Rates 
Occueation 3 Furnaces Rates d. eer ton 
Hot Metal Cold Metal 
Up to Over Up to Over 
4.000T 4,OOOT 2.400T 2.400T 
1st Hand Melter 3 82/4.92 3.559 4.825 4.858 7.405 
2nd Hand Melter 3 72/11.30 2.230 3.594 2.935 5.557 
3rd Hand Melter 3 68/1.59 1.574 3.060 1.983 4.828 
3. The existing tonnage bonus conditions and calculations in respect of 
Hot Metal working up to and including 4,000 tons per week and in excess 
of 4,000 tons per week and Cold Metal working up to and including 2,400 
tons per week and in excess of 2,400 tons per week are hereby continued 
and confirmed and paid for at the appropriate tonnage bonus rate of 
each occupation shown in Clause 2. 
4. Whereas all former duties associated with Open Hearth Furnaces shall 
continue to be performed by the revised complement it is clearly 
understood that the following specified duties are now held to be part 
of the overall job content to be undertaken by the revised manning 
i.e. Community Fettling; Addition of Alloys to Ladles; Re-railing of 
charging bogies on Furnace stage; Stacking of Aluminium; Using --,net 
for clearing floor; The taking of Temperature Dips and use of dipping 
equipment. 
5. This agreement has under the terms of current Government legislation 
been referred to the Department of Employment and Productivity and 
whereas following scrutiny clearance has been obtained the agreement 
shall be implemented from 6.00 a.m. Sunday, 8th February, 1970 and 
shall thereafter continue in force for a trial period of 6 months 
when the agreement shall then be subject to review by both parties. 
6. The rates referred to in Clause 1 and Clause 2 shall be subject to 
the increa.e awarded under the National Agreement dated 27th November, 
1969. 
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7. Except as amended or cancelled by this Agreement all conditions 
under existing agreements or arrangement shall be continued. 
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF 
THE BRITISH STEEL CORPORATION 
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF 
THE CONFEDERATION 
BRITISH STEEL CORPORATION 
STRIP MILLS DIVISION 
SCOTTISH GROUP 
RAVENSCRAIG WORKS 
Slab Provider 
4.1738 .002388 
Asst. Slab Provider 
3.8729 .02100 
Charger 
3.7828 .001971 
Straddle Car (Days~ 
3.7698 .002017 
Slinger 'A' 
3.6929 .001971 
Slinger 'B' 
3.6929 .001971 
Utility Man 
3.6929 .001971 
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SLAB YARD 
Appendix Four 
Stock Controller 
4.1738 .002388 
Slab Identifier 
3.8729 .001980 
TOng Slinger (N) 
3.6929 .001971 
Tong Slinger (C) 
3.6929 .001971 
Tong Slinger (S) 
3.6929 .001971 
Semi-portal Slinger 
3.6929 .001971 
• 0 
-.0 
"" 
Appendix Five 
Sho t ton 
Colville, Ltd. - Raven_craig Works 
Comparison of selected occupation in the Hot Strip Mills at 
Sho t ton , Spencer and Ravenscraig Works. 
Spencer 
Statement No.5 
Raven. crai g 
Occupation 
placing 
Gross shift earnings based on Gross shift earnings paid on Gross shift eaminas based on 
1671 T per shift. 1331 T per shift 749 T per shift. 
'Ferator Finishins Rollerman Screw Q2erator 
Gross Time Rate 2. 9. 9. Gross Time Rate 4.11. O. Gross Time Rate 4. 1. 1. 
Gross T.B. at 1671 T 4. 1. 1. Gross T. B. 207. 0.18. 2. Gross T.B. at 749 T 1.9.10. 
C. o. L. 0.12. 3. C.O. L. 0.12. 3. C.O.L. ~. 3. 
£.7.3.1. .£6. 1. 5. .£6. 3. 2 • 
==a==-===== --====---- ----------Top 
Heater Heater Heater 
Gross Time Rate 2. 1. 4 Gross Time Rate 4. 4. O. Gross Time Rate 3.11. 9. 
Gross T.B. at 1671 T 3. 6. 8. Gross T.B. at 20% 0.16.10. Gross T.B. at 749 T 1.10.11. 
C.O.L. 0.12. 3. C.O. L. 0.12. 3. C.O.L. ~. 3. 
.£6. O. 3. .£5.13. 1 • .£5.14·11 • 
===-====== -==-====-- ==-====-== 
CoUer Operator CoUer Qperator Coiler Q2erator 
Gross Time Rate 1.12. 9. Gross Time Rate 3.11. 9. Gross Time Rate 2.19.11. 
Middle Gross T.B. at 1671 T 2. 6. 3. Gross T.B. at 20% 0.14. 4. Gross T.B. at 749 T 1. 8. 1.-
C. O. L. 0.12. 3. C.O.L. 0.12. 3. C.O.L. 0.12. 3. 
,£4.11. 3. .£4.18. 4. .£5. O. 3 • 
==--~====== ----=---- ---------
Coi1er Bander CoUer Bander Coiler Bander 
Gross Time Rate 1. 8. 2. Gross Time Rate 2.10. 9. Gross Time Rate 1.19. 6. 
Gross T.B. at 1671 T 1.13. O. Gross T.B. at 20% 0.10. 2. Gross T.B. at 749 T 0.15. 4. 
Bottom C. O. L. 0.12. 3. C.O.L. 0.12. 3. C.O.L. Q:Jl. 3. 
.£3.13. 5. .£3.13. 2 • .£3. 7. 1 • 
=======-== 
=-==_m ____ 
---------
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